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INTRODUCTION
Silvia Allegrezza
This book aims to cast light on the effectiveness of defence rights in
criminal proceedings and on their justiciability in the European criminal
justice area. In particular, its main objective is to assess the existence
and the efficiency of judicial remedies that ensure the respect of those
rights in the light of the first three ‘Stockholm road map’ Directives, the
so-called ABC Directives. 1
This ambitious goal represented the very heart of a research
project financed by the EU Commission in 2015. 2 The study
intended to map the European dimension of judicial remedies in case
of breach of defence rights in six selected Member States (Belgium,
France, Germany, Luxembourg, Poland, and Spain). It finally aimed
to develop a European blueprint for the right to judicial review such
as protected by the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European
Convention on Human Rights. The research was leaded by the
University of Luxembourg and saw the priceless participation of
excellent scholars of five other universities representing the different
selected countries (University of Leuven, University of Poitiers,
University of Gerona, University of Saarbrücken, and University of
Gdansk).
1 The formula ‘ABC Directives’ makes reference to the Roadmap approved in
Stockholm on 30 November 2009 according to which the Commission ‘Work Plan’
urged the adoption of measures related to the following rights:
-Measure A: Translating and interpreting
-Measure B: Informing of rights and charges
-Measure C: Free legal advice and justice
-Measure D: Communication with relatives, employers and consulate authorities,
and
-Measure E: Special safeguards for vulnerable suspects or accused persons.
2 Action Grant ‘Effective defence rights in criminal proceedings: a European and
comparative study on judicial remedies’ (JUST/2014/JACC/AC/PROC/6583). More
information about the research project is available at <www.jurecripro.eu>.
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This project was designed explicitly as an integrate and
comparative research programme. In many respects, it resembles
an in-depth analysis of the European and national legal frameworks
together with a wider supranational reflection on basic features of
criminal justice. The analysis methodology was twofold: on the one
hand, we looked into national implementation of European
Directives with the aim to assess the completeness and correctness
of the national legislative process. On the other hand, we observed
the effectiveness of defence rights in its operational dimension, ie
how the law in the books was translated into concrete guarantees for
the individuals.
In that, it was intended to identify and describe which are the
existing convergences among national systems and, conversely,
which points of conflicts were emerging and acting as obstacles for
the effectiveness of defence rights. Among those variables, a special
place is given to the right to an effective legal remedy at the disposal
of the defendant in case of a breach of a procedural safeguard.
However, the research team soon realized that before analysing the
single Directives, some basic concepts would have been in need of
clarification. In particular, the meaning and scope of concepts such as
‘judicial review’ or ‘judicial control’ or ‘judicial authority’ tend to
vary enormously. These differences are relevant for the assessment on
the effectiveness.
In order to offer a complete overview, together with the
contributions strictly related to the project, this book indeed offers
to the reader an ample perspective of crucial topics such as the
concept of judicial authority and judicial control, legal remedies.
They are examined in a European and international dimension,
including an overview on the ECHR case law and on international
criminal law.
The defence rights in criminal proceedings have recently gained a
central role in the European debate on criminal justice. Several reasons
lie behind this long journey over troubled waters. In the not so distant
past, the primary interest of the European Union action in this area was
to promote security via criminal law harmonising the existing crimes or
introducing new enforcement tools, first and foremost the European
arrest warrant, via Framework Decisions, Directives or Conventions. All
of them aiming at strengthening the punitive response to criminal
activities against the Union or the Member States.
Furthermore, Member States have always been reluctant to
harmonise procedural safeguards in criminal law. Neglected and
rather ignored for several years, they have been later at the heart of a
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harsh debate among the Council that brought to the failure of the
proposal for a framework decision presented by the Commission in
2004. 3 Several reasons led to this failure. First and foremost, the
sceptical approach of the Member States toward a possible
harmonisation of procedural guarantees. Criminal justice lies indeed
at the very heart of the State action, being criminal punishment
traditionally linked to the State sovereignty. Secondly, criminal
justice systems differ technically and theoretically. Thirdly, a certain
reluctance to submit national rules on criminal justice to the control
of the Court of Justice emerged clearly from the declarations
submitted according to ex-Article 35 of the Treaty on European
Union (TEU) as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam. 4 Those days
are now firmly gone. Human rights in general, and procedural
safeguards in criminal proceedings in particular, receive a strong and
rooted protection at the European level, sometimes more intense than
what they seem to receive from national governments.
Procedural safeguards in criminal justice have proliferated in
different forms within the European legal order. First and foremost,
thanks to the daily work of the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR), shaping and strengthening the rights provided by the
Convention of 1950. A complex system of protection based on the
unprecedented power for the individuals to hold the States responsible
for the breaches of human rights. On that basis, the European Union
built up an autonomous system in which procedural safeguards in
criminal matters are strongly protected by several provisions of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR), now
equated to the Treaties as for its legal value. Several provisions
contribute in shaping a constitutional framework for criminal justice:
Article 47 CFR on the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial,
Article 49 with a reference to the need to respect the legality principle or
Article 50 on the ne bis in idem principle. Of utmost importance for our
topic is Article 48 on the presumption of innocence and in particular its
3 Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on certain procedural rights in
criminal proceedings throughout the European Union, COM (2004)328.
4 According to Article 35 TEU, as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam (ex Art.
K.7), the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to give preliminary rulings in criminal
matters was subject to a formal declaration by the single Member State to accept such
jurisdiction. Up to March 2008, only 17 Member States had made such declaration, see
<https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2008-09/art35_2008-09-
25_17-37-4_434.pdf>.
INTRODUCTION XIX
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
paragraph 2, paving the way for a constitutional basis of defence rights
within the European legal order. 5
Once the European competence to legislate in the field of
procedural safeguards was inserted in Article 82 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFUE), the adoption of the
Roadmap Directives was made possible. In less than six years, all the
measures decided in Stockholm were approved. These texts represent
only the first but extremely meaningful steps in highlighting a radical
change in perspective. The clear orientation of EU policies in the sense
of a stronger securitisation via criminal law has not been abandoned but
it is now combined, even though not entirely matched, with a stronger
attention to procedural safeguards.
Nevertheless, the texts of the Directives that were finally approved
show immediately a common weakness. The EU legislation is very poor
in describing the way national laws should guarantee the effectiveness of
these procedural safeguards. The single provisions state in very general
terms the right for the defendant ‘to challenge, in accordance with
procedures in national law, the possible failure or refusal of the
competent authorities to provide information’ 6 or to challenge ‘a
decision finding that there is no need for the translation of documents’ or
‘the possibility to complain that the quality of the translation is not
sufficient to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings’. 7 Only the
Directive on the right to a lawyer offers something more, providing that
‘Member States shall ensure that suspects or accused persons in criminal
proceedings, as well as requested persons in European arrest warrant
proceedings, have an effective remedy under national law in the event of
a breach of the rights under this Directive’. 8 The draft proposal was
more valiant, suggesting that an exclusionary rule should ban any
5 See S Peers, T Harvey, J Kenner, A Ward (eds), The EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights. A commentary (Hart Publishing, 2014) 1309-1349; R.
Mastroianni, O Pollicino, S Allegrezza, F Pappalardo, O Razzolini (eds), Carta dei
diritti fondamentali dell’Unione Europea (Giuffrè Editore, 2017) 934-971; M
Holoubek, G. Lienbacher (eds), GRC Kommentar (Manz Verlag, 2014).
6 Art. 8(2) Directive 2012/13/EU of 22 May 2012 on the right to information in
criminal proceedings [2010] OJ L142/1.
7 Art. 3(5) Directive 2010/64/EU on the right to interpretation and translation
[2010] OJ L280/1.
8 Art. 12(1) Directive 2013/48/EU of 22 October 2013 on the right of access to a
lawyer in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings, and on the
right to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate
with third persons and with consular authorities while deprived of liberty [2013]OJ
L294/1. An almost identical provision lies in Art. 10(1) Directive 2016/343/EU of 9
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evidentiary result obtained in violation of the right to access to a lawyer.
But reluctance toward harmonisation of evidence law and the hustles in
finding an agreement diluted this provision into a pilatesque one:
‘Without prejudice to national rules and systems on the admissibility of
evidence, Member States shall ensure that, in criminal proceedings, in
the assessment of statements made by suspects or accused persons or of
evidence obtained in breach of their right to a lawyer or in cases where a
derogation to this right was authorised in accordance with Article 3(6),
the rights of the defence and the fairness of the proceedings are
respected’. 9 A similar provision related to in the assessment of
statements made and evidence obtained in breach of the right to remain
silent or the right not to incriminate oneself can be found in the 2016
Directive on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of
innocence. 10
The leit motiv of the European Directives is nevertheless the referral
to national systems: the European legislator imposes to the Member
States to provide for the possibility to challenge the breach of those
rights but leaves to the national legislators the possibility to shape those
remedies ‘in accordance with procedure in national law’. No specific
reference is offered as to whether judicial control and potentially a
procedural sanction should intervene in order to ‘protect’ the defence
right and make it effective. Procedural autonomy is thus the tool for the
national systems to adapt their rules to the European duties. But what
reforms were adopted at national level in order to compel with the
European Directives? Did the Member States change their rules on
procedural remedies? And how? Are those remedies efficient in order to
grant the effectiveness of European procedural safeguards? And last but
not least, what is the role of the Court of Justice in assessing the
adequacy of national judicial remedies?
These questions lie at the very heart of this book and guided the
research team all along the two years. It intends also to fill a gap in the
existing literature, which mostly deals with procedural safeguards and
focalises exclusively on the content of the Directives, describing the
harmonisation required for the different procedural safeguards. The
topic of effectiveness was thus poorly treated and definitely not
exhaustively analysed.
This book is divided into four different but consequential parts that
March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence
and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings [2016] OJ L65/1.
9 Art. 12(2) Directive 2013/48/EU on the right to access a lawyer.
10 Art. 10(2) Directive 2016/343/EU on the presumption of innocence.
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are intended to complement each other offering a comprehensive picture
on the effectiveness of defence rights and judicial protection both at
European and internal level. The first part will present the European
Constitutional framework of the rights of suspects and defendants in
criminal proceedings. A description of the relevant provisions of the EU
Charter of fundamental rights, their origin and their relationship with the
ECHR will be followed by the analysis of the so-called ABC Directives
on which this book will focus: the Directive 2010/64/EU on the right to
interpretation; the Directive 2012/13/EU on the right to information and
the Directive 2013/48/EU 2013/48/EU on the right of access to a lawyer
in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings, and
on the right to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty
and to communicate with third persons and with consular authorities
while deprived of liberty. The choice to limit the analysis to these three
Directives is due to the fact that only for them national legislation and
accordingly case law of national courts are sufficiently developed. The
Directives more recently approved did not receive enough attention from
the national legislators at the time of our research.
The second part of the book will set the scene on judicial remedies
and discusses the concept, nature and scope of the right to an effective
judicial protection. It aims to identify common standards and differences
of this right analysing the meaningful case law of the Court of Justice of
the European Union, the European Court of Human Rights and the
International Criminal Court. These essays do not compose a
fragmented puzzle but rather offer different perspectives of the same
core problem: is there a convergence at European and international level
on what is to be intended as ‘effective judicial protection’? This section
also addresses critical issues rising from the need of effectiveness of
defence rights and judicial review with regard to vertical and horizontal
cooperation instruments in criminal matters, with a specific focus on the
European arrest warrant.
The third part of the book will provide a detailed analysis of six
selected criminal national systems. In particular, each chapter will focus
on one national system checking the impact of the ABC Directives
implementation and how this transposition reshaped the effectiveness of
defence rights. Specific attention is given to the national system of
judicial remedies and its effectiveness in offering a concrete protection
for the defendant in case of a breach of procedural safeguards. In this
light, this part of the book devotes itself to explain differences in
national laws and practices in the selected jurisdictions of Belgium,
France, Germany, Luxembourg, Poland and Spain.
The last part offers three comparative transversal studies elaborated
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by the members of the research group on the basis of the national
reports. These essays are focusing on crucial issues related to the
effectiveness of judicial protection of the ABC Directives and thereby
highlight commonalities and divergences in the structure of national
criminal justice systems throughout Europe.
A final conclusive analysis indicates a potential blueprint for
shaping the right to an effective judicial remedy at the European level.
Conditions and variables of a continental approach to this highly
technical topic will be described in the light of the comparative and
transversal studies.
This book and the entire research is the fruit of a collective effort.
Words of thanks go to all those who contributed to the success of this
research, participating in workshops and in the final conference, held in
Luxembourg in September 2017. First and foremost, we are extremely
grateful to our colleagues of partner universities for their valuable
contributions to the research. The national rapporteurs of the different
research teams brought to the project a much-needed depth of
understanding of national criminal justice systems.
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PART I
FROM THE CHARTER TO THE ABC DIRECTIVES:
AN OVERVIEW OF PROCEDURAL SAFEGAURDS
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

CHAPTER I
TOWARD A EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL
FRAMEWORK FOR DEFENCE RIGHTS
Silvia Allegrezza
TABLE OF CONTENTS: 1. European integration and criminal justice: A brief
history of a new alliance. – 2. Justice for Europe: Criminal law as a
tool to protect the EU financial interests. – 3. The age of realism:
Justice in Europe via police and judicial cooperation. – 4. Toward the
approximation of criminal law and criminal procedure: The Lisbon
Treaty. – 5. A European Constitutional framework for procedural
safeguards: Article 48(2) of the Charter of fundamental rights. – 6.
Disentangling the content of Article 48(2) of the Charter: The link
with the ECHR.
1. European integration and criminal justice: A brief history of a
new alliance
The impact of EU law on criminal law and criminal procedure is
a quite recent phenomenon. Criminal justice is a field in which
external influences are traditionally unwelcome. Neglected and
ignored for a long time, criminal justice lies currently at the very
heart of the European Union policies. Despite all the efforts of the
Member States to protect their sovereignty and maintain exclusive
competence on criminalization and prosecution of crimes, the EU
finally succeeded in abandoning the awkward cross-pillar character
and gaining the power to legislate in this field. European criminal
justice today is a work in progress, probably one of the areas in
which the EU is more active.
For decades, the European integration process has followed other
tracks, leaving criminal law and the related procedural rules
undisturbed. Reasons are several. Firstly, of normative nature: the lack
of an explicit EU competence in criminal matters, at least in the original
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
Treaties, 1 has precluded the adoption of specific legislative initiatives/
proposals at EU level. Cultural differences, mutual distrust, divergent
legal traditions did the rest. The awareness of the distance separating
the several national frameworks, the result of thousand-year old
traditions, led many to dismiss the possibility of a common criminal
justice. The cultural background of criminal lawyers and the autarchic
mould of criminal law and procedure have strengthened its resistance
to change. 2
It is out of our mandate to offer a complete historical detour on the
development of European criminal justice, 3 but it is nevertheless
important to understand how the EU has shaped its current legal
framework in this field. To this aim, we will sketch the main steps of
this recent but complex history, highlighting the role of the different
actors, the rationales behind certain proposals and the reasons of
political opponents that twarthed them. We will concentrate on those
European legal acts and case-law that are composing a ‘European
criminal procedure, with a specific focus on the constitutional
framework for defence rights in criminal jutice.
For a long time, the strongest influences on criminal procedure have
come from the other Europe, the large one of the Council of Europe. The
adoption of its fundamental text, the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR) and its subsequent Protocols, marked a major
milestone in the path towards a progressive harmonisation of the
different national systems. But first and foremost, for the first time in
1 The reference goes to the European Treaties previous to the Lisbon Treaty. A
limited competence in the area of justice and home affairs was introduced by the
Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 in the so-called third pillar, replaced by the area of
freedom, security and justice by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997.
2 In this sense A Bernardi, L’europeizzazione del diritto e della scienza penale
(Giappichelli, 2004) 1 ff. In his view, ‘it is not surprising that criminal law and
criminal lawyers have proved to be, respectively, the area and the category of
lawyers more reluctant to accept the primacy and the direct applicability of
european law and its impact on the national legal framework’.
3 JHA Vervaele, European Criminal Justice in post-Lisbon area of Freedom,
security and justice (ESI, 2014); E Herlin-Karnell, The Constitutional dimension of
European Criminal Law (Hart, 2012) 3 ff; A Klip, European Criminal Law
(Intersentia, 2016) 15 ff; V Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law (Hart, 2009); H Satzger,
International and European Criminal Law (C.H. Beck-Hart-Nomos, 2018 ) 46 ff.; F
Sgubbi, ‘Diritto penale comunitario’ in Dig. d. pen., vol. IV (Utet, 1990) 102; G
Grasso, Comunità europee e diritto penale (Giuffrè, 1989) and recently E Aprile,
Diritto processuale penale europeo e internazionale (Cedam, 2007).
4 PART I, CHAPTER I
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
history, individuals were granted the possibility to bring their case
directly to a supranational court. 4
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the first judicial
body of a continental dimension and with a continental competence,
has carried out a thorough work on the single legal systems, going at
the heart of their procedural rules, each time assessing their
compatibility with the guarantees enshrined in the Convention. 5
Although it proved reluctant to verify the abstract conformity of the
national legal systems, there were cases in which the Strasbourg Court
explicitly required the Contractings States to modify their internal
provisions and adapt them to the Convention’s principles. The
abundant case law of the Court of Strasbourg reveals how still today,
after decades of condemnations and censures by the supranational
judge, plenty are the frictions between the internal rules and the
conventional rights.
The European Union, on the other hand, seemed to be indifferent to
criminal justice, showing no interest in dealing with issues so closely
related to State sovereignty. It has been observed how criminal
proceedings have remained for long time immune from the birth and
development of the European Communities. The gist of the new
entities was entirely market oriented. The initiatives designed to
abolish borders were meant to foster commercial trade and exchanges,
the ‘free movement’; harmonisation was necessary with regards to
trademarks, patents and customs. Criminal justice laid at a sidereal
distance from this world.
What happened thereafter is well-known: geographical borders
have fallen down also for criminals; the globalisation of crime and of
the instruments it uses (not only money laundering, but also terrorism
and paedophilia, and cybercrime) have cancelled the distances and
blurred the function of territory as limit to States’ sovereignty.
Freedom of movement has favoured those forms of criminality that
are more able to profit from new spaces or from agreements with
similar phenomena in other countries. Furthermore, the European
Community itself has become the target of crime, in particular frauds,
4 For an historical overview, W Schabas, The European Convention on Human
Rights. A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2015) 3ff.
5 More specifically, on the prolific case law inherent to the right to a fair trial
under Article 6 of the Convention, W Schabas (n 4) 264 ff; S Trechsel, Human
Rights in Criminal Proceedings (Oxford University Press, 2006) 45 ff; K Ambos,
Internationales Strafrecht (C.H. Beck, 2006) 335 ff.
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corruption and extortions at the hands of its own officials. 6 This led to
the development of a European criminal law, but such relationship
between the national legal order and EU law requirements is not
always untroubled: it is marked by steps forward, regressions, new
impulses and new standstills.
Despite the indisputable successful results of the last decade, we are
still far from a real integration in this field. Especially when it comes to
criminal procedure, European integration has still to go through a real
rocky way. Even compared to substantive criminal law, the historical
steps of the development of a European criminal procedure are
different, at list for two reasons. Firstly, the ‘open’ structure of certain
offences – environmental crimes, for example – allows for an indirect
influence of EU law, either by means of interpretation (integrating or
disapplying the offence) or thanks to the impact of secondary
legislation on the constitutive elements of the offences (the concept of
‘waste’ , in our example). Secondly, the circumstance that
criminalisation is regarded as a means to protect effectively the
interests of the EU and as a way for Member States to discharge EU
obligations in this sense. 7 This is not the case for procedural rules:
these are more fragile, on the one hand, in terms of respect of the
legality principle in a strict sense, but stronger, on the other, as to
their resistance to external influences seeking to affect directly the
essence of the rule.
Only recently we are noticing a progressively direct impact of EU
legislation and case law on procedural law, even for crimes of purely
national character, lacking of any transnational dimension.
In analysing how and to what extent the EU has influenced criminal
procedure, offering a comprehensive picture goes beyond our present
objectives – and capacities. We will limit ourselves to recall the major
historical and cultural milestones, going more into detail only where
needed.
Despite the existing wealth of literature about European criminal
6 A remarkable example are the fraud allegations revealead by the Commitee of
Independent Experts, which lead to the collective resignation of the Santer
Commission in 1999. See Committee of Independent Experts, First Report on
Allegations regarding Fraud, Mismanagement and Nepotism in the European
Commission, 15 March 1999, < http://www.europarl.europa.eu/experts/
report1_en.htm>.
7 V Covolo, L’émergence d’un droit penal en réseau. Analyse critique du système
européen de lutte antifraude (Nomos, 2015) 39.
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law 8 and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, 9 very poor literature
is indeed dedicated to the European concept of ‘criminal defence’ and
its effectiveness. This book aims at contributing to fill that gap.
The first part of this chapter will sketch the history of the difficult
relationship between criminal justice and European law, highlighting
the use of criminal policy as a tool in protecting financial interests of
the European Union. It will list the different actors and instruments
approved in the last twenty years in order to grant justice for the
European Union, up to the approval of the European Prosecutor
Office. In the following paragraph, the issue of police and judicial
cooperation will be addressed with the aim of presenting how the EU
has developed into an area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ).
The primary actors such Europol and Eurojust will be analysed. As for
the approximation of criminal procedure, the fourth part will first
introduce the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty dealing with criminal
justice and their functional link with the principle of mutual
recognition. The last paragraph concludes on the real constitutional
framework of defence rights in European criminal justice: the meagre
but meaningful Article 48(2) of the Charter of fundamental rights (CFR).
2. Justice for Europe: Criminal law as a tool to protect the EU
financial interests
European law and criminal justice always had a turbulent
relationship. The very idea of a European interference in that sensitive
field posed a conundrum for national stakeholders and a dilemma for
scholars. Political obstacles linked to dangerous challenges to national
sovereignty, the lack of a specific legal basis in the Treaties and the
need for robust constitutional protections in criminal matters, lacking
at the EU level since very recently, contributed to the impasse.
8 A Klip (n 3) ; H Satzger (n 3) ; V Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law (Hart, 2009) ; J
Vervaele (n 3) ; S Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (Oxford, 2011); D Flore,
Droit penal européen (Larcier, 2014) ; K Ambos, European Criminal Law (Cambridge
University Press, 2018).
9 V Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law after Lisbon. Rights, Trust and the
Transformation of Justice in Europe (Hart, 2016); L Surano, G Vernimmen-Van
Tiggelen, A Weyembergh, The future of mutual recognition in criminal matters in
the European Union (Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2009); K Ligeti,
Strafrecht und strafrechtliche Zusammenarbeit in der Europäischen Union (Duncker
& Humblot, 2005).
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Nevertheless, pragmatism won over scepticism and criminal law
and criminal procedure finally became part of the European
integration process.
Dealing with criminal justice and the European Union, a first
crucial distinction should be made between instruments and organs
that deal with justice in Europe and others aimed at ensuring justice
for Europe. 10 In the first case, the policies are designed to ensure
security and justice to the European citizens within the continent’s
borders, dealing also with merely ‘internal’ situations; conversely, in
the second case, the objective is the protection of the EU interests
themselves. The European initiatives therefore move along these two
lines, the dominant trend being variable.
Historically the justice for Europe has prevailed for very pragmatic
reasons. The Union very soon realised that criminal law was needed in
terms of prevention and protection of breaches hitting the Union’s
financial interests. In the last decade of last century the EU became
aware of how costly were frauds committed against the EU common
budget, affecting directly the Union and indirectly all European
citizens. It has thus risen a need for justice for Europe, to protect the
financial interests of the community. To that end, a number of legal
instruments imposing on State parties to assimilate the protection
offered to community and national goods have been adopted. 11 These
have a direct impact on substantive criminal law, but no real impact
with respect to criminal procedure. Nevertheless, the problem of
States not complying with European obligation remains on the table,
as also the wide differences between the implementation measures
and concrete enforcement adopted by the member States. 12 Yet this
first wail brought to the adoption of a European Public Prosecutor
Office (EPPO) and seems to promise a future of deep harmonisation.
At the end of last century, a group of European experts, led by
Mireille Delmas-Marty, elaborated a project called Corpus Juris, a
10 V Covolo (n 8) 51.
11 In particular, Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on
European Union, on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests
[1995] OJ C 316/49, replaced by Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the
Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law [2017] OJ L 198/29.
12 A general overview of the current fragmented legal framework can be found in
the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council,
Protection of the European Union’s financial interests — Fight against fraud 2016
Annual Report, COM (2018) 383 final.
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sort of micro-codification of criminal law and procedure with the
specific aim to protect the financial interests of the EU. 13 It included
crimes to the detriment of the Union’s budget, which only indirectly
affect the Member States. The rationale is clear: a more limited scope
of action guarantees more chances of success to a prosecuting
authority, whose action goes side by side to the repressive activities of
the national authorities, as it reduces the risk of refusal by the single
national systems. The competences confined to the sole financial
crimes affecting the community interests were leading to a sectorial
process of criminal unification.
At procedural level, the major novelty was the proposal to introduce
a European Public Prosecutor Office (EPPO), a fully-fledged European
organ composed by national members under the direction of a common
European chief prosecutor and conferred with the power to prosecute
within the whole European judicial area. With the idea of a European
public prosecutor, a qualitative leap was achieved. Though sectorial –
being devoted to the sole protection of the financial interests – such
proposal was highly significant also for the years to come, for it
demonstrated the possibility of accomplishing the adoption of
common procedural rules.
A part of that idea finds its way into the Green paper on the criminal
protection of the financial interests and on the creation of a European
public prosecutor adopted at the end of 2001, 14 and subsequently is
given a formal consecration by the project on the European
Constitution. The failure of the latter does not put an end to the idea
of a centralised prosecutor at European level.
Both the Corpus Juris, the ensuing Green paper and, at last, the
European Constitution forewent the project of ‘socialization of the
Union through criminal law’ and of the EPPO as the key actor of the
regional criminal policy with a role of ‘super guardian’ of justice in
the European area. But the time was premature.
The creation of the European Public Prosecutor should have been
the main objective of the European Council in Tampere in October
1999, but the boldness of the idea caused great opposition on the part
of certain Member States, so that the meeting ended up with a strong
statement on the principle of mutual recognition and a small opening
13 M Delmas-Marty et al., Corpus Juris: Introducing Penal Provisions for the
Purpose of the Financial Interests of the European Union (Paris: Economica, 1997).
14 Green paper on criminal-law protection of the financial interests of the
Community and the establishment of a European Prosecutor, COM (2001) 715 final.
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to harmonization, but without any significant step forward as to the
creation of a common organ. The idea was proposed again within the
European Constitution, whose failure is well known. 15 Even weaker
was the Hague Programme, 16 ‘shy and generic’ in indicating the lines
of intervention, very distant from the possibilities opened by the
constitutional treaty. Nonetheless, the Corpus Juris remains an
essential reference for those wanting to trace back the path of
European criminal law: the subversive nature of the idea of a unique
prosecutor acting before national jurisdictions has spurred a debate –
the first in our subject – of continental dimensions. Many the
opponents, many the problems inherent in the project: the difficulties
in separating ‘prosecution’ from ‘jurisdiction’, the uncertainties on the
status of the European Public Prosecutor, on the rules on prosecution
and on the decision not to prosecute between the European prosecutor
and national systems, on the law of evidence.
Despite all these obstacles, the strength of the initial idea evolved
and survived several turmoils until the final approval in 2017. 17 This
was made possible because the Lisbon Treaty now offers a solid legal
basis and recognises the possibility of enhanced cooperation among
certain member States, allowing ambitious policies in criminal matters
to have a chance to succeed. 18 One prosecutorial agency for one
single legal area, provided with a limited but relevant material scope,
as defined by the Directive 2017/1371 of 5 July 2017 on the fight
against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal
law. 19
15 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe [2004] OJ C 310/1.
16 The Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security and justice in the
European Union [2004] OJ C 53/1.
17 Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing
enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s
Office [2017] OJ L 283/1. For a detailed analysis, L Bachmaier Winter (ed), The
European Public Prosecutor’s Office. The Challenges Ahead (Springer, 2018); W
Geelhoed, L H Erkelens, A Meij (eds), Shifting Perspectives on the European
Public Prosecutor’s Office (Asser Press, 2018); V Mitsilegas, F Giuffrida, Raising
the bar? Thoughts on the establishement of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office,
CEPS research report, No 2017/39; F Giuffrida, The European Prosecutor’s Office:
Kind without Kingdom?, CEPS research report, No 2017/03.
18 According to Article 86 TFEU, ‘[i]n order to combat crimes affecting the
financial interests of the Union, the Council, by means of regulations adopted in
accordance with a special legislative procedure, may establish a European Public
Prosecutor’s Office from Eurojust’.
19 On the material scope of the future EPPO, see K Ligeti, ‘Approximation of
Substantive Criminal Law and the Establishment of the European Public
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Nevertheless, the original idea of a ‘single office’ operating in a
‘single legal area’ has been partially overruled by a collegial complex
structure, as a compromise to overcome political hurdles. However,
the metamorphosis of this initial idea, from how it was reflected in
the first Proposal for a Regulation on the establishment of an EPPO20
to how it is transposed into the adopted version of the Council
Regulation, 21 reveals scarce harmonisation of procedural rules related
to evidence gathering 22 and defence rights. 23 Harsh criticism has
been raised for the lack of specific rules on defence rights. Scholars
have questioned the extent to which the poor provisions of the EPPO
Regulation, entirely relying on the approximation made by the
Stockholm roadmap directives recently approved, can effectively
guarantee fundamental defence rights. 24
The inherently weaker position of the accused is indeed particularly
Prosecutor’s Office’ in F Galli, AWeyembergh, Approximation of substantive criminal
law in the EU: The way forward (Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2013) 73; S
Peers, ‘The European Communities Criminal Law Competence: the plot thickens’
(2008) 33 European Law Review 399; Sicurella, ‘Some reflections on the need for
a general theory of the competence on the European Union in criminal law’ in Klip
(ed) Substantive criminal law of the European Union (Maklu, 2011) 233; R
Sicurella, ‘EU competence in criminal matters’ in V Mitsilegas, M Bergström, T
Konstadinides (eds), Research handbook on European criminal law (Edward Elgar,
2016) 49 ff. It has been observed that ‘Article 86 TFEU is phrased in an ambiguous
way when it comes to the legal basis for harmonising the material scope of
competence of the EPPO. Its predecessors were much clearer and did include an
explicit reference to substantive criminal law as forming part of the EPPO
regulatory package. However we cannot conclude that the legislator has deliberately
excluded substantive harmonisation from the phrasing under Article 86’, see J
Vervaele, ‘The material scope of competene of the European Public Procsecutor’s
Office: a harmonised national patchwork?’ (2015) Centro Studi di Diritto Penale
Europeo, <http://dirittopenaleeuropeo.it/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Vervaele-2014-
15.pdf>.
20 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Public
Prosecutor’s Office, COM (2013)534 final, of 17 July 2013.
21 Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing
enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s
Office [2017] OJ L 283/1.
22 Art 37 Regulation 2017/1939.
23 Art 47 Regulation 2017/1939.
24 N D Abad, ‘The legal framework of the protection of fundamental rights of the
supected or accused in transnational proceedings under the EPPO’ in L Bachmaier
Winter (ed), The European Public Prosecutor’s Office. The Challenges Ahead
(Springer, 2018), forthcoming; V Mitsilegas, F Giuffrida, ‘The European Public
Prosecutor’ s Office and Human Rights, in W Geelhoed, L H Erkelens, A Meij
(eds), Shifting Perspectives on the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (Asser
Press, 2018).
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sensitive in transnational proceedings, as the disadvantage compared to
the prosecution is even more accentuated with regard to information and
available means, especially when it comes to evidence gathering. An
appropriate consideration for the rights of the defence is thus essential
in view of the growth of a common, European culture of procedural
rights, where a homogeneous protection of defence rights is
guaranteed. 25 This is why the effectiveness of defence rights as
protected by the European directives within national jurisditcions will
be crucial also to ensure the fairness of the EPPO investigations and
prosecutions.
3. The age of realism: Justice in Europe via police and judicial
cooperation
When it comes to justice in Europe, the key of European policies in
criminal matters always has been the police and judicial cooperation,
areas in which the Union, since the Treaty of Maastricht, and mostly,
the Treaty of Amsterdam, could benefit from new actors and new
instruments.
Since the Council of Tampere, judicial cooperation as a tool to grant
justice in Europe should have developed along two interconnected lines:
mutual recognition and freedom of movement of judicial decisions, on
the one hand, and harmonization of criminal law and procedure on
the other. The strengthening of that political and juridical notion of
‘area of freedom, security and justice’, objective of the whole
European criminal policy, is pursued via the strengthening of judicial
cooperation. 26 The harmonisation of criminal procedure and defence
rights always stayed in the backstage.
The field of police cooperation has seen the birth of a number of ad
hoc organisms. First, the European Police Office (Europol) and its
database, 27 in conjunction with the Schengen Information System,
created with the Schengen Agreement and then extended to the whole
25 See S Allegrezza, A Mosna, ‘Cross-border criminal evidence and the future
European Public Prosecutor. One step back on mutual recognition?’, L Bachmaier
Winter (ed), The European Public Prosecutor’s Office. The Challenges Ahead
(Springer, 2018) forthcoming.
26 E Herlin-Karnell, ‘Recent Developments in Substantive and Procedural EU
Criminal Law –Challenges and Opportunities’ in M Bergström, A Jons-son Cornell
(eds), European Police and Criminal Co-operation (Hart Publishing 2014) 33.
27 Convetion based on Article K.3 TEU creating a European Police Office
(Europol Convention) of 26 July 1995 (OJ 27 November 1995 n. C 316).
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Community thanks to the corresponding Convention. 28 More recently,
the landscape of transnational police enforcement is enriched by the
Joint Investigation Teams (JITs), a real investigative police force that
can be created by two or more Member States in order to fight
transnational crimes. Whreas Europol lacks of investigative powers
and can hardly be defined as a European police agency, the JITs may
enjoy concrete enforcement powers as allowed by national
legislations. These teams, composed by agents of different
nationalities, are conferred with true investigative powers also beyond
the borders of the single Member State. 29 Nevertheless, these bodies
remain at the margins of the internal criminal procedure: they
represent forms of cooperation limited in time and in scope, more or
less formalised, allowing the different police authorities to directly
exchange information relevant for the investigations. The issues
brought about by the JITs are, rather, the existence of a dual legal
basis 30 of such teams or the judicial control over their activities.
Their effect on harmonisation of procedural law is merely indirect,
forcing the police forces to a continuous confrontation of different
rules and practices.
As for judicial cooperation, the new actor was introduced in 2002
with the creation of Eurojust, a collegial judicial cooperation unit
with the aim to reinforce the fight against trans-border crime by
consolidating cooperation among judicial authorities. Eurojust is
28 Agreement of Schengen of 14 June 1985 on the gradual abolition of checks at
their common borders, the implemented by the Convention implementing the
Schengen Agreement of 19 June 1990 [2000] OJ L 239/1.
29 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on joint investigation teams
[2002] OJ L 162/1. On the structure and powers, see the Guidelines on the use of
the Joint investigation team, <https://rm.coe.int/16806f720a>. M Plachta, ‘Joint
Investigation Teams. A New Form of International Cooperation in Criminal
Matters’ (2005) 13 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice
284; C Rijken, G Vermeulen (eds), Joint Investigation Teams in the European
Union: From Theory to Practice (Asser Press, 2006); J Kapplinghaus, ‘Joint
Investigation Teams: Basic Ideas, Relevant Legal Instruments and First
Experiences in Europe’ (2006) 134 th International Training Course Visiting
Experts ’ Papers, <https: / /www.unafei .or. jp/publicat ions/pdf/RS_No73/
No73_07VE_Kapplinghaus2.pdf>; M Helmberg, ‘Eurojust and Joint Investigation
Teams: How Eurojust Can Support JITs’ (2007) 2 ERA-Forum 245; J Monar,
‘Common Threat and Common Response? The European Union’s Counter-
Terrorism Strategy and its Problems’ (2007) 3 Government and Opposition 292.
30 C Rjken, ‘Joint Investigation Teams: principles, practice, and problems.
Lessons learnt from the first efforts to establish a JIT’ (2006) 2 Utrecht Law
Review 99, 105.
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composed of national prosecutors, magistrates, or police officers of
equivalent competence, detached from each Member State
according to their own legal systems. Anticipated by Pro-Eurojust
in 2000, the new judicial cooperation unit was introduced by
Council Decision 2002/187/JHA as a consequence of the the
attacks of 9/11 in the USA. 31 It serves the goal of facilitating
judicial cooperation among the Member States authorities when
they need coordination to fight against transnational crimes such as
terrorism, trafficking in human beings, drug cartels. In 2008 a new
Council Decision was adopted in order to further reinforce ‘the
operational capabilities of Eurojust, increase the exchange of
information between the interested parties, facilitate and strengthen
cooperation between national authorities and Eurojust, and
strengthen and establish relationships with partners and third
States’. 32 The Lisbon Treaty formally recognised the judicial
cooperation unit and its crucial role ‘to support and strengthen
coordination and cooperation between national investigating and
prosecuting authorities in relation to serious crime affecting two or
more Member States [...]’. 33 But Eurojust architecture and powers
are still a work in progress. The next step will be the approval of a
new Regulation ‘to increase information exchange between
Eurojust and Member States while ensuring an adequate level of
data protection’ together with governance reforms, including the
creation of a new Executive Board, an effective democratic
oversight to ‘be guaranteed through regular reporting to the
European Parliament and national parliaments’. 34 The Regulation
also establishes ‘institutional, operational and administrative
relations with the new European Public Prosecutor’s Office to
ensure complementarity and synergies’. 35
Besides European actors, judicial cooperation has been completed
31 Council Decision 2002/187/JHA of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with
a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime [2002] OJ L 63/1.
32 Council Decision 2009/426/JHA of 16 December 2008 on the strengthening of
Eurojust and amending Decision 2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust with a view to
reinforcing the fight against serious crime [2009] OJ L 138/14.
33 Art 85 TFEU.
34 Eurojust Press Release, ‘EU lawmakers reach political agreement on a new
Regulation for Eurojust’, 19 June 2018.
35 See the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation
(Eurojust), COM (2013) 535 final.
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by the adoption of several instruments such as the European Arrest
Warrant, 36 the European investigation order, 37 the European
protection order. 38 Furthermore, several framework decisions and
directives were adopted in the field of mutual recognition of final
decisions and financial penalties, 39 transfer of prisoners, 40 freezing
orders 41 and confiscation. 42 As for the latter, the Council just reached
a political agreement for a ‘single regulation covering freezing and
confiscation orders, directly applicable in the EU’ with the aim to
‘resolve the issues linked to the implementation of the existing
instruments, which have led to insufficient mutual recognition’. 43
The cornerstone of judicial cooperation in criminal matters is
indeed the principle of mutual recognition, the golden rule elaborated
in the Council of Tampere and confirmed by the Hague Programme
of 2004. 44 In a nutshell, it means that all judicial decisions in
36 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European
arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States - Statements made
by certain Member States on the adoption of the Framework Decision [2002] OJ L
190/1.
37 Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3
April 2014 regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters [2014]
OJ L 130/1.
38 Directive 2011/99/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13
December 2011 on the European protection order [2011] OJ L 338/2.
39 Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA of 24 February 2005 on the
application of the principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties [2005] OJ L
76/16.
40 Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the
application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters
imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the
purpose of their enforcement in the European Union [2008] OJ L 327/27.
41 Council Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA of 22 July 2003 on the execution
in the European Union of orders freezing property or evidence [2003] OJ L 196/45.
42 The composite legal framework includes the Council Framework Decision
2006/783/JHA on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to
confiscation orders [2006] OJ L 328/59, the Directive 2014/42/EU of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the freezing and confiscation of
instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union [2014] OJ L 127/39
that partly modified the Framework Decisions 2001/500/JHA and 2005/212/JHA.
43 Council of the EU Press realese, ‘Freezing and confiscation: Council agrees
general approach on the mutual recognition of freezing and confiscation orders’, 20
June 2018.
44 On mutual recognition L Klimek, Mutual Recognition of Judicial Decisions in
European Criminal Law (Springer, 2017); A Souminnen, The Principle of Mutual
Recognition in Cooperation in Criminal Matters (Intersentia, 2011).
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criminal matters taken in one EU country will normally be directly
recognised and enforced by another Member State.
The Hague programme stressed out the need to complete the
implementation of the principle of mutual recognition extending it to
‘judicial decision in all phases of criminal procedures or otherwise
relevant to such procedures, such as the gathering and admissibility of
evidence, conflicts of jurisdiction and the ne bis in idem principle and
the execution of final sentences of imprisonment or other (alternative)
sanctions. 45
The implementation of the principle in criminal matters still
represents, however, a challenge. Initially developed within the internal
market, mutual recognition originally aimed to support the free
movement of goods. Where no harmonised rules exist at European
level, ‘products lawfully marketed in one Member State can be sold in
other Member States regardless of complying or not with the national
technical rules of these Member States’. 46 Thus, for mutual recognition
to work, the decision adopted by the authority of a different Member
State can enter into another national system only if it is recognized as
similar. Such similarity should build or strengthen mutual trust, the
essential precondition for mutual recognition. The existence of a
relation of confidence is the key for the good functioning of simplified
mechanisms; in the absence of such condition, any policy relying on
mutual recognition is inexorably deemed to fail.
In criminal matters, however, mutual trust is not a given fact: it is
more a hard-earned objective than a sound prerequisite from which to
move forward. The most useful and effective technique to this aim
seems to be that of increasing the harmonization of national laws, of
introducing at European level those ‘minimum rules’ needed to ensure
‘the compatibility of the applicable rules in the Member States, to the
extent necessary improve [...] cooperation’. 47 In other words, mutual
recognition requires an understanding of cooperation that cannot be
achieved without a minimal normative harmonization. Only sharing
certain basic principles can dispel the fears against a decision coming
from outside, because common values pave the way to the recognition
of that decision as homologous. Without this passage, mutual
45 The Hague Programme (n 19).
46 Commission Background document, Public consultation on the possible
revision of the Mutual Recognition Regulation (EC) No 764/2008, <http://
ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/16827>.
47 Art.82 §2 TFEU.
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recognition can only mean the enforcement of an order imposed from
above, not the action of someone who feels to be contributing to the
development of an area of justice of continental dimension.
The relationships between mutual recognition and harmonisation,
however, have always been troublesome. It suffices to consider that in
European criminal policy the principle of mutual recognition has often
been regarded as a true, easy and cheap alternative to harmonization.
As for the latter, the EU went through a real rocky way, especially
when it comes to procedural safeguards. It took several years and a
new Constitutional framework composed by the Nice Charter and the
Lisbon Treaty to overcome the opposition of several Member States
and reach a common agreement on minimum standards. Those
provisions deserve a detailed analysis. Inverting the chronological
order, we will first describe the Treaty provisions related to criminal
justice and then analyse Article 48 CFR as the real Constitutional
basis for defence rights.
4. Toward the approximation of criminal law and criminal
procedure: The Lisbon Treaty
The real turning point for the EU toward the harmonization of
procedural safeguards in criminal proceedings has been the approval
of the Lisbon Treaty. After the failure of the Constitution project, the
European Union did not renounce to amend the treaties. Once the flag
and the hymn out of the picture, in 2007 the Member States finally
approved the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on
the functioning of the European Union (TFEU). They both provide
for provisions related to criminal justice and in particular to defence
rights.
As for the TEU, of utmost importance is Article 3, according to
which ‘the Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security
and justice’ to be achieved, inter alia, ‘preventing and combating of
crime’. An ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ implies that
criminal justice in Europe becomes a priority of European policy, with
the need to combine punitive choices together with the due respect of
fundamental rights. Where the former received so much attention
from the EU – producing a ‘massive imbalance of the European
criminal policy at the expense of the defendant’ 48 - the latter were
48 H Satzger (n 3) 129.
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left to the CJEU case law and to the non-binding provisions of the
Charter. It was thus pivotal for the EU to finally confer a specific role
to the Charter within the EU legal framework. It is with Article 6
TEU that the Union formally recognises the rights, freedoms and
principles set out in the CFR, ‘which shall have the same legal value
as the Treaties’. Despite the introduction of some limit, such as the
fact that the ‘Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of
the Union as defined in the Treaties’.
Article 6 TUE solves once for all the disputes related to the role of
the CFR in the EU legal order: those provisions shall be treated as
founding, Constitutional principles of the Union. It also clarifies the
relationship between first the CFR and the ECHR, stating ‘the rights,
freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be interpreted in
accordance with the general provisions in Title VII of the Charter
governing its interpretation and application’, which make explicit
reference to the ECHR provisions as interpreted in the ECtHR case
law. To close the circle, Article 6 TUE provides that ‘the Union shall
accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’. The troubled path toward the
accession is still an ongoing process and its description would exceed
our mandate but it is worth notice how the creation of the AFSJ
reshaped the face of criminal justice in Europe. 49
More detailed provisions on procedural safeguards are offered by
the TFEU. After recalling that ‘the Union shall constitute an area of
freedom, security and justice with respect for fundamental rights’,
Article 67 TFEU highlights the need to respect ‘the different legal
systems and traditions of the Member States’. In the same light,
Article 82(2) confirms that the approximation exercise ‘shall take into
account the differences between the legal traditions and systems of the
Member States’. A common goal, indeed, but respectful of national
49 On the rocky way toward the accession, see S Allegrezza, ‘The Interaction
between the ECJ and the ECtHR with Respect to the Protection of Procedural
Safeguards after Lisbon: the Accession of the EU to the ECHR’ in K Ligeti (ed),
Toward a Prosecutor for the European Union (Hart Publishing 2013) 905; P
Layden, T Lock, ‘Protection of Fundamental Rights post Lisbon: The Interaction
between the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Convention on
Human Rights and National Constitutions’ (FIDE National Report for the United
Kingdom) (2011) University of Edinburgh, School of Law, Working Papers 34-35; J
Morijn, ‘After Opinion 2/13: how to move on in Strasbourg and Brussels?’ (2015)
eutopia law, <http://eutopialaw.com/2015/01/05/after-opinion-213-howto-move-on-
in-strasbourg-and-brussels/>.
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diversities. The principle of procedural autonomy hence receives a
formal acknowledgement from the Treaties. 50
Article 82 and Article 83 TFEU, related to the harmonization of
criminal law and criminal procedure, need to be read in the light of
Article 67 TFEU. This last provision recalls Articles 3 and 6 TUE and
stipulates that the Union shall constitute an area of freedom, security
and justice with respect for fundamental rights and the different legal
systems and traditions of the Member States. Moreover, it reads that
the Union shall endeavour to ensure a high level of security through
measures to prevent and combat crime, racism, xenophobia, and
through measures for coordination and cooperation between police and
judicial authorities and other competent authorities, as well as through
the mutual recognition of judgments in criminal matters and, if
necessary, through the approximation of criminal laws.
Article 82 TFEU directly focuses on criminal procedure and sets up
the basic principles of harmonization of law in this field as a tool to
build up an area of freedom, security and justice. As a result, the
AFSJ reflects broader trends in European integration, namely the
increasing scope of European law combined with a more flexible
model of integration. 51 Article 82(1) TFEU builds the bridge between
approximation and mutual recognition stating that ‘judicial
cooperation in criminal matters in the Union shall be based on the
principle of mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions
and shall include the approximation of the laws and regulations of the
Member States’. 52 Mutual recognition 53 is indeed intended to be the
50 For a detailed analzsis of the legal concept, D U Galetta, Procedural Autonomy
of EU Member States: Paradise Lost? (Springer, 2010). On the consequences in
criminal matters, see infra Part II, Chap I.
51 G Grasso, R Sicurella, V Scalia, -Articles 82 – 86 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union and Environmental Crime’ (2015) Report,
<https://efface.eu/articles-82-%E2%80%93-86-treaty-functioning-european-union-
and-environmental-crime>; E Herlin-Karnell (n 28) 33.
52 Art 82(1) TFEU.
53 On the concept and the problems related to the principle of mutual recognition,
see among others V Mitsilegas, ‘The Constitutional Implications of Mutual
Recognition in Criminal Matters in the EU’ (2006) 10 Common Market Law
Review 1277-1311; G Corstens , ‘Criminal Justice in the post-Lisbon era’ (2011) 13
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 23; M J Borges, ‘Mutual
Recognition and the European Court of Justice: The Meaning of Consistent
Interpretation and Autonomous and Uniform Interpretation of Union Law for the
Development of the Principle of Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters’ (2010) 18
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 99; M Möstl, ‘Preconditions and limits of
mutual recognition’ (2010) 47 CMLRev 432 ff; G de Kerchove, A Weyembergh, La
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main motor of European integration in the field of criminal justice, 54
whereas approximation of criminal law and criminal procedure seems
to play an ancillary role. The reference to mutual recognition is
twofold: first, it means that judicial cooperation ‘shall include’ law
approximation, i.e. EU criminal policy cannot be limited to measures
of mutual recognition. 55 Second, approximation seems instrumental to
mutual recognition and serves the goal of mutual recognition,
especially (but not exclusively) ‘criminal matters having a cross-
border dimension’. 56
Despite the wording could suggest a limited field of application, i.e.
covering only those crimes having a cross-border nature or proceedings
where more than one Member State is involved, it is hardly conceivable
an harmonization of criminal procedure related to evidence or defence
rights but limited by the cross-border dimension of the crime or of the
specific criminal case. As it has been correctly highlighted, the EU
powers in the field of criminal procedure ‘would be rendered
meaningless if they could only be applied in cross-border proceedings,
given that Article 82(1) TFEU already sets out a power to regulate
criminal proceedings with a purely cross-border nature’ . 57
Furthermore, nothing in the directives approved until now points at
excluding non-transnational cases and the first decisions of the Court
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) seem to justify an ample
interpretation of the EU competence in this field. 58
reconnaissance mutuelle des decisions judiciaires pénales dans l’Union européenne
(Editions de l’Universite de Bruxelles, 2002); G L Tosato, ‘Some remarks on the
limits to mutual recognition of judicial decisions in CML and criminal matters
within the European Union’ (2002) 4 Rivista di diritto internazionale 869; D
Spinellis, ‘Mutual recognition and harmonisation of national criminal legislations.
The example of the European Arrest Warrant’ in G Grasso, R Sicurella (eds), Per
un rilancio del progetto europeo. Esigenze di tutela degli interessi comunitari e
nuove strategie di integrazione penale (Giuffrè, 2008) 457; G Vernimmen-Van
Tiggelen, L Surano, ‘Analysis of the future of mutual recognition in criminal
matters in the European Union’ , <http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/
index_en.htm>; M Bargis, ‘La cooperazione giudiziaria penale nell’Unione europea
tramutuo riconoscimento e armonizzazione: analisi e prospettive’ (2012) 4 Rivista di
diritto processuale 914; J B Banach-Gutierrez, ‘Globalised Criminal Justice in the
European Context – How Theory meets Practice’ (2013) 1-2 New Journal of
European Criminal Law 154; E Smith, ‘Running before we can walk? Mutual
recognition at the expense of fair trials in Europe’s area of freedom, justice and
security’ (2013) 1-2 New Journal of European Criminal Law 82.
54 V Mitsilegas (n 9) 154.
55 S Peers (n 9) 666.
56 Art 82(2) TFEU.
57 S Peers (n 9) 670.
58 Case C216/14 Covaci EU:C:2015:686.
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Thanks to Article 82 TFEU, criminal procedure falls thus within the
competence of the European Union, 59 representing an explicit and
express – albeit functional – EU competence. 60 ‘Functional’ means
that in order to justify new measures of approximation, to be ‘adopted
in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure’, 61 the EU
should highlight how the differences in national procedural rules are
hindering judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The successful
exercise of this test should support and justify the European initiatives
to adopt measures of approximation. In this light, harmonization of
criminal procedures is not a goal in itself but it rather serves mutual
recognition to be effective. In other words, ‘co-operation by
approximation merely complements the principle of mutual
recognition’. 62 The rationale behind it is obvious: the closer the
systems are, the smoother judicial cooperation will be.
To this aim, Article 82(1) TFEU first identifies specific areas in
which approximation measures are required, such as (a) mutual
recognition throughout the Union of all forms of judgments and
judicial decisions; (b) prevention and settling of conflicts of
jurisdiction between Member States; (c) the training of the judiciary
and judicial staff; (d) facilitation and cooperation between judicial or
equivalent authorities of the Member States in relation to proceedings
in criminal matters and the enforcement of decisions. For those areas,
the ordinary legislative procedure always applies and there is no
possibility for the Member States to rely on the so-called ‘emergency
brake’, as it is the case for the competence set up by paragraph 2 of
Article 82 TFEU. 63
But the real legal basis to harmonise criminal procedure is provided
by Article 82(2) TFEU that confers to the EU the power to establish
minimum rules ‘by means of directives adopted in accordance with
the ordinary legislative procedure’, with the abovementioned
59 A Klip (n 3) 248.
60 V Mitsilegas (n 10) 156.
61 This is the main political achievement of the Lisbon Treaty in the field of
criminal justice, see A Klip (n 3) 21 ff; S Peers (n 9) 665 ff.; Unanimity survives
only to increase the areas of criminal procedure that would deserve approximation
of law, see Art 82(2) TFEU.
62 H Satzger (n 3) 128.
63 In those cases, if a Member State considers that a draft directive ‘would affect
fundamental aspects of its criminal justice system, it may request that the draft
directive be referred to the European Council’ and, as a conquence suspend the
legislative procedure.On the emergency brake, see S Peers (n 9) 664-668.
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possibility for the Member States to trigger the emergency brake. These
measures shall concern (a) the mutual admissibility of evidence between
Member States; (b) the rights of individuals in criminal procedure; (c)
the rights of victims of crime; (d) or any other specific aspects of
criminal procedure which the Council has unanimously identified in
advance by a decision. 64 Article 82(2)(b) TFEU clearly represents the
specific legal basis of all the directives approved within the realm of
the Stockholm Roadmap.
Before focusing on the defendant’s rights, it is worth to define what
‘minimum rules’ means. The first approach might be a ‘qualitative’
definition of minimum rule as referred to the level protection granted
by EU law. In this light, the first reference goes to the rich case law
of the ECtHR as developed in the last decades: 65 the level of
protection of a fundamental right as defined by the ECHR and its
case law represents the ‘minimum’ level to which the EU law shall
obey. Neither the EU nor the Member States can go below those
standards, as confirmed by Article 6 TUE and Article 52 CFR. But in
principle, the EU is allowed to go beyond (it indeed went further in
certain fields) 66 and develop higher standards of protection.
Moreover, Article 82(2) states that the adoption of the minimum rules
‘shall not prevent Member States from maintaining or introducing a
higher level of protection for individuals’. In order to respect the
limits of a shared competence and of national constitutional identities,
the EU should accept national differences. However, as the Melloni
doctrine made very clear, 67 when EU standards have been adopted,
the CJEU is not keen to tolerate national guarantees that might
frustrate the primacy of Union law and thereby hinder judicial
cooperation.
The second meaning of ‘minimum rules’ might refer to the limits of
the European interference in such a sensitive field. ‘Minimum’ means
limited to the functional rationale as set up by the Treaties: the EU
should justify the approximation of procedural rules only to the extent
64 Art 82(2) TFEU.
65 M Böse, ‘Kompetenzen der Union auf dem Gebiet des Straf- und
Strafverfahrensrechts’ in M Böse (ed), Europäisches Strafrecht (Nomos, 2013) 149,
174.
66 An example thereof is Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in
criminal proceedings [2010] OJ L 280/1. See infra Part I, Chap II.
67 C-399/11 Melloni EU:C:2013:107. LFM Besselink, ‘The parameters of
Constitutional conflicto after Melloni’ (2014) 39 European Law Review 531.
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that this policy might support judicial cooperation in criminal matters
and serve, as we have seen, the principle of mutual recognition.
However, mutual recognition of decisions in criminal matters ‘can
operate effectively only in a spirit of trust in which not only judicial
authorities, but all actors in the criminal process consider decisions of
the judicial authorities of other Member States as equivalent to their
own’ 68. In this way, the European legislator ‘attempts to address the
consequences of the perceived moral distance inherent in mutual
recognition via the harmonization of criminal procedural law’. 69 The
reference to mutual trust helps to reduce the excessive functionalism
of the mutual recognition rationale but might hinder the potential
control on the respect of legality of the legal basis and subsidiarity of
the adopted measures. In other words, strengthening mutual trust is a
fluid un-objective parameter, unable to sustain the scrutiny of the
Court of justice on the exercise of EU competence in this field. 70
Nevertheless, it is important to overcome functionalism adding
references to the Kern of criminal justice, which is the protection of
the individuals against the use and misuse of State coercive powers.
In the end, the Lisbon Treaty has made mutual recognition as
dependent from the existence of mimimum rules rather than the
contrary.
Strengthening mutual trust is a two-steps process: it first implies ‘to
trust the adequacy of other Member States’rules, but also trust that those
rules are correctly applied’. This second step links mutual trust to
procedural safeguards, because only a specific set of detailed rules on
the protection of the procedural rights and guarantees can increase
mutual trust. However, the European constitutional framework
composed by the Charter and the ECHR seems not enough. The
Union should, by means of Directives, make these rights concrete and
effective. Only a collective effort, involving EU and national
legislators in adopting and transposing EU directives, national and
European courts in accepting a European Constitutional dimension of
defence rights despite national diversity will contribute to this will. In
this light, effective remedies play a prominent role.
68 See Recital 6 Directive 2013/48/EU on the right of access to a lawyer in
criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings, and on the right
to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with
third persons and with consular authorities while deprived of liberty [2013] OJ L
294/1.
69 V Mitsilegas (n 10) 157.
70 Ibid.
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In an EU oriented perspective, defence rights are clearly the crucial
starting point as they often represent the major obstacles to a smooth and
rapid cooperation among the national judicial authorities. 71 With the
aim of standardizing minimum procedural safeguards for the suspect
and the defendant in criminal proceedings, the EU thus intended to
grant a common level playing field to support judicial cooperation
and facilitate mutual recognition. The provision at stake targets for the
first time the suspect/defendant as the one deserving protection and
represents the specific legal basis of all the directives approved within
the realm of the Stockholm roadmap. After several initiatives to
protect the victims’ rights and increase the right their right to
compensation, 72 the EU finally recognizes the need to add minimum
rules on defense rights in the European toolbox.
Despite its crucial role, this provision received scarce attention from
legal literature. As for the content, it implies the power to harmonise
whatever suspect’s right related to fair trial, with the only exception
of the ne bis in idem, for which the Treaty offers a specific provision
under Article 82(1)(b) TFEU. 73 Some stressed how its application
should be considered as an ultima ratio, as if the EU could intervene
only once every other possible solution has failed and should be
limited to those provisions that directly grant a right to a suspect. 74
Accepting that Article 82(2)(b) TFEU might justify the approximation
of provisions indirectly confer a procedural right would mean to
increase the EU competence to almost all procedural rules. This
argument is certainly solid as far as direct legislative power of the
Union is concerned but seems shortsighted as for the indirect effects
of EU procedural safeguards: the entire national criminal procedure
should be interpreted in the light of granting effectiveness to the EU
minimum standards, including direct and indirect conferral of defence
rights.
71 The case law of the CJEU shows several clashes among the different national
systems when it comes to defence rights. For instance C-399/11 Melloni; Case C-168/
13 PPU Jeremy F. EU:C:2013:358.
72 Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA of 15 March 2001 on the
standing of victims in criminal proceedings [2001] OJ L 82/1, replaced by Directive
2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012
establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of
crime [2012] OJ L 315/57; Directive 2004/80/EC of 29 April 2004 relating to
compensation to crime victims [2004] OJ L 261/15.
73 S Peers (n 9) 671.
74 H Satzger (n 3) 128-129.
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Even though the EU competence in the field of criminal procedure
is still limited, the definition the rights of individuals in criminal
procedure as a priority area under Article 82(2)(b) TFEU has been
welcomed as un unprecedent development in EU criminal law,
allowing the Union to adopt secondary legislation in the field of
fundamental rights in the field of criminal justice. 75
Since 2002, right after the approval of the Framework Decision on
the European Arrest Warrant, the Commission started working on the
proposal for a framework decision on the rights of the defendant that
was finally presented in 2004. 76 Despite its modesty as for the
contents, Member States never found an agreement to turn the
proposal into EU law. Politicians fear ‘far-reaching implications for
the integrity of their domestic criminal justice systems’. 77 But that
proposal still represented the starting point on which the current
directives are based. It already included the specific rights that later
on were made object of single directives: right to interpretation and
translation, right to information, right to a lawyer, right to legal aid. 78
As it has been highlighted by some authors, 79 integration in the
AFSJ can therefore be seen to be a system for organising difference,
since the limited nature of its competence, the increased capacity for a
‘multi-speed’ Europe and above all the variety of tools and techniques
aim, not to construct a complete pan-European legal regime, but rather
to increase cooperation and inter-operability between national legal
system and, thereby, manage variation within a single coherent system.
5. A European constitutional framework for procedural safeguards:
Article 48(2) of the Charter of fundamental rights
As previously mentioned, the CFR has been approved in Nice in
2000, but its legal value has been fully recognised only with the
75 V Mitsilegas (n 10) 153 ff.
76 Proposal for a council framework Decision on certain procedural rights in
criminal proceedings throughout the European Union, COM (2004) 328 final.
77 On the negotiations, V Mitsilegas (n 10) 155 ff.
78 See the contributions in the collective book C Araguena Fanego (Ed), Los
derechos procesales penales en la Union Europea Garantías procesales en los
procesos penales en la Unión Europea (Lex Nova, 2007).
79 V Covolo (n 8) 153 ff. More generally on the origins and the constitutional
implications of the EU legal pluralism, M. Delmas-Marty, Towards a Truly Common
Law: Europe as a Laboratory for Legal Pluralism (Cambridge University Press,
2007); J Habermas, La Constitution de l’Europe (Gallimard, 2012) 100 ff.
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Lisbon Treaty. 80 Despite the efforts to limit the impact of this catalogue
of fundamental rights for the EU, as stated by Article 51(2) CFR, 81 the
Charter represents the real Constitutional basis of any European policy,
especially in the field of criminal justice.
In a legal culture of liberal criminal law that is firmly committed to
the legality principle and devoted to fair trial and judicial review, there is
little space for the exercise of punitive powers without a solid
Constitutional background. The answer to this need is offered by
several provisions of the Charter explicitly dedicated to criminal
justice, in particular its Chapter VI, where the criminal law and
procedure play a main role. 82
The most relevant provision is Article 48(2) Charter EU, according
to which ‘Respect for the rights of the defence of anyone who has been
charged shall be guaranteed’. Despite its concise formulation, the
provision is in fact a very meaningful since it triggers new
perspectives and future developments of European criminal law. It
presents several interrelations with other provisions of the Charter that
protect the rights of the defence under different circumstances and
with various nuances. The first one is Article 47 (2), according to
which ‘everyone shall have the possibility of being advised, defended
and represented’ and is applicable to every kind of proceedings, be it
a civil, administrative or criminal one. Article 48 (2) should therefore
be read as a specification of the rights of defence for the particular
field of criminal proceedings. Such an interpretation is suggested by
the different personal scope of the two provisions: while Article 47
(2) deals with the rights of defence enjoyed by ‘everyone’, the
provision at issue refers only to the accused.
As a first approximation, it could then be argued that Article 48 (2)
is of little significance, as its scope of application is limited to stricto
sensu criminal proceedings. This seems to be the current stance of the
Court of Justice, according to which Article 48 ‘protects the
80 G De Búrca, ‘After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Court of
Justice as a Human Rights Adjudicator’ (2013) 20 MJ 168, 173.
81 According to the provision, the CFR ‘does not establish any new power or task
for the Community or the Union, or modify powers and tasks defined by the Treaties’.
On this topic, see M Condinanzi in R Mastroianni, O Pollicino, S Allegrezza, F
Pappalardo, O Razzolini, Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione europea
(Giuffrè, 2017) 1085 ff.
82 For a detailed analysis of the said rights, S Peers, T Hervey, J Kenner, AWard
(eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights : a commentary (Hart Publishing, 2014)
1197 ff.
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presumption of innocence and rights of the defence of which must be
enjoyed by a person ‘who has been charged’ and is therefore not
applicable in administrative proceedings’. 83 However, there are two
main reasons suggesting that it would be hasty to maintain such a
drastic interpretation.
Firstly, the notion of ‘accused’ should be construed in the light of
the case law of the ECtHR, with particular reference to its broad
understanding of ‘criminal charge’. The explicit reference to the
ECHR in the Explanations relating to the Charter calls for an
extensive interpretation of the notion of ‘accused’, from which
follows, as a result, the applicability of Article 48 (2) to all those
proceedings, which are very common in European law, that are
formally administrative but have, in substance, a punitive nature. 84 In
this regard, many crucial fields for the EU come into consideration,
such as competition, the financial market and the European Banking
Union. 85 Their effectiveness, indeed, depends largely on the existence
of strong sanctioning powers, which turns them precisely into quasi
criminal systems.
Secondly, the CJEU itself has explicitly referred to the Engel
criteria 86 in the cases Bonda and Spector 87 noting that ‘observance of
the rights of the defence is a general principle of EU law which
applies where the authorities are minded to adopt in respect of a
person a measure which will adversely affect him’. 88 Furthermore, in
other fields such as competit ion, the Court of Justice has
acknowledged that the notion of accused under Article 48 (1) CFR
depends on the nature and the degree of severity of the penalties
likely to be imposed, thus finding the presumption of innocence to be
applicable also in that field. 89
The second interrelation is with Article 41 CFR, which is concerned
with the right to good administration. Both the right of every person to
83 Case C-419/14 WebMindLicences Kft. V Nemzeti EU:C:2015:832, para 83.
84 V Manes in V Zagrebelsky, P De Sena, S Bartole (eds), Commentario alla
convenzione europea per la tutela dei diritti dell’uomo e delle libertà fondamentali
(CEDAM, 2012) 334.
85 Dubus S.A. v France App no 5242/04 (ECtHR, 11 June 2011).
86 Engel and others v the Netherlands App no 5100/71, 5101/71, 5102/71, 5354/
72 and 5370/72 (ECtHR, 8 June 1976) para 82.
87 Case C-489/10 Bonda EU:C:2012:319, para 36; Case C-45/08 Spector Photo
Group NV,Chris Van Raemdonck v Commissie voor het Bank-, Financie- en
Assurantiewezen (CBFA) EU:C:2009:806, para 42.
88 Case C-419/14 WebMindLicenses Kft. v Nemzeti, para 84.
89 Case T-11/06 Romana Tabacchi v Commission EU:T:2011:560, paras 129-143.
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be heard before any individual measure which would adversely affect
him and the right of every person to have access to his file, while
respecting the legitimate interests of confidentiality and of
professional and business secrecy, listed under that provision belong
also to the rights of defence. Accordingly, when the procedural
guarantees ensured under the right to a good administration overlap
with those afforded by Article 48 CFR, Article 41 shall be regarded
as lex specialis in relation to the administrative proceedings at
European level. 90 As to the national level, Article 48 (2) is
conversely fully applicable, provided that the scope of Article 41,
unlike the former provision, is expressis verbis limited to the actions
of European institutions, and thus does not cover proceedings before
national authorities. 91
In sum, Article 48 (2) CFR is applicable when there is a criminal
charge, either from a formal or substantive perspective, that allows to
qualify an individual as an ‘accused’. This first approximation
highlights a potential danger: what is the effect and the scope of the
provision at hand with reference to the pre-trial stage? Should the
applicability of Article 48 (2) be ruled out in relation to those phases
of the proceedings occurring before the formal acquisition of the
status of accused? Certain scholars, especially English-speaking ones,
take this view. 92 The English version, admittedly, confines the
personal scope of the provision to ‘anyone who has been charged’.
Nevertheless, a different reading, adopted also in the case law of the
Court of Strasbourg, seems preferable: with reference to Article 6
paragraphs 1 and 3, the ECtHR clarifies that those rights are
guaranteed to every person who has been charged within the
autonomous meaning of the Convention. A ‘criminal charge’ comes
into play from the moment an individual has received an official
notification by the competent authorities of an allegation that he has
committed a criminal offence or from the moment when his situation
has been substantially affected by actions of the authorities upon the
suspect that he has committed a criminal offence. 93
The autonomous interpretation adopted by the ECtHR thus extends
90 H P Nehl in S Peers, T Hervey, J Kenner, A Ward (eds), The EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights : a commentary (Hart Publishing, 2014) 1290.
91 W Weiß, ‘Human Rights in the EU: Rethinking the Role of the European
Convention on Human Rights After Lisbon’ (2011) 7 European Constitutional Law
Review 64, 88-90.
92 For instance H P Nehl (n 93) 1291 ff.
93 Deweer v Belgium App no 6903/75 (ECtHR, 27 February 1980) para 42-46;
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the relevance of such guarantees to the pre-trial phase, in which the
individual is particularly vulnerable, in as far as the fairness of the
trial is likely to be seriously prejudiced by an initial failure to comply
with the rights of defence in the previous stages. 94 The same
approach is followed by the Court of Justice in relation to anti-trust
administrative proceedings, in which the rights of the defence are
relevant also in the investigation stage before the notification of the
‘charge’. 95
Nevertheless, several State Parties limited considerably the right of
access to a lawyer in the preliminary phase, making it often contingent
upon a deprivation of liberty. 96 For this reason, the Directives play a
fundamental role: they extend the applicability of their provisions to
both ‘suspects and accused’, thus also to the preliminary investigations
phase, thereby confirming the importance of the substantial notion of
charge developed in the ECtHR case law.
However, there are some differences among the Directives as to the
exact moment starting from which they become applicable ratione
temporis. Such discrepancies are, in part, minimal and rather
irrelevant: while Article 1 (2) Directive 2010/64/UE on the right to
interpretation and translation and Article 2 (1) Directive 2013/48/UE
on the right of access to a lawyer provide that the relevant defence
right is applicable from the moment in which a person is ‘made
aware by the competent authorities of a Member State, by official
notification or otherwise, that [he or her is] suspected or accused of
having committed a criminal offence’, Article 2 (1) Directive 2031/
13/UE on the right to information simply refers to the moment when
‘persons are made aware by the competent authorities of a Member
State that they are suspected or accused of having committed a
criminal offence’. It seems more interesting to notice that only the
provision under Article 2 (1) Directive 2013/48/UE specifies explicitly
that the application of the right is not contingent upon the deprivation
of liberty of the suspect. Considerably different is the provision under
Eckle v Germany App no 8130/78 (EctHR, 15 July 1982) para 73; McFarlane v
Ireland App no 31333/06 (ECtHR, 10 September 2010) para 143.
94 Foti and others v Italy App nos 7604/76, 7719/76, 7781/77 and 7913/77
(ECtHR, 10 December 1982) para 52; Imbrioscia v Switzerland App no 13972/88
(ECtHR, 24 November 1993) para 36; Dvorski v Croatia App no 25703/11 (ECtHR,
20 October 2015) para 76.
95 Case C-105/4 P CEF City Electrical Factors BV and CEF Holdings Ltd v
Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging EU:C:2006:592, § 50; V Covolo (n 8) 435 – 437.
96 E Cape, Z Namoradze, R Smith, T Spronken, Effective Criminal Defence in
Europe (Intersentia, 2010) 558 ff.
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Article 2 Directive 2016/343/UE on the presumption of innocence,
which generally foresees that the rights therein are applicable ‘at all
stages of the criminal proceedings, from the moment when a person is
suspected or accused of having committed a criminal offence, or an
alleged criminal offence’. Such a wording, vague and uncertain, is
nevertheless needed to protect the rights in question and avoid
potential abuses and undue postponements of their applicability. It
seems, however, that, thanks to the substantive notion of ‘suspect’ and
‘accused of the case law of the ECHR, it is viable to interpret such
provision in accordance with the other Directives.
As to the final moment until when the rights provided are
applicable, the provisions of the different Directives in principle
coincide. An identical rule is set forth in Directives 2010/64/UE,
2012/13/UE and 2013/48/UE: the corresponding rights are relevant
‘until the conclusion of the proceedings, which is understood to mean
the final determination of the question whether the suspect or accused
person has committed the offence, including, where applicable,
sentencing and the resolution of any appeal’. 97 At last, according to
Directive 2016/343/UE the rights provided are guaranteed ‘until the
decision on the final determination of whether that person has
committed the criminal offence concerned has become definitive’. 98
As to the scope ratione materiae, the rights of the defence are
applicable in any criminal proceedings and in the proceedings for the
execution of a European Arrest Warrant, exception made for the
Directive on the presumption of innocence that does not cover the
latter procedure.
More importantly, the rights of the defence, as confirmed by the
said Directives 99 and in accordance with the ECHR, are applicable
irrespective of the type of offence in issue. In this age of global terror
threat, the ECtHR has reminded that it is not possible to derogate the
fair trial rights when faced with terrorism crimes. 100 Nevertheless, the
97 Art 1(2) Directive 2010/64/EU; Art 2(1) Directive 2012/13/EU of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the right to information
in criminal proceedings [2012] OJ L 142/1; Art 2(1) Directive 2013/48/EU.
98 Art 2 Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of
innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings [2016]
OJ L 65/1.
99 See infra.
100 Ibrahim and others v the United Kingdom App no 50541/08, 50571/08,
50573/08 and 40351/09 (ECtHR, 13 September 2016) para 252.
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ECtHR itself has authorized a lowering of such guarantees on grounds
of public interest 101 in so far as such restrictions do not cause
disproportionate difficulties to the enjoyment of the rights of the
defence and do not extinguish the very essence of those rights.
Although the wording of Article 48 (2) seems to have natural
persons as main reference, its guarantees are in fact applicable also to
legal persons when they are involved in punitive proceedings. It is
easier to reach such finding when referring to the English version
referring to ‘anyone’. 102 With regards to the Directives, on the other
hand, it is not clear whether they also apply to legal persons or not,
as the term ‘person’ is used without any further specification.
Directive 2016/343/EU on the presumption of innocence, however,
explicitly limits its scope only to natural persons. 103 The existence of
a precise restriction to the personal scope of application in only one
of the Directives suggests that all the others, in which such limit does
not appear, may be invoked also by legal persons.
6. Disentangling the content of Article 48(2) of the Charter: The
link with the ECHR
The wording of Article 48 (2) recalls the main international treaties
for the protection of human rights, notably Article 11 (1) of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 14 (3) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and, first and
foremost, Article 6 (3) ECHR. This last provision plays an essential
role when determining the substantive content of Article 48 (2), as
indeed confirmed by the Explanations relating to the Charter which
assert that the two rules are the same. 104
Article 48 (2) is to be regarded as one component of the right to a
fair trial under Article 47 CFR, to the effect that a violation of the rights
of the defence entails at the same time also an infringement of the
fairness of the trial. More particularly, it constitutes the backbone of
that right: by ensuring the principle of equality of arms, it affords the
necessary instruments to the defence, which is, precisely, the
structurally weak party in the balance of powers of criminal
proceedings.
101 Jalloh v Germany App no 54810/00 (ECtHR, 11 July 2006) para 97.
102 H P Nehl (n 93) 1292; W Weiß (n 94) 190.
103 Art 2 Directive 2016/343/EU.
104 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] JO C303/29.
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In order to define what the rights of the defence are, it is necessary
to refer to the wording of Article 6 (3) which lists the specific procedural
guarantees that fall within such notion. The notion of ‘defence’ in
criminal matters is sometimes self-referential, as if a definition for
such a clear concept were redundant. The truth is, however, that an
effective protection of the defence requires to specify its single
components, which are necessarily more than one, as shown by the
use of the term ‘rights’ in Article 48 (2) CFR. In order for a trial to
be ‘fair’, in light of the reference to Article 6 (3), the accused shall
have the right:
‘(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands
and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his
defence;
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his
own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal
assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so
require;
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to
obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf
under the same conditions as witnesses against him;
(e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot
understand or speak the language used in court.’
The reference to Article 6 (3), however, is not limited to the
wording of such provision, but rather extends also to the interpretation
given to it by the Court of Strasbourg. This can be deduced from the
Explanations relating to the Charter, where it is clarified that Article
48 (2) CFR ‘has the same meaning and scope as the right guaranteed
by the ECHR’. As a result, the protection afforded to the rights of the
defence under Aricle 48 (2) encompasses also those guarantees that
are not explicitly provided in Article 6 (3) ECHR, but which the
ECtHR in its rich case law has read into such provision, in
accordance also with Article 6 TUE. Therefore, when defining what
are ‘the rights of the defence’, the list laid down in Article 6 (3) is
not exhaustive because in several occasions the ECtHR has read into
that scanty provision a much wider set of guarantees by filling the
loopholes and adopting an evolutive interpretation of the Convention
in order to adjust it to the challenges of contemporary criminal justice.
In this connection, the Court of Strasbourg, taking in consideration
the object and purpose of Article 6 taken as a whole, has acknowledged
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the right to be present at the trial as the precondition for an effective
exercise of the rights laid down at letters c), d) and e) of Article 6 (3)
ECHR. 105
Also the right to remain silent, despite not being expressly
mentioned in Article 6 of the Convention among the rights of the
defence, has been acknowledged by the ECtHR as a standard that lies
at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure. The rationale for this
right is to protect the accused against improper compulsion by the
authorities and, thus, avoid miscarriages of justice. More in particular,
the right not to incriminate oneself entails the prohibition for the
prosecution to obtain evidence through methods of physical or
psychological coercion in defiance of the will of the accused. In this
sense, the said right is strictly linked to the presumption of innocence
under Article 6 (2) of the Convention. 106
The specific referral to the ECHR in the Explanations relating to the
Charter reveals the age of latter instrument: at the time of its adoption,
legal instruments dealing with the rights of the defence were scarce in
EU legislation. This gap has now been filled through the adoption of
several directives protecting the rights of the accused that represent
the laboured implementation of Article 82 (2) TFUE and of the so-
called Roadmap adopted in Stockholm in 2009. 107 By virtue of
Article 82 (2) TFUE, the legal basis of the said directives, the
European legislator has set minimum rules to harmonize of the rights
of individuals in criminal proceedings in order to facilitate mutual
recognition of criminal judgments and decisions. The directives on
procedural rights, whose content will be discussed hereinafter,
represent today a reference point for procedural guarantees and should
be regarded as an integral part of the scope of protection afforded by
Article 48 (2) CFR.
Aside from this functional aspect, the legislation on procedural
safeguards represents an important step forward also from a substantive
105 Colozza v Italy App no 9024/80 (ECtHR, 12 February 1985) para 27; F.C.B. v.
Italy App no 12151/86 (ECtHR, 28 August 1991) para 29; T. v Italy App no 14104/88
(ECtHR, 12 October 1992) para 26; Belziuk v Poland App no 23103/93 (ECtHR, 25
March 1998) para 37; Sejdovic v Italy App no 56581/00 (ECtHR, 1 March 2006)
para 81; W Schabas (n 4) 316.
106 Saunders v the United Kingdom App no 19187/91 (ECtHR, 16 December
1996) para 68; Heaney and McGuinness v Ireland App no 34720/97 (ECtHR, 21
December 2000) para 40; W Schabas (n 4) 319.
107 The Stockholm Programme - An open and secure Europe serving and
protecting citizens [2010] OJ C 115/1.
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 33
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
viewpoint thanks to the introduction of a ‘non-regression clause’ echoing
Article 53 CFR. Such clause is meant to preclude any interpretation of the
directives’ provisions which has the effect of lowering the level of
protection of fundamental rights by limiting or derogating the rights
and procedural guarantees that are ensured under the ECHR, the
Charter and other relevant provisions of international law or the law of
any Member State which provides a higher level of protection. 108 As
to its scope, it is well known that the rights enshrined in the ECHR
represent the minimum standard that all State parties must ensure,
though they remain free to afford a higher level of protection. 109 The
same applies also for the EU, as clarified by Article 52 (3): the EU is
free to provide more extensive protection when adopting legislation
that implements the rights of the Charter. However, since the UE is not
yet a contracting party to the ECHR, its institutions are not bound to
comply with its provisions. This is where the above-mentioned
directives become relevant: for the moment being, they set the rules for
national enforcement authorities, but in the future, they will represent
the backbone of an eventual European criminal proceeding.
108 B De Witte in S Peers, T Hervey, J Kenner, AWard (eds), The EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights : a commentary (Hart Publishing, 2014) 1524.
109 S Trechsel (n 5) 333.
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THE ABC’S OF THE INTERPRETATION
AND TRANSLATION DIRECTIVE
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1. Introduction
Perhaps nothing is more fundamental to the right to fair trial in the
criminal realm than the right of a defendant to understand what is the
nature of the process against him, the evidence against him and the
outcome of the trial. While this may seem like an obvious right, one
that should bare little debate, in reality it can prove to be an elusive
right fraught with ambiguity and at times difficult to ensure.
One of the fundamental freedoms of the Union law is the free
movement of people. With this, almost by necessity, comes the
free movement of crime, and accused persons who do not speak
the language of the investigation and prosecution of their alleged
crimes.
There are over 250 indigenous languages on the European
continent, 1 with 24 official languages recognized by the European
1 Meirion Prys Jones, ‘Endangered Languages and Linguistic Diversity in the
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Union. 2 This ease of movement has also lead to a greater awareness of
the difficulties faced by individuals who are suspected or accused of
committing crimes within the European criminal justice area. The
concept that that a defendant is entitled to interpretation and or
translation in Europe is not new and has existed within the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) for nearly seventy years. 3
More recently it has developed since 2009 with the European Union’s
Directive 2010/64/EU, wherein the Union has attempted to codify and
regularize the very fundamental rights of accused and suspected
individuals, which are key components of the right to a fair trial.
This paper will examine the development of the rights to
interpretation and translation in Europe, paying particular mind of
Directive 2010/64/EU, and the resulting jurisprudence of the Court of
Justice of the European Union, asking whether recent developments
represent progress for criminal defendants, or rather, are minor steps
which provide little real help in clarifying what can be a most, a
strange, Kafkaesque process, particularly if one does not understand
or can communicate in the language of the court.
2. Translation and Interpretation at the European Court of Human
Rights
Since the adoption of the ECHR in 1951, the primary source of
protection for fair trial rights in Europe has been Articles 5 and 6 of
the Convention. Both of these articles have been interpreted by the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as including the right to
language services for those who cannot communicate in the language
of the criminal proceedings.
Article 5 ECHR provides process protection for those who have
been arrested or detained, whether or not their arrest results in a
trial, with Article 5(2) providing that: ‘Everyone who is arrested
shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands,
of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him’. 4 While
European Union’, European Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Education
(Brussels 2013) 41.
2 Official website of the European Commission, Office of Translation, <https://
ec.europa.eu/info/departments/translation_en> accessed 1 March 2018.
3 Art. 6 para 3 (a) and (e) ECHR.
4 Art. 5 (2) ECHR.
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Article 5 protects individuals who have been deprived of their liberty,
Article 6 affords procedural safeguards aimed at guaranteeing a fair
criminal trial.
Article 6(3)(a) provides the right to ‘be informed promptly, in a
language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him,’ and in subsection (e) the right to ‘have
the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak
the language used in court’. 5
The ECtHR has, over the years, delineated the extent to which the
right to interpretation (and translation) applies. 6 The Court pays
particular attention to the ultimate goal of those rights, verifying
whether the interpretation assistance provided is ‘such as to enable the
defendant to have knowledge of the case against him and to defend
himself, notably by being able to put before the court his version of
the events’. 7 Consideration is thus given to the specific circumstances
of the individual case, notably whether ‘the nature of the offence and
communications to the accused by domestic authorities (...) are
sufficiently complex as to require detailed knowledge of the language
used during the trial proceeding’. 8 In Cuscani v United Kingdom and
Amer v Turkey, the Court applied a holistic, rather than a technical
approach, imposing a positive obligation on the domestic courts to
ensure that the right is adequately protected. 9
The case law has melded these rights over time, bringing the right
from difference sources to an identical place, as today the right covers
the moment of contact with the police until the termination of the
case, either by judgment, through to the final appeal.
5 Art. 6 ECHR.
6 Ladent v Poland, 11036/03 [2008] ECHR 212 (18 March 2008) para 59-63 (the
translation protections of Article 6(3), such as in the case where a defendant is arrested,
but subsequently released); Galliani v Romania, 69273/01 [2008] para 53-54 (right
applies to individual who is arrested for the purposes of deportation); Diallo v
Sweden, 13205/07 [2010] para 25 (right begins at the first contact or questioning by
the law enforcement agency).
7 Hermi v Italy App no 18114/02 (ECtHR, 18 October 2006) para 70.
8 W A Schabas, The European Convention of Huan Rights. A commentary
(Oxford University Press 2015) 314.
9 Amer v Turkey, 25720/02 [2009] para 81-83, Cuscani v United Kingdom
(32771/96) [2002] ECHR 625 (24 September 2002) para 38-39, See also, J
Brannan, ‘Raising the Standard of Language assistance in Criminal Proceedings
From the Rights under Article 6 (3) ECHR to Directive 2010/64/EU’ (2012) 1
Cyprus Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 128.
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3. The rights of suspects and accused persons under Directive
2010/64/EU
3.1. Defence rights to foster mutual trust
The ECHR paradigm of defence rights protection sets the minimum
standard, yet it is fragmented and provides little guidance as to the
practical application of when and how these rights were to be applied.
With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009,
the European Union, in an effort to foster mutual trust between
Member States, particularly in judicial proceedings, has sought to
further elaborate the core fair process rights with a certain degree of
consistency. 10
Notably, the Treaty raised the value of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights to that on par with the Treaties. The Charter however is limited in
its provisions which protect an accused, 11 as it only applies when
Member States are implementing Union law, meaning that the Court
of Justice has jurisdiction to rule on the consistency of domestic law
with the Charter provided that the case or controversy at hand comes
within the scope of EU law. 12 Article 82(2) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), however, provides the
legal basis of Union action regarding the protection of the rights of
the accused, with the purpose of harmonizing the rights of individuals
in criminal proceedings to the ‘extent necessary to facilitate mutual
recognition of judicial decisions in criminal matters’. 13
10 Competence for harmonizing criminal procedures is provided in Article 82
TFEU. The Union had previously delved into the field of criminal law, yet only for
the purpose of combatting crime, through the adoption of mechanisms which
coordinated and strengthened communication and mutual recognition between the
Member States.
11 Articles 47 to 50 EU Charter of fundamental rights specifically apply to rights
protected in criminal proceedings, with Article 47 guaranteeing the right to an effective
remedy and fair trial; Article 48 providing the presumption of innocence: Article 49
ensuring the principles legality and proportionality of criminal offences and
penalties; and Article 50 ensuring the application of ne bis in idem. It should be
noted that while there is no specific provision providing for translation or
interpretation, Article 48 (2) reads: ‘Respect for the rights of the defence of anyone
who has been charged shall be guaranteed.'
12 Case C-617/10 Åklagaren v Hans ÅkerbergFransson EU:C:2013:105, para 19;
Case C- 650/13 Delvigne v Commune de Lesparre-Médoc and Préfet de la Gironde
EU:C:2015:648, para 27.
13 S Allegrezza, V Covolo, ‘The directive 2012/13/EU on the right to information
in criminal proceedings: Status quo or step forward?’ in Z Ðurđević and E Ivičević
Karas (eds), Eurpean Criminal Procedure Law in Service of Protection of European
38 PART I, CHAPTER II
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
After earlier attempts to provide procedural protections for accused
individuals, 14 in November 2009, the Council of the European Union
adopted the Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights of suspected
or accused persons in criminal proceedings. 15 What was named the
Stockholm Programme was seen as a compromise, a place to begin on
the task of guaranteeing procedural rights, which would foster mutual
trust. 16 The directives which followed are often referred to as the
ABC directives. The Directive on Interpretation and Translation 17
would be the Union’s first legislative act in the field of criminal law
which sought to protect the rights of the accused, and represented a
base-line of agreement for the Member States: the essential right of
understanding of the process brought against an individual was
paramount to the effectiveness and legitimacy of the proceedings, and
is a significant step for the protection of procedural rights of
suspected and accused persons. 18
3.2. The substance of the rights to interpretation and translation
The Directive is straightforward requiring the Member State to
provide, free of charge, language assistance which would ensure that
the accused is able to participate in his own defence and understand
the actions, which might be being taken against him. 19
Article 2 covers the right of interpretation in criminal proceedings,
with Article 2(1) providing a core right of interpretation at all stages of
the investigatory and fact-finding process. Article 2(2) provides for
interpretation for communication between the accused and her legal
Union Financial Interests: State of Play and Challenges (Croatian Association of
European Criminal Law 2016) 41, 41.
14 See, S Cras, L De Matteis, ‘The Directive on the Right to Interpretation and
Translation in Criminal Proceedings: Genesis and Description’ (2010) 4 Eucrim 153.
15 Resolution of the Council of 30 November 2009 on a Roadmap for
strengthening procedural rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal
proceedings [2009] OJ C 295/1. See also, S Cras, L De Matteis (n 14). The rights
included in the Roadmap were: Right to Interpretation and Translation; Right to
Information; Access to a Lawyer; Legal Aid Reform; Vulnerable Accused and
Suspected Persons; Pre-Trial Detention; and, Presumption of Innocence.
16 J S Hodgson, ‘Safeguarding Suspects’ Rights in Europe A Comparative
Perspective’ (2011) 14 New Criminal Law Review 611, 655.
17 Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20
October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings
[2010] OJ L 280/ 1.
18 S Cras, L De Matteis (n 14) 153.
19 S Allegrezza, V Covolo (n 13) 41.
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representatives albeit limited in a twofold way: the communication must
be in direct connection with any questioning or hearing during the
proceedings or with the lodging of an appeal or other procedural
applications and the interpretation necessary for the purpose of
safeguarding the fairness of the proceedings. Article 2(3) extends
these rights to the hearing and speech impaired. The physical presence
of the interpreter is not systematically required. Indeed, Article 2(6)
allows the Member States to use technology in the provision of
interpretation services. The right to interpretation also belongs,
according to Article 2(7), to persons who are the subject of a
European Arrest Warrant in the executing Member State. Lastly,
Directive 2010/64/EU does not solely guarantee linguistic assistance.
Article 2(8) requires measures, which insure the quality of the
interpretation provided. 20
Article 3, on the other hand, covers the right to translation of
essential documents in criminal proceedings. Article 3(2) defines the
term ‘essential documents’ as including ‘any decision depriving a
person of his liberty, any charge or indictment, and any judgment’.
Where the defence requests the translation of other documents, the
EU Directive leaves however the national authorities free to decide
whether document is essential. 21 Likewise, Article 3(4) restricts the
right by limiting the requirement of translation to only ‘essential
documents, which are not relevant for the purposes of enabling
suspected or accused persons to have knowledge of the case against
them’. Article 3(5) provides a mechanism wherein the accused may
challenge a court’s decision regarding which documents are essential.
Mirroring Article 2, Article 3(6) provides for translations of
documents for those who are the subject of a European Arrest
Warrant. Just as the case law of the ECtHR, 22 Article 3(7) allows
national authorities to substitute the right to translation of documents
for the right of interpretation of the documents in circumstances
where ‘such oral translation or oral summary does not prejudice the
fairness of the proceedings’. Unlike with the right to interpretation,
Article 3(8) expressly allows an accused to waive translation rights.
Any waiver must nonetheless fulfil specific requirements. The waiver
must be unequivocal, given voluntary and in full knowledge of the
20 Art. 2 Directive 2010/64/EU.
21 Art. 3 (3) Directive 2010/64/EU.
22 See for instance Hermi v Italy App no 18114/02 (ECtHR, 18 October 2006)
para 70.
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consequences thereof, for instance after having received legal advice. 23
Finally, Article 3(9) requires that the translations provided be of ‘a
quality sufficient to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings, in
particular by ensuring that suspected or accused persons have
knowledge of the case against them and are able to exercise their
right of defence’. 24
The quality required in the interpretation and translation does
however provide pragmatic challenges. While the EU Directive seems
to hold a high standard, when read together with Article 2(6) on the
use of technology, it becomes apparent that the Union was attempting
to hit a middle ground of protecting the right in a sufficient manner to
ensure the integrity of the proceedings while not creating an
insurmountable standard for the Member States. 25 Additionally, there
is no apparent mechanism of ensuring that the translation or
interpretation is of the necessary quality, whatever level that may be.
To date, no cases specific to quality standards of Article 2(8) and 3(9)
have come through the courts wherein an accused has alleged that the
quality of language services violated EU law. Instead, the European
Union has encouraged Member States to pursue training for language
professionals to fill the posts as required by the obligations set forth
in the Directive. 26
As mentioned above, the Directive also allows for the use
technology for Courts and law enforcement agencies in their
upholding of the duties proscribed. 27 This has proven to be quite
effective for law enforcement agencies, which may encounter a
defendant on the street and share no common language with them. To
this end many law enforcement authorities have developed
technological services, which ensure compliance and thereby afford an
accused with real-time interpretation services. 28
The Directive does not create a specific right to have the
proceedings or crucial documents translated into a language that is the
23 Art. 3 (8) Directive 2010/64/EU.
24 Art. 3 Directive 2010/64/EU.
25 Article 2(6) reads, ‘Where appropriate, communication technology such as
videoconferencing, telephone or the Internet may be used, unless the physical
presence of the interpreter is required in order to safeguard the fairness of the
proceedings.’
26 Art. 6 Directive 2010/64/EU.
27 Art. 2(6) Directive 2010/64/EU.
28 See, S Braun, J Taylor ‘Videoconference and remote interpreting in legal
proceedings’ (2012) <http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/805380/>, accessed 1 March 2018.
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choice of the accused, but rather, simply to a language which the
accused understands. Additionally, while the Directive requires that
the accused be afforded an interpreter for the entirety of the
procedure, from the initial contact to the imposition of a final
judgment (including appeal), the obligation regarding translation of
documents only extends to essential documents, which concern an
accused’s deprivation of liberty, any imposition of charges, or any
judgment lodged against the accused. 29
4. First challenges and answers by the CJEU for the implementation
of the EU Directive
Three cases have been referred to the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) for interpretation of Directive 2010/64/EU.
Each of the cases regard the question of the scope of the right to
translation and interpretation and the measures, which are required to
be taken by Member States with regards to their obligations under EU
law. Two of the decisions, Covaci and Sleutjes, dealt with the nuanced
practicalities of the application of the Directive, while the third,
Balogh, was much more clear cut as to the specific application of it.
4.1 The preliminary ruling in Covaci
In the 2014 case of Gavril Covaci, a German court of first
instance requested a preliminary ruling seeking clarification on two
questions. 30 The first as whether the national courts could require a
defendant to lodge an appeal in the language of the proceedings.
The second was whether Articles 2, 3(1)(c) and 6(1) and (3)
precluded the accused from being required to appoint a person
authorised to accept service, in cases where the time for bringing
an appeal began to run upon the service on the person authorised
to accept service, whether or not the accused had actual notice (or
knowledge) of the charged offense. 31
Mr Covaci, a Romanian citizen, was charged with failing to
produce proof of insurance, and providing forged insurance
29 See Case C-216/14 Covaci EU:C:2015:686; Case C-25/15, Balogh
EU:C:2016:423.
30 Case C216/14 Covaci EU:C:2015:686.
31 Ibid para 16.
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documentation when he was stopped at a traffic checkpoint. 32 Paragraph
132 of the German Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung)
requires that an accused persons who is not resident in Germany,
appoint a person to accept service of process. This person is the clerk
of the local court. Additionally, under German law, the time periods
for bringing appeals against any judicial decision begins to run from
date of service of the decision upon the persons appointed. As Mr
Covaci was not domiciled in Germany, he executed the required
authorization, appointing the clerk of the court as the person
authorized to accept service. 33
Paragraph 410 of the Code of Criminal Procedure also contains an
abbreviated process called a ‘Penalty Order’, which allows prosecutors
to apply to a competent court for an order establishing the guilt of the
defendant and the penalty in cases where there is no discernable
question of fact that would require a hearing or trial. If the court
issues the order and no objection is made, the provisional order
becomes the permanent order enforceable upon the party accused. An
objection may be submitted either in writing or by making a
statement recorded by the registry of the court. If an objection is
lodged, the court will hold a hearing to determine the merits of the
charges. 34
In Mr Covaci’s case, a Penalty Order was sought by the
prosecutor’s office. 35 The judge charged with determining whether or
not to issue the order sought guidance from the CJEU on the
interpretation of Directive 2010/64/EU.
In what is a narrowly drawn decision the CJEU did not take as an
expansive view of the rights protected under the Directive. Similar to the
Opinion of Advocate General Bot, the Court stressed the purpose of the
Directive was to ensure that a minimum right to translation and
interpretation was necessary in order to promote mutual trust in
criminal proceedings, yet their focus was on the minimum standards
of protection that EU secondary law provides. 36 However, the Court
viewed the case not strictly as a question of whether the defendant
could submit an appeal in a language different from the official
language of the national court, but rather, whether a national court
32 Ibid
33 Ibid paras 18 to 20.
34 Ibid para 20.
35 Ibid para 21.
36 Ibid para 67.
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was obliged to provide or pay for the translation of the appeal as
required under Article 5 Directive 2010/64/EU.
Against this background, the Court took view that requiring the
Member States ‘to take responsibility (...) for the translation of every
appeal brought by the persons concerned against a judicial decision
which is addressed to them would go beyond the objectives pursued
by Directive 2010/64 itself’. 37 Nonetheless, guarantees of free
linguistic assistance must enable the suspect or accused persons to
‘exercise their rights of defence and safeguarding the fairness of the
proceedings’. 38 In this regards, the Court noted that under German
law objections against a penalty order constitute the ‘only possibility’
for the accused to defend himself against the charges against him and
have an adversarial trial. 39
Yet, German law allows an accused person to object to the Penal
Order in person, as well as in writing. As a consequence, the court
distinguished the two situations since they call into question different
rights. Where the accused submit the objection orally without the
assistance of a legal counsel, he shall benefit from the free legal
assistance of an interpreter under Article 2 Directive 2010/64/EU. By
contrast, Article 3 of the Directive does not grant the accused the
right to lodge an objection in writing in a language other than the one
of the proceedings. As the Court stressed, the right to translation
‘concerns, in principle, only the written translation into the language
understood by the person concerned’. 40 Moreover, it is up to the
national court to assess whether such an objection do constitute an
‘essential document’ within the meaning of Article 3 Directive 2010/
64/EU. 41
The right of interpretation was restricted to oral statements related
to the case. This however, in the Court’s view, does not require that a
national court provide defendants with a carte blanche with regards to
translation:
‘compliance with the requirements relating to a fair trial merely
ensures that the accused person knows what is being alleged
against him and can defend himself, and does not necessitate a
37 Ibid para 38
38 Ibid para 37.
39 Ibid para 41.
40 Ibid para 44.
41 Ibid para 49.
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written translation of all items of written evidence or official
documents in the procedure’. 42
The provision of German law, which allows an accused person to
object to the Penal Order in person, as well as in writing, seemed to
satisfy the Court, as this allowed for the assistance of an interpreter
under Article 2, and therefore German Law. 43
4.2. Right to translation or procedural obstacle to mutual recognition?
The case in Balogh
In June of 2016, a second decision regarding the Directive’s
interpretation was handed down regarding the application of the
Directive to a special proceeding of the Hungarian courts for the
recognition of a foreign judgment. 44
In 2014, István Balogh, a citizen of Hungary, was convicted in
Austria of aggravated burglar. He was sentenced to imprisonment and
to pay the costs of his prosecution. He was assisted at trial and
sentencing with an interpreter. Pursuant to the requirements of Article
4(2) of Framework Decision 2009/315, Austrian officials then
informed Hungarian authorities of the conviction, using the European
Criminal Record Information system (ECRIS). 45
For the recognition of foreign convictions, including those from
other EU Member States, Hungary applies a ‘special proceeding’,
which requires that the judgment be translated into Hungarian in
order to be fully recognized under Hungarian law. 46 The procedure’s
sole purpose was to give Hungarian legal affect to the Austrian
judgment and did not involve the determination of new facts or in
fact the guilt of Mr Balogh. The question referred essentially was,
who should pay for the translation – the Hungarian State, or the
defendant.
The Judgment of the Fifth Chamber of the CJEU, noted that the
Article 1 of the Directive required that Mr Balogh receives an
interpretation of the judgment of sentencing at the time of the courts
42 Ibid para 39, relying on Kamasinski v Austria, 9783/82 ECtHR [1991] 13
EHRR 36 (19 December 1989).
43 Ibid para 38-42.
44 Case C-25/15 Balogh EU:C:2016:423.
45 Ibid paras 8, 9, 10, 29.
46 Ibid para 37.
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pronouncement in Austria, and a written translation as soon as possible
thereafter, and that is precisely what occurred in the case before the
Court. 47 The Hungarian special procedure, however, fell outside of
the proceedings covered by the Directive, as the Hungarian court was
not determining the guilt or innocence of Mr Balogh, but rather it was
merely confirming the conviction in Hungarian law. 48
Significantly, the Court found that the Hungarian procedure for the
enforcement of a foreign conviction in and of itself violated Union Law
as Article 82(1) TFEU provides that judicial cooperation in criminal
matters is based on the principle of mutual recognition of judicial
decisions. The Union’s mechanisms to effectuate this recognition are
Framework Decision 2009/315 and Decision 2009/316, which provide
for the uniform sharing of criminal adjudications through the ECRIS
system. 49 The special procedure employed by Hungary violated the
principle of mutual recognition because it required a separate
proceeding to ‘recognise’ the foreign (EU Member State) judgment. 50
ECRIS was designed to eliminate the necessity for such proceedings.
The Court noted that the principle of mutual recognition under Article
82(1) does not permit a Member State to condition the recognition of
a decision on such a procedure. 51
4.3. The scope of the right to translation in Sleutjes
Finally, in October 2017, the CJEU handed down the most recent
decision interpreting the Directive in the case regarding criminal
charges against Frank Sleutjes. 52
On 2 November 2015, upon the application of the Aachen Public
Prosecutor, the Düren Local Court (Amtsgericht Du¨ren, Germany)
issued a penalty order against Mr Frank Sleutjes, a Dutch national
imposing, imposing a fine for failure to stop at the scene of an
accident. The documentation accompanying the Penalty Order
informed Mr Sleutjes, in Dutch, that the order would become legally
47 Ibid para 39.
48 Ibid, see also Case C-25/15 Balogh, Opinion of AG Bot EU2016:29, para 37
49 Case C-25/15 Balogh Opinion of Advocate General Bot, para 68: ECRIS is a
‘decentralised information technology system based on the criminal records databases
in each Member State.’
50 Ibid.
51 Case C-25/15 Balogh, paras 51, 54
52 Case C-278 Franck Sleutjes EU:C:2017:757.
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binding if he did not challenge or object to it within two weeks of its
service. 53 Notably, while the notice as to his legal remedies was
provided in Dutch, the Penalty Order itself was not translated into
Dutch and was served upon Sleutjes in German, the language of the
proceedings, yet determined by the court to be a language that Mr
Sleutjes did not understand.
Mr Sleutjes objected to the imposition of the Penalty Order by
emails sent in Dutch to the Düren court. The Düren court then
informed Sleutjes that correspondence to the court must be in German
by letter dated 1 December 2015. At the same time, Mr Sleutjes’s
lawyer filed an objection to the Penalty Order by fax on 1st
December 2015. On 28th January 2016 the court dismissed the
objection as inadmissible on account of its late submission. Mr
Sleutjes appealed against the order of dismissal of the appeal. 54
The German appellate court asked the CJEU for a preliminary
ruling pursuant to Article 267 TFEU whether the Penalty Order was a
judgment covered by Article 3 of the Directive. 55
Interestingly, the German Government, in its written observations,
conceded that the under German domestic law entitled the accused is
entitled to a translation of the Penalty Order and any opposition
which he might lodge. The Government argued that therefore the
matter was moot before the Court. 56 The position of the German
Government – that the accused had a right under German Law to
have his objection translated, was also a departure from the German
position in Covaci. Additionally, as the CJEU pointed out, this was a
view that the Düren Appeals Court did not seem to share. 57
In making its ruling, the Court likened the penalty order to both an
indictment and a judgment, both being necessarily covered by the
Directive, and therefore the document must be translated into a
language that the accused would understand. 58
The tone of the judgment of the Court was significant. In Covaci,
the Court seemed hesitant to push forward the rights granted to
defendants by the directive, setting it was a minimum with modest
application, the Court in Sleutjes more confidently pressed Member
53 Ibid para 11.
54 Ibid para 15.
55 Ibid para 17.
56 Ibid para 20
57 Ibid para 20.
58 Ibid para 33.
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States to provide translation for necessary documents. This can be seen,
not only in the words used by the Court, but also in the fact that they
judged on the case at all, as the German Government had conceded
that the right to translation under German Law applied to the Penalty
order, and any objection which would be filed by the accused. 59
Additionally, appears to be movement in the acceptance of these
rights by the Member States, if Germany serves as a barometer of
state sentiments. Whereas in Covaci, neither the Court, nor the
German Government would advocate for a translation of the
objections to be covered by this right, now the point would be conceded.
5. Conclusions
While the right of translation and interpretation is vital for an
accused defending himself in a foreign court in a language he does
not understand, the right is only as effective as its implementation. As
cooperation in criminal matters expands between the Member States,
these guarantees, along with the sibling fair trial rights contained in
the Stockholm Roadmap will become much more important. It is not
about homogenizing criminal law, but rather about ensuring that the
minimum rights allow for a fair process in order to foster mutual
recognition between the Member States. These rights serve to nurture
not only cooperation but also trust, at a cost that is insignificant when
weighed against the protection granted.
This is particularly important as Member States develop
‘simplified’ processes, which, while they may be more economically
efficient, cut against the ideas of a process where evidence is
presented, tested and justice is served. It is particularly important in
these cases that the core process rights be vigilantly protected. That
seems to be the underlying theme or flavour of the Court’s reasoning.
What applies in a normal process must also apply in a truncated
process, in so far as procedural safeguards are essential to ensure the
fairness of the criminal proceedings.
As with much legislation which implements and protects rights, the
test of effectiveness of the measure often depends on the interpretation
of the duty imposed upon the Member States and the extent to which the
competent national authority is willing to broadly construe the duty.
Directive 2010/64/EU contains provisions which, when interpreted
59 Ibid para 20.
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narrowly, could have a negative effect upon the exercise of defence
rights. Chief among these is the provision, which allows Member
States to avoid or limit the cost of translation.
This could occur primarily in two situations. The first is a narrow
reading of the documents which are ‘necessary for the defence’, as
provided in Article 3(1). This problem is perhaps the easiest to
address in the CJEU and the three cases, which have come before the
Court have dealt specifically with this provision. Interestingly,
however, the Court declined to delineate what constitutes the essential
character of a document. Additionally, from a defence point of view,
what might be relevant to the authority making the determination as
to what constitutes ‘essential’ is either the prosecutorial agency or the
court. Often the significance of material can only be seen when
viewed against other material. For example, a witness statement,
which seems to be insignificant, may gain greater importance when
read in conjunction with other ‘relevant’ or ‘irrelevant’ pieces of
evidence.
The second, and perhaps most amorphous is Article 3(4) which
allows for the translation of only the relevant portions of the
statement, this limitation allows for judicial actors outside of the
defence to determine what is significant to the defence of a case. This
might also be more difficult to challenge, either at the national level
or at the European level.
Article 3(7) permits the national court to allow for a verbal
communication of the relevant material (via interpretation as opposed
to translation), or an ‘oral summary’ provided that there is no
prejudice to the defence. This also could be problematic, and difficult
to prove the violation of. Thus far this issue has not come before the
CJEU.
Additionally, Article 1(3), regarding the scope of the Directive,
provides that minor offenses, which have the possibility of an appeal
to a higher court, are exempt from the application of the Directive.
The right would therein only apply once the individual appeals the
adverse judgment. This provision could have a negative impact upon
defence rights, as often convictions on minor offenses are the basis
for enhanced sanctions on subsequent convictions. Additionally, this
may be a bulk of the cases where translation and interpretation is
needed.
Lastly, and perhaps most fundamentally, is that the Member States
are largely left to themselves to assess whether or not the quality of
translation and interpretation meets the criteria of allowing an accused
to understand the process brought against him and meaningfully
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participate in his own defence. The Directive sets no criteria for the
qualifications of translators or interpreters – this is let to national law.
Hence, according to a 2016 study published by the Legal Experts
Advisory Panel, the measure of qualification of service providers, and
the quality of language services are inconsistent across the European
Union. 60 Thus far, no cases have been brought before the CJEU
seeking interpretation as to the level of ‘quality’ foreseen in Article
2(8) and 3(9) of the Directive.
Perhaps important is the goal of Directive 2010/64/EU when read
in conjunction with the other Roadmap directives. These are base-line
rights, which are Europeanised in order to facilitate judicial
cooperation, mutual trust and recognition. Taken with Directive 2012/
13 on the right to information; Directive 2013/48 on the right to
access to a lawyer; Directive 2016/343 on the presumption of
innocence and Directive 2016/800 on the special safeguards for
children, and Directive 2016/1919 on the provision of legal aid,
Directive 2010/64 can be seen as a positive base-line from which to
build, in order to ensure that the right to fair trial, enshrined in Article
47 of the EU Charter and Article 6 ECHR, are actually and
effectively respected and implemented. The proof however will be in
the pudding, or in other words, how the rights are enforced at the
national level.
60 See, Legal Experts Advisory Board, The Quality of Interpretation in Criminal
Proceedings, LEAP Survey Report (2106) <https://www.fairtrials.org/wp-content/
.../LEAP-Interpretation-Report-Mar2016.pdf> accessed 16 March 2017.
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CHAPTER III
DIRECTIVE 2012/13/EU ON THE RIGHT
TO INFORMATION IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Silvia Allegrezza and Valentina Covolo
TABLE OF CONTENTS: 1. The genesis of Directive 2012/13/EU. – 2. Right to
information about rights. – 3. The right to be informed about the
charges. – 4. The right of access to the case file. – 5. Recording
procedure and legal remedies. – 6. Conclusions.
1. The genesis of Directive 2012/13/EU
The right to information is aimed at enabling persons suspected or
accused of having committed a criminal offence to effectively prepare
their defence, and, thereby, guaranteeing the fairness of the
proceedings. 1 With this understanding, the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) interpreted for the first time Directive 2012/
13/EU on the right to information in criminal proceedings 2 and, more
generally, the rights of defence that EU secondary law grants to
suspects and accused persons in criminal matters. 3 Indeed, the 2012
Directive implements measure B of the Roadmap for strengthening
procedural rights of defendants adopted by the Council in 2009. 4
Pursuant to Article 82 (2) TFEU, which forms the legal basis for the
1 Case C- 216/14 Covaci EU:C:2015:686, para 63.
2 Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22
May 2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings [2012] OJ L 142/1.
3 In particular, the preliminary ruling referred to the CJEU in Covaci also
concerned the interpretation of Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation
in criminal proceedings [2010] OJ L 280/1.
4 Resolution of the Council of 30 November 2009 on a Roadmap for
strengthening procedural rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal
proceedings [2009] OJ C 295/1. On the difficulties encountered during the
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
ABC Directives, their purpose lies in harmonizing rights of individuals
in criminal proceedings to the extent necessary to facilitate mutual
recognition of judicial decisions in criminal matters. 5 Despite the
approximation of domestic law resulting from the extensive case law
of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), significant
discrepancies between national criminal procedures may still
jeopardize mutual trust between Member States. 6 Moreover, recent
studies have highlighted the limited effectiveness of the Strasbourg
system in exhorting national legislators to strengthen procedural
guarantees by reforming criminal procedures. 7
Against this background, Directive 2012/13/EU is intended to
promote common minimum standards for the information to be
provided to suspects and accused persons in order to ensure the
fairness of transnational criminal proceedings, considering both the
vertical and horizontal dimension of the European penal area. 8 To this
end, the right to information guaranteed under the directive is rooted
on the one hand in the common constitutional traditions of the
Member States. On the other, it falls within the umbrella concept of
defence rights referred to in Article 48 (2) of the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights. The latter provision and, in a similar fashion,
Directive 2012/13/EU, reflect the corresponding rights to be informed
arising from Articles 5 and 6 of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR). 9 Even though the right to information is not
explicitly mentioned in the wording of the Convention, its scope has
been outlined over the years by the case law of the ECtHR. 10 From
this perspective, does Directive 2012/13/EU represent a step forward?
To answer this question, the following sections will analyse the three
dimensions of the procedural safeguard harmonized by the 2012
legislative process, S Cras, L De Matteis, ‘The Directive on the Right to Information.
Genesis and Short Description’ (2013) 1 Eucrim 22.
5 Art. 82 para 2 (b) TFEU.
6 T Sproken, G Vermeulen, D De Vocht, EU Procedural Rights in Criminal
Proceedings (Maklu, 2009) 25 ff.
7 L Van Puyenbroeck, G Vermeulen, ‘Towards minumun procedural guarantees
for the defence in criminal proceedings in the EU’ (2011) 60 Int Comp Law Q
1017 – 1038, 1022 ff..; M Morgan, ‘Are article 6 ECHR and ECtHR enough to
protect defence rights?’ (2007) J Eur Crim Law 27 – 35.
8 Recital 10 Directive 2012/13/EU.
9 In particular, Article 5 §2 of the Convention guarantees the right to be promptly
informed of the reasons of the arrest, whilst Article 6 §3 (a) enshrines the right to be
informed promptly of the nature and causes of the accusation.
10 E Lloyd-Cape, Z Namoradze, R Smith, T Spronken, Effective Criminal
Defence in Europe (Intersentia, 2012) 32 ff.
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Directive: respectively, the right of the suspect or accused person to be
informed about procedural guarantees, 11 the right to be informed about
charges 12 and the right to access the case file. 13
2. The right to information about rights
The effective exercise of the right to defence presupposes that the
suspected or accused persons are promptly made aware of the rights
they are entitled to in criminal proceedings. To this end, the right to be
informed about procedural rights arises ‘from the time persons are
made aware by the competent authorities of a Member State that they
are suspected or accused of having committed a criminal offence until
the conclusion of the proceedings’. 14 Consequently, the right to
information about rights guaranteed under Article 3 Directive 2012/13/
EU does not depend on the official notification of the charges, nor on
the indictment by the prosecuting authorities. Indeed, the term ‘suspect’
refers to an individual who has not yet been officially charged. 15
Similarly, the ECtHR does not systematically adopt a formal definition
of criminal charges in order to identify the procedural stage that
triggers the applicability of the fair trial guarantees enshrined in Article
6 (3) of the Convention. Rather, the European case law refers at times
to a substantial criterion, where the situation of the applicant who is
not formally accused is nevertheless ‘substantially affected’ by the
criminal investigation. 16 In this circumstance, the Court admits that
Article 6 ECHR comes into play at an early stage of the proceedings
considering the ‘special features of those proceedings and the
circumstances of the case assessed in relation to the entirety of the
domestic proceedings conducted in the case’. 17 Therefore, the
procedural stage at which the suspect must be first informed will
mostly depend on the significance of the secrecy of pre-trial
investigations within criminal justice systems and, consequently, may
11 Art. 3 Directive 2012/13/EU.
12 Art. 6 Directive 2012/13/EU.
13 Art. 7 Directive 2012/13/EU.
14 Art. 2 §1 Directive 2012/13/EU.
15 S Quattrocolo, ‘The Right to Information in EU Legislation’, in S Ruggeri,
Human Rights in European Criminal Law (Springer, 2015) 81 – 93, 85.
16 Zaichenko v Russia, App no 39660/02 (ECtHR, 18 February 2010) para 42 – 43.
17 Ibid para 45.
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vary significantly among Member States. 18 Thus, Directive 2012/13/EU
is expected to entail limited harmonization in this respect.
Having regard to the substance of information conveyed, Article 3
Directive 2012/13/EU enacts only a minimum content. National
authorities must inform the suspect or the accused, at the very least,
of their right of access to a lawyer, any entitlement to free legal
advice and the conditions for obtaining such advice, the right to be
informed of the accusation, the right to interpretation and translation
and the right to remain silent. 19 Concerning the latter procedural
guarantee, it remains doubtful whether the right to remain silent
should be understood as encompassing the privilege against self-
incrimination. Although these rights are intrinsically linked, the case-
law of the ECtHR refers separately to both guarantees while
interpreting Article 6 of the Convention. 20 As with regards to
procedural requirements, the 2012 Directive requires the competent
national authorities to communicate the information orally or in
writing, as well as in simple and accessible language. 21 This last
requirement has to be interpreted in line with Directive 2010/64/EU
on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings. 22
The standards of protection are higher in the case of deprivation of
liberty. According to Article 4 of the Directive, Member States must
inform promptly the arrested or detained person in writing about
further procedural guarantees. 23 The so-called ‘Letter of Rights’ shall
indicate the right of access to the materials of the case, the right to
have consular authorities and one person informed, the right of access
to urgent medical assistance, the maximum number of hours or days
suspects or accused persons may be deprived of liberty before being
brought before a judicial authority. 24 The Directive also provides for
a model letter of rights to be used in proceedings for the execution of
a European arrest warrant. 25 In addition, basic information about any
18 S Quattrocolo (n 15) 85.
19 Art. 3 (1) Directive 2012/13/EU.
20 See for instance Saunders v United Kingdom, App. no 19187/91 (ECtHR, 17
December 1996) para 68.
21 Art. 3 (2) Directive 2012/13/EU.
22 Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20
October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings
[2010] OJ L 280/1.
23 Art. 4 (1) Directive 2012/13/EU.
24 Art. 4 (2) Directive 2012/13/EU.
25 Art. 5 Directive 2012/13/EU.
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possibility, under national law, of challenging the lawfulness of the
arrest, obtaining a review of the detention or making a request for
provisional release must be provided. 26 The inclusion of the latter
information corresponds to the habeas corpus guarantees enshrined in
Article 5 (4) ECHR. In this respect, it is worth recalling that the right
to a review of the lawfulness of the arrest does not simply require
information about the possibility of appealing a detention order and
the related procedural requirements. It also implies the opportunity for
the arrested person to know the reasons for his arrest and detention,
as well as the right to have access to the case file within adequate
time, in order for the right to review of arrest warrants to be
effectively exercised according to the principle of equality of arms. 27
3. The right to be informed about the charges
According to Article 6 Directive 2012/13/EU, the right to be
informed about the accusation takes different forms. While the first
paragraph of the provision guarantees the right for the defendant to be
promptly informed about the offence he is suspected of having
committed, 28 the third paragraph compels national authorities to
provide detailed information, at the very latest, upon the submission
of the merits of the accusation to a court. 29 In other words, the closer
the proceedings come to the adversarial stage, the more detailed the
information available to the defendant must be.
The provision first guarantees that general information about the
criminal act that an individual is suspected or accused of having
committed. 30 Little guidance for determining the scope of the right
arises from the wording of Article 6 itself. On the one hand, the
directive gives a rather vague and broad definition of the content of
such a communication. Indeed, it requires that the information about
the charges must be provided ‘in such detail as is necessary to
safeguard the fairness of the proceedings and the effective exercise of
the rights of defence’. 31 Given the lack of precise requirements,
Member States are likely to adopt divergent standards of protection in
26 Art. 4 (3) Directive 2012/13/EU.
27 Schöps v Germany, App no 25116/94 (ECtHR, 9 December 1998) para 44.
28 Art. 6 (1) Directive 2012/13/EU.
29 Art. 6 (3) Directive 2012/13/EU.
30 Art. 6 (1) Directive 2012/13/EU.
31 Art. 6 (1) Directive 2012/13/EU.
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implementing Article 6 (1) of the Directive. On the other hand, the
provision does not specify the time period in which the person must
be informed. 32 Nonetheless, recitals 19 and 28 indicate a certain
timeframe that national authorities should respect. When read in
conjunction, a ‘prompt’ provision of information means that the
guarantees under Article 6 Directive 2012/13/EU apply, at the latest,
before the first official interview of the suspect or accused person by
the police or by another competent authority. 33
Both aspects were addressed by the CJEU in Covaci. 34 The
preliminary rulings submitted by a German Court brought into
question the compatibility of national notification procedures with
Article 6 Directive 2012/13/EU. 35 In the dispute in the main
proceedings, a German Court, upon the request of the Public
Prosecutor, issued a penalty order against Mr Covaci, a Romanian
citizen who was not resident in Germany. The penalty order
constitutes a provisional decision, which informs the accused about
the charges against him and imposes a fine in case of minor offences.
Thus, the service of the penalty order must be seen as a
communication of the accusation against the offender. Yet, German
law provides that the accused who is not resident in the country is
under an obligation to appoint a person authorized to accept service
of a penalty order. The period of two weeks for lodging an objection
against that order runs from the service of the penalty order to the
authorized person.
Following the opinion delivered by Advocate General Bot, the
Court firstly recalled that the 2012 Directive ‘does not regulate the
procedures whereby information about the accusation (...) must be
provided’. 36 However, those procedures cannot undermine the
objective of Article 6 (1) and (3), which consists in enabling suspects
or accused persons to prepare their defence and in safeguarding the
fairness of the proceedings. 37 Therefore, the notification procedure in
question was consistent with Article 6 Directive 2012/13/EU in as far
as the period for lodging an objection begins to run from the time
when the accused person actually becomes aware of the penalty
32 Art. 6 (1) Directive 2012/13/EU.
33 Recitals 19 and 28 Directive 2012/13/EU.
34 Case C- 216/14, Covaci EU:C:2015:686.
35 Ibid para 52.
36 Case C- 216/14 Covaci, para 62; Case C- 216/14 Covaci, Opinion of AG Bot
EU:C:2015:305, para 105.
37 Case C- 216/14 Covaci, para 63.
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order. 38 With this reasoning, the Court did not address the
appropriateness of the limitation period established under national law,
but merely applied the principle of non-discrimination between
accused persons with a residence within or outside the territory of the
Member State. 39
A similar question was addressed by the CJEU in Tranca. 40 The
preliminary ruling relates once again to the German notification rules
governing penalty orders against persons who have no fixed domicile
or residence in Germany, nor in their country of origin. In line with
the ruling in Covaci, the Court emphasised that ‘the objective of
Article 6 of Directive 2012/13 [...] is manifestly infringed if the
addressee of a penalty order such as those at issue in the main
proceedings, which has become final and enforceable, could no longer
object to it, even though he had not been aware of the existence and
content of that order at a time when he could have exercised his rights
of defence, in so far as, for want of a known place of residence, it was
not served on him personally’. 41 As a result, an accused person who
has not been served personally with the order must benefit from the
whole of the prescribed period for lodging an objection against the
penalty order, 42 an objection that represents the first and only
possibility for the accused to exercise his right of defence in the
simplified penalty order procedure. This does not only require the
competent authorities not to reduce the duration of that period by the
time needed by the person authorized to receive notice of the order to
transmit it to its addressee. 43 Article 6 Directive 2012/13/EU also
implies the right of the accused person to have his position restored to
the status quo ante, where this is necessary to guarantee the right to
lodge an objection and, thereby, the effective right of defence. 44
Secondly, the defendant has the right to obtain more precise
information at a later stage of proceedings. Thus, the competent
authorities shall provide the accused person with detailed information
on the accusation, which includes the nature and legal classification of
the criminal offence as well as the nature of participation by the
38 Ibid para 66 - 67.
39 Ibid para 65.
40 Joined Cases C-124/16, C-188/16 and C-213/16, Criminal proceedings against
Ianos Tranca and Others EU:C:2017:228.
41 Ibid para 45.
42 Ibid para 47.
43 Ibid para 43.
44 Ibid para 48 ff.
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accused. 45 The right to be informed under Article 6 (3) of the Directive
applies, at the latest, upon submission of the merits of the accusation to a
court. 46 In the view of Advocate General Bot, the wording of the
provision must be understood as referring to the opening of the oral
procedure before the trial court. 47 Therefore, the communication of
detailed information about the charges must take place at the latest
before the adversarial assessment of evidence in the court room,
provided that such communication is ‘accompained by the grant of a
period which suffices for the accused to prepare an effective
defence’. 48 The information to be provided encompasses factual and
legal aspects, while the right to be informed enshrined in paragraph 1
of the provision might be construed as limited to the factual aspects
of the case. 49 Lastly, the directive requires that any changes in the
informat ion given in accordance with Art ic le 6 must be
communicated to suspects and accused persons. 50
In addition to criminal charges, Article 6 Directive 2012/13/EU
contains a specific provision on the right to information for the
reasons of the arrest. 51 As mentioned above, the right to be informed
constitutes the conditio sine qua non that enables the person deprived
of their liberty to challenge the lawfulness of an arrest warrant or
detention order, as guaranteed by Article 5 (4) ECHR.
Likewise, the right to be promptly informed about the reasons for
the arrest corresponds to the procedural safeguard enshrined in Article
5 (2) of the Convention. 52 In this respect, the ECtHR case law
provides clarification regarding both the content of the information
conveyed and the timeframe within which such a communication
should be made. On the first aspect, the Court considered that by
virtue of Article 5 (2) of the Convention ‘any person arrested must be
told, in simple, non-technical language that he can understand, the
essential legal and factual grounds for his arrest’. 53 As regards to the
45 Art. 6 (3) Directive 2012/13/EU.
46 Art. 6 (3) Directive 2012/13/EU.
47 Case C-612/15 Criminal proceedings against Nikolay Kolev and Stefan
Kostadinov, Opinion of AG Bot EU:C:2017:257 para 100.
48 Ibid para 101.
49 S Quattrocolo (n 15) 87.
50 Art. 6(4) Directive 2012/13/EU.
51 Art. 6 (2) Directive 2012/13/EU.
52 C Grabenwarter, European Convention of Human Rights. Commentary (2014,
Beck, Hart, Nomos) 85.
53 Fox, Campbell and Hartley v United Kingdom, App nos 112244/86, 12245/86
and 12383/86 (ECtHR, 30 August 1990) para 40.
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time frame, neither the Convention provisions, nor the case-law,
establish an exact interval defined by minimum and maximum terms
during which the information must be provided. As a general rule, the
information should be given immediately or as soon as practicable
after the person is deprived of his liberty, the requirement of
promptness being assessed in each case according to its special
features. 54 The Court held, for instance that information provided a
few hours after arrest complied with Article 5 (2) ECHR, 55 whilst it
found a violation of the provision where the delay between the arrest
and the communication amounted to 76 hours. 56 Again, the extensive
case law of the Strasbourg Court offers guidance for interpreting
Article 6 (2) Directive 2012/13/EU.
4. The right of access to the case file
The third component of the right to information under the 2012
Directive lies in access to the case file. On the one hand, Article 7
grants the arrested and detained persons access to documents that
are essential to effectively challenging the lawfulness of arrest and
detention. 57 The wording of the provision coincides with the
interpretation adopted by the ECtHR of Article 5 (4) of the
Convention. Indeed, in Mooren v Germany, the Court explicitly
stressed that proceedings ‘before the court examining an appeal
against detention must be adversarial and must always ensure
equality of arms between the parties (...). Equality of arms is not
ensured if counsel is denied access to those documents in the
investigation file which are essential in order to effectively
challenge the lawfulness of his client’s detention’. 58 It is interesting
to note that, unlike the ECtHR case law, 59 Article 7(4) Directive
2012/13/EU rules out any possibility of restricting the right of the
person deprived of his liberty to access documents essential to
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid; Murray v United Kingdom, App no 14310/88 (ECtHR, 28 October 1994)
para 78.
56 Saadi v United Kingdom, App no 13229/03 (ECtHR, 29 January 2008) para
84.
57 Art. 7 (1) Directive 2012/12/EU.
58 Mooren v Germany, App no 11364/03 (ECtHR, 9 July 2009) para 124.
59 See for instance Piechowicz v Poland, App no 20071/07 (ECtHR, 17 April
2012) para 203.
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challenging the lawfulness of detention. The exact content of the
information to be provided ultimately relies on the way the
competent court interprets the ‘essential’ character of those
documents. Hence, the provision of incomplete factual information
or brief summaries may raise concerns about whether the national
judicial practice is fully respectful of the requirement in Article 7(1)
of the EU Directive. 60
On the other hand, the EU Directive guarantees to any other suspect
or accused person the right to access all material evidence in the
possession of the competent authorities, whether for or against
them. 61 The information disclosed must be sufficient to safeguard the
fairness of the proceedings and to enable the adequate preparation of
the defence. 62 Furthermore, access to the case materials shall be
granted in due time. 63 In this respect, the directive adds a precise
time limit prior to which the procedural guarantees must be enforced,
namely ‘at the latest upon submission of the merits of the accusation
to the judgment of a court’. 64 However, it is not clear from the
wording used whether the right to access the case file should be
granted during the pre-trial stage of criminal proceedings.
Consequently, discrepancies may persist among the legislation of
Member States.
The entitlement to disclosure of relevant materials and evidence is
not an absolute right. 65 Accordingly, Article 7 (4) Directive 2012/13/EU
allows Member States to refuse access to certain case materials in a
limited number of circumstances. The grounds of refusal that are
allowed by EU legislation are restricted to threats to the life or the
fundamental rights of another person, as well as the need to safeguard
an important public interest provided that the refusal to access the
case file is strictly necessary for that purpose. 66 In a similar way, the
ECtHR consistently held that restrictions to the right to access to the
60 A Tinsley, ‘Protecting Criminal Defence Rights through EU Law:
Opportunities and Challenges’ (2013) 4 New J Eur Crim L 461 – 480, 478.
61 Art. 7 (2) Directive 2013/13/EU. For an overview of the ECtHR case law on
the right to access the case file, A Tsagkalidis, ‘Directive 2012/13/EU on the Right to
Information in Criminal Proceedings’ (2017) <http://www.era-comm.eu/
procedural_safeguards/kiosk/pdf/2017/Article_Right_to_Information.pdf>, 9 ff.
62 Art. 7 (2) Directive 2013/13/EU.
63 Art. 7 (3) Directive 2013/13/EU.
64 Art. 7 (3) Directive 2013/13/EU.
65 Rowe and Davis v United Kingdom, App no 28901/95 (ECtHR, 16 February
2000) para 61.
66 Art. 7 (4) Directive 2013/13/EU.
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case file are admissible under Article 6 of the Convention in as far as
they are ‘strictly necessary’. 67
It should however be stressed that Article 7 Directive 2012/13/EU
does not refer to official questioning. The silence of the text on this point
might seem surprising, especially considering that knowledge of
incriminating evidence is crucial for the defence to prepare for
interrogation. Indeed, empirical studies have shown the reluctance of
prosecuting authorities to disclose information. The reasons
highlighted by these studies have their basis in the culture of secrecy
characterizing criminal investigations and distrust toward defence
lawyers.
5. Recording procedure and legal remedies
Directive 2012/13/EU provides two legal mechanisms in order to
ensure the effectiveness of the right to information. First, Article 8
grants the suspect or accused person, or their lawyer, the right to
challenge the failure or refusal of the competent authorities to provide
information in accordance with the directive. 68 It is worth noting that
an equivalent right to challenge is not guaranteed as such by the
ECHR. Indeed, the Strasbourg Court assesses the overall effectiveness
of the right to be informed and the access to evidence under the
principle of equality of arms. 69 The right to access the case file
constitutes an essential element forming part of the reasonable
opportunity that must be afforded to the defence to present his case in
conditions that do not place him at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the
prosecution. 70 Secondly, all the information provided in accordance
with the Directive shall be noted using the recording procedure
specified in the law of the Member State concerned. 71 Similarly, the
ECtHR found, for instance, a breach of the right to be informed of
the reasons for the arrest in case of a lack of reliable information
resulting from the absence of recording. 72
67 Jasper v United Kingdom, App no 27052/95 (ECtHR, 16 February 2000) para
52.
68 Art. 8 (2) Directive 2012/13/EU.
69 Foucher v France, App no 22209/93 (ECtHR, 18 March 1997) para 32 ff.
70 Ibid.
71 Art. 8 (2) Directive 2012/13/EU.
72 Kaboulov v Ukraine, App no 41015/04 (ECtHR, 19 November 2009) para 147
– 148.
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However, no procedural sanctions are provided in case of a
violation of the duty to record or a breach of the right to information.
One could wonder whether the lack of legal consequences in case of
infringement would undermine the effectiveness of the procedural
guarantees enshrined in the EU Directive. 73 Although the defendant
shall have the possibility to challenge the failure of the competent
authorities to provide information, the concrete consequences (if any)
of such an appeal procedure where the competent authorities found a
breach of the right to information strongly relies on the national
legislation of each Member State. Furthermore, some empirical
studies have pointed out that despite the information conveyed,
individuals mostly remain ignorant of the procedural guarantees they
are entitled to. In order for the accused to gain a sound understanding
of the procedure, the tone of communication is just as important as
the content. From that perspective, does the right to information
guarantee, in an effective way, sufficient awareness of the suspected
or accused person of their own rights?
5. Conclusions
Even though Directive 2012/13/EU is mostly built upon the ECHR
and its related case law, it takes a step forward with regards to certain
aspects of the right to information in criminal proceedings. While the
abundant case law of the Strasbourg Court provides further
explanations concerning the amount of information that must be
communicated, the EU Directive imposes on national authorities more
specific requirements relating to the time frame, recording and legal
remedies. In doing so, the EU legislator strove to enhance the
effectiveness of the right to be informed. 74 Similarly, the ECtHR pays
particular attention to the effective exercise of defence rights
stemming from the principle of a fair trial. 75 However, the
effectiveness of the right to information under the Convention
primarily relies on the specific features and circumstances of a case.
Likewise, the ECtHR stressed that the fact that competent authorities
passively make information available to the suspect or accused person
73 S Quattrocolo (n 15) 90.
74 Recital 16 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the right to information in criminal proceedings, COM(2010) 392 final.
75 Padalov v Bulgaria, App no 54784/00 (ECtHR, 10 August 2006) para 51.
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does not necessarily mean that they systematically comply with the
rights guaranteed under the Convention. 76 Indeed, the right to
information in criminal proceedings also entails a positive obligation
on competent authorities to provide individuals with information on
their defence rights as well as to take additional steps in order to
ensure that they effectively understand the information conveyed. 77
Despite this common background, it should be emphasized that
Member States have less leeway regarding the duty to inform the
suspect or accused person under the Directive compared to the ECHR.
Although the Directive strengthens the right to information arising
from European legal texts, its transnational implementation still raises
questions. In this regard, the CJEU explicitly held that ‘in so far as
the ECHR would, in requiring the EU and the Member States to be
considered Contracting Parties not only in their relations with
Contracting Parties which are not Member States of the EU but also
in their relations with each other, including where such relations are
governed by EU law, require a Member State to check that another
Member State has observed fundamental rights, even though EU law
imposes an obligation of mutual trust between those Member States,
accession is liable to upset the underlying balance of the EU and
undermine the autonomy of EU law’. 78 To what extent is the EU
judicature willing to limit the principle of mutual recognition in
criminal matters in the event of a violation of the right to be informed
and more generally when procedural guarantees of the defendant have
been infringed? The question does not only reflect concerns about the
judicial dialogue between European judges. It also reminds us that the
effective implementation of defence rights guaranteed by the new
directives depends in fine on the judicial review undertaken by
national and European courts. The judgments of the CJEU in Covaci
and Tranca are surely the first of a series of preliminary rulings,
which will further clarify the scope of defence rights within the
multilayered European penal area. 79
The role the CJEU will play in interpreting defence in criminal
76 Mattoccia v Italy, App no 23969/94 (ECtHR, 25 July 2000) para 65.
77 Talat Tunç v Turkey, App no 32432/96 (ECtHR, 27 March 2007) para 61;
Panovits c. Cyprus, App no 4268/04 (ECtHR, 11 December 2008) para 72 – 73.
78 CJEU, Opinion 2/13 EU:C:2014:2454, para 194.
79 At the time of writing ths contribution, two additional preliminary rulings
dealing with the interpretation of Directive 2012/13/EU are pending. See Requests
for a preliminary ruling in Case C-510/17 Criminal proceedings against ML and
Case C-646/17 Criminal Proceedings against Gianluca Moro.
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proceedings is even more crucial given the potential scope of application
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. According to article 51 (2) of the
EU Charter, the latter applies to the Member States only when they are
implementing the Union law. 80 In other words, the Court of Justice has
jurisdiction to rule on the consistency of domestic law with the Charter
provided that the legal situation under consideration comes within the
scope of EU law. 81 As Directive 2012/13/EU shows, the scope of
application of secondary law harmonizing procedural guarantees
covers any kind of criminal proceedings, irrespective of the
seriousness of the offence at stake. 82 Likewise, the applicability of
EU Directives on defence rights under criminal procedure is not
dependent on prior harmonization of substantive criminal law, nor
should the procedural guarantees stemming from the Charter be
limited to those sectors of penal law falling within the scope of
Article 83 TFEU. The transversal dimension of the newly adopted
directives will dramatically increase the number of preliminary rulings
addressed to the EU judicature in the coming years. Let us hope that
this will give rise to courageous stances and fruitful judicial dialogue.
80 Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson EU:C:2013:105, para 19.
81 Case C-650/13 Delvigne EU:C:2015:648, para 27.
82 Art 2 Directive 2012/13/EU.
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CHAPTER IV
THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO A LAWYER
UNDER DIRECTIVE 2013/48/EU
Teresa Armenta Deu and Lisa Urban
TABLE OF CONTENTS: 1. Introduction. – 2. Scope of application. – 3. The content
of the right to legal assistance. – 3.1. Access and communication with a
defence lawyer. – 3.2. The role of the defence counsel: from attendance
to effective participation. – 3.3. Legal assistance and EAW. – 4. Waiver
and limitations. – 5. Conclusions.
1. Introduction
At the very heart of a fair criminal trial stands the right of the
defendant 1 to adequately and effectively defend himself. A keystone
of this defence is the possibility of having access to a lawyer. In this
context, Article 6 paragraph 3 (c) of the European Convention of
Human Rights (ECHR) states that any person charged with a criminal
offence is entitled to ‘defend himself in person or through legal
assistance of his own choosing, or, if he has not sufficient means to
pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of
Justice so require'. Indeed, the defence lawyer holds a central role
throughout the procedure, as he ensures, on several levels, effective
defence for the suspect or the accused. By explaining and advising his
client, the legal counsel enables the defendant to understand the case
against him, prepare his defence and enforce his rights, thereby
enhancing the equality of arms.
Although the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has stated
that the right to legal advice must be guaranteed at any stage of the
1 Defendant, as used in this article, is to be understood as both the suspect and the
accused person.
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proceedings, 2 past experiences have shown that the exact scope of this
right and its limitations differ greatly from one Contracting State to
another. 3 This is due to a number of factors. Firstly, the Convention
itself sets only minimum standards for the protection of human rights
and leaves it to the national legislators to implement and enforce the
guaranteed rights accordingly. As a consequence, the practical
implementation into national law may vary greatly. Secondly, the role
of the ECtHR as a harmonizing tool is also essentially limited, since
the Strasbourg judges only decide in a reactive manner and on a case-
to-case basis. Furthermore, the decisions only unfold their effect inter
partes and without the guarantee of effective and rapid enforcement
mechanisms. 4 Consequently, the actual application of the right to
legal assistance, as with many other rights protected by the
Convention, differs greatly among the Contracting States.
However, common standards in the protection of procedural rights
are essential to promote cross-border cooperation among EU Member
States. Indeed, judicial cooperation within the EU criminal justice area
is based on the principle of mutual recognition, which requires mutual
trust that only grows where fundamental rights are respected.
Therefore, Article 82 paragraph 2 (b) of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union (TFEU) demands the establishment of
homogenous minimum rules concerning ‘the rights of individuals in
criminal procedure’ in order to facilitate mutual recognition of judicial
decisions and to render cooperation in cross-border criminal
procedures more effective. To this end, the Swedish Presidency
elaborated a Roadmap 5 in 2009, promoting common minimum
2 Volkov and Adamskiy v Russia App nos 7614/09 and 30863/10 (ECtHR, 26
March 2015).
3 See the example of the Salduz doctrine described in J Jackson, ‘Providing
Suspects with Access to a Lawyer’ in R Colson, S Field (eds), EU Criminal Justice
and the Challenges of Diversity (Cambridge, 2016) 183. ‘Repetitive Cases’ are
another problem in this context, for more detail see: T. Spronken, D de Vocht, ‘EU
Policy to Guarantee Procedural Rights in Criminal Proceedings: “Step by Step”’
(2011) 37 North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation,
443 ff.
4 See statistics on pending cases and their length provided by the Department for
the Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, online available
under <https://rm.coe.int/2-pending-cases-2013-2017-state-by-state/16807b8668> and
<https://rm.coe.int/5-length-of-the-execution-process-pending-state-by-state-eng/
16807b91b5> (last accessed on 15.04.2018).
5 Resolution of the Council of 30 November 2009 on a Roadmap for
strengthening procedural rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal
proceedings [2009] OJ C 295/1.
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standards for the protection of suspected and accused persons in criminal
proceedings. 6 In this Roadmap, which was later incorporated into the
Stockholm Programme, 7 the European Council proposed to address
the different procedural safeguards separately, in order to facilitate
negotiations between the Member States. 8 In the following years, a
number of Directives on defence rights in criminal proceedings were
adopted, among which was the Directive 2013/48/EU on access to a
lawyer. 9
In accordance with the above, the Directive follows three general
aims: (a) to harmonize national procedural standards on the right to
legal assistance in order to generate trust among the EU Member
States, (b) to overcome shortcomings of the protection of this right in
the ECHR and (c) to further develop and strengthen the existing
standards of protection for the right to access to a lawyer as set out
by the ECHR and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (hereinafter
the Charter).
The provisions of the Directive had to be transposed into national
law by the 27 November 2016, as stated in Article 15 paragraph 1.
All Member States complied with the transposal deadline. By
November 2019 the Commission will assess the application of the
right to legal assistance by submitting a report on the effectiveness of
the implementation into national law. 10
6 With this Roadmap, the Swedish Presidency invited the Commission to submit
new legislative proposals on the topic, after the Proposal for a Framework-Decision on
Procedural Rights in Criminal Cases, COM (2004) 328, 28 April 2004, had failed. See:
Resolution of the Council of 30 November 2009 on a Roadmap for strengthening
procedural rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings [2009] OJ
C 295, 4.
7 European Council, The Stockholm Programme- An Open and Secure Europe
Serving and Protecting Citizens, 4 May 2010, Doc no C 115/01.
8 The Roadmap separated the issue in the following Measures: Measure A:
Translation and Interpretation; Measure B: Information on Rights and Information
about the Charges; Measure C: Legal Aid and Legal Advice; Measure D:
Communication with Relatives, Employers and Consular Authorities; Measure E:
Special Safeguards for Vulnerable Persons; Measure F: A Green Paper on the Right
to Review of the Grounds for Detention.
9 Directive 2013/48/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22
October 2013 on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in
European arrest warrant proceedings, and on the right to have a third party
informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with third persons and
with consular authorities while deprived of liberty [2013] OJ L 294/1.
10 Art. 16 Directive 2013/48/EU.
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2. Scope of application
Article 2 Directive 2013/48/EU defines the personal, objective,
territorial and temporal scope of application of the right to a lawyer,
as it is guaranteed under the Directive.
The subjective scope of application extends to all suspects and
accused persons in criminal proceedings, including persons subject to
European Arrest Warrant proceedings, 11 independently of EU
citizenship or country of residency. Furthermore, the right to access a
lawyer benefits all persons ‘who in the course of questioning by the
police or by another law enforcement authority, become suspects or
accused persons’. 12 In other words, the person has to be a suspect or
accused person and not just a witness in criminal proceedings.
Recitals 20 and 21 clarify that the term questioning does not include
preliminary interviews that are undertaken in order to identify a
suspect or to gather general information and determine whether an
investigation should be opened or not. Any interview of a witness
should be ‘suspended immediately’ as soon as the questioned person
becomes a suspect or an accused person. In this interruption, he
should be informed of his rights and be given the opportunity to have
access to a lawyer. 13
The directive gives, however, no concrete guidelines on how to
determine the moment in which a person must cease to be considered
a witness and start to be considered a defendant. 14 Such determination
implies several undefined concepts. Firstly, Member States might differ
on the minimum threshold of evidence generally needed to declare
somebody a suspect in a criminal investigation. While in one country a
slight probability might be sufficient grounds for somebody to be
officially considered a suspect, another Member State might require
strong evidence in order to provide him with the same status.
Secondly, the considerations depend on the evaluation of evidence in
the individual case at hand, demanding a subjective opinion and
evaluation of the specific circumstances of the case. The determination
of the exact moment in which someone starts to be considered a
suspect in criminal proceedings depends therefore on a combination of
11 Article 2 (2) and 3 Directive 2013/48/EU.
12 Article 2 (4) Directive 2013/48/EU.
13 Recital 21 Directive 2013/48/EU.
14 L Bachmaier Winter, ‘The EU Directive on the Right to Access to a Lawyer: A
Critical Assessment’ in Stefano Ruggeri (ed), Human Rights in European Criminal
Law (Cham/Heidelberg/New York/Dordrecht/London, 2015) 113.
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less foreseeable factors. This uncertainty arising from the vague
formulation of the Directive could have been better controlled, had
Article 2 paragraph 3 been followed by a clarification that even in
cases where doubt has arisen about the statute of the interrogated
person, the questioning should be suspended and the rights stemming
from this Directive should be granted. 15
In its material scope of application, the right of access to a lawyer is
limited to criminal proceedings and proceedings for the execution of a
European Arrest Warrant. 16 Furthermore, the Directive states
explicitly that the right to legal advice has to be guaranteed whenever
a suspect or accused person finds himself deprived of his liberty. 17
Not all types of proceedings are, however, included in the scope of
application. Paragraph 4 of this Article restricts the application of the
Directive in proceedings regarding minor offences. Where the
deprivation of liberty cannot be imposed as a sanction or if an
authority other than a court having jurisdiction in criminal matters
imposes a sanction that may be appealed or referred to such a court,
the ‘Directive shall only apply to the proceedings before a court
having jurisdiction in criminal matters’. 18 This leads to important
shortcomings in the protection of the right to legal advice, since it
does not encompass the entirety of administrative proceedings that
actually have a criminal nature. Indeed, the definition of ‘minor
offences’ might strongly vary among the Member States and matters
that might entail important economic sanctions might fall outside the
scope of protection of the Directive. 19 In order to compensate for
these shortcomings as much as possible, the Directive ensures its
rights from the moment that those cases are brought before a criminal
court onwards, either directly or in the form of appeal proceedings. A
better defined wording of the Directive, 20 in line with the case law of
the ECtHR, would have been preferable regarding this point.
15 See L Bachmaier Winter (n 15) 113, where the author demands additionally
that witnesses should be granted the right to seek the assistance of a lawyer,
whenever they require so, and that this assistance should not be conditioned by the
fact that the concerned person is considered as a witness or as a suspect or accused.
16 Art. 2 Directive 2013/48/EU.
17 Art. 2 (4) (b) Directive 2013/48/EU.
18 The Directive 2013/48/EU states in Recital 17 that this exception was made to
exclude, for instance, proceedings in minor traffic offences or in minor offences in
relation to general municipal regulations or public order.
19 W van Ballegooij, The Nature of Mutual Recognition in European Law
(Cambridge/Antwerp/Portland, 2015) 211 ff.
20 Also in view of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR on the criminal nature of
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As to the territorial scope, the Directive applies to all EU Member
States, with the exception of Denmark, UK and Ireland who applied
their right to opt-out of the Directive as foreseen in the Treaties. 21
Regarding its time scope, the right to legal assistance is granted to
defendants ‘from the time when they are made aware by the competent
authorities of a Member State, by official notification or otherwise, that
they are suspected or accused of having committed a criminal offence’
and until the proceedings, including respective appeal proceedings, 22
are concluded. 23 Basing the existence of the right to a lawyer on the
act of informing the defendant about his status of being a suspect or
accused entails two risks. On the one hand, it must be noted that the
provision only addresses competent authorities of the Member States.
This raises questions as to the application of Directive 2013/48/EU
vis-à-vis the European Public Prosecutors Office (EPPO). 24 On the
other hand, making the protection of the Directive depend on whether
or not a person has been informed about his status as a suspect or
accused could encourage the authorities to delay the point from which
legal assistance has to be granted by simply deferring the moment of
notification. 25 This theoretical risk is limited by the clarifications in
Article 3 paragraph 2. Independent of any notification, access to a
lawyer must be granted ‘without undue delay’ and at the latest, (a)
before the first questioning, (b) when investigative measures or acts of
evidence-gathering are undertaken, (c) when the concerned person is
deprived of his liberty, (d) before court appearances. By ensuring the
suspect or accused benefits from access to a lawyer even before the
first questioning, the Directive follows the standards set out by the
ECtHR jurisprudence. 26 However, specifically in situations in which a
witness becomes a suspect or accused in the course of an interview,
certain administrative sanctions Engel and Others v the Netherlands App nos 5100/71,
5101/71, 5102/71, 5354/72 and 5370/72, ECtHR, 8 June 1976, para 82 - 83.
21 Recital 58 and 59 Directive 2013/48/EU
22 Compare to ECtHR case-law: for instance Volkov and Adamskiy v Russia App
nos 7614/09, 30863/10 (ECtHR, 26 March 2015).
23 Art. 2 paragraph 1 Directive 2013/48/EU.
24 L Bachmaier Winter(n 15) 119.
25 Ibid 118.
26 In Salduz v Turkey, the Court states that a lawyer should be present from the
initiation of the proceedings onwards, since a lawyer should be available as ‘an
accused often finds himself in a particularly vulnerable position at that stage of the
proceedings, the effect of which is amplified by the fact that legislation on criminal
procedure tends to become increasingly complex, notably with respect to the rules
governing the gathering and use of evidence’. Salduz v Turkey App no 36391/02
(ECtHR, 27 November 2008) para 52.
70 PART I, CHAPTER IV
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
the aforementioned risk stands. As noted above, it might cause
additional difficulties to determine this exact moment. For
proceedings regarding an EAW, Article 2 paragraph 2 specifies that
the Directive applies from the moment the concerned person is
arrested in the Member State.
3. The content of the right to legal assistance
The Directive focusses on the protection of four different
procedural rights: The right to legal assistance, the right to have a
third person informed in case of deprivation of liberty, the right to
communicate with third persons while deprived of liberty and the
right to communicate with consular authorities. This study will
concentrate only on the first aspect, the right to access to a lawyer.
At the outset, it is to be pointed out that Article 14, specified by
Recital 54, states that the Directive only sets minimum guarantees,
which do not prevent the Member States from providing a higher
level of protection, in accordance with the standards set out by the
ECHR and the EU Charter.
Concerning concrete content of the right, Article 3 of the Directive
specifies that the effective exercise of the right to legal assistance
includes (a) the right of the suspect or accused person to meet and
communicate in private with his lawyer, 27 (b) the effective
participation of the lawyer in questioning 28 as well as (c) the
attendance of the lawyer during certain investigative and evidence-
gathering acts. 29 The content of the right will therefore be analysed
under two perspectives. Firstly, the actual access to a lawyer, that is
the possibilities of the concerned person to contact a lawyer of his
choosing, the communication between the lawyer and the suspect or
accused, and the confidentiality of this communication. Secondly, the
analysis will focus on the role of the lawyer in the light of the
Directive. This includes rules concerning effective participation in
questioning and attendance at investigative measures.
27 Art. 3 (3) (a) Directive 2013/48/EU
28 Art. 3 (3) (b) Directive 2013/48/EU.
29 Art. 3 (3) (c) Directive 2013/48/EU.
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3.1. Access and communication with a defence lawyer
In general, the Directive does not lay down procedures to establish
the contact to a lawyer, let alone whether the competent authorities
should take an active role in this regard. However, Recital 27 requires
the Member States to make general information available. Website-
information or leaflets at police stations are mentioned as examples of
actions that Member States could engage in to facilitate obtaining a
lawyer. However, when a suspect or accused is deprived of his liberty,
the obligations of the Member States increase: national competent
authorities should take an active role in arranging for legal assistance
by providing, for instance, lists of available lawyers and, eventually,
legal aid. 30 Additionally, the competent authorities should take any
potential vulnerability of the person concerned into consideration in
order to ensure the effective exercise of the rights provided by the
Directive in those situations. 31
Regarding the choice of a lawyer, the wording of the Directive
falls short when compared to the case law of the ECtHR. Indeed,
Article 6 paragraph 3 (c) states that the right to legal advice should
entail the right to be represented by the lawyer of one’s choice,
irrespective of reasonable exceptions. 32 Article 3 Directive 2013/
48/EU does not do so. Although the absence of this detail in the
Direc t ive is regre t tab le , in prac t ice i t wi l l hard ly be of
consequence. As Recital 53 notes, the implementation and
interpretation of Directive 2013/48/EU have to be effected in light
of the ECHR and the related case law. Consequently, the fact that
the right to legal assistance expands to a lawyer of one’s choice
should be read into the Directive 2013/48/EU. 33
When provided with a lawyer, the suspect or accused person should
be able to meet and communicate in private with his legal counsel.
While it is generally up to the Member States to decide on the
practical arrangements of these communications, regarding, for
example, the duration and frequency of meetings, the Directive
requires that general means of communication be provided at any
stage of the proceedings, even before lawyer and suspect actually
30 Recital 28 Directive 2013/48/EU.
31 Art. 13 Directive 2013/48/EU; Recital 51 Directive 2013/48/EU.
32 See Artico v Italy App no 6694/74 (ECtHR, 13 May 1980) para 34 and Pakelli
v Germany App no 8398/78 (ECtHR, 25 April 1983) para 31.
33 A Ogorodava, T Spronken, ‘Legal Advice in Police Custody: From Europe to
a Local Police Station’ (2014) Erasmus Law Review 193.
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meet. 34 By way of example, Recital 23 Directive 2013/48/EU mentions
the possibility of video-conferencing and communication technology as
means by which the effective exercise of the right could be granted.
In any case, the communication between a lawyer and his client has
to be confidential, in order to ensure a trust-based relationship. 35 This
means that all communications which are permitted between the
suspect and his legal counsel have to have their privacy protected to
ensure that an effective defence can be composed. Guaranteeing the
confidentiality of the communication not only means that Member
States should stay passive and refrain from any interruption or
disruption of the communication, but also that they should actively
support the facilitation of confidential communication if the suspect or
accused finds himself deprived of his liberty. 36
3.2. The role of the defence counsel: from attendance to effective
participation
As far as the role of the lawyer during the proceedings is concerned,
the Directive distinguishes two situations: interrogations and other
measures of evidence gathering. Regarding interrogations by either
law enforcement or judicial authorities, the Directive provides for the
lawyers presence and effective participation. 37 It is up to the Member
States to define and regulate the specifics of this participation, as long
as the national procedural rules ‘do not prejudice the effective
exercise and essence of the right concerned’. Recital 25 states that the
participation of the lawyer may for instance consist in asking
questions, requesting clarifications and making statements. Interpreted
in line with ECtHR case-law, 38 the participation of the lawyer should
also include the possibility of intervening whenever the defendant’s
right to remain silent has to be protected and to prevent any unlawful
or unfair behaviour from the competent authorities. 39 Nonetheless,
Directive 2013/48/EU only sets vague minimum standards on this
point, using undefined terms like ‘effective participation’ 40 and the
34 Recital 23 Directive 2013/48/EU.
35 Art. 4 Directive 2013/48/EU.
36 Recital 33 Directive 2013/48/EU.
37 Art. 3 (3) ( b) Directive 2013/48/EU.
38 Salduz v Turkey App no 36391/02 (ECtHR, 27 November 2008) para 54.
39 A Ogorodava, T Spronken (n 36) 195.
40 Art. 3 (3) (b) Directive 2013/48/EU.
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‘effective exercise and essence of the right’, 41 a lack of clarity that calls
for interpretation by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).
Outside the specific situations of questioning, the Directive requires
the possibility of the lawyer’s participation only when the suspect or
accused finds himself deprived of his liberty. In such cases it is
necessary that the lawyer is able to question the conditions of the
deprivation of liberty with the competent authorities. 42 For other
evidence-gathering acts, Directive 2013/48/EU is even more limited,
since several Member States feared that the presence of a lawyer at
every investigative step would delay investigations, without
contributing significantly to the protection of the defendant. 43 It only
foresees the lawyer’s attendance at investigative acts at which the
defendant also might attend under national law and without any
obligation for the Member States to provide additionally for the
possibility for the lawyer to participate actively in those acts. Article
3 paragraph 3 (c) states that the defendant’s lawyer should at least
attend identity parades, confrontations and reconstructions of a crime
scene, 44 as long as they are provided for in national law, since they
represent key measures in establishing the facts of a criminal offence
and the guilt of a suspect. For any additional investigative act, the
Member States remain free to decide whether the lawyer might be
allowed to attend. By choosing such specific requirements, the scope
of the protection of the right to legal assistance is greatly limited in
the Directive. 45
41 Recital 25 Directive 2013/48/EU. Critics also by E Cape, J Hodgson ‘The
Right to Access to a Lawyer at Police Stations – Making the European Union
Directive Work in Practice’ (2014) New Journal of European Criminal Law 467 s.
42 Recital 29 Directive 2013/48/EU.
43 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and on the right to communicate
upon arrest – Note by Belgium/France/Ireland/the Netherlands/ the United
Kingdom, 22 September 2011, Doc no 14495/11. Explanation and comment in J
Jackson (n 3) 189.
44 Little case-law of the ECtHR is available that defines the general role of the
lawyer in criminal proceedings. One example is the Dayanan v Turkey case, in
which the Court states that the ‘counsel has to be able to secure without restriction
the fundamental aspects of that person’s defence: discussion of the case,
organization of the defence, collection of evidence favorable to the accused,
preparation for questioning, support of an accused in distress and checking of the
conditions of detention’. Dyanan v Turkey App no 7377/03(ECtHR, 13 October
2009) para 32.
45 In this context, L Bachmaier Winter proposes that the Directive 2013/48/EU
should have required ‘the widest possible participation of the defence lawyer in the
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3.3. Legal assistance and EAW
Article 10 Directive 2013/48/EU adapts the right to legal assistance
to the specifics of EAW proceedings. According to the rules set out by
Framework Decision 202/584/JHA on the EAW, which allows a
challenge to an EAW only in the executing Member State, Directive
2013/48/EU provides that persons subject to an EAW shall have
access to a lawyer in the executing Member State. Additionally, the
executing State should inform the person subject to the request about
his right to appoint a secondary lawyer in the issuing State, who
would assist the primary lawyer with information and advice. For this
purpose, the issuing State shall provide information to facilitate the
appointment of such a secondary lawyer, upon request by the
concerned person and the executing State. 46 Critics invoke that this
mere provision of information about the right of access to a lawyer in
the issuing State might not be enough to protect the right to legal
assistance sufficiently in practice. 47 The actual content of the right
granted under Article 10 paragraph 2 is nearly identical to the
wording of Article 3. 48 However, the wording is less diligent, since
Article 10 paragraph 2 abstains to refer to an ‘effective participation’
and the ‘effective exercise and essence of the right’ 49 as safeguards
of this right. Nonetheless, this discrepancy in the drafting of the
Directive will most likely not have any consequences in practice. 50
4. Waiver and limitations
The right to legal assistance is not an absolute right. A first
consequence thereof is the possibility for the suspect or accused to
waive his right to legal assistance. Article 9 Directive 2013/48/EU
sets out the conditions of a waiver. It should be noted, however, that
the possibility of waiving the right protected by the Directive might
be limited by national rules requiring the mandatory assistance of a
investigative stage, as long as this does not prejudice the success of the investigation
and establish the exclusionary rule for evidence for not complying with the right of
access to a lawyer during those three investigative acts set out under Article
3(3)(c)’. L Bachmaier Winter (n 15) 122.
46 Art. 10 (4) and (5) Directive 2013/48/EU.
47 L Bachmaier Winter (n 15) 123; opposed opinion by W van Ballegooij (n 20)
217.
48 Compare also Recitals 42-44 Directive 2013/48/EU.
49 Art. 3 (3) (b) Directive 2013/48/EU.
50 See Recital 53 Directive 2013/48/EU.
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lawyer. This might, for example, be the case in proceedings in front of
higher courts and tribunals.
For a waiver to be effective, the suspect or accused must have been
duly informed about his right to access a lawyer and about the
consequences of a waiver. This information must have been clear,
sufficient and in simple and understandable language. 51 In this aspect,
the protection granted by the ECtHR goes further, demanding that the
competent authorities take all reasonable steps necessary in order to
ensure that the defendant is fully aware of his rights, their content and
the consequences of a waiver. 52 The second condition is that the
waiver is given voluntarily and unequivocally. With regards to the
case law of the ECtHR this means that no inaccurate or misleading
information should be given. 53 The wording of the Directive could
have been more detailed at this point, setting out concrete rules of
conduct and ensuring that the defendant be placed in a position in
which he is actually able ‘to make a considered and informed
choice’. 54 Any waiver might be revoked at any point of the
subsequent proceedings.
The Directive 2013/48/EU recognizes several circumstances under
which the right to a lawyer might be limited: temporary derogations
under Article 3 paragraph 5 and Article 3 paragraph 6, as well as
limitations to the confidentiality in the communication between
lawyer and defendant.
Firstly, under Article 3 paragraph 5, after a person is deprived of his
liberty, the Member State might derogate temporarily from the right to
have access to a lawyer, if the geographical remoteness of the
detained person so requires. This might be the case, if he finds
himself in overseas territories or in a military mission outside the
national territory, as Recital 30 clarifies. However, during such
temporary derogation, the authorities should refrain from any
questioning or investigative measures. Furthermore, the person
deprived of his liberty should, if possible, be provided with
communication to his lawyer, for instance via telephone or video-
conference. 55
51 Art. 10 (1) (a) Directive 2013/48/EU.
52 Panovits v Cyprus App no 4268/04 (ECtHR, 11 December 2008) paras 67 ff
and Plonka v Poland App no 20310/02 (ECtHR, 31 March 2009) paras 37 ff.
53 A Ogorodava, T Spronken (n 36) 193.
54 E Cape, J Hodgson (n 44) 459.
55 Recital 30 Directive 2013/48/EU.
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Secondly, it is possible to delay the opportunity for the defendant’s
lawyer to attend questioning or investigative acts in the pre-trial stage,
whenever this is necessary in order to prevent serious consequences
for the life, liberty or physical integrity of a person or, if this is
necessary to prevent substantial jeopardy for the criminal proceedings
(like the destruction or alteration of essential evidence or the
interference with witnesses). 56 Contrary to the aforementioned
derogations, authorities are allowed to question the defendant or to
perform investigative acts in these circumstances, as long as they are
only undertaken in order to avert the apprehended consequences and
under the condition that the defendant was informed about his right to
remain silent. 57 Such situations will often arise in specific fields of
criminality, like terrorism. 58
Both types of temporary derogations apply only under the general
condition that the derogation is (a) proportionate and necessary, (b)
strictly limited in time, (c) not exclusively based in the seriousness
of the alleged offence and (d) not affecting the overall fairness of
the criminal proceedings. 59 The limiting decision has to be taken
individually by a judicial or other competent authority, under the
condition that this decision is submitted to judicial review. For the
same reason, the decision should also be duly reasoned and
recorded. 60
As far as the confidentiality of communication between lawyer and
defendant is concerned, Recitals 33 and 34 contain detailed information
about the possibilities and conditions of exceptions to this right. This
includes situations in which the lawyer is suspected to have engaged
in criminal activities himself, or special exceptions applicable if the
defendant is deprived of his liberty. The latter concerns mainly
measures to avoid illicit enclosures 61 and incidental breaches of
confidentiality in the context of lawful surveillance. 62
56 Recital 32 Directive 2013/48/EU.
57 Recital 31 Directive 2013/48/EU.
58 Compare in this context, Ibrahim and Others v United Kingdom Appl nos
50541/08, 50571/08, 50573/08, 40351/09 (ECtHR, 13 September 2016).
59 Art. 8 (1) Directive 2013/48/EU.
60 Art. 8 (2) Directive 2013/48/EU.
61 Recital 33 Directive 2013/48/EU.
62 Recital 34 Directive 2013/48/EU.
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5. Conclusions
It was the declared aim of Directive 2013/48/EU to contribute to the
facilitation of mutual recognition and efficient cross-border cooperation
in the EU and much progress has been made in this regard. However, for
several issues, the chance to formulate clear conditions and underline
details was missed. 63 Although the Directive 2013/48/EU is intended
to harmonize the right to access a lawyer in criminal proceedings,
thereby mitigating the limited impact of the ECHR on the national
legal frameworks, shortcomings in wording will lead to the necessity
to fall back on the interpretations of the Strasbourg Court. This might
prevent the protection of the right to legal assistance to unfold itself
directly, but may require both national courts and the CJEU to further
clarify the content of the rights provided under the EU Directive. In
this regard it is worth noting that Article 13 paragraph 1 of Directive
2013/48/EU requires national legislation to provide for ‘effective
remedies’ against breaches of the rights to legal assistance.
Additionally, the second paragraph of the same Article demands that
breaches to the right should be taken under consideration in the
assessment of statements or evidence that was obtained on the basis
of such a breach or even in cases in which a temporal derogation was
authorized.
In practice, the successful implementation of Directive 2013/48/EU
relies on the willing cooperation of key stakeholders, specifically police
and lawyers. This calls for professional training as well as changes in
policies and judicial practice. 64 For instance, officers should be
trained to deliver information about the right to legal assistance in a
neutral manner and encourage defendants to take up this right. 65
Unfortunately, Directive 2013/48/EU remains silent on these points,
leaving the success of its implementation to the sole discretion and
good will of the Member States.
For a long time, the most common investigative policy prevailing in
a large number of Member States was to keep lawyers as far as possible
from criminal investigations. In this aspect, the enforcement of the right
to legal assistance calls for an immediate change in the everyday
63 Also critical in this regard, A Soo ‘Article 12 of the Directive 2013/48/EU: A
Starting Point for Discussion on a Common Understanding of the Criteria for Effective
Remedies of Violation of the Right to Counsel’ (2017) European Journal of Crime,
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 32 s.
64 A Ogorodava, T Spronken (n 36) 204.
65 E Cape, J Hodgson (n 44) 472 s.
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practice of police officials. Lawyers’ interventions can no longer be
considered a danger to investigative success, but should rather be
perceived as an asset for a fair trial.
A right to legal assistance should additionally entail prompt access
to a competent lawyer, however regarding the quality of legal assistance
provided Directive 2013/48/EU also relies on the commitment of the
Member States. They should, however, ensure that sufficiently
qualified and experienced lawyers are willing to accept urgent cases.
It should also be ensured that lawyers are available on short notice
and willing to attend interrogations and investigative measures even
outside office hours. This could be established by ensuring adequate
pay schemes for state-provided legal aid. Furthermore, an obligation
for Member States to provide adequate duty-lawyer schemes for
urgent cases could prove useful in rendering the right to legal access
effective. 66
Directive 2013/48/EU, especially considering its interplay with the
other ABC Directives, is to be welcomed as a milestone in the
harmonization of procedural rights among the EU Member States.
Although it represents a major step forward in the protection of
defence rights, much is still to be done, if defence rights are to be
protected in a comprehensive and effective way.
66 A Ogorodava, T Spronken (n 36) 205.
RIGHT OF ACCESS TO A LAWYER 79
© Wolters Kluwer Italia

PART II
EFFECTIVE REMEDIES FOR EFFECTIVE RIGHTS
IN THE EUROPEAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE AREA

CHAPTER I
ENSURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DEFENCE RIGHTS:
REMEDIAL OBLIGATIONS
UNDER THE ABC DIRECTIVES
Valentina Covolo
TABLE OF CONTENTS: 1. Effective judicial protection versus national procedural
autonomy. – 2. General obligation to provide an effective remedy. – 3.
Right to challenge in accordance with procedures in national law. – 4.
Restrictions on defence rights by judicial authorities or subject to
judicial review. – 4.1 The concept of judicial authority. – 4.2 The
timing of review. – 5. Right to a new trial. – 6. Conclusions.
1. Effective judicial protection versus national procedural
autonomy
The effectiveness of defence rights granted by the ABC Directives
does not simply rely on their correct implementation into national law. It
greatly depends on the possibility for suspects and accused persons to
have access to judicial review of the respect of procedural safeguards
they are entitled to under Union law. In this light, the existence of
effective control mechanisms within the Member States becomes a
topical and contentious issue within the European criminal justice area.
The increasing number of EU instruments in the field of
criminal law dramatically expands the potential impact the right to
an effective remedy may have on the national criminal justice
systems. The judgments delivered by Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) in this field are early indicators of this.
The case law does not solely encompass landmark decisions
related to the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), such as Jeremy F, 1
1 Case C-168/13 PPU Jemery F. EU:C:2013:358.
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Melloni 2, Radu 3 and LM. 4 It is worth noting that the first
preliminary reference concerning the interpretation of EU
directives on defence rights in criminal proceedings called into
question the right to appeal against a penalty order. 5
These examples point strongly to the need for an in-depth analysis
of the right to an effective judicial remedy in a European and
comparative perspective. To what extent does this fundamental
guarantee, enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter, compel the domestic
legal orders to interpret national procedures, modify or create ex-novo
remedies for securing the effectiveness of Union law within the
European criminal justice area? And to what extent do the new
directives harmonizing defence rights foster this need of effectiveness?
The right to effective judicial protection finds expression in a set of
provisions under the ABC Directives which require the Member States
to provide remedies against breaches of the defence rights that Union
law confers to suspects and accused persons. Such remedial
obligations conflict a fortiori with national procedural autonomy. The
latter is a manifestation of national sovereignty, which preserves the
freedom of the Member States to legislate independently on
procedural rules governing their domestic justice system, where, and
so long as, EU law has not pre-empted this discretion. 6
The balance between effectiveness of Union law and national
procedural autonomy has long been a source of litigation before the
CJEU. Since the mid-1970s, the Court has consistently held that
national procedural autonomy reaches its limits – even in the absence
of EU procedural rules – in the effective judicial protection of rights
guaranteed by the Union legal order. 7 Originally emerging as a
general principle of EU law, 8 the requirement of effective judicial
protection is nowadays enshrined in Article 19(1), paragraph 2 TEU,
according to which, ‘Member States shall provide remedies sufficient
to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union
law’. As the CJEU recently stressed, the provision ‘gives concrete
expression to the value of the rule of law’, whose essence lies in the
2 Case C-399/11 Melloni EU:C:2013:107.
3 Case C-396/11 Radu EU:C:2013:39.
4 Case C-216/PPU, LM EU:C:2018:586.
5 Case C-216/14 Covaci EU:C:2015:686, para 42.
6 W Van Gerwen, Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures (2000) 37 CMLR 501.
7 Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz, para 5.
8 Case 222/84 Johnston EU:C:1986:206, para 18.
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‘very existance of effective judicial review designated to ensure
compliance with EU law’ within each the Member State. 9
The principle of effective judicial protection entails two constitutive
elements. On the one hand, the principle of equivalence requires that
‘detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding an
individual’s right under [Union] law must be no less favorable that
those governing similar domestic actions’. 10 In other words, national
procedure should not offer a lower level of judicial protection when
the case presents an extraterritorial element (for instance, where the
defendant is a non-resident 11) and thereby introduce a form of
discrimination when EU rights are at stake.
On the other hand, the principle of effectiveness means that national
procedural rules must ‘not render practically impossible or excessively
difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Union law’. 12 This second
element of the principle reflects the effectiveness requirements that
judicial remedies must fulfill under Article 47 of the Charter. 13 Over
the years, the CJEU has progressively given priority to the principle
of effective judicial protection over the Member States procedural
autonomy. 14 The case law has even admitted that the former may
imply, albeit under exceptional circumstances, the introduction of new
proceedings where ‘no legal remedy existed which made it possible to
ensure, even indirectly, respect for an individual’s rights under
Community law’. 15
Would the CJEU adopt a similarly demanding approach in criminal
matters? In other words, what room do the ABC Directives leave to the
procedural autonomy of national criminal justice systems? The answer
will mainly depend on the number and stringency of requirements set
forth under the different remedial obligations at issue. Indeed, national
procedural autonomy is limited by the presence of specific procedural
provisions under Union law and, conversely, is strongest in absence of
9 Case C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses EU:C:2018:117,
para 32 and 36.
10 Case C-432/05 Unibet EU:C:2007:163, para 43.
11 See for instance Case C-216/14 Covaci, para 42.
12 Case C-432/05 Unibet, para 43.
13 Art. 47(1) EU Charter.
14 A Arnull, ‘The principle of Effective Judicial Protection in EU law: An Unruly
Horse?’ (2011) 36 ELRev 52.
15 Case C-432/05 Unibet, para 41. In a similar way, ‘Article 47 of the Charter (...)
is not intended to change the system of judicial review laid down by the Treatiesm and
particularly the rules relating to the admissibility of direct actions brought before the
Courts of the European Union’. Case C-583/11 P Inuit EU:C:2013:625, para 97.
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such rules. 16 Based on this, the following sections will subsequently
analyse the different categories of remedial obligations set forth under
the ABC Directives.
2. General obligation to provide an effective remedy
The 2013 Directive on the right to access a lawyer and the 2016
Directive on certain aspects of the presumption of innocence lay
down general remedial obligations. The latter constitute the mere
transcription of the right to an effective remedy and, therefore, entail
the requirements set forth by Article 47 of the Charter. In particular,
Article 12 of Directive 2013/48/EU requires the Member States to
‘ensure that suspects or accused persons in criminal proceedings, as
well as requested persons in European arrest warrant proceedings,
have an effective remedy under national law in the event of a breach
of the rights under this Directive’. 17 In a similar way, Article 10
Directive 2016/343/EU states that national law must provide suspects
and accused persons with ‘an effective remedy if their rights under
this Directive are breached’. 18 The wording of both provisions
stresses the ancillary nature of the right to an effective remedy, while
preserving the largest margin of discretion that Member States enjoy
in implementing the Directive. 19
Provisions relating to the use of evidence gathered in breach of the
right to access a lawyer, the right to remain silent or the right not to
incriminate oneself equally reflect the wish of the EU legislature not
to interfere with national systems of nullities and exclusionary rules.
Article 12 (2) of Directive 2013/48/EU and Article 10(2) of Directive
2016/343/EU require the Member States to ensure that, in the
assessment of statements made by suspects or accused persons or of
evidence obtained in breach of the above mentioned procedural
safeguards, ‘the rights of the defence and the fairness of the
proceedings are respected’. However, both provisions explicitly state
16 V Couronne, ‘L’autonomie procédurale des Etats membres de l’Union
européenne à l’épreuve du temps’ (2010) 3-4 Cahiers de droit européen 273, 291 ff.
17 Art. 12(1) Directive 2013/48/EU.
18 Art. 10(1) Directive 2016/343/EU.
19 As regards the lack of specific requirements in the 2013 Directives, see A Soo,
‘Article 12 of the Directive 2013/48/EU: A starting Point for Discussion on a Common
Understanding of the Criteria for Effective Remedies of Violation of the Right to a
Counsel’ (2017) 1 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 31.
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that such an obligation is ‘[w]ithout prejudice to national rules and
systems on the admissibility of evidence’. It follows that the ABC
Directives do not intend to harmonize rules governing the use of
evidence, nor sanctions provided under national law against violations
of defence rights.
Nonetheless, the right to an effective judicial protection implies the
duty on domestic courts to ascertain ‘whether the criminal proceedings
as a whole, including the way in which the evidence was obtained, were
fair’. 20 In other words, Articles 12(2) of Directive 2013/48/EU and
Article 10(2) of Directive 2016/343/EU must be understood as
guaranteeing the ‘right to a fair use of evidence’. 21 According to the
ECtHR case law, judicial review of evidence gathered in breach of
defence rights during the pre-trial stage of proceedings shall ensure
that the use of such evidence does not impair the fairness of
proceedings as a whole. As a result, the remedial obligations set forth
in the ABC Directives leave room for a balancing test that, according
to the ECtHR case law, weighs the gravity of the norm violated, the
probative value of the evidence obtained in breach of fundamental
rights and, to a certain extent, the gravity of the crime being
prosecuted. 22
3. Right to challenge in accordance with procedures in national law
Among the remedial obligations set forth in the ABC Directives is
the right to challenge restrictions to defence rights ‘in accordance with
procedures in national law’. This applies to decisions finding that
there is no need for interpretation 23 or translation. 24 Likewise, where
linguistic assistance has been provided, Directive 2010/64/EU requires
the Member States to provide the defendant with the possibility of
complaining that the quality of the interpretation 25 or translation 26
was not sufficient to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings.
20 Gäfgeng v Germany App no 22978/05 (ECtHR, 1 June 2010).
21 P Ölçer, ‘The European Court of Human Rights: The Fair Trial Analysis under
Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights’ in S Thaman (ed),
Exclusionary Rules in Comparative Law (2013, Springer) 371 ff.
22 Ibid 375.
23 Art. 2(5) Directive 2010/64 EU.
24 Art. 3(5) Directive 2010/64/EU.
25 Art. 2(5) Directive 2010/64 EU.
26 Art. 3(5) Directive 2010/64/EU.
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Finally, Article 8(2) Directive 2012/13/EU compels the Member States
to ‘ensure that suspects or accused persons or their lawyers have the
right to challenge, in accordance with procedures in national law, the
possible failure or refusal of the competent authorities to provide
information in accordance with this Directive’.
Although the above-mentioned provisions focus on particular acts
taken by the national competent authorities, they do not require the
Member States to provide specific judicial remedies. On the contrary,
they simply refer to applicable procedural rules under national law,
while preserving a maximum margin of discretion for the Member
States. Recital 25 of Directive 2010/64/EU confirms the significant
leeway given to the national legislator: the remedial obligations
resulting from Articles 2(5) and 3(5) do ‘not entail the obligation for
Member States to provide for a separate mechanism or complaint
procedure in which such finding may be challenged’. 27 A similar
statement can be found in the preamble of Directive 2012/13/EU with
regard to the right to challenge the failure to provide information. 28
The lack of specific procedural requirements under the EU
Directives leaves room for different levels of protection in the
Member States, a protection that first relies on the promptness with
which the suspect or accused person in criminal proceedings can
access a court with the jurisdiction to review decisions violating the
right to translation, interpretation or information. In particular, the
rights enshrined in Directive 2010/64/EU apply during the pre-trial
stage of proceedings, most notably during questioning for the right to
interpretation 29 and, for the right to translation, with respect to
decisions depriving a person of his liberty, any charge or indictment
or materials of the case file that are considered essential documents
for the preparation of defence. 30 Yet, the possibility of appealing a
decision denying linguistic assistance would imply the existence of a
procedure – specific or not – which enables the suspect or accused
person to enforce, in due time, the rights he derives from the ABC
Directives. Thus, national law would provide a maximum degree of
judicial protection where it allows the defendant to directly challenge,
in the pre-trial stage of the criminal proceedings and in front of a
27 Recital 25 Directive 2010/64/EU.
28 Recital 36 Directive 2012/13/EU.
29 Art. 2(1) Directive 2010/64/EU.
30 Art. 3(2) Directive 2010/64/EU
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Court within the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter, the decision that
allegedly breaches his defence rights.
The implementation a minima of the remedial obligations in
question would consist of a system in which the decision that
allegedly encroached on the right to translation, interpretation or
information would be subject to judicial review, but only at the trial
stage of the criminal proceedings.
This minimum level of judicial protection is – unfortunately – in
line with the case law of the ECtHR. The latter has consistently held
that trial courts are the ‘ultimate guardians of the fairness of the
proceedings, encompassing, among other aspects, the possible absence
of translation or interpretation for a non-national defendant’. 31
According to the Strasbourg Court, the scope of review encompasses
the effective and practical character of the rights to interpretation and
translation, including ‘a degree of subsequent control over the
adequacy of the interpretation provided’. 32
In a similar way, the right to challenge refusals or failures to provide
information under Directive 2010/64/EU refers to both restrictions and
the quality of the interpretation and translation provided. 33 As for the
latter, it is worth noting that, in Covaci, the CJEU surprisingly
refrained from interpreting the ‘essential character’ of documents, and
passages thereof, which must be accompanied by a written translation
according to Article 3 Directive 2010/64/EU. 34 It has merely
reiterated that it is for the national judge to ascertain whether, in the
light of the proceedings concerned and the circumstances of the case,
a document, of which translation has been requested, constitutes an
essential document within the meaning the EU Directive.
The same observations equally apply to the remedial obligation
enshrined in Article 8(2) of Directive 2012/13/EU. Indeed, the right
to information about procedural r ights 35 and the right to
information about the accusation 36 shall be provided promptly in
order to allow the effective exercise of those safeguards and to
31 Katritsch v France App no 22575/08 (ECtHR, 4 November 2010) para 41.
32 Hermi v Italy App no 18114/02 (ECtHR, 18 October 2006) para 70.
33 Art. 2(5) and 3(5) Directive 2010/64/EU.
34 Art. 3 Directive 2010/64/EU states that ‘essential documents shall include any
decision depriving a person of his liberty, any charge or indictment, and any
judgment’. However, the provision leaves to the national competent authorities to
decide whether, in a given case, any other document is essential.
35 Art. 3 Directive 2012/13/EU.
36 Art. 6 Directive 2012/13/EU.
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guarantee adequate time necessary for the preparation of defense. The
effectiveness of the right to be informed must be subject to judicial
review, at the latest, by trial courts, particularly in light of the
principle of equality of arms. 37 However, requirements of judicial
review stemming from Article 5 ECHR may influence the timing
of the judicial protection afforded by national law where EU
defence rights benefit persons under arrest or pre-trial detention.
Indeed, the right to information of the arrested person 38 is part of
the review undertaken by the judicial authority competent to rule
on the lawfulness on detention in the pre-trial stage of criminal
proceedings.
4. Restrictions on defence rights by judicial authorities or subject
to judicial review
4.1 The concept of judicial authority
The third category of remedial obligation requires that decisions
restricting defence rights be taken by judicial authorities, or at least be
subject to subsequent judicial review. A first example can be found in
Article 7(4) of Directive 2012/13/EU as regards decisions whereby
the national competent authority refuses access to certain material of
the case file. In a similar way, Article 8(2) of Directive 2013/48/EU
requires that temporary derogations from the right to access a lawyer
‘may be authorized only by a duly reasoned decision taken on a case-
by-case basis, either by a judicial authority, or by another competent
authority on condition that the decision can be submitted to judicial
review’. With a similar wording, Article 8(3) of Directive 2013/48/EU
requires the intervention of a judicial body when the restriction relates
to the right to have a third party informed about the arrest.
It should be firstly noted that the Directives do not compel the
Member States to provide remedies before a court or a tribunal, 39
but merely refer to ‘judicial authorities’. However, the term
‘judicial’ is open to different interpretations depending on the
37 As regards the access to evidence see, for instance, Foucher v France App no
222209/93 (ECtHR, 18 March 1997) para 32 ff.
38 Art. 4 Directive 2012/13/EU.
39 Such remedial obligation would have implied judicial proceedings before a
court within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU. See for instance, Case C-506/04
Wilson, para 47 ff.
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context in which it is used. 40 In the field of cross-border cooperation,
such as for instance proceedings for the execution of the EAW, it may
encompass prosecutorial authorities. 41 By contrast, the term is to be
understood in a narrow sense when it refers to judicial scrutiny. This
second interpretation is of relevance as regards the remedial
obligation enshrined in Article 7(4) of Directive 2012/13/EU. The
provision refers to judicial review or, al ternatively, prior
authorisation by judicial authorities that consequently can exercise
judicial powers. According to the case law of the CJEU, among the
inherent features of adjudication under Article 47 of the Charter is
the concept of independence. 42 The latter entails, as regards its
internal aspect, impartiality of the reviewing authority in order to
ensure ‘a level playing field for the parties to the proceedings and
their respective interests in relation to the subject-matter of those
proceedings’. 43
Thus, the decision restricting defence rights shall be adopted, or
at least reviewed, by an authority providing guarantees of
independence and impartiality in order for the judicial protection
afforded by national law to be effective. The argument endorses the
interpretation adopted by the ECtHR of the terms ‘judge or other
officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power’ under Article
5(3) of the Convention. Although the provision does not require
the supervision of pre-trial detention by a court, the competent
authority must offer comparable guarantees, among which are
independence and impartiality. It follows that national prosecutors
cannot be regarded as authorities having judicial powers, 44 as they
do not have judicial status 45 and, conversely, have to be considered
as a party to the criminal proceedings. 46 In sum, the decision
limiting the right of access to materials of the case and access to a
lawyer must be taken either by an independent and impartial body
40 Z Ðurđević, ‘Judicial Control in the Pre-trial Criminal Procedure Conducted
by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office’ in K Ligeti (ed), Towards a Prosecutor
for the European Union, Vol I (Hart Publishing 2013) 989, 989 – 990.
41 Case C-453/16 PPU Özçelik EU:C:2016:860.
42 Case C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, para 41 ff.
43 Case C-175/11 H. I. D. and B. A. v Refugee Applications Commissioner
EU:C:2013:45, para 95 – 96.
44 Nikolova v Bulgaria App no 31195/96 (ECtHR, 25 March 1999) para 49 – 50.
45 Ibid, para 53.
46 Assenov v Bulgaria App no 24760/94 (ECtHR, 28 October 1998) para 149 –
150.
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or by an authority that does not meet such requirements, for instance
a public prosecutor, provided that national law enables a court to
subsequently review that decision.
4.2 The timing of review
The effectiveness of the judicial protection guaranteed under
domestic law does not exclusively depend on guarantees provided by
the reviewing body. It further relies on the time within which the
remedy is available. In the absence of specific timelines, the question
arises of whether Article 7(4) of Directive 2012/13/EU and Article
8(2) of Directive 2013/48/EU require a specific remedy against
decisions refusing access to the case file or delaying access to a
lawyer during the pre-trial phase or, conversely, whether it would
suffice that such a decision is reviewed at a later stage of the
proceedings by the trial court.
A teleological interpretation of both Directives supports this
second hypothesis. While the preamble of Directive 2013/48/EU
explicitly states that ‘the temporary derogation can be assessed by
a court, at least during the trial stage’, 47 according to Directive
2012/13/EU the right to challenge a decision denying access to
documents ‘does not entail the obligation for the Member States to
provide for a specific appeal procedure, a separate mechanism, or a
complaint procedure in which such failure may be challenged’. 48
From this perspective, national law complies with the ABC
Directives so far as decisions delaying legal assistance, or refusing
access to certain materials, are adopted by a non-judicial authority
but subsequently scrutinized by the court competent for reviewing
the merits of the accusation. Hence, a Member State may grant
sufficient judicial protection through the review undertaken by a
judge at the trial stage of criminal proceedings on the admissibility
and use of evidence collected in breach of defence rights. As for
temporary derogations of the right to access a lawyer, the ECtHR
stressed that even though such limitations are justified in
exceptional circumstances for compelling reasons, ‘ i t may
nonetheless be necessary, in the interests of fairness, to exclude
from any subsequent criminal proceedings any statement made
47 Recital 38 Directive 2013/48/EU.
48 Recital 36 Directive 2012/13/EU.
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during a police interview in the absence of a lawyer’. 49 Similarly,
judicial protection of the right of access to the case file is achieved
where the competent court undertakes the adversarial assessment of
evidence.
The CJEU case law does not speak against such an interpretation.
On the one hand, where EU Directives leave room for the procedural
autonomy of the Member States, who enjoy a margin of discretion for
implementing remedial obligations, it is for the national judge to
interpret and apply domestic legal provisions in conformity with
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter. On the other, the
availability of an alternative remedy under national law meets the
requirements of Article 47 of the Charter, unless such a remedy
makes it impossible to ensure, even indirectly, respect for an
individual’s rights under Union law. 50 Consequently, judicial review
of the merits of the accusation undertaken by first instance tribunals is
deemed sufficient as far as it encompasses procedural irregularities
committed during preliminary inquiries with the aim to ensure the
fairness of the proceeding as a whole. 51
It thus follows that depending on the structure of the national
criminal justice system and the judicial remedies available to the
defendant, the effectiveness of the judicial protection afforded may
vary from one Member State to another. National criminal procedures
at the pre-trial stage which provide the possibility of appealing against
a decision refusing access to the case file guarantee greater
effectiveness of judicial protection: where the suspect or accused
person has the opportunity to immediately challenge restrictions on
defence rights, he is able to enforce the rights he derives from EU
law at the initial stage of criminal proceedings. The effective remedy
would thus consist of the invalidation of the decision restricting the
right and the consequent provision of the requested documents to the
defence before the submission of the merits of the accusation to the
judgment of a court. 52
49 Ibrahim v United Kingdom App no 50541/08, 50571/08, 50573/08 and 40351/
09 (ECtHR, 16 December 2014) para 195.
50 Case C-432/05 Unibet, para 41.
51 Art. 12(2) Directive 2013/48/EU.
52 Art. 7(3) Directive 2012/13/EU.
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5. Right to a new trial
Besides the remedial obligations aimed to ensure the effectiveness
of defence rights harmonized by EU law, a specific duty applies with
respect to remedies available under national criminal procedure
against convictions rendered in absentia. Article 8(2) of Directive
2016/343/EU allows Member States to hold a trial that results in a
decision of guilt or innocence in the absence of the accused in two
cases: where the accused does not appear in person despite being
informed, in due time, of the trial and of the consequences of non-
appearance, or when, having been informed of the trial, he is
represented by a lawyer. If the above-mentioned conditions are not
fulfilled, the trial held in the absence of the accused leads to a
conviction rendered in absentia and, consequently, triggers the right to
a new trial. Indeed, Article 9 of Directive 2016/343/EU requires the
Member States to ensure that, in such circumstances, the accused has
‘the right to a new trial, or to another legal remedy, which allows a
fresh determination of the merits of the case, including examination of
new evidence, and which may lead to the original decision being
reversed’.
It should first be noted that the provision does not set forth specific
requirements as to the structure of the judicial remedy to be provided
under national law. The right to a new trial may amount to the
possibility for the accused to lodge an appeal against judgments
delivered in absentia with a court of the same instance or to institute
other judicial actions with a court of higher instance. Nonetheless, the
scope of the review undertaken by the competent tribunal must
comply with the specific requirements set forth under Article 9 of
Directive 2016/343/EU. First, the provision does not grant the right to
a new trial against any conviction delivered in absentia. In line with
the ECtHR, the guarantee does not benefit ratione personae the duly
informed accused who had waived his right to appear and defend
himself in person, 53 nor to the accused who could not be located
despite reasonable efforts having been made by the competent
authorities, for instance because the person had fled or absconded. 54
Second, pursuant to the ECtHR case law, the right to a new trial shall
guarantee the person convicted in absentia the opportunity, with
sufficient certainty, of obtaining access to a court. As for the scope of
53 Art. 8(2) Directive 2016/343.
54 Recital 39 Directive 2016/343.
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the review, the latter implies a fresh determination of the merits of the
charges by a tribunal that has heard the accused. 55 With regard to the
new trial, ‘Member States shall ensure that those suspects and accused
persons have the right to be present, to participate effectively, in
accordance with procedures under national law, and to exercise the
rights of the defence’. 56
6. Conclusions
In light of the foregoing analysis, the ABC Directives leave
significant leeway for the Member States to secure effective control
over alleged breaches of defence rights in criminal proceedings. The
remedial obligations, as analysed above, do not lay down detailed
procedural requirements governing the structure, scope and timing of
judicial scrutiny. They simply echo the duty incumbent upon the
Member States to provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal
protection of individual rights granted by Union law, 57 or codify
minimum standards of judicial protection already recognized by the
ECtHR case law. 58 Hence, the ABC Directives have very little to no
direct impact on the design of judicial remedies in criminal
proceedings, which primarily fall within the competence of the
Member States. Indeed, the structure of judicial remedies lies at the
heart of the national constitutional traditions and among the
fundamental aspects of the Member States’ criminal justice systems,
to which the EU legislature must have regard. 59
This does not rule out, however, any further restriction that the ABC
Directives may entail as regards national procedural autonomy in
criminal matters. Despite the lack of harmonization, national remedies
available to suspects and accused persons must still meet the
effectiveness requirements stemming from Article 47 of the Charter
and the general principle of effective judicial protection. An
illustration thereof are the recent preliminary rulings of the CJEU
interpreting the ABC Directives. In Sleutjes, the Court emphasized
55 Sanader v Croatia App no 66408/12 (ECtHR, 12 February 2015) paras 84 and
95.
56 Art. 9 Directive 2016/3434/EU.
57 Art 19 (1) TEU.
58 This holds true for both the right to a fair use of evidence and the right to a new
trial against convictions rendered in absentia.
59 Art 82 TFEU.
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that the accused who does not understand the language of the
proceedings cannot effectively challenge in front of a court a penalty
order if he is not provided with a written translation of the said act. 60
Likewise, the Court underlined in Tranca that national rules governing
the notification of decisions imposing a criminal sanction cannot be
interpreted in such a way that would deprive the accused of any
possibility to access a court. 61 It thus follows that the ABC Directives
do not only require the Member State to provide effective remedies
against breaches of defence rights. First and foremost, they grant
procedural safeguards, which enable suspects and accused persons to
exercise their right of defence before a court and to effectively
institute judicial actions available throughout national criminal
proceedings. How can the defendant challenge a decision in front of
the competent court without having been informed of it in due time,
without access to documents necessary for the preparation of defence
or without being able to understand the language of the proceedings?
It is precisely the potential violation of defence rights provided under
the ABC Directives that may bring national systems of judicial
remedies in criminal proceedings under the scrutiny of the CJEU.
60 Case C-278/16 Sleutjes EU:C:2017:757, para 33.
61 Joined Cases C-124/16, C-188/16 and C-213/16 Tranca EU:C:2017:228, para
45.
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6. Conclusions.
1. The autonomous and multilayered meaning of right to an
effective remedy under EU law
In the EU, judicial review carried out by national courts constitutes a
tool ensuring the primacy and direct effect of Union law within the
Member States. 1 Indeed, given the absence of a complete system of
judicial remedies at the supranational level, the enforcement of Union
1 H Hofmann, ‘Article 47. Specific provisions’ in S Peers, T Hervey, J Kenner, A
Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights : a commentary (Hart Publishing,
2014) 1211, 1212.
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law primarily relies on the national justice systems, 2 which must provide
‘direct and immediate protection of rights arising from the Union legal
order’. 3 Hence, the duty for the Member States to provide effective
remedies in the fields covered by EU law is the necessary corollary of
the fundamental right to an effective judicial protection.
Against this background, one might soon realize the complex
meaning that the right to an effective remedy has within the EU
multi-level legal order. This complexity is also reflected in the
separate, but complementary, legal sources providing for such right. 4
The general principle of effective judicial protection acknowledged by
the CJEU since the 1970’s 5 finds expression in the obligation for the
Member States to establish a sufficiently complete system of judicial
remedies under Article 19 TEU. 6 A second constitutional basis has to
be found in Article 47 of the Charter. 7 The provision requires both
the EU institutions and the Member States, when they are
implementing Union law, to guarantee the right to an effective remedy
before a tribunal and to fair trial. 8
One should bear in mind that Article 47 of the EU Charter also
echoes fundamental guarantees of judicial protection already provided
under other corpus of human rights. In particular, the CJEU interprets
Article 47 of the Charter in line with the European Convention of
Human Rights (ECHR) 9 as well as with the common constitutional
traditions of the Member States. 10 The minimum level of effective
judicial protection under the provision shall correspond to the
standards developed by the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) in interpreting the meaning and scope of Articles 6(1) and
13 of the Convention, without precluding the possibility for the EU to
2 W Van Gerven, ‘Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures’ (2000) 37 CMLRev 501,
521.
3 H Hofmann (n 1).
4 M Safian, D Düsterhaus, ‘A Union of Effective Judicial Protection: Addressing
a Multi-level Challenge through the Lens of Article 47 CFREU’ (2014) 33 Yearbook
of European Law 3, 4.
5 K Lenaerts, I Maselis, K Gutman, EU Procedural Law (2015, Oxford
University Press) 111 ff.
6 Art. 19(1), para 2 TEU. H Hofmann (n 1).
7 On the relation with Article 47, M Safian, D Düsterhaus (n 4) 3ff.
8 It is worth noting that despite the multiple legal sources, the CJEU has usually
addressed the right to an effective remedy and the effective judicial protection of
individual rights jointly. M Safian, D Düsterhaus (n 4) 15.
9 Art. 52(3) of the Charter.
10 Art. 52(4) of the Charter.
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provide more extensive protection. 11 Despite the parallels, Article 47 of
the Charter has gradually ‘acquired a separate identity and substance (...)
which are not the mere sum’ of the above-mentioned provisions of the
ECHR. 12 As emphasized by Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Samba
Diouf, the right to an effective remedy:
[O]nce it is recognised and guaranteed by the European Union [...]
goes on to acquire a content of its own, the definition of which is
certainly shaped by the international instruments on which that
right is based, including, first and foremost, the ECHR, but also
by the constitutional traditions from which the right in question
stems. 13
Two arguments support this statement. First, Article 47 of the
Charter has a specific scope of application that only includes
situations in which Member States are implementing Union law. 14
Second, the right to an effective remedy acquires a multilayered
meaning within the EU composite legal order, since it encompasses
both the horizontal and vertical implementation of Article 47 of the
Charter. As mentioned above, the provision applies in a vertical
perspective to remedies and procedural rules governing claims before
national courts that are based on Union law. Given the lack of a
centralized enforcement system within the Union, it is indeed for the
Member States to ‘designate the courts having jurisdiction and
determine procedural conditions governing actions intended to ensure
the protection of those rights’ that citizens derive from EU law. 15 An
illustration of this duty are the remedial obligations that the ABC
Directives impose on the Member States with the aim of ensuring the
enforcement of defence rights conferred by Union law. As for the
horizontal implementation, different standards of effective judicial
protection in the Member States may conflict with EU legal
instruments governing cross-border cooperation. From this
perspective, the right to an effective remedy enshrined in Article 47
of the Charter shall be interpreted in the light of the constitutional
11 Art. 52(3) of the Charter.
12 Case C-69/10 Samba Diouf , Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón EU:C:2011:102,
para 39.
13 Ibid para 39.
14 Art. 51(1) of the Charter.
1 5 Ca s e 33 /76 Rewe -Zen t ra l f i nan z eG and Rewe -Zen t r a l AG v
Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland [1976] E.C.R. 1989, para 5.
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principle of mutual trust, 16 which forms the basis of EU rules enacting
mutual recognition of judicial decisions.
Both scenarios bring into play the effective judicial protection of
fundamental rights and its relationship with the effectiveness of Union
law. What guarantees does Article 47 of the Charter trigger within the
EU criminal justice area? To answer this question, one should first
define its scope of application.
2. Scope of application
2.1 Judicial protection of rights conferred by Union law
The right to an effective remedy guaranteed by Article 47 of the
Charter has a twofold delimitation. The provision first grants judicial
protection to ‘everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
law of the Union are violated’. 17 Thus, the fundamental right in
question is of an ancillary nature: the scope of Article 47 of the
Charter relies on the existence of other rights conferred on a litigant by
EU law. 18 In this respect, the wording of Article 47(1) of the Charter
mirrors Article 13 of the ECHR, 19 which makes the right to an
effective remedy contingent upon an arguable claim that a right set
forth in the Convention is violated. 20 Unlike the latter, the
corresponding EU right to an effective remedy does not solely apply in
combination with other provisions of the Charter itself. 21 Rights and
freedoms referred to in Article 47(1) encompass individual guarantees
afforded also by other provisions of primary and secondary law. In this
sense, the provision is the expression of the right to effective judicial
protection that individuals can invoke in front of national courts in
order to exercise rights they enjoy by virtue of Union law. 22
16 As regards the constitutional value of the principle of mutual trust, see K
Lenaerts, ‘La vie après l’avis: Exploring the Principle of Mutual (Yet not Blind)
Trust’ (2017) 54 CMLRev 805, 813.
17 Art. 47(1) EU Charter.
18 H Hofmann (n 1) 1215.
19 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] JO C303/29.
20 Kaya v Turkey App no 22535/93 (ECtHR, 28 March 2000) para 124.
21 D Shelton, ‘Source of Article 47 Rights’ in S Peers, T Hervey, J Kenner, A
Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights : a commentary (Hart
Publishing, 2014) 1210.
22 Indeed, the principle of effective judicial protection was first acknowledged by
the Court of Justice in Rewe as a corollary of the duty of sincere cooperation.
According to the ruling, the Member States shall ‘designate the courts having
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When applied in the field of criminal law, Article 47 of the Charter
consequently entails the effective judicial protection of rights arising
from the EU legal order against European and national penal
provisions (ubi ius ubi remedium). 23 Considering the possible
interactions between Union law and national criminal legislation, one
could distinguish two sets of guarantees. On the one hand, EU law
and, more specifically, the Charter, confer fundamental rights that
suspects and accused persons typically claim against the arbitrary use
of force and the power to sanction within the criminal realm such, for
instance, defence rights, 24 the right to liberty and security in case of
imprisonment, 25 the right not to be tried twice for the same
offence, 26 the right to privacy and protection of personal data 27
where law enforcement authorities carry out intrusive investigative
measures, such as house searches or phone tapping. 28 On the other
hand, the right to an effective remedy of Article 47 Charter also
protects freedoms of movements that European citizens enjoy under
Union law against unjustified and disproportionate restrictions
resulting from national criminal provisions. 29 This indirect and
negative interaction implies the obligation for the national judge to
‘disapply’ a national criminal provision that entails unjustified and
disproportionate restrictions to EU fundamental freedoms. Scholars
identify this legal phenomenon as the ‘neutralizing effect’.
jurisdiction and determine procedural conditions governing actions intended to ensure
protection of the rights which citizens have from direct effect of Community law’. See
Case 33/76, Rewe-Zentral, para 5. Thus defined, the right to effective judicial
protection “adds flesh to the skeleton of primacy, direct effect and state liability” of
Union law. A Arnull, ‘The principle of Effective Judicial Protection in EU law: An
Unruly Horse?’ (2011) 36 ELRev 51.
23 According to Article 51(1) EU Charter, the latter is legally binding for both EU
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and for the Member States when they are
implementing Union law.
24 Art. 48 EU Charter.
25 Art. 6 EU Charter.
26 Art. 50 EU Charter.
27 Art. 7 and 8 EU Charter.
28 In a similar way, a close relation between the above mentioned rights and
judicial review emerges from the case law of the ECtHR. The judicial protection is
not only a core element of Article 5 and 6 of the Convention. The recent case law
further emphasizes the key role of judicial scrutiny over investigative measures that
encroach the right to privacy under Art. 8 of the ECHR. See for instance, Gutsanovi
v Bulgaria App no 34529/10 (ECtHR, 15 October 2013) para 220 ff.
29 L Arroyo Zapatero, M Muñoz de Morales Romero, ‘Le contrôle des choix de
la pénalisation: effets directs et indirects’ in G Giudicelli-Delage, S Manacorda (eds),
Cour de Justice et justice pénale en Europe (SLC, 2010) 23.
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2.2 Only when the Member States are implementing Union law
A claim alleging violations of fundamental rights granted by EU
law is not sufficient per se to infer the applicability of Article 47 of
the Charter. Indeed, the latter establishes in its Article 51(1) a second
condition: the Member States have the duty to observe the rights
enshrined in the Charter ‘only when they are implementing the Union
law’. 30 According to the Explanations relating to the Charter, this
wording is not intended to reverse the long-standing case law of the
CJEU concerning the applicability of fundamental rights stemming
from the EU legal order. 31 Therefore, the term ‘implementation’
encompasses situations in which the Member States ‘act in the scope
of Union law’. 32 The meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter is
particularly contentious when considering the sensitive question it
underlies. As pointed out by Advocate General Cruz Villalón, the
applicability of the Charter presupposes a link between the subject
matter of the dispute and Union law, which legitimates the transfer of
the responsibility for guaranteeing fundamental rights from the
national to the supranational level. 33 Consequently, the right to an
effective judicial remedy provided by Article 47 of the Charter applies
where a domestic legal provision interferes with fundamental rights
and freedoms that an individual enjoys by virtue of the EU legal
order, provided that a connection can be established between the
national criminal proceedings in issue and the scope of Union law. 34
Conversely, the right to an effective legal remedy under Article 47 of
the Charter cannot be invoked in front of national courts if the
subject-matter of the dispute in the main proceedings is not connected
in any way with situations contemplated by EU law.
The Court outlined a range of criteria for interpreting the concept of
‘implementing Union law’. In Siragusa, the Court referred to the
questions of ‘whether that legislation is intended to implement a
provision of EU law; the nature of that legislation and whether it
pursues objectives other than those covered by EU law, even if it is
30 Art. 51(1) EU Charter.
31 Case 5/88 Wachauf [1989] ECR 2609, para 19; Case C-260/89, ETR [1991]
ECR I-2925, para 42.
32 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (n 18) 32.
33 Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón,
EU:C:2013:105.
34 For instance, Case C-457/09 Chartry v Belgian State [2011] ECR I-00819,
para 25.
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capable of indirectly affecting EU law; and also whether there are
specific rules of EU law on the matter or capable of affecting it’. 35
As emphasized by the legal doctrine, however, the CJEU does not
refer in a systematic and consistent way to the above mentioned
criteria. 36 Although the same difficulties in defining the meaning of
Article 51(1) arise in criminal matters, the case law seems to
distinguish two situations.
2.2.1 National rules enacting EU instruments of police and judicial
cooperation in criminal matters
In its narrower sense, the ‘implementation of Union law’ referred to
under Article 51(1) of the Charter corresponds to the transposition of EU
legal instruments into the domestic legal orders. This excludes at the
outset the so-called ‘purely internal situations’. The latter arise where
neither the subject matter of the dispute in the main proceedings is
connected in any way with EU law, nor the national legislation in
dispute lies within the scope of Union law. 37 An illustration can be
found in Chalakova. 38 The national court referred a preliminary
ruling regarding the interpretation of the right to liberty and security
enshrined in Article 6 of the Charter with respect to a national arrest
warrant issued by the Bulgarian authorities against a Bulgarian
citizen, who refused to present his identity documents in violation of
national criminal provisions. The CJEU declined its competence after
observing that no EU legal instrument applied to the dispute in the
main proceedings, nor did the arrested person intended to exercise his
right to free movement. 39
The Court put forward similar arguments to preclude the application
of Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter in Vinkov. 40 The facts in the main
proceeding called into question the absence of the right to a judicial
remedy against a decision imposing a financial penalty and the
35 Case C-206/13 Siragusa, EU:C:2014:126, para 25. See also Case C-40/11,
Iida, EU:C:2012:691, para 79.
36 For instance, M Dougan, ‘Judicial review of Member State Action under the
General Principles and the Charter: Defining the scope of Union law’ (2015) 52
CMLRev 1201; E Hancox, ‘The meaning of “implementing” EU law under Article
51(1) of the Charter: Åkerberg Fransson’ (2013) 50 CMLRev 1411.
37 Case C-299/95 Kremzow [1997] ECR I-02629, para 15.
38 Case C-14/13 Cholakova EU:C:2013:374.
39 Ibid paras 25 - 26.
40 C-27/11 Vinkov EU:C:2012:326, para 55 ff.
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deduction of points from a driving license after the commission of minor
road traffic offences. The purely internal character of the case resulted
once again from the lack of a cross-border dimension of the facts,
which did not fall within the scope of EU instruments of mutual
recognition applicable to road traffic offences. 41 In addition, the Court
stressed that the applicability of the Charter cannot result from
provisions of the Treaties that exclusively aim at establishing the
legislative competences of the Union. Hence, Article 82 TFEU is
solely directed to confer to EU institutions the power to harmonize
national criminal procedures and thereby was not in relation to the
facts of the main action. 42
By contrast, the CJEU interprets instruments adopted under Article
82 TFEU in the light of Article 47 of the Charter when the national law
aims to implement those instruments within the Member States. This
was notably the case as regards domestic criminal proceedings for the
execution of the EAW in the well-known cases Radu 43, Melloni 44
and Jeremy F. 45 Besides the instruments of mutual recognition in
criminal matters, the newly-adopted directives harmonizing defence
rights of the suspect and accused persons in criminal proceeding
constitute a topical area for the implementation of the right to an
effective remedy. The implementation of the ABC Directives into
national legal systems dramatically expands the justiciability of the
rights deriving from the Charter before national criminal courts. This
is all the more true considering their scope of application. Indeed, the
Directives on the right to interpretation and translation 46, the right to
information 47, the right of access to a lawyer 48 and certain aspects of
41 Ibid para 53.
42 Ibid paras 41 – 43.
43 C-396/11 Radu EU:C:2013:39.
44 C-399/11 Melloni EU:C:2013:107.
45 C-168/13 PPU Jeremy F. EU:C:2013:358.
46 Art. 1(2) of Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 20 October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal
proceedings [2010] OJ L280/1.
47 Art. 2(1) of Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 22 May 2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings [2012]
OJ L142/1.
48 Art. 2(1) of Directive 2013/48/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 22 October 2013 on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal
proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings, and on the right to have a
third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with third
persons and with consular authorities while deprived of liberty [2013] OJ L294/1.
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the presumption of innocence 49 cover almost the entirety of criminal
proceedings: they apply from the investigation stage and more
specifically from the moment a person is suspected or accused of
having committed a criminal offence, until the conclusion of the
proceedings including sentencing and resolution of any appeal. In this
regard, it is worth recalling that Union law does not guarantee the
right to appeal against conviction and sentences. 50 Nonetheless,
appellate courts in criminal proceedings shall protect the rights that
defendants derive from the ABC Directives. Second, the ABC
Directives set forth remedial obligations, whereby the Member States
must provide effective remedies and judicial review mechanisms
available to the defendant against violation of EU procedural
safeguards. Such remedial obligations shall be interpreted in the light
of the right to an effective judicial protection afforded by Article 47
of the Charter. This holds also true for the rights conferred to victims
of crimes by the 2012 Directive, in so far as the right to obtain a
decision on compensation by the offender 51 and the role of the victim
in the criminal proceeding are examined, respectively, in the light of
the guarantees of an effective remedy and fair trial. 52
Besides EU instruments in the field of criminal procedures, it is
worth asking whether secondary law adopted on the basis of Article
83 of the TFEU might also constitute a sufficient link entailing the
applicability of the Charter. In other words, would it be possible to
invoke the right to an effective remedy provided by Article 47 with
the purpose of challenging, for instance, the independence of a
tribunal that decides upon a criminal charge when the offence and the
related sanction have been subject to harmonization under Union law?
49 Art. 2 of Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption
of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings
[2016] OJ L 65/1.
50 Indeed, neither the EU Charter nor the EU Directives provide for a right to
appeal correspondent to the guarantee enshrined in Article 2 Protocol 7 ECHR.
51 Art. 16 of Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support
and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision
2001/220/JHA [2012] OJ L315/57.
52 Indeed, the procedural rights enshrined under Article 13 and Article 6(1) of the
Convention also benefit the victim in criminal proceedings. Given that Article 47 EU
Charter must be interpreted in the light of the ECHR and the related jurisprudence, the
CJEU might potentially be confronted with the interpretation of Directive 2012/29 in
the light of Article 47 of the Charter.
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The scenario is not purely hypothetical. In Kremzov, a national Court
referred to the CJEU a preliminary ruling concerning an imprisonment
sentence imposed on a European citizen, who was found guilty for
murder and illegal possession of firearms under Austrian law 53. The
question focused on the lawfulness of a national custodial sanction in
the light of Articles 5 and 6 of the ECHR, 54 the Charter not being
adopted at the time of the facts. The applicant nonetheless claimed
that the competence of the EU judges for ascertaining respect of
fundamental rights, given that the imprisonment measure constitutes a
restriction on the freedom of movement European citizens enjoy by
virtue of the EU Treaties. The Court declined its competence whilst
stressing that ‘a purely hypothetical prospect of exercising [the right
to free movement] does not establish a sufficient connection with
Community law’. 55 In addition, the national legal provisions defining
the offence ‘were not designed to secure compliance with rules of
Community law’. 56
Would the Court adopt a different solution if the criminal charge in
the main proceedings would refer to offences under national criminal
law, the definition of which has been subject to EU harmonization? In
other words, would the sole harmonization of a criminal offence
justify the applicability of the EU Charter to national criminal
proceedings? Yet, the Charter must be interpreted in the light of the
principle of conferral of powers 57 and, consequently, cannot have the
effect of extending the competences and tasks conferred to the
Union. 58 In this regard, neither Article 83 TFEU nor the harmonizing
directives adopted on its basis intend to confer individual rights. They
merely allow for the approximation of substantive criminal law to the
extent necessary to combat serious cross-border crimes on a common
basis. 59 Although these considerations advocate for a negative answer,
the CJEU aknowledged that the Charter also applies where the
disputed national rules contribute to meetobligations incumbent on the
Member States by virtue of the EU Treaties.
53 Case C-299/95 Kremzow [1997] ECR I-02629.
54 Ibid para 12.
55 Ibid para 16.
56 Ibid para 17.
57 Case C-14/13 Cholakova EU:C:2013:374, para 31.
58 Art. 51(2) EU Charter. See also Explanations relating to the Charter of
Fundamental Rights, (n 18) 32.
59 Art. 83(1) TFEU.
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2.2.2 National criminal law performing Member States’ obligations set
out by EU law
A second scenario calls into question domestic penal provisions,
which contribute to securing EU objectives and interests, without
however constituting implementing measures of Union legislation in
the narrowest sense. 60 This may be the case of European provisions
compelling the Member States to adopt effective, dissuasive and
proportionate sanctions or any appropriate measure in order to secure
the effectiveness of Union law. Such link was at the core of the well-
known Åkerberg Fransson ruling. 61 The facts in the main
proceedings concerned the cumulation of administrative sanctions and
criminal penalties imposed by the Swedish authorities for the breach
of the obligation to declare VAT. The national Court referred a
question for preliminary ruling regarding the compliance of national
law with the ne bis in idem principle enshrined in Article 50 of the
Charter. Some Member States, as well as the Commission, argued that
the situation in dispute was purely internal, considering that national
penalties and criminal proceedings for tax evasion were not intended
to enact or execute specific provisions of Union law. 62
The CJEU adopted a much wider interpretation of Article 51(1) of
the Charter. On the one hand, the Court stressed that European
Directives compel the Member States to take appropriate measures for
ensuring collection of VAT. 63 On the other, securing collection of
such taxes also results from the duty of national authorities to protect
the financial interests of the EU, as required by Article 235 TFEU. 64
The Court thereby concluded that tax penalties and criminal
proceedings for VAT evasion actually implement Union law. 65 Thus,
the applicability of the Charter does not solely result from ‘mandating
rules’, namely obligations for the national authorities to undertake a
specific activity. 66 It is further triggered by ‘optioning rules’ that
60 Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson EU:C:2012:340, Opinion of AG Cruz
Villalón, para 60.
61 Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson EU:C:2013:105.
62 Ibid para 16.
63 Ibid para 25.
64 Ibid para 26.
65 Ibid para 27 – 28.
66 D Sarmiento, ‘Who is afraid of the Charter? The Court of Justice, National
Courts and the New Framework of Fundamental Rights Protection in Europe’
(2013) 50 CML Rev 1267, 1280 ff.
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leave margin of discretion to the Member States in implementing EU
law. 67
In sum, the implementing function of the criminal penalties in the
main proceedings stems from the fact that such national sanctions
perform obligations for the Member States arising from Union law. 68
The same reasoning may advocate for the applicability of Article 47
of the Charter to criminal proceedings and penalties aiming to
sanction and deter other forms of EU fraud. Pursuant to the case law,
the scope of application of the Charter is not dependent upon an
actual implementation or execution of an exclusive or shared
competence by the EU legislature. 69 In protecting the Union financial
interests by means of criminal law, the Member States are
implementing Union law - more specifically obligations stemming
from Article 325 TFEU – and, thereby, they must comply with the
fundamental rights guaranteed under the Charter. Consequently, the
defendant charged with EU fraud offences in national proceedings
may claim a breach of Article 47 of the Charter, provided that the
alleged lack of effective judicial protection hinders the effective
enforcement of other rights conferred to him by Union law. 70 In the
criminal law field, such accessory rights correspond above all to
procedural guarantees and the right to presumption of innocence
enshrined in Article 48 of the Charter and harmonized by the ABC
Directives. In sum, ‘fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order
of the European Union are applicable in all situations governed by
EU law’, 71 including where the national provisions in question
perform positive obligations for the Member States.
The Court adopted the same reasoning in Delvigne. 72 The facts
referred to sanctions imposed by a French Court consisting in the
removal from electoral roll and loss of the right to vote in elections to
the European Parliament after conviction for a criminal offence. The
67 Ibid 1281. In a similar way, the Court held in N.S. that the discretionary powers
Member States enjoy in implementing EU legal provisions do not hinder the
applicability of Article 47 EU Charter. Case C-411/10 NS EU:C:2011:865, para 66.
68 Case C-650/13 Delvigne, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón.
69 V Scalia, ‘Protection of Fundamental Rights and Criminal Law. The Dialogue
between the EU Court of Justice and the National Courts’ (2015) 3 Eucrim 100 – 111,
104.
70 Art. 47(1) EU Charter.
71 Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson, para 19; Case C-265/13 Torralbo Marcos
EU:C:2014:187, para 29.
72 Case C-650/13 Delvigne EU:C:2015:648.
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defendant claimed that the imposition of such penalties violated, on the
one hand, the right conferred by Article 39 of the Charter to vote and
stand as a candidate at the elections of the European Parliament and,
on the other, the retroactive effect of more lenient criminal law under
Article 49 of the Charter. 73 The Court first recalled that it is for the
Member States to define the persons entitled to the right to vote in
the elections to the European Parliament. 74 Nonetheless, in exercising
this competence, national authorities are under the obligation provided
under the Treaties to ensure that the election is by direct universal
suffrage, free and secret. 75 Therefore, the facts in the main
proceedings were governed by EU law.
The difference with Åkerberg Fransson lies in the effect national
criminal sanctions have vis-à-vis the objectives fulfilled by EU legal
obligations. In the first judgment, national penalties contributed
positively to the protection of Union’s financial interests. 76 By
contrast, the penalties imposed to Mr. Delvigne did not perform any
EU legal obligation for the Member States to punish or to adopt
appropriate sanctions in order to ensure the effectiveness of European
policies. Rather, they affect the way in which national authorities
implement the duty to ensure democratic elections of the European
Parliament, thereby restricting specific rights and freedoms European
citizens enjoy by virtue of EU law. 77
3. Institutional and procedural requirements inherent to the
structure of judicial review
3.1. Right to access a tribunal previously established by law
From a substantive point of view, the right to an effective remedy
under Article 47(2) of the Charter has the same meaning of the
corresponding right enshrined in Article 6(1) of the Convention. 78
Thus, its components will be primarily identified through a cross-
analysis of the CJEU and the ECtHR case law, 79 laying special
73 Ibid para 20.
74 Ibid para 31.
75 Ibid para 32.
76 Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson, para 26.
77 Case C-650/13 Delvigne, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón, para 82.
78 Art. 52(3) EU Charter. Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental
Rights (n 18) 30.
79 It should however be recalled that in interpreting the rights guaranteed under
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emphasis on the EU case law related to criminal and punitive
administrative proceedings. 80 As regards the structure of judicial
scrutiny, Article 47 of the Charter entails both institutional and
procedural requirements. The provision first guarantees the right to
access an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by
law. The institutional requirements set forth in the provision
encompass the ‘task of judging, independently and in accordance with
the law, cases coming within the jurisdiction conferred on it by the
law’. 81 Similarly to Article 6(1) ECHR, 82 the notion of ‘tribunal’
under Article 47 of the Charter has an autonomous meaning. 83 Under
EU law, the term is to be understood as corresponding to the
definition of ‘court or tribunal’ entitled to refer preliminary questions
under article 267 TFEU. 84 According to the long-standing case law of
the CJEU, the formal classification provided under national law is not
decisive. A national authority that domestic legal provisions define as
a court, is not necessarily a tribunal within the meaning of Article 267
TFEU. 85 Conversely, bodies that are not usually classified as tribunals
may exceptionally be accorded such status under Union law. 86 The
Court held, for instance, that an examining magistrate who is
competent to proceed by indictment (juge d’instruction) constitutes a
judicial authority capable of referring questions for preliminary
ruling. 87 By contrast, a Public Prosecutor cannot be regarded as court
or tribunal within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU, considering that
the Charter, the CJEU also refers to the common constitutional traditions of the
Member States, according to Article 52(4) EU Charter.
80 It is worth recalling however, that unlike Article 6 ECHR the right to access
‘an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law’ under Article
47 of the Charter is not confined to disputes relating to civil rights and obligations.
Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (n 18) 30.
81 Case 14/86 Pretore di Salò EU:C:1987:275, para 7.
82 Belilios v Switzerland App no 10328/83 (ECtHR, 29 April 1988) para 64;
Coëme and others v Belgium App no 32492/96, 32547/96, 32548/96, 33209/96 and
33210/96 (ECtHR, 22 June 2000) para 99.
83 L Pech, ‘Article 47(2)’ in S Peers, T Hervey, J Kenner, AWard (eds), The EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights : a commentary (Hart Publishing, 2014) 1250 ff.
84 Ibid. For a detailed analysis of the definition of ‘court or tribunal’ under article
267 TFEU, N Fenger, M Broberg, Le renvoi prejudicial à la Cour de justice de l’Union
européenne (2013, Larcier) 85 ff.
85 See for instance, Case C-24/92 Corbiau [1993] ECR I-1277, para 15 – 16.
86 This might be the case, for instance, of certain arbitral bodies. Case 61/65
Vaassen-Göbbels [1966] ECR 377.
87 Case 65/79 Chatain EU:C:1980:108 ; Case 54/80 Wilner EU:C:1980:282 ;
Case C-235/02 Criminal proceedings against Saetti and Frediani EU:C:2004:26,
para 23.
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his role ‘is not to rule on an issue in complete independence but (...) to
submit that issue, if appropriate, for consideration by the competent
judicial body’. 88
As for the substance, the definition of ‘tribunal’ relies on a range of
factors corresponding to those developed by the ECtHR. In Dorsch
Consult, the CJEU outlined the characteristic features to be
considered, namely the questions of ‘whether the body is established
by law, whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdiction is
compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes, whether it applies
rules of law and whether it is independent’. 89 In particular, the CJEU
verifies whether the organization, the establishment of a tribunal, as
well as the appointment and remuneration of its members are
regulated by legislative statutes. 90
Moreover, the essential feature of a tribunal under Union law is the
exercise of a judicial function. The latter consists in the capacity to solve
a dispute 91 and to adopt a decision, which acquires force of res
judicata. 92 In conducting proceedings intended to lead to decisions of
a judicial nature, a tribunal applies rules of law. 93 Thus, a judicial
body does not settle the dispute according to principles of fairness, 94
on the contrary, it applies legally binding rules and gives reasons in
fact and law for its decisions. 95 Such a definition is in line with the
case law of the ECtHR related to Article 6(1) of the Convention.
Accordingly, a tribunal is characterized in a substantive sense by its
judicial function, 96 namely the capacity to determine matters within
its competence after proceedings conducted in a prescribed manner. 97
It is worth recalling that Article 47 of the Charter ‘affords an
individual a right of access to a court or a tribunal but not to a
number of levels of jurisdiction’. 98 Pursuant to this interpretation, the
CJEU ruled in Samba Diouf that the principle of effective judicial
88 Case C-74/95 Criminal proceedings against X EU:C:1996:491, para 19.
89 Case C-54/96 Dorsch Consult [1997] ECR I-4961, para 23.
90 Case C-175/11 H. I. D. and B. A. v Refugee Applications Commissioner and
Others EU:C:2013:45, para 46.
91 C-182/00 Lutz GmbH and Others EU:C:2002:19, para 14.
92 C-363/11 Epitropos tou Elegktikou Synedriou EU:C:2012:825, para 26 – 28.
93 Case 61/65 Vaassen-Göbbels [1966] ECR 377.
94 L Pech (n 87) 1255.
95 Joined Cases C-110/98 and C-147/98 Gabalfrisa [2000] ECR I-1571, para 38.
96 Belilos v Switzerland App no 10328/83 (ECtHR, 29 April 1988) para 64.
97 Coëme and others v Belgium App no 32492/96, 32547/96, 32548/96, 33209/96
and 33210/96 (ECtHR, 22 June 2000) para 99.
98 Case C-69/10 Samba Diouf EU:C:2011:524, para 69.
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protection does not require the Member States to guarantee access to
Appellate Courts. 99 In a similar way, the ECtHR consistently held
that Article 6(1) of the Convention does not compel the Contracting
States to provide appeals in civil or criminal proceedings. 100
Nonetheless, the full range of procedural rights to a fair trial
enshrined in that provision apply to national Courts of second
instance, irrespective of whether the country ratified Article 2 of
Protocol 7 of the ECHR, affording the right to appeal against
convictions and sentences. 101 Although a corresponding provision is
not included in the Charter, the same conclusion would likely apply
with respect of Article 47. Theoretically, the CJEU may be asked to
examine whether national appeal proceedings comply with the
requirements of effective judicial protection and fair trial, provided
that judicial review on appeal concerns alleged violations of rights
and freedoms guaranteed by virtue of Union law. 102
3.2. Independence and impartiality of the reviewing body
The definition of ‘tribunal’ under Article 47 of the Charter further
implies the independence 103 and impartiality of the reviewing body. 104
The requirements are closely intertwined and, therefore, reviewed
jointly by both the ECtHR 105 and the CJEU. 106 As pointed out by
Advocate General Stix-Hackl, ‘there is a functional connection
between independence and impartiality, the former being a necessary
condition of the latter’. 107 The CJEU defines an independent judicial
body as ‘an authority acting as a third party in relation to the
99 Ibid; Case C-169/14 Sánchez Morcillo and Abril García EU:C:2014:2099,
para 36.
100 Delcourt v Belgium App no 2689/65 (ECtHR, 17 January 1970) Series A no
11, para 25.
101 Lalmahomed v The Netherlands App no 26036/08 (ECtHR, 22 February
2011) para 38.
102 Art. 47(1) EU Charter.
103 Case C-54/96 Dorsch Consult [1997] ECR I-4961, para 23 related to Article
267 TFEU, but define mutatis mutandis to the indepent ‘tribunals’ under Article 47 EU
Charter.
104 Case C-17/00 De Coster EU:C:2001:651, para 17.
105 Findlay v United Kingdom App no 22107/93 (ECtHR, 25 February 1997)
ECHR 1997-I, para 73.
106 See for instance Case C-506/04 Wilson EU:C:2006:587, para 52.
107 Case C-506/04 Wilson, Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl EU:C:2006:311, para 75.
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authority which adopted the decision forming the subject-matter of the
proceedings’. 108
In Wilson, the CJEU further outlined its constituent elements, while
distinguishing two aspects. The first one, which is external, presumes
that the body is protected against external intervention or pressures
liable to jeopardise the independent judgment of its members as
regards proceedings before them. That essential freedom from such
external factors requires certain guarantees sufficient to protect the
person of those who have the task of adjudicating in a dispute, such
as guarantees against removal from office. The second aspect, which
is internal, is linked to impartiality and seeks to ensure a level
playing field for the parties to the proceedings and their respective
interests with regard to the subject-matter of those proceedings. That
aspect requires objectivity and the absence of any interest in the
outcome of the proceedings apart from the strict application of the
rule of law’. 109
Although the structure of the reasoning adopted by the CJEU
slightly differs from the one developed by the ECtHR, 110 the
substantive elements are almost identical. First, the Wilson judgment
explicitly refers to the ECtHR case law as regards the freedom from
external intervention or pressures. 111 Second, the factors to be
considered in assessing the independence and impartiality are the
same under Union law and the Convention, namely ‘the composition
of the body and the appointment, length of service and the grounds
for abstention, rejection and dismissal of its members’. 112 Third, the
CJEU seeks to examine whether national legislation provides
sufficient guarantees ‘to dismiss any reasonable doubt in the minds of
individuals as to the imperviousness of that body to external factors
and its neutrality with respect to the interests before it’. 113 The
wording used by the Court is clearly reminiscent of the importance
attached by the ECtHR to the appearance of independence and
impartiality. Indeed, Article 6(1) is violated where there is a legitimate
108 Case C-24/92 Corbiau, para 15.
109 Case C-506/04 Wilson, para 51 - 52 (emphasis added).
110 In particular, the CJEU case law does not explicitly distinguish between
objective and subjective impartiality, a distinction that the ECtHR developed in
interpreting Article 6(1) of the Convention. See for instance Kyprianou v Cyprus
App no 73797/01 (ECtHR, 15 December 2015) para 119.
111 Case C-506/04 Wilson, para 51.
112 Ibid para 53.
113 Ibid para 51.
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reason, which is objectively justified, to fear that the reviewing body
lacks independence or impartiality. 114
3.3. Procedural fairness
According to the CJEU case law, ‘the principle of effective judicial
protection laid down in Article 47 of the Charter comprises various
elements; in particular, the rights of the defence, the principle of
equality of arms, the right of access to a tribunal and the right to be
advised, defended and represented’. 115 Thus, procedural fairness
constitutes both a prerequisite for an effective judicial review as well
as the object of judicial scrutiny. As for its first function, fairness
implies equality of arms and adversarial proceedings, which entail in
turn specific criminal-headed guarantees.
3.3.1. Equality of arms and adversarial proceedings
The principle of equality of arms, together with the principle audi
alteram partem, form the corollary of the very concept of a fair
hearing. 116 As regard to the former, the definition adopted by the
CJEU is identical to the one formulated by the ECtHR: 117 ‘each party
must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case,
including his evidence, under conditions that do not place him at a
substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent’. 118 In other words,
the Court verifies whether the domestic law provides a person with a
reasonable opportunity to take legal action based on rights deriving
from Union law in conditions that do not place him in a clearly less
advantageous position than the other parties to the dispute. 119 In
assessing the equality of arms, specific attention is paid to any
imbalance between the procedural rights available to parties. 120 This
114 For instance Clarke v United Kingdom (dec) App no 23695/02 (ECtHR, 28
August 2005); Padovani v Italy App no 13396/87 (ECtHR, 26 February 1993) para 27.
115 Case C-199/11 Europese Gemeenschap v Otis NVand Others EU:C:2012:684,
para 48.
116 Case C-169/14 Sánchez Morcillo and Abril García EU:C:2014:2099, para 49.
117 Klimentyev v Russia App no 46503/99 (ECtHR, 16 November 2006) para 95.
118 Case C-199/11 Europese Gemeenschap v Otis NVand Others EU:C:2012:684,
para 71.
119 Case C-539/14 Sánchez Morcillo and Abril García EU:C:2015:508, para 48.
120 Case C169/14 Sánchez Morcillo and Abril García para 46.
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includes for instance the possibility to examine and challenge any
document submitted to the court. The case law specifies, however,
that the alleged lack of balance must, as a rule, be proven by the
person who has suffered it. 121
The equality of arms overlaps with the adversarial principle. Indeed,
the CJEU defined the latter as the possibility for the parties to the
proceeding to take position on the facts and documents on which the
judicial decision is based, as well as the opportunity to discuss
evidence and arguments submitted to the judge and pleas raised on
his own motion that the court intends to rely upon in its decision. 122
Thus, the principle of audi alteram partem is complied with where a
person is able to lodge submissions and evidence in support of his
claim, 123 particularly in order to contest the grounds on which the
impugned act is based and, therefore, to put forward an effective
defence. 124 The right to an adversarial hearing implies for instance,
the possibility to raise objections to admissibility. 125 Conversely, the
CJEU held that subsequent extensions of procedural time limits
afforded without adversarial debate do not jeopardize the fairness of
the proceedings. 126
The adversarial requirement deriving from Article 47 of the Charter
is not absolute. Similarly to the ECtHR, 127 the CJEU acknowledges
restrictions justified on grounds of State security, including threat for
the life, health or freedom of persons, as well as the need to keep the
methods of investigation specifically used by national authorities
secret when the disclosure of such information would seriously
impede, or even prevent, future performance of the tasks of those
authorities. 128 Restrictions must be strictly necessary: the judge
ensures to the greatest possible extent compliance with the adversarial
principle and more specifically defence rights that constitute its
components. 129 With regard to restrictive measures enacted in the
field of Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP), the CJEU
121 Case C-199/11 Europese Gemeenschap v Otis NV and Others, para 72.
122 Case T-26/14 P Schönberger v Court of Auditors EU:T:2014:887, para 23.
123 Joined Cases C-110/98 and C-147/98 Gabalfrisa, para 37.
124 Case C-300/11 ZZ v Secretary of State for the Home Department
EU:C:2013:363, para 65.
125 Case F-82/09 Nolin v Commission EU:F:2010:154, para 96.
126 Case F-212/07 Strack v Commission EU:F:2011:3, para 39.
127 Case C-300/11 ZZ v Secretary of State for the Home Department, para 65.
128 Ibid para 66.
129 Ibid para 65.
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emphasized the crucial importance of judicial review where restricted
access to documents and information undermines the right to be heard
and, thereby, the effective judicial protection. 130 As regards the role
of national courts, the Court held in ZZ:
The fundamental right to an effective legal remedy would be
infringed if a judicial decision were founded on facts and
documents which the parties themselves, or one of them, have
not had an opportunity to examine and on which they have
therefore been unable to state their views. However, if, in
exceptional cases, a national authority opposes precise and full
disclosure to the person concerned of the grounds which
constitute the basis of a decision (...) by invoking reasons of State
security, the court with jurisdiction in the Member State
concerned must have at its disposal and apply techniques and
rules of procedural law which accommodate, on the one hand,
legitimate State security considerations regarding the nature and
sources of the information taken into account in the adoption of
such a decision and, on the other hand, the need to ensure
sufficient compliance with the person’s procedural rights, such as
the right to be heard and the adversarial principle. 131
According to the Court’s rulings in Kadi 132 and Kadi II, 133 the
same reasoning stands for the judicial scrutiny undertaken by the EU
Courts. 134 Judges must base their decision solely on the materials that
has been disclosed to them by the competent authority. If the reasons
130 Joined cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P Commission v Kadi
EU:C:2013:518, para 119 ff.
131 Case C-300/11 ZZ v Secretary of State for the Home Department, para 56 –
57.
132 Joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International
Foundation v Council EU:C:2008:461, para 337 ff. The Court particularly stressed that
‘[o]bservance of that obligation to communicate the grounds is necessary both to
enable the persons to whom restrictive measures are addressed to defend their rights
in the best possible conditions and to decide, with full knowledge of the relevant
facts, whether there is any point in their applying to the Community judicature, and
to put the latter fully in a position in which it may carry out the review of the
lawfulness of the Community measure in question which is its duty under the EC
Treaty’.
133 Joined cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P Commission v Kadi
EU:C:2013:518, para 125 ff.
134 M Safian, D Düsterhaus (n 4) 27 – 28.
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invoked for precluding disclosure of evidence or information are
insufficient in the Court’s view, judicial review will be based only on
the materials, which have been disclosed to the person subject to
restrictive measures. If, by contrast, the reasons put forwards by the
EU authority do indeed preclude that disclosure, it is for the Court:
to strike an appropriate balance between the requirements attached
to the right to effective judicial protection, in particular respect for
the principle of an adversarial process, and those flowing from the
security of the European Union [and therefore to] assess whether
and to what the extent the failure to disclose confidential
information or evidence to the person concerned and his
consequential inability to submit his observations on them are
such as to affect the probative value of the confidential evidence’. 135
3.3.2. Specific procedural saveguards
As the CJEU stressed, among the constituent elements of the
effective judicial protection guaranteed under Article 47 of the Charter
are defence rights. 136 It should however be underlined that the
wording of the latter provision does not contain a detailed list of
procedural safeguards applicable in criminal proceedings as Article 6,
paragraphs 2 and 3 ECHR does. The latter are echoed in article 48 of
the Charter 137 that broadly refers to the presumption of innocence 138
and the rights of defence of anyone who has been charged. 139
Nonetheless, Article 47 of the Charter incorporates two specific
guarantees, namely the right to be advised, defended and
represented 140 as well as the right to legal aid that, in line with the
ECHR, shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources
in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to
justice. 141 The latter has been interpreted notably in the landmark
judgment DEB. The CJEU acknowledged that national rules must not
135 Joined cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P Commission v Kadi,
para 127 – 128.
136 Case C-199/11 Europese Gemeenschap v Otis NV and Others, para 48.
137 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (n 18) 30.
138 Art. 48(1) EU Charter.
139 Art. 48(2) EU Charter.
140 Art. 47(2) EU Charter.
141 Art.47(3) EU Charter.
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preclude a legal person from the benefit of legal aid, even if the relevant
EU secondary law does not provide for such a right. 142 Indeed, the right
to legal aid should be understood as an ancillary guarantee of the right to
an effective remedy, since denial of legal aid may affect the very essence
of the principle of effective judicial protection when it amounts to an
obstacle for the parties’ access to court. 143 While quoting the ECtHR
case law, the CJEU recalled, however, that legal aid shall be
guaranteed only in as far as necessary for ensuring access to a court
and a fair hearing. For that purpose, the granting of legal aid ‘must be
determined on the basis of the particular facts and circumstances of
each case and will depend, inter alia, upon the importance of what is
at stake for the applicant in the proceedings, the complexity of the
relevant law and procedure and the applicant’s capacity to represent
himself effectively’, in particular as regards his financial capacity. 144
In such circumstances, legal aid encompasses both assistance by a
lawyer and dispensation from payment of the costs of proceedings. 145
In GREP, The CJEU confirmed that the right to legal aid enshrined in
Article 47(3) EU Charter benefits also legal persons. 146 Accordingly,
national legal provisions cannot make it impossible for a legal person
to obtain legal aid where the latter is necessary for contesting before a
court the cross-border enforcement of measures based on EU
regulations concerning the recognition and enforcement of judgments
in civil and commercial matters. 147
The CJEU further emphasized the twofold relation between
defence rights and effective judicial protection while interpreting
the ABC Directives. It clearly emerges from the case law that the
procedural guarantees of suspects and accused persons do not only
determine the fairness of the proceedings that lead to a court’s
decision. Their violation may directly jeopardize the right of access
to a court guaranteed under Article 47 of the Charter. 148 An
illustration thereof is the preliminary ruling whereby the CJEU
142 Case C-279/09 DEB EU:C:2010:811.
143 Likewise Airey v Irland App no 6289/73 (ECtHR, 9 October 1979).
144 Ibid para 46.
145 Ibid para 48.
146 Case C-156/12 GREP EU:C:2012:342.
147 It is worth recalling that legal aid is granted under the same conditions to the
applicant who challenges before the EU Court the validity of an act in order to prevent
him of being deprived of effective access to justice. This is the case, for instance, of
persons who are subject to restrictive measures, notably freezing of funds.
148 Case C-216/14 Covaci EU:C:2015:686, para 42.
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interpreted the right to translation and interpretation in Covaci. The
facts in the main proceedings called into question the sui generis
character of penal order procedure under German law. Accordingly,
the competent court can issue, upon application by the public
prosecutor and without holding a hearing, a penalty order that
imposes a sanction against a person accused of having committed a
minor offence. Thus, ‘[t]he only possibility the accused person has
of obtaining a trial inter partes, in which he can fully exercise his
right to be heard, is to lodge an objection against that order’. 149 In
the light of this, the Court held that national law should guarantee
the free legal assistance of an interpreter enshrined in Article 2
Directive 2010/64/EU to the person who orally and without
assistance of a lawyer lodges an objection against the penalty order
at the registry of the competent court. 150 By contrast, Article 3 of
the Directive does not require the Member States to guarantee the
right of a written translation of such an objection, ‘provided that
the competent authorities do not consider (...), in the light of the
proceedings concerned and the circumstances of the case, such an
objection constitutes an essential document’. 151
The Court adopted a similar approach in Sleutjes , by
acknowledging the right to a written translation of a penalty order
whereby the competent authorities both inform the accused about the
charges against him, and impose a fine. 152 Given the simplified
national proceedings at issue, denying the benefit of such right would
entail a denial of justice. 153 The ruling particularly stressed indeed that:
Where a penalty order such as that at issue in the main proceedings
is addressed to an individual only in the language of the proceedings
in question even though the individual has no command of that
language, that individual is unable to understand what is alleged
against him, and cannot therefore exercise his rights of defence
effectively if he is not provided with a translation of that order in
a language which he understands. 154
In a similar way, the right to information about the accusation can
149 Ibid para 41.
150 Ibid para 42.
151 Ibid para 51.
152 Case C-278/16 Sleutjes EU:C:2017:757.
153 Case C-278/16 Sleutjes, Opinion of AGWahl EU:C:2017:366, para 34.
154 Case C-278/16 Sleutjes, para 33.
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be understood as a precondition for instituting judicial actions. Yet, it is
for the legal system of each Member State to determine rules governing
the notification of decisions imposing criminal sanctions as well as the
admissibility of judicial actions against those decisions. 155 However, the
Court stressed in Tranca that:
[T]he objective of Article 6 of Directive 2012/13 (...) is manifestly
infringed if the addressee of a penalty order (...) which has become
final and enforceable, could no longer object to it, even though he
had not been aware of the existence and content of that order at a
time when he could have exercised his rights of defence, in so
far as, for want of a known place of residence, it was not served
on him personally. 156
Lastly, it is worth recalling that the European Courts adopt the same
approach in determining whether breaches of specific procedural
safeguards amount to the violation of the right to fair trial. Sticking to
the ECtHR case law, the CJEU held in Pupino that national Courts
are under the duty to interpret domestic criminal procedure in
conformity with EU instruments conferring rights to vulnerable
victims, in as far however as the measures therefore applied are not
likely to make the criminal proceedings against defendant, considered
as a whole, unfair within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention. 157
3.4. Time requirements
Article 47 of the Charter further affords the right to be tried without
excessive delays. 158 As for Article 6 of the ECHR, the period to be
considered covers the whole of the proceeding at issue. 159 When the
reasonable time requirement is subject to specific EU legal provisions,
the Court verifies the reasonable length of investigations 160 as well as
155 Joined Cases C-124/16, C-188/16 and C-213/16 Tranca EU:C:2017:228, para
44.
156 Ibid para 45.
157 Case C-105/03 Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino EU:C:2005:386,
para 60.
158 Art. 47(2) EU Charter.
159 V. v United Kingdom App no 24888/94 (ECtHR, 16 December 1999) para
109.
160 For instance, as regard to OLAF investigations, Case T-48/05 Franchet and
Byk v Commission EU:T:2008:257, para 270 ff.
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the reasonableness of the period for delivering the judgment. 161 The
duration ‘is to be appraised in the light of the circumstances specific
to each case and, in particular, the importance of the case for the
person concerned, its complexity and the conduct of the applicant and
of the competent authorities’. 162 As for the appropriate remedy, the
CJEU sanctions the unreasonable length of the proceeding when it
affects the ability of the parties to defend themselves. 163 In particular,
the judge shall prevent defence rights from being irremediably
compromised on account of the excessive duration of the investigation
phase and to ensure that the duration of that phase does not impede
the establishment of evidence designed to refute the existence of
conduct susceptible of rendering the person liable. 164 Thus, the failure
to adjudicate within a reasonable time may lead to the annulment of
the final decision imposing sanctions only when the length of
proceedings may have had an effect on the outcome of the dispute. 165
Besides reasonable time requirements, the ECtHR case law
repeatedly stressed that the speed of the proceedings shall not
jeopardize the procedural guarantees of the parties 166 and most
particularly the right to have adequate time for the preparation of
defence. 167 In a similar way, EU case law refers to a period of time
that ‘must be sufficient in practical terms to enable an effective
objection to be prepared and submitted’. 168 The CJEU examines such
a requirement with regard to the two components of the principle of
effective judicial protection.
On the one hand, a judicial remedy is effective if the procedural
rules governing actions for safeguarding an individual’s rights under
Union law do not render ‘practically impossible or excessively
161 Case C-385/07 P Der Grüne Punkt v Commission EU:C:2009:456, para 176
ff.
162 Joined Cases C238/99 P, C244/99 P, C245/99 P, C247/99 P, C250/99 P to
C252/99 P and C254/99 P Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission
EU:C:2002:582, para 187.
163 Case C-105/04 P Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging v Commission
EU:C:2006:592, para 49.
164 Ibid para 50.
165 Case C-385/07 P Der Grüne Punkt v Commission, para 193
166 OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v Russia App no 14902/04 (ECtHR, 20
September 2011) para 540.
167 The European Courts assess the adequate time for the preparation of defence
in the light of the specific circumstances of the case. See for instance Iglin v Ukraine
App no 39908/05 (ECtHR, 12 January 2012) para 65.
168 Case C-418/11 Texdata Software EU:C:2013:588, para 80.
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difficult’ the exercise of such rights. 169 The CJEU held for instance that
the late disclosure of the grounds for a restrictive measure may infringe
the applicant’s rights of defence and his right to effective judicial
protection in that he was not notified in good time of the adoption of
such sanction. 170 Indeed, the right to information in due time entails
the communication of the grounds for a restrictive measure as well as
the access of the relevant information and evidence on which the
impugned decision is based. 171 The notification shall intervene
rapidly in order to afford the person concerned the opportunity to
effectively make known his view 172 and sufficient time within which
assessing the validity of the impugned measure 173 and bringing an
action against it. 174
On the other hand, the CJEU examined time limits for instituting
judicial proceedings in the light of the principle of equivalence.
According to the latter, national procedures governing actions for
safeguarding an individual’s rights under Union law ‘must be no less
favourable than those governing similar domestic actions’. 175 Indeed,
the adequate time requirement raises questions with regard to specific
notification procedures under national law that apply to persons
whose place of residence or habitual abode is in another Member
State. 176 A similar question was addressed to the CJEU in Covaci.
According to German law, the persons who is subject to a penalty
order has a period of two weeks to lodge an objection against it, with
that period running from the service of the order. However, if the
convicted person is a non-resident of the country, he is required to
appoint a person authorized to accept service of the judicial decisions.
In the light of this, the Court held that:
Both the objective of enabling the accused person to prepare his
defence and the need to avoid any kind of discrimination between
(i) accused persons with a residence within the jurisdiction of the
national law concerned and (ii) accused persons whose residence
169 Case C-432/05 Unibet EU:C:2007:163, para 43.
170 Case T-496/10 Bank Mellat v Council EU:T:2013:3, para 105.
171 Ibid para 85.
172 Case T-493/10 Persia International Bank v Council EU:T:2013:398, para 84.
173 Case T-256/11 Ezz and Others v Council EU:T:2014:93, para 181.
174 Joined cases T-174/12 and T-80/13 Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank v
Council EU:T:2014:52, para 64.
175 Case C-432/05 Unibet, para 43.
176 See for instance Case C-325/11 Alder EU:C:2012:824, para 34 ff.
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does not fall within that jurisdiction, who alone are required to
appoint a person authorised to accept service of judicial
decisions, require the whole of that period to be available to the
accused person. (...) [I]f, as in the present case, that period begins
to run from the service of the penalty order on the person
authorised by the accused person, the latter can effectively
exercise his right of defence and the trial is fair only if he has the
benefit of that period in its entirety, that is to say without the
duration of that period being reduced by the time needed by the
authorised person to transmit the penalty order to its addressee. 177
4. Requirements related to the function of judicial scrutiny: scope
and powers of review
4.1. Full judicial review
Among the characteristic features of a court having jurisdiction in
criminal matters, the CJEU identified its unlimited jurisdiction. 178 As
underlined by Advocate General Bot in Baláž, a court having
competence for reviewing financial penalty decisions ‘must be one
whose constitution, procedures and scope of review secure the
minimum guarantees applicable under Articles 47 and 48 of the
Charter when a person is charged with a criminal offence’. 179 This
entails, inter alia, ‘proper judicial review’ of the sanctioning decision,
which requires ‘review on the facts, not merely on the law, and may
involve the attendance and examination of witnesses’. 180
The case law related to EU antitrust proceedings provides further
clarifications as regards the guarantee of full judicial review arising
from Article 47 of the Charter. In particular, the CJEU stressed that
judicial scrutiny of decisions imposing penalties within the meaning
of Article 6 of the ECHR encompasses ‘the correctness in law and in
fact of any accusation’. 181 Thus, as opposed to a restricted review
aimed at verifying the ‘procedural legality’ of an act, 182 unlimited
177 Case C-216/14 Covaci, para 65 – 67(emphasis added).
178 Case C-60/12 Baláž EU:C:2013:733, para 39.
179 Case C-60/12 Baláž Opinion of AG Bot, para 56.
180 Ibid para 63.
181 Joined cases T-56/09 and T-73/03 Saint-Gobain Glass Franece e.a. v
Commission, para 84 et seq.
182 Ibid para 79.
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jurisdiction ‘entails an exhaustive review of both the Commission’s
substantive findings of facts and its legal appraisal of those facts’. 183
On the one hand, the review of legality under Article 263 TFEU
includes ‘the power to assess the evidence, annul the decision and to
alter the amount of the fine’. 184 On the other hand, the full
jurisdiction granted to EU Courts by Regulation 1/2003 allows the
European judge to review the proportionality of the sanction imposed
‘by examining all the complaints raised by the appellants, based on
issues of fact and law, seeking to show that the amount of the fine is
not commensurate with the gravity or the durat ion of the
infringement’. 185 In similar terms, the Court outlined the requirement
of full jurisdiction with respect to disciplinary sanctions imposed to
EU officials. By reference to the case law of the ECtHR, a judicial
authority having full jurisdiction must be able to examine all
questions of law and facts relevant to the dispute brought before it,
including in case of a disciplinary sanction the competence to review
the proportionality between the misconduct and the penalty. 186
Nonetheless, the case law stressed that the principle of effective
judicial protection does not dictate ex-officio review. 187 In field of
antitrust proceedings, the CJEU recalled that, with the exception of
pleas involving public policy (e.g. failure to state raisons), it is for the
applicant ‘to identify the impugned elements of the contested
decision, to formulate grounds of challenge in that regard and to
adduce evidence – direct or circumstantial – to demonstrate that its
objections are well founded’. 188 This results from the very essence of
actions for annulment taken before the EU Courts, namely an inter
partes procedure 189 which ‘has neither the object nor the effect of
183 P. Van Cleynenbreugel, ‘Efficient justice in the service of justiciable
efficiency? Varieties of comprehensive judicial review in a modernized EU
competition law enforcement context’ (2014) 10 CompLR 35, 37.
184 Case C-295/12 P Telefónica SA et Telefónica de España SAU v Commission
EU:C:2014:2062, para 53.
185 Ibid para 204.
186 Case T-184/11P, Nijs v Court of Auditors EU:T:2012:236, para 85; Case T-17/
08 P Andreasen v Commission EU:T:2010:374, para 146.
187 Case C-386/10 P Chalkor AE Epexergasias Metallon v Commission
EU:C:2011:815, para 66; Case C-194/14 P AC-Treuhand AG v Commission
EU:C:2015:717, para 75.
188 Case C-272/09 P KME Germany AG, KME France SAS et KME Italy SpA v
Commission [2011] ECR I-12789, para 105.
189 Joined cases C-239/11 P, C-489/11 P and C-498/11 P Siemens, Mitsubishi
Electric Corp. and Toshiba Corp. v Commission EU:C:2013:866, para 335.
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replacing a full investigation of the case’ by the Commission 190. Thus,
the scope of judicial scrutiny relies on the pleas in law put forward by
the applicant, provided that ‘the way in which [they] are formulated
determines the extent to which the Court will be obliged to respond to
them’. 191 This does not preclude compliance with Article 47 of the
Charter, provided that the principle of effective judicial protection
‘does not require that the General Court (...) should be obliged to
undertake of its own motion a new and comprehensive investigation
of the file’. 192
4.2. Evidence gathered in breach of individual rights
The unlimited jurisdiction undertaken by EU Courts entails the task
of establishing whether the evidence relied upon for the imposition of
penalties is factually accurate, reliable and consistent. 193 Thus, the
effective judicial protection implies the power of the reviewing judge
to substitute his own assessment of the evidence, facts and
circumstances justifying the adoption of measures adversely affecting
a person. 194 As under Article 6 of the ECHR, 195 Article 47 of the
Charter does not include specific rules on the admissibility of
evidence. However, the CJEU has consistently held that the right to
an effective remedy prevents an authority from imposing penalties for
misconduct established on the basis of evidence unlawfully
collected. 196 Indeed, according to the case law related to EU anti-trust
proceedings, judicial control of legality does not exclusively
encompass the power to assess evidence 197 that is excluded if not
subject to an adversarial debate. 198 The EU judges further verify
190 Case C-510/11 P Kone Oyj and Others v Commission EU:C:2013:696, para
26.
191 P Van Cleynenbreugel (n 183) 41.
192 Case C-295/12 P Telefónica SA et Telefónica de España SAU v Commission,
para 55.
193 Case C-199/11 Europese Gemeenschap v Otis NV and Others, para 59.
194 Case T-181/08 Tay Za v Council EU:T:2010:209, para 144.
195 Heglas v Czech Republic App no 5935/02 (ECtHR, 1 March 2007) para 84.
196 Case C-583/13P Deutsche Bahn AG and Others v Commission
EU:C:2015:404, para 41 – 46.
197 Case C-295/12 P Telefónica SA et Telefónica de España SAU v Commission,
para 53.
198 See, for instance, the case law of the CJEU regarding restrictive measures
referred to under Section 4.3.1 ‘Equality of arms and adversarial procedure’.
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whether procedural irregularities during preliminary inquiries
irremediably compromised the ability of the accused to defend
himself, 199 in particular with regard to those investigative acts that
are decisive in providing evidence of the unlawful conduct. 200 In
such circumstances, a breach of defence rights during the
investigation can vitiate the entire proceeding and therefore lead to the
annulment of the final decision imposing sanctions where ‘latter could
have had a different outcome if the rules had been observed’. 201
Thus, like the ECtHR case law, the CJEU pays attention on whether
the illegally obtained evidence was ‘an integral and significant part of
the probative evidence upon which the conviction was based’ and,
thereby, rendered the trial as a whole unfair. 202
In the same way, the CJEU has clarified the scope of judicial
scrutiny national judges must undertake with regard to evidence
gathered in breach of fundamental rights guaranteed under Union law.
In WebMindLicences, the Court was called upon to rule on the use, by
national tax authorities, of evidence gathered without the taxable
person’s knowledge in the course of parallel criminal proceedings. 203
With regard to the review carried out by the competent domestic
court, the judgment stressed:
In order for the judicial review (...) to be effective, the court
reviewing the legality of a decision implementing EU law must
be able to verify whether the evidence on which that decision is
founded has been obtained and used in breach of the rights
guaranteed by EU law and, especially, by the Charter. That
requirement is satisfied if the court (...) is empowered to check
that the evidence upon which that decision is founded, deriving
from a parallel criminal procedure that has not yet been
concluded, was obtained in that criminal procedure in accordance
with the rights guaranteed by EU law or can at least satisfy itself,
on the basis of a review already carried out by a criminal court in
199 Case C-105/04 P Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging v Commission, para 50.
200 Joined cases 46/87 and 227/88 Hoechst AG v Commission EU:C:1989:337,
para 15.
201 Case T-210/01 General Electric Company v Commission EU:T:2005:456,
para 632.
202 Ibrahim v United Kingdom App no 50541/08, 50571/08, 50573/08 and 40351/
09 (ECtHR, 16 December 2014) para 309.
203 Case C-419/14 WebMindLicenses Kft. v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Kiemelt
Adó- és Vám Foigazgatóság EU:C:2015:832.
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an inter partes procedure, that that evidence was obtained in
accordance with EU law. If that requirement is not satisfied and,
therefore, the right to a judicial remedy is not effective, or if
another right guaranteed by EU law is infringed, the evidence
obtained (...) must be disregarded and the contested decision
which is founded on that evidence must be annulled if, as a
result, the decision has no basis. 204
The same judgment reiterates that the right for private life enshrined
in Article 7 of the Charter does not require any ex-ante judicial review of
intrusive investigative measures. 205 In line with the ECtHR case law, 206
the CJEU nonetheless acknowledged that absence of a prior judicial
warrant increases risks of arbitrariness. 207 Therefore, it must be
counterbalanced by the availability to the person concerned of an
effective ex post factum judicial review relating to both the legality
and necessity of such investigative act. 208
4.3. Duty to state reasons
According to Article 41 of the Charter, the duty to state reasons is
one of the guarantees stemming from the right to a good
administration. 209 The latter implies the obligation for the EU
institutions to give reasons for their decision, including acts that
impose sanctions or affect the right of the person to whom the
decision is addressed. Although it is not explicitly enshrined in Article
47 of the Charter, the case law has acknowledged that the duty to
state reasons is also incumbent upon the European institutions as a
component of the right to an effective remedy. 210 In the field of
antitrust proceedings, the Court has underlined that the decision of the
Commission imposing a fine ‘must be particularly clear and precise’
in order to enable the undertaking held liable ‘to understand and to
204 Ibid paras 87 – 89 (emphasis added).
205 Case C-419/14 WebMindLicenses, para 77; Case C-583/13P, Deutsche Bahn
AG and Others v Commission, para 25.
206 Gutsanovi v Bulgaria App no 34529/10 (ECtHR, 15 October 2013) para 220
ff.
207 Case C-419/14 WebMindLicenses, para 77.
208 Ibid para 78. Similarly, Smirnov v Russia App no 71362/01 (ECtHR, 7 June
2007) para 45.
209 Art. 41(2) EU Charter.
210 Case T-67/11 Martinair Holland v Commission EU:T:2015:984, para 31.
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contest that imputation of liability and the imposition of those penalties,
as set out in the wording of that operative part’ of the impugned
decision. 211
Accordingly, the CJEU adopts the same interpretation of the
obligation to state reasons as the ECtHR under Article 6 of the
Convention. First, the authority imposing a penalty is not required to
answer every argument raised by the parties. 212 Nonetheless, the
decision must at least set out the facts and considerations having
decisive importance as to enable the person sanctioned to understand
such decision and bring an appropriate and effective appeal. 213
Second, the same arguments have led the CJEU to verify whether the
grounds on which the decision is based are sufficiently clear and
precise. 214 Third, the adequate reasoning of decisions imposing
penalties shall be assessed according to the nature of such decision
and in the light of the circumstances of the case. 215
4.4. Powers of review
As outlined above, the extent of judicial powers granted to a
tribunal called upon to impose or review a penalty is strictly related
to its unlimited jurisdiction. With regard to EU competition
proceedings, the CJEU consistently held that full judicial review
entails the power to assess evidence and alter the amount of the fine
or repeal it altogether, on the basis of an independent assessment of
the circumstances of the case. 216 In doing so, EU judges enjoy the
power to substitute their own assessment of the case for the findings
of the Commission. 217 Thus, the right to an effective remedy
211 Ibid.
212 Van de Hurk v The Netherlands App no 16034/90 (ECtHR, 19 April 1994)
para 61.
213 Case T-67/11 Martinair Holland v Commission, para 27. Similarly, Boldea v
Rumania App no 19997/02 (ECtHR, 15 February 2007) para 30.
214 Case T-67/11 Martinair Holland v Commission, para 31; Hadjianastassiou v
Greece App no 12945/87 (ECtHR, 16 December 1992) para 33.
215 Case C-619/10 Trade Agency EU:C:2012:531, para 60; Ruiz Torija v Spain
App no 18390/91(ECtHR, 09 December 1994) para 29.
216 Case C-272/09 P KME Germany AG, KME France SAS et KME Italy SpA v
Commission, para 102; Case C-386/10 P Chalkor AE Epexergasias Metallon v
Commission, para 62.
217 Joined cases T-56/09 and T-73/03 Saint-Gobain Glass Franece e.a. v
Commission, paras 84 ff.
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presupposes the powers of the reviewing Court to adopt a legally
binding judgment annulling the impugned decision that imposes
penalties. 218 It is worth noting that the latter requirement is part of
the very definition of a tribunal. While the ECtHR requires Courts
under Article 6 of the Convention to give binding decisions, 219 which
may not be altered by a non-judicial authority, the CJEU refers to the
power of adopting decisions that acquire force of res judicata. 220
5. Limitations on the right to access a court
According to the EU case law, the right of access to a court is not
absolute. It therefore may be subject to restrictions that pursue an
objective of general interest (i.e. lightening of the burden on the court
system) and do not involve, with regard to the objectives pursued, a
disproportionate and intolerable interference, which infringes upon the
very substance of the rights guaranteed. 221 As for the other rights
enshrined in the Charter, limitations to the effective judicial protection
guaranteed under Article 47 must be provided for by law. 222
However, the CJEU allows some implicit limitations aimed at
ensuring the proper administration of justice. Notably, the existence of
an interest in bringing a judicial action forms an essential and
fundamental prerequisite for any legal proceedings and consequently
does not affect the very essence of the right of access to a court. 223
In particular, the CJEU acknowledges restrictions to the right of
access to a first instance tribunal in case of penalties that do not form
part of hard-core criminal law. By reference to the case law of the
ECtHR, 224 the EU judges have consistently held that the right to an
effective judicial protection does ‘not preclude a ‘penalty’ from being
218 Case C-295/12 P Telefónica SA et Telefónica de España SAU v Commission,
para 53.
219 Findlay v United Kingdom App no 22107/93 (ECtHR, 25 February 1997) para
77.
220 C-363/11 Epitropos tou Elegktikou Synedriou EU:C:2012:825, para 26 – 28.
221 Joined cases C-317/08, C-318/08, C-319/08 and C-320/08 Alassini v Telecom
Italia EU:C:2010:146, para 63 – 64.
222 Art. 52(1) EU Charter. See also, Case C-407/08 P Knauf Gips v Commission
EU:C:2010:70, para 91; Case T-234/07 Koninklijke Grolsch v Commission
EU:T:2011:476, para 37 – 38.
223 Case T-19/06 Mindo Srl v Commission EU:T:2011:56, para 97 – 99.
224 Menarini Diagnostic v Italy App no 43509/08 (ECtHR, 27 September 2011)
para 58 – 59.
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imposed by an administrative authority with the power to impose
penalties in competition law matters, provided that the decision adopted
by that authority is amenable to subsequent review by a judicial body
exercising unlimited jurisdiction’. 225 Likewise, the ECtHR adopted the
same reasoning with regard to minor road traffic offences. 226 It is
worth noting that such a restriction finds expression in the EU
Directives concerning the rights of the suspect and accused persons in
criminal proceedings. Indeed, their scope of application encompasses
the proceedings before a court following an appeal against a decision
imposing sanctions for minor offences by an authority other than a
tribunal having jurisdiction in criminal matters. 227 The underlying
justification for a restricted access to court lies in demands of flexibility
and efficiency of the justice system 228 that overweight procedural
defects of the administrative stage of proceedings. 229
By contrast, legal provisions that provide limitations on the exercise
of the rights recognised by the Charter must not impair the very essence
of those rights. The requirement laid down in Article 52 (1) EU Charter
finds an illustration in Schrems. The CJEU held that:
[L]egislation not providing for any possibility for an individual to
pursue legal remedies in order to have access to personal data
relating to him, or to obtain the rectification or erasure of such
data, does not respect the essence of the fundamental right to
effective judicial protection, as enshrined in Article 47 of the
Charter (...) The very existence of effective judicial review
designed to ensure compliance with provisions of EU law is
inherent in the existence of the rule of law. 230
225 Joined cases T-56/09 and T-73/03 Saint-Gobain Glass Franece e.a. v
Commission, paras 77 – 79; Case T-138/07 Schlindler Holding e.a. v Commission,
para 35.
226 Öztürk v Germany App no 22479/93 (ECtHR of 21 February 1984) Series A
no 73, para 56. The Court adopted the same approach as regards tax surchanges. See
for instance Bendenoun v France App no 12547/86 (ECtHR, 24 February 1994) para
46.
227 For instance, Art. 1(3) Directive 2010/64/EU.
228 Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v Belgium App no 6878/75 and 7238/
75 (ECtHR, 23 June 1981) Serie A no 54, para 51.
229 D Slater, S Thomas, D Waelbroeck, ‘Competition law proceedings before the
European Commission and the right to a fair trial: no need for reform?’ (2008) 1
College of Europe Research Paper in Law https://www.coleurope.eu/study/european-
legal-studies/research-activities/research-papers-law, 21.
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6. Conclusions
At first glance, the protection afforded under Article 47 of the
Charter is more extensive than under Articles 13 and 6 ECHR. On the
one hand, its first paragraph expressly refers to remedies ‘before a
tribunal’, 231 while Article 13 of the Convention does not necessarily
require the intervention of a judicial authority in the strict sense. 232 On
the other, the scope of Article 47(2) of the Charter is wider than the
field of application characterizing Article 6(1) of the ECHR: under
Union law, the right to access ‘an independent and impartial tribunal
previously established by law’ is not confined to disputes relating to
civil rights and obligations, nor to the determination of a criminal
charge. 233 Consequently, Article 47 of the Charter also applies to
administrative proceedings, without the need to establish whether that
they lead to the imposition of penalties according to the Engel
criteria. 234 Nonetheless, the CJEU has consistently held, in line with
the ECtHR case law, 235 that the criminal-headed guarantees, more
specifically the right to access a court and defence rights, do not
necessarily apply with their full stringency in punitive administrative
proceedings, which do not form part of the ‘hard core’ of criminal law. 236
It is precisely the effective protection of defence rights that opens
up a new field of interaction between the CJEU and the abundant
case law of the ECtHR related to Article 6 of the Convention. Not
only shall the Luxembourg Court interpret the meaning and scope of
the procedural guarantees the ABC Diretives grant to suspect and
accused persons in line with the corresponding rights enshrined in the
ECHR. 237 The newly-adopted Directives also raise questions as to the
level of judicial protection of defence rights that Article 47 of the
Charter provides within the EU criminal justice area. 238
230 Case C-362/14, Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner EU:C:2015:650, para 95
(emphasis added).
231 Art. 47(1) EU Charter.
232 Silver and others v United Kingdom App no 5947/72, 6205/73, 7052/75,
7061/75, 7107/75, 7113/75 and 7136/75 (ECtHR, 25 March 1983) para 113.
233 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (n 18) 30.
234 The CJEU referred explicitly to the Engel criteria for the definition of penalties
within the meaning of Article 6 ECRH in Case C489/10 Bonda EU:C:2012:319, para 37.
235 Jussila v Finland App no 73053/01 (ECtHR, 23 November 2006) XIV-2006-
XIV, para 43.
236 Case T-138/07 Schlindler Holding e.a. v Commission EU:T:2011:362, para 52.
237 Art. 52 (3) EU Charter.
238 M Caianiello, ‘Giudice imparziale preconstituito e tutela effectiva dei diritti in
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materia penale’ in R Mastroianni, O Pollicino, S Allegrezza, F Pappalardo, O Razzolini
(eds), Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione europea (2017) Giuffrè 902, 911.
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1. Reconciling autonomy and consistency
As the time limits for implementing the ABC Directives expire,
national criminal courts will presumably refer to the CJEU an
increasing number of questions for preliminary rulings. This brings
under the jurisdiction of the EU judicature a new set of legal issues
that are among the key areas of the prolific case law of the ECtHR:
the interpretation of the rights of suspects and accused persons in
criminal proceedings. 1 Such parallelism inevitably leads the CJEU to
take into consideration the case law of the Strabourg Court when
interpreting both the substance of defence rights and the duty for the
Member States to provide effective remedies against alleged breaches
1 This corresponds to a general trend towards an increasing number of cases in
which the CJEU plays the role of human right adjudicator. See G de Burca, ‘After
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Court of Justice as a Human Rights
Adjudicator’ (2013) 20 Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp. L. 168.
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of those rights. 2 Indeed, EU primary law lays down a set of rules that
aims to prevent conflicting interpretations of fundamental rights by
the CJEU and the ECtHR. The first historical one is rooted in Article
6(3) TEU: fundamental rights recognised by the ECHR constitute
general principles of Union law. 3 All the more crucial are the general
provisions of the Charter that strive to clarify its relationship with the
Convention. Pursuant to Article 52(3) of the EU Charter, the meaning
and scope of the fundamental rights it enshrines ‘shall be the same’ as
those corresponding to rights laid down by the Convention, ‘without
thereby adversely affecting the autonomy of Union law and of that of
the Court of Justice of the European Union’. 4 Further rules useful for
interpretation focus on the level of protection the Charter must
provide. According to Article 53, the EU Charter cannot be
interpreted ‘as restricting or adversely affecting human rights and
fundamental freedoms’ recognized by the ECHR. Where it otherwise,
the Member States would be required to implement lower standards to
protect fundamental rights in violation of the Convention, to which all
Member States are party. This does not prevent, however, Union law
from providing more extensive protection. 5
The above-mentioned provisions remain nonetheless controversial.
To what extent shall and will the CJEU show deference to the rulings of
the ECtHR? Will the case law of the Strasbourg Court substantially
influence the interpretation given by the EU judges of the rights of
suspects and accused persons in criminal proceedings? Considering
that the ABC Directives are largely based on the jurisprudence of the
ECtHR under Article 5 and 6 of the Convention, 6 one would expect
the CJEU to take it into careful consideration. However, the
Luxembourg Court repeatedly emphasized in the last years the
2 References to the case law of the ECtHR can be found in the very first
preliminary ruling on interpretation of the ABC Directives. See Case C-216/14
Covaci EU:C:2015:686, para 39
3 Since the 1980’s, the CJEU aknowledged the ‘particular significance’ of the
ECHR for interpreting fundamental rights within the EU legal order. See for
instance Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88 Hoechst AG v Commission EU:C:1989:337,
para 13.
4 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ C 303/17, 33.
5 Art. 52 (3) EU Charter.
6 The preambles of all ABC Directives make explicit reference to the ECHR and
the Strasbourg case law. See for instance Recitals 5 and 14 Directive 2010/64/EU of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the right to
interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings [2010] OJ L 280/1.
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autonomous content of the rights enshrined in the Charter, 7 including
the right to an effective remedy and fair trial of Article 47. 8
This approach led the CJEU to take a particular strong stance vis-à-
vis the undermining effect that the accession of the EU to the
Convention could have had on mutual recognition of judicial
decisions within the EU criminal justice area. 9 More recently, the
Court emphasized the autonomy of Union law while undertaking a
‘Charter-centered’ interpretation of the ne bis in idem principle. 10
Indeed, the case law of the Luxembourg Court repeatedly stresses that
the Convention ‘does not constitute, as long as the European Union
has not acceded to it, a legal instrument which has been formally
incorporated into EU law’. 11 Thus, as the CJEU underlined in Orsi
and Baldetti, questions on the interpretation of EU law must be
examined ‘solely in the light of the fundamental rights guaranteed by
the Charter’. 12 In Menci, Advocate General Campos Sánchez-
Bordona takes a step further when arguing that ‘the case-law of the
ECtHR should be disregarded where, in the case of rights laid down
in the Charter which are similar in content to those laid down in the
ECHR and the protocols thereto, the interpretation of the Court of
Justice establishes a higher level of protection, provided that this is
not detrimental to another right guaranteed by the Charter’. 13
Although the preliminary ruling in Menci does not substantially depart
from the judgment of the ECtHR in A and B versus Norway, it is
significant to note that the CJEU interpreted the ne bis in idem
principle exclusively by reference to Union law. Nonetheless, the
autonomy did not prevent the Court from verifying in a second step
7 In partuclar, the CJEU has put special emphasis on the autonomy of Union law
since the negotiations on the accession of the EU to the ECHR. See for instance, C
Eckes, ‘EU Accession to the ECHR: Between Autonomy and Adaptation’ (2013) 76
Mod L Rev 254, 258 ff.
8 Case C-69/10 Samba Diouf, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón EU:C:2011:102, para
39.
9 Opinion 2/13 EU:C:2014:2454, para 192. Criticism against the opinion was
expressed for instance by S Peers, ‘The EU’s Accession to the ECHR: The Dream
Becomes a Nightmare’ (2015) 16 German Law Journal 213. Contra K Lenaerts, ‘
La vie après l’avis: Exploring the Principle of Mutual (Yet not Blind) Trust’ (2017)
54 CMLRev 805.
10 Case C-524/15 Menci EU:C:2018:197, para 23.
11 Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson EU:C:2013:105, para 44.
12 Case C-217/15 Orsi and Baldetti EU:C:2017:264, para 15.
13 Case C-524/15 Menci, Opinion of AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona
EU:C:2017:667, point 75.
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of its reasoning whether such autonomous interpretation does not
conflict with the minimum level of protection guaranteed under the
ECHR, as required by Article 53 of the Charter. 14
A similar trend is even more accentuated in some recent judgments
whereby the CJEU interpreted the right of defendants to access an
independent and impartial court or the duty incumbent upon the
Member States to provide suspects and accused persons with effective
remedies against breaches of defence rights. Despite the numerous
references to the ECtHR case law in the Opinion of Advocate
General Tanchev, 15 the preliminary ruling in LM omits any reference
to the ‘flagrant denial of justice’ as interpreted by the Strasbourg
Court, even though the concept was at the very heart of the question
asked by the national referring court. 16 Even more striking is the
silence of the CJEU about the Charter and the related rights under the
Convention when called upon to interpret the requirements that the
presumption of innocence would entail for the judicial review of
detention pending trial. 17
This approach does not solely bring into play the consistency
between the EU right to an effective remedy of Article 47 of the
Charter with the corresponding safeguards in Article 6 and 13 of the
Convention. 18 It touches upon the whole set of gurantees of judicial
review provided by the ECHR in criminal proceedings. Among these
is the right to challenge the lawfulness of a deprivation of liberty
under Article 5 of the Convention, which finds a corresponding
provision in Article 6 of the EU Charter. 19 How will the CJEU
interpret for instance the right to access documents essential to
challenge arrest and detention guaranteed by Article 7(1) Directive
2012/13/EU? Would the Luxembourg Court simply ignore the ECtHR
case law related to defence rights at the appeal stage of criminal
proceedings, given that the EU Charter does not guarantee the right to
appeal against convictions and sentences enshrined in Article 2
Protocol 7 ECHR? 20 To answer those questions, it is first necessary
14 Case C-524/15 Menci, para 62.
15 Case C-216/PPU LM, Opinion of AG Tanchev EU:C:2018:517.
16 Case C-216/PPU LM EU:C:2018:586.
17 Case C-310/18 PPU Milev EU:C:2018:732.
18 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ C 303/17, 29 –
30.
19 Ibid 19 – 20.
20 Case C-69/10 Samba Diouf EU:C:2011:524, para 69.
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to map the different guarantees of judicial scrutiny and their relationship
under the Convention.
2. Mapping guarantees of judicial review under the Convention
Although the ECHR and the Strasbourg case law do not
acknowledge properly speaking a ‘right to judicial review’, judicial
scrutiny is at the heart of different and overlapping fundamental rights
that protect suspects and accused persons in criminal proceedings. In
particular, judicial review is a core element of the right to liberty and
security, 21 the right to access an independent and impartial tribunal
and fair trial, 22 the right to an effective remedy 23 and the right to
appeal against convictions or sentences. 24 In addition, although
judicial control does not appear among the formal requirements laid
down in Article 8 of the Convention, the ECtHR assigns an
overriding importance to mechnisms of ex-ante judicial scrutiny
aimed to prevent disproportionate enchroachements on the right to
privacy. 25
The analysis of the abundant case law highlights a set of common
requirements that judicial remedies must fulfill in criminal proceedings:
effective access to court; guarantees of independence and impartiality of
the reviewing body; a scope of review that enables the competent
authority to ascertain breaches and thereby secure the substance of
rights enshrined in the Convention; the power to sanction those
breaches and provide appropriate relief by means of legally-binding
decisions; a decision rendered within adequate time; a reasoned
decision that enables the defendant to understand the reasons for it
and to lodge subsequent available remedies. 26 However, the
requirements inherent to the structure and function of judicial review
may vary depending on the fundamental right at issue, the specific
21 In particular Art. 5(3) and (4) ECHR.
22 Art. 6 ECHR.
23 Art. 10 ECHR.
24 Art. 2 Protocol 7 ECHR.
25 N Hervieu, ‘Droits et garanties de la procédure pénale (Art. 3, 5, 8 et 13
CEDH) : Un spectaculaire resserrement de l’étau européen sur les perquisitions et
les privations de liberté’ (2013) Lettre ‘Actualités Droits-Libertés’ du CREDOF <
https://revdh.wordpress.com/2013/10/18/procedure-penale-etau-europeen-
perquisitions> accessed 22 November 2017.
26 V Covolo, ‘Judicial Scrutiny in Criminal Proceedings: Related Rights under
the ECHR’ (2018) forthcoming.
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characteristics of the criminal proceeding in question and the peculiar
circumstances of the case. The variable standards of judicial
protection find an illustration in the relationship between the above-
mentioned provisions under the Convention.
2.1. Right to an effective remedy and access to court
Article 5, 6 and 13 ECHR afford procedural safeguards, which form
part of the backbone of the proper administration of criminal justice in
democratic societies. Even though the underlying common objective is
to combat the arbitrary exercise of States’ coercive powers, the
fundamental rights in question differ in their nature and scope. First,
the right to an effective remedy under Article 13 ECHR has an
ancillary character: the provision intends to guarantee effective
mechanisms by which the applicant can claim a violation of a
substantive right set forth in the Convention and the Protocols
thereto. 27 Consequently, a breach of Article 13 presupposes an
arguable claim that invokes a violation of a fundamental right
stemming from the ECHR. 28 Similarly, the duty on the Contracting
States to provide effective remedies is contingent upon the scope of
the substantive right allegedly violated. 29 By contrast, Articles 5 and
6 of the Convention grant autonomous safeguards, which do not
require the ECtHR to find prior infringements of other fundamental
rights.
Second, Article 13 ECHR entails less stringent requirements in
comparison with Article 5 (3) and (4) and Article 6. In particular, an
effective remedy under the former does not necessarily imply judicial
scrutiny, whilst the latter provisions explicitly refer to tribunals, 30
judges or officers authorized by law to exercise judicial power. 31 Due
to the different level of protection provided, Articles 5 and 6 must be
regarded as ‘ lex specialis in relation to Article 13 of the
Convention’. 32 Therefore, the established violation of Articles 5 and 6
27 C Grabenwarter, European Convention of Human Rights. Commentary (Beck,
Hart, Nomos, 2014) 328.
28 W Schabas, The European Convention of Human Rights. A Commentary
(Oxford University Press, 2015) 551.
29 C Grabenwarter (n 19) 329.
30 Art. 6 (1) ECHR.
31 Art. 5 (3) ECHR.
32 C Grabenwarter (n 19) 329 ff.
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may make the accompanying complaint under Article 13 superfluous. In
this regard, two situations should be distinguished. Where the safeguards
enshrined in Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention overlap and absorb those
of Article 13, there is no legal interest in re-examining the same subject
matter under the less stringent requirements of the latter provision. 33 In
such circumstances, the Court consistently held that it is not necessary to
rule on the absence of effective remedies under Article 13 ECHR.
However, a violation of reasonable time requirements under Article 6
does not necessarily prevent the ECtHR to examine separately the
accompanying complaint made under Article 13. 34 Accordingly, the
Court held in Kudla versus Poland that the provisions may relate to
separate legal issued, given that ‘the issue to be determined before the
Article 6 § 1 ‘tribunals’ was the criminal charges brought against the
applicant, whereas the complaint that he wanted to have examined by
a ‘national authority’ for the purposes of Article 13 was the separate
one of the unreasonable length of the proceedings’. 35
The supporting arguments derive from both the spirit of the
provision and legal practice. On the one hand, the Court explicitly
underlined that nothing can be found ‘in the letter of Article 13 to
ground a principle whereby there is no scope for its application in
relation to any of the aspects of the “right to a court” embodied in
Article 6 § 1. Nor can any suggestion of such a limitation on the
operation of Article 13 be found in its drafting history’. 36 On the
other hand, the ECtHR ruling stressed the constantly increasing
number of legal actions claiming a failure to ensure a hearing within
a reasonable time in breach of Article 6 (1) of the Convention. 37
2.2. Habeas corpus and right to a fair trial
Likewise, Article 5 and 6 of the Convention have different scopes
of application. The former guarantees the right to have any detention or
33 Kudła v Poland App no 30210/96 (ECtHR, 26 October 2000) para 146.
34 Ibid para 147.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid para 151.
37 Ibid para 148. Similarly, the Court accepted to examine separately the lack of
effective domestic remedies within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention in
respect of non-enforcement or delayed enforcement of judgments against the
Contracting States. See for instance Burdov v Russia (no 2) App no 33509/04
(ECtHR, 15 January 2009) para 98 ff; Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v Ukraine App no
40450/04 (ECtHR, 15 October 2009) para 65 ff.
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arrest order judicially reviewed as to its lawfulness in order to prevent
individuals from being arbitrarily deprived of their liberty. On the
other hand, the guarantees enshrined in Article 6 apply to any
proceedings for the determination of the criminal charge within the
autonomous meaning of the provision. 38 Yet, the procedural
safeguards enshrined in Article 6 ECHR also apply in the pre-trial
stage of criminal proceedings ‘as far as the fairness of the trial is
likely to be seriously prejudiced by an initial failure to comply with
them’, 39 from the moment an individual is notified ‘by the competent
authority of an allegation that he has committed a criminal offence’. 40
Nonetheless, proceedings that do not result in a criminal charge fall
outside the scope of Article 6. 41 For instance, judicial scrutiny of
detention on remand does not result from the application of that
provision, but is required under Article 5 of the Convention. 42
Similarly, extradition proceedings 43 and proceedings for the execution
of a European Arrest Warrant (EAW) 44 do not fall in principle within
the scope of Article 6. However, the provision applies if transfer
proceedings and criminal proceedings are exceptionally closely
connected so that the former have to be regarded as an integral part
of the latter. 45
Moreover, Articles 5 and 6 ECHR encompass similar requirements
and procedural rights. 46 The former provision grants for instance the
right of the arrested person to be brought promptly before ‘a judge or
judicial officer’. 47 A literal interpretation of the provision suggests
that the two authorities are not identical. By adopting this view, the
ECtHR initially held in Schiesser that the ‘officer’ may also include
38 Engel and others v The Netherlands App nos 5100/71, 5101/71, 5102/71,
5354/72 and 5370/72 (ECtHR, 8 June 1976).
39 Imbrioscia v Switzerland App no 13972/88 (ECtHR, 24 November 1993) para
36; Salduz v Turkey [GC] App no 36391/02 (ECtHR, 27 November 2008) para 50;
Schatschaschwili v. Germany [GC] App no 9154/10 (ECtHR, 15 December 2015)
para 104.
40 Deweer v Belgium App no 6903/75 (ECtHR, 27 February 1980) para 46.
41 C Grabenwarter (n 19) 112.
42 Neumeister v Austria App no 1936/63 (ECtHR, 27 June 1968) para 23.
43 Paňafiel Salgado v Spain App no 65964/01 (ECtHR, 16 April 2002).
44 Monedero Angora v Spain (dec) App no 41138/05 (ECtHR, 7 October 2008).
45 Smith v Germany App no 27801/05 (ECtHR, 1 April 2010) para 41.
46 In particular, the ECtHR held that ‘proceedings conducted under Art. 5 (4)
should in principle also meet, to the largest extent possible under the circumstances
of an ongoing investigation, the basic requirements of a fair trial as guaranteed by
Art. 6’. Albrechtas v Lithuania App no 1886/06 (ECtHR, 19 January 2016) para 73.
47 Art. 5 (3) ECHR.
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officials in public prosecutors’ departments provided that they enjoy the
‘necessary guarantees of independence’. 48 Over time, however, the case
law increasingly emphasized the need to ensure that the ‘officer’ must
provide the arrested person with guarantees similar to the ones which
would be provided by a judicial authority within the meaning of
Article 6 of the Convention. This led the Court to reverse the
Schiesser ruling, 49 by excluding public prosecutors from the
authorities entitled to hear promptly the arrested person within the
meaning of Article 5(3) ECHR. 50 Indeed, the ‘officer’, like the judge,
must be independent from the executive and the parties. 51 According
to consistent case law, ‘this does not mean that the ‘officer’ may not
be to some extent subordinate to other judges or officers provided that
they themselves enjoy similar independence’ . 52 However,
independence and impartiality may appear undermined if the officer
in charge of reviewing the lawfulness of detention is entitled to
intervene in the subsequent proceedings on behalf of the prosecuting
authorities. 53
Despite the similarities, however, the exact substance of the
procedural safeguards provided under Article 5 does not necessarily
correspond to the one under Article 6 ECHR. 54 The cross-analysis of
the case law under the two provisions raises some difficulties given
that the assessment of procedural fairness shall be based on the
specific circumstances of the case. Indeed, Article 5 requires
procedures that have ‘a judicial character and provide guarantees
appropriate to the kind of deprivation of liberty in question’. 55
Similarly, the manner in which the fair trial guarantees referred to in
Article 6 §3 apply to the preliminary stage of criminal proceedings
‘depends on the special features of the proceedings involved and on
the circumstances of the case’. 56
48 Ibid para 33.
49 S Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (Oxford University Press,
2006) 508 ff.
50 See for instance Moulin v France, App. no 37104/06 (ECtHR, 23 November
2010); Nikolova v Bulgaria, App. no 31195/96 (ECtHR, 25 March 1999) para 49.
51 Nikolova v Bulgaria App no 31195/96 (ECtHR, 25 March 1999) para 49.
52 Schiesser v Switzerland App no 7710/76 (ECtHR, 4 December 1979) para 31.
53 Hood v United Kingdom App no 27267/95 (ECtHR, 18 February 1999) para
57; Schiesser v Switzerland App no 7710/76 (ECtHR, 4 December 1979) para 31.
54 C Grabenwarter (n 19) 94.
55 Idalov v Russia App n 5826/03 (ECtHR, 22 May 2012) para 161.
56 Murray v United Kingdom App no 18731/91 (ECtHR, 8 February 1996) para
62.
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2.3. Right to appeal and fair trial guarantees
Further guarantees of judicial review can be found in Article 2
Protocol No 7 to the Convention. The provision enshrines the right to
appeal in criminal proceedings, which consists in the possibility for a
person convicted of a criminal offence to have his conviction or
sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal. The notions of ‘criminal
offence’ and ‘tribunal’ correspond respectively to the autonomous
concepts of ‘criminal charge’ and ‘tribunal’ within the meaning of
Article 6 (1) of the Convention. 57 Despite their overlapping scope of
application, the Court explicitly recalled that Article 2 Protocol 7, ‘has
to be regarded as an addition to the Convention’. 58 In particular,
Article 6 (1) ECHR guarantees the right of access to an independent
an impartial tribunal, but it does not compel States to provide appeals
in civil or criminal proceedings. 59 In a similar way, the CJEU
stressed that Article 47 of the EU Charter ‘affords an individual a
right of access to a court or tribunal but not to a number of levels of
jurisdiction’. 60
Yet, there is no provision under the Charter that guarantees a right
to appeal against convictions and sentences corresponding to the one
enshrined in Article 2 Protocol No 7 ECHR. Nonetheless, the
Strasbourg Court consistently held that the full range of procedural
safeguards enshrined in Article 6 of the Convention apply before
appellate courts, irrespective of whether the Contracting Parties have
ratified Protocol 7, which imposes the obligation to provide the
defendant with the opportunity to appeal. 61 Thus, the right to appeal
in criminal proceedings under Protocol 7 does not prejudice nor limit
the scope of fair trial guarantees enshrined in Article 6 of the
Convention at the appeal stage of criminal proceedings. 62 In the same
way, guarantees inherent to a fair trial under Articles 47 and 48 of the
Charter also apply in criminal proceedings before appellate courts and
all the more so as the ABC Directives and the defence rights they
harmonize apply from the initial stage of the proceedings until the
57 C Grabenwarter (n 19) 429.
58 Ekbatani v Sweden App no 10563/83 (1988) Series A no 134, para 26.
59 Delcourt v Belgium App no 2689/65 (1970) Series A no 11, para 25.
60 Case C-69/10 Samba Diouf EU:C:2011:524, para 69.
61 Lalmahomed v The Netherlands App no 26036/08 (ECtHR, 22 February 2011)
para 38.
62 Ibid.
142 PART II, CHAPTER III
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
final determination of guilt or innocence, including the resolution of any
appeal. 63
Hence, like the ECtHR, the CJEU could be called upon to rule, via
the preliminary ruling procedure, upon the interpretation of defence
rights at the appeal stage of criminal proceedings. 64 In this event,
rulings whereby the ECtHR interprets the susbstance of defence rights
at the appeal stage of criminal proceedings under Article 6 of the
Convention are of relevance. In this regard, it is worth recalling that
the manner in which the provision is to be applied in relation to
appeal proceeding depends upon the special feature of the proceedings
involved, with particular regard to the role of appellate courts, the
function and scope of the judicial review they undertake. 65 For
instance, the personal attendance of the defendant does not take on the
same crucial significance for an appeal hearing as it does for a trial
hearing. Leave-to-appeal proceedings and proceedings involving only
questions of law comply with Article 6 of the Convention even if the
defendant did not appear in person before the appeal court, provided
that a public hearing was held at first instance. 66 Nonehteless, where
the appellate court undertakes a full assessment of the issue of guilt or
innocence, both as to facts and law, the defendant must be afforded
with the right to appear in person and give evidence in person. 67
2.4. Judicial review of investigative measures
In addition to the above-analyzed provisions, the ECtHR examines
the structure and functions of the judicial control undertaken by national
63 See notably Art. 1 (2) Directive 2010/64/EU; Art. 2 (1) Directive 2012/13/EU
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the right to
information in criminal proceedings [2012] OJ L 142/1; Art. 2(1) Directive 2013/
48/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 on the
right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant
proceedings, and on the right to have a third party informed upon deprivation of
liberty and to communicate with third persons and with consular authorities while
deprived of liberty [2013] OJ L 294/1.
64 See notably Case C-270/17 PPU Tupikas EU:C:2017:628, where the Court has
referred to the ECHR case law on defence rights, in particular the attendance of the
defendant, at appeal stage, in order to interpret a ground for refusing the execution
of a EAW.
65 Ekbatani v Sweden App no 10563/8326 (ECtHR, 26 May 1988) para 27.
66 Hermi v Italy App no 18114/02 (ECtHR, 18 October 2006).
67 Popovici v Moldova App nos 289/04 and 41194/04 (ECtHR, 27 November
2007); Tierce and others v San Marino App no 69700/01 (ECtHR, 17 June 2003).
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judiciary where coercive investigative measures interfere with other
fundamental guarantees enshrined in the Convention. This is typically
the case with regards to house searches and seizures, which encroach
on the right to respect for private and family life, home and
correspondence. 68 Judicial scrutiny itself is not part of the
requirements that any interference with the right to privacy must meet
under Article 8 (2) of the Convention. In particular, the case law
expressly stresses that the provision does not require ex-ante judicial
authorization for house searches. 69 It allows restrictions to the right to
privacy, provided that they are implemented according to the law,
pursue a legitimate aim and are necessary in a democratic society.
Nonetheless, the recent case law emphasizes the importance of
judicial review to prevent arbitrary and disproportionate restrictions on
the right to privacy. 70 In examining the quality of national rules
governing house searches, the Court ascertains whether the relevant
legislation and practice afford individuals ‘adequate and effective
safeguards against abuse’. 71 Among those safeguards, prior judicial
review required by domestic criminal procedures is of major
importance. In Gutsanovi vs Bulgaria, the Court found that in the
absence of prior authorization by a judge and of retrospective review
of a house search, the procedure had not been attended by sufficient
safeguards to prevent the risk of an abuse of power by the criminal
investigation authorities. 72 The judgment adopts a similar reasoning
with regard to the alleged violation of Article 3 of the Convention
resulting from the manner in which the police operation at the
applicant’s home was carried out;
[T]he lack of prior judicial review of the necessity and lawfulness
of the search left the planning of the operation entirely at the
discretion of the police and the criminal investigation bodies and
did not enable the rights and legitimate interests of [the applicant]
(...) to be taken into consideration. In the Court’s view, such prior
judicial review, in the specific circumstances of the present case,
would have enabled their legitimate interests to be weighed
68 Art. 8 ECHR.
69 Funke v France App no 10828/84 (ECtHR, 25 February 1993) para 50.
70 N Hervieu (n 17).
71 Camenzind v Switzerland App no 21353/93 (ECtHR, 16 December 1997) para
45.
72 Gutsanovi v Bulgaria App no 34529/10 (ECtHR, 15 October 2013) para 220
ff.
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against the public-interest objective of arresting persons suspected
of committing a criminal offence. 73
In the absence of ex-ante judicial scrutiny, the Court verifies whether
the lack of a judicial warrant ‘was, to a certain extent, counterbalanced by
the availability of an ex post factum judicial review’. 74 The latter implies
the possibility to make a complaint to a court, which has competence to
review both the lawfulness of and justification for the search warrant. 75
It thus follows that judicial review is ‘one of the fundamental principles
of a democratic society’ based on the rule of law that aims to protect the
individual against arbitrary interferences by the law enforcement
authorities with his rights and liberties. 76
3. Defence rights and judicial review
3.1. A two-way path
Among the fundamental guarantees enshrined in the Convention,
the right to access a court and to a fair trial is the ultimate and most
detailed expression of requirements that judicial scrutiny must fulfill
in criminal proceedings. The prolific case law related to Article 6
ECHR perfectly illustrates the two-way path between defence rights
and judicial review.
On the one hand, the rights of suspected and accused persons in
criminal proceedings form a set of procedural preconditions that
guarantee the fairness of judicial proceedings. An illustration thereof
is the right of the accused to be informed about the charges against
him. Indeed, the notification of the accusation to the defendant
constitutes ‘an essential prerequisite for ensuring that the proceedings
are fair’. 77 The Court consistently stressed that the right guaranteed
73 Ibid para 133.
74 Smirnov v Russia App no 71362/01(ECtHR, 7 June 2007) para 45.
75 Ibid; Brazzi v Italie App no 57278/11(ECtHR, 27 September 2018) para 44.
The Court further emphasized that a system of ex post judicial scrutiny shall be
particularly efficient where the contested measure affects lawyers and journalists.
See respectively, Heino v Finland App no 56720/09 (ECtHR, 15 February 2011);
Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v The Netherlands App no 38224/03 (ECtHR, 14 September
2010).
76 Brogan and others v the United Kingdom App nos 11209/84, 11234/84, 11266/
84 and 11386/85 (1988) Series A no 145 para 58.
77 Dallos v Hungary, App no 29082/95 (ECtHR, 1 March 2001) para 47.
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under Article 6 paragraph 3 (a) aims to provide the defendant with
sufficiently detailed information in order to fully understand the
charges against him and prepare his defence. Hence, the right to
information covers ‘not only of the “cause” of the accusation, that is
to say, the acts he is alleged to have committed and on which the
accusation is based, but also of the “nature” of the accusation, that
is, the legal characterisation given to those acts’. 78
The ECtHR put the same emphasis on the actual and effective
ability of the accused to defend himself in case of recharacterization
of the facts in the course of the criminal proceedings. In this event,
the accused must be duly and fully informed of any changes in the
accusation. 79 Nonetheless, reclassification of the offence is
sufficiently foreseeable if it concerns ‘an element intrinsic to the
initial accusation’, so that the chances for the accused to defend
himself in respect of the new element of the charges were not
impaired. 80 Defects in the notification of the charge may however be
counteracted if the accused has the possibility to advance his defence
in respect of the reformulated charges and to contest his conviction in
respect of all relevant points of facts and law before appeal courts. 81
On the other hand, judicial scrutiny constitutes the appropriate
mean to ensure the effectiveness of defence rights afforded by the
Convention. A striking example is the case law related to the right to
free assistance of an interpreter. In interpreting Article 6 paragraph 3
(e), the ECtHR has repeatedly emphasized the role and obligations
incumbent on domestic courts. National courts are ‘the ultimate
guardians of the fairness of the proceedings, encompassing, among
other aspects, the possible absence of translation or interpretation for
a non-national defendant’. 82 Consequently, the competent judge
ascertains in consultation with the defendant his need for
interpretation services, which are aimed at preventing that the lack of
interpretation prejudices the accused’s full involvement in a matter of
crucial importance for him. 83 The assessment should consider the
nature of the offence and any communications addressed to the
78 Penev v Bulgaria App no 20494/04 (ECtHR, 7 January 2010) para 33
(emphasis added).
79 Mattoccia v Italy App no 23969/94 (ECtHR, 25 July 2000) para 61.
80 Juha Nuutinen v Finland App no 45830/99 (ECtHR, 24 April 2007) para 32.
81 Zhupnik v Ukraine App no 20792/05 (ECtHR, 9 December 2010) para 39 ff.
82 Katritsch v France App no 22575/08 (ECtHR, 4 November 2010) para 41.
83 Cuscani v United Kingdom App no 32771/96 (ECtHR, 24 September 2002)
para 38.
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accused, in order to assess whether they are sufficiently complex to
require a detailed knowledge of the language used in court. 84 In
addition, domestic courts should ascertain whether the right to
interpretation is practical and effective, which includes not only the
appointment of an interpreter ‘but may also extend to a degree of
subsequent control over the adequacy of the interpretation provided’. 85
3.2. To counterbalance or not to counterbalance?
The recent case-law related to the right of access to a lawyer further
illustrates how the ECtHR develops requirements related to the scope
and standards of judicial review that national criminal courts shall
apply to ensure respect of defence rights enshrined in the Convention.
In Ibrahim versus United Kingdom, the Court had the opportunity to
further clarify the assessment that must be undertaken by the
competent authorities of the Contracting States where they restrict the
right of a person suspected of a terrorism offence to access a lawyer
during police questioning. The Court noted firstly that the competent
authority must ascertain on a case-by-case basis the existence of
compelling reasons for delaying access to a lawyer, such as, for
instance, the need to avert serious adverse consequences to life,
liberty or physical integrity in a given case. 86 This stringent criterion
is met only in exceptional circumstances, provided that the restriction
is of a temporary nature and based on an individual assessment of the
particular circumstances of the case. 87 Nonehteless, the absence of
compelling reasons does not in itself entail a violation of Article 6 of
the Convention. In this regards, the Court stressed that:
[A] holistic assessment of the entirety of the proceedings must be
conducted to determine whether they were “fair” for the purposes
of Article 6 § 1. As noted above, a similar approach is taken in
Article 12 of EU Directive 2013/48/EU on, inter alia, the right of
access to a lawyer, and a number of jurisdictions approach the
question of admissibility of evidence by reference to its impact
on the fairness or integrity of the proceedings.
84 Şaman v Turkey App no 35292/05 (ECtHR, 7 July 2011) para 30.
85 Hermi v Italy App no 18114/02 (ECtHR, 18 October 2006) para 70.
86 Ibrahim and Others v United Kingdom App nos 50541/08, 50571/08, 50573/08
and 40351/09 (ECtHR, 13 September 2016).
87 Ibid para 258.
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Where there are no compelling reasons for restricting access to
legal advice, the Court must apply a very strict scrutiny to its
fairness assessment. The failure of the respondent Government to
show compelling reasons weighs heavily in the balance when
assessing the overall fairness of the trial and may tip the balance
in favour of finding a breach of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c). The
onus will be on the Government to demonstrate convincingly
why, exceptionally and in the specific circumstances of the case,
the overall fairness of the trial was not irretrievably prejudiced by
the restriction on access to legal advice. 88
The above quotation calls for two remarks. Interesting to note is
first the reference in the ruling to Directive 2048/13/EU, which lays
down similar requirements governing temporary restrictions on the
right to access a lawyer in the pre-trial stage of criminal proceedings.
The reference thus confirms the relevance of the ECtHR case law for
interpreting Article 3 (6) and Article 8 of the EU Directive.
Second, legal sholars have argued the ruling in Ibrahim gives
greater importance to the ‘overall fairness test’ compared to the
stringent approach previously adopted by the Court in Salduz. 89 In
the latter case, the ECtHR held that the right of defence is ‘in
principle irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating statements made
during police interrogation without access to a lawyer were used for
conviction’. 90 In Ibrahim, however, the Court seems to consider that
violations of Article 6 may arise only when incriminating statements
made by the suspect in the absence of legal assistance formed an
‘integral and significant part of the probative evidence upon which the
conviction was based’. 91 This approach confirms what Caianiello
defines a ‘new-old-fashined trend’, whereby the Cout pays increasing
attention to specific counterbalancing measures that cure breaches of
defence rights in individualized cases. 92
Yet, references to the ‘overall fairness assessement’ can be found in
several provisions of the ABC Directives. A telling example is precisely
the assessement of statements made in breach of the right to access a
88 Ibid para 264 -265.
89 M Caianiello, ‘You Can’t Always Counterbalance What You Want’ (2017) 25
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 283, 293.
90 Salduz v Turkey App no 36391/02 (ECtHR, 27 November 2008) para 55.
91 Ibrahim and Others v United Kingdom App nos 50541/08, 50571/08, 50573/08
and 40351/09 (ECtHR, 13 September 2016), para 309.
92 M Caianiello (n 86).
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lawyer. 93 Given that the EU Directives do not set forth specific
sanctions against breaches of defence rights, nor do they intend to
harmonize national rules governing the use of evidence, the
Strasbourg case law would provide national criminal courts with
minimum standards of protection to be applied. 94 But will the CJEU
adopt a similar approach when called upon to interpret Article 12
Directive 2013/48/EU?
To answer this question, one should take into consideration a
fundamental difference between the CJEU and ECtHR. Questions for
preliminary rulings enable the CJEU to interpret the rights of suspects
and accused persons at an early stage of the criminal proceedings. By
contrast, the Strasbourg Court intervenes after all domestic remedies
have been exhausted and thus can itself ascertain whether breaches of
defence rights did hamper the overall fairness of the criminal
proceedings. 95 Conversely, preliminary rulings of the CJEU are only
intended to provide national courts with guidance on how to interpret
and implement Union law and this in the course of the proceedings.
Given that structural difference in the judicial review carried out by
the two Courts, it is hardly conceivable that the CJEU will develop a
thourough interpretation of the ‘overall fairness’ test provided under
the ABC Directives, in particular where it delivers a preliminary
ruling at an initial stage of the proceeding. Let us image a national
Court called upon to review the admissibility of statements gathered
in breach of the right to access a lawyer before referring the case for
trial or to exclude that evidence at the first instance trial stage. What
guidance would the CJEU provide to the referring judge on how
93 Art. 12 (2) Directive 2013/48/EU.
94 A Soo, ‘Article 12 of the Directive 2013/48/EU: A starting Point for
Discussion on a Common Understanding of the Criteria for Effective Remedies of
Violation of the Right to a Counsel’ (2017) 25 European Journal of Crime, Criminal
Law and Criminal Justice 31.
95 The Protocol enables the highest courts and tribunals of the Contracting
States to request the ECtHR to deliver non legally-binding opinions ‘on questions
of principle relating to the interpretation or application of the rights and freedoms
defined in the Convention or the protocols thereto’. Protocol No. 16 to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, CETS
No 214. This would enable the ECtHR interact with national courts in the course
of the proceedings, through a mechanism that recalls the preliminary ruling
procedure under Article 267 TFEU. For a detailed analysis, G Janneke, ‘Advisory
Opinions, Preliminary Rulings and the New Protocol No. 16 to the European
Convention of Human Rights: A Comparative and Critical Appraisal’ (2014) 21
Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp. L. 630.
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should the latter interpret Article 12 Directive 2013/48/EU if compliance
with the provision still relies on procedural sanctions that another
national court can apply at a subsequent stage of the criminal
proceedings? In the absence of in-depth interpretation by the EU
judicature, wouldn’t the ‘overall fairness’ criterion become a mere
‘cup-out’ that enables the referring court to refrain from sanctioning
breaches of EU defence rights? Could the national court simply reject
a request by the defence lawyer to submit a question to preliminary
ruling to the CJEU on the ground that even if national law is not
consistent with the EU Directives the resulting breach of defence
rights does not affect the overall fairness of the proceedings?
4. Implementing ECHR guarantees in the field of Union law
The last question may arise when considering the recent rulings
whereby the ECtHR acknowledges the duty of national courts to state
reasons for refusing to refer a question for preliminary ruling to the
CJEU. 96 One may argue that the cases referred to have a limited
impact on the Member States judicial practice, above all because they
only deal with domestic courts of last instance. Nonetheless, the
ECtHR’s rulings in Dahbi, 97 Schipani 98 and Avotiņš 99 are striking
examples of another way Union law may interact with the
Convention: what if a Member State breaches a fundamental right
guaranteed under the ECHR when it is implementing Union law?
In this respect, the ECtHR consistently held that the transfer of
competences to international organisations such as the EU does not
affect the obligations incumbent upon the Member States under the
Convention. 100 Such transfer of powers is therefore ‘not incompatible
with the Convention provided that within that organisation
fundamental rights will receive an equivalent protection’. 101 In
Bosphorus, the Court formulated such requirement as a rebuttable
presumption vis-à-vis the EU: ‘if such equivalent protection is
96 Dhahbi v Italy App no 17120/09 (ECtHR, 8 April 2014); Schipani v Italy App
no 38369/09 (ECtHR, 21 July 2015).
97 Ibid.
98 Schipani v Italy App no 38369/09 (ECtHR, 21 July 2015).
99 Avotiņš v Latvia App no 17502/07 (ECtHR, 23 May 2016).
100 Matthews v UK App no 24833/94 (ECHR, 6 February 1999) para 32.
101 M & Co v Federal Republic of Germany App no 13258/87 (EComHR, 9
January 1990).
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considered to be provided by the organisation, the presumption will be
that a State has not departed from the requirements of the Convention
when it does no more than implement legal obligations flowing from
its membership of the organisation’. 102
The approach taken by the ECtHR does not however rule out
possible imfringements of the Convention by the Member States when
they are implementing Union law. This holds true in criminal matters
and all the more so considering the increasing number of legal
instruments that the EU has adopted over the last years in this field.
The implementation into national law of the ABC Directives draws
attention on two particular lines of case law: the right to access a
court in the procedure for preliminary rulings in Article 267 TFEU on
the one hand and, one the other, respect for the right to fair trial and
habeas corpus in proceedings for the execution of a European Arrest
Warrant (EAW).
4.1. Preliminary rulings and duty to state reasons
The ABC Directives are likely to tremendously increase the number
of preliminary rulings that national criminal courts may refer to the
CJEU. Preliminary rulings of interpretation thus promote the effective
enforcement of EU defence rights in national criminal proceedings. A
person suspected or accused of a criminal offence might claim a
violation of the defence rights he enjoys by virtue of the EU
Directives. The defence counsel may thus have the possibility to
request the competent national tribunal to refer a question for
interpretation to the Court of Justice. Yet, the proceedings under
Article 267 TFEU does not constitute a judicial action that individuals
can institute, but an interlocutory judicial procedure which can only
be initiated upon decision by a national tribunal. 103 This does not
imply however, that domestic – including criminal – courts can
arbitrarily refuse to refer questions for preliminary rulings.
Several complaints brought in the last years have alleged a violation
of Article 6 (1) ECHR resulting from a breach of Article 267 TFEU. The
provision precisely requires national courts against whose decision there
102 Bosphorus v Ireland App no 45036/98 (ECHR, 30 June 2005) para 155.
103 For a critical analysis of the preliminary ruling procedure in this respect see A
Nieto Martin, ‘Architectures judiciaires du droit pénal européen’, in G Giudicelli-
Delage, S Manacorda (eds), Cour de Justice et Justice pénale en Europe (Paris,
Société de Législation comparée, 2010) 271 ff.
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is no judicial remedy under national law to bring the matter before the
CJEU if a question of validity or interpretation of EU acts is necessary to
enable national tribunals to give judgment. 104 However, the obligation
to submit a reference for a preliminary ruling can be set aside where
the question in issue has already been interpreted by the CJEU (acte
éclairé) 105 or leave no scope for any reasonable doubt (acte clair). 106
In Ullens de Schooten and Rezabeck vs Belgium, the ECtHR
recalled first that it is primarily for the national courts to interpret and
apply domestic law, if necessary in conformity with the engagements
undertaken by the Contracting States. 107 Thus, the Strasbourg Court
does not examine any errors that might have been committed by
national judicial authorities in applying Union law. 108 Nonetheless,
the refusal by domestic courts to grant a request for preliminary
ruling might, in certain circumstances, infringe the right to a fair trial
enshrined in Article 6 of the Convention 109. This would be the case
where a domestic court of last instance fails to ‘give reasons for their
refusal in the light of the exceptions provided for in the case-law of
the Court of Justice’ in order to prevent any arbitrariness. 110 In
Dhahbi versus Italy, the Court found for the first time that a decision
refusing to refer a question for preliminary ruling from the CJEU
violated Article 6 §1 of the Convention, given that the impugned
judgment contained no reference to the applicant’s request for a
preliminary ruling nor to the reasons why the question raised did not
warrant referral to the CJEU. 111 The same arguments led the Court to
find a breach of the right to fair trial in Schipani versus Italy. 112
In Avotiņš, the ECtHR takes a step further. For the first time, the
Court was called upon to ‘examine observance of the guarantees of a
fair hearing in the context of mutual recognition based on European
Union law’. 113 More precisely, the applicant claimed that a Latvian
Court recognized and enforced a foreign judgment on the basis of
104 Art. 267 §3 TFEU.
105 Joined Cases 28, 29 and 30/62 Da Costa EU:C:1963:6.
106 Case 283/81 Cilfit EU:C:1982:335.
107 Ullens de Schooten and Rezabek v Belgium App nos 3989/07 and 38353/07
(ECtHR, 20 September 2011) para 54.
108 Dhahbi v Italy App no 17120/09 (ECtHR, 8 April 2014) para 31.
109 Ullens de Schooten and Rezabek v Belgium App nos 3989/07 and 38353/07
(ECtHR, 20 September 2011) para 59.
110 Ibid para 62.
111 Dhahbi v Italy App no 17120/09 (ECtHR, 8 April 2014) paras 31 – 33.
112 Schipani v Italy App no 38369/09 (ECtHR, 21 July 2015) para 69 – 72.
113 Avotiņš v Latvia App no 17502/07 (ECtHR, 23 May 2016) para 98.
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Brussels I Regulation, although that judgment was rendered against him
in violation of the right to be heard. The Court first recalled that ‘a
decision to enforce a foreign judgment cannot be regarded as
compatible with the requirements of Article 6 (1) of the Convention if
it was taken without the unsuccessful party having been afforded any
opportunity of effectively asserting a complaint as to the unfairness of
the proceedings leading to that judgment, either in the State of origin
or in the State addressed’. 114 This holds true even when the
impugned decision is recognized and enforced by a Contracting State
when applying Union law. 115 Nonetheless, being ‘mindful of the
importance of compliance with the rule laid down in Article 52(3) of
the Charter' 116 as well as ‘of the mutual recognition mechnisms for
the construction of the area of freedom, security and justice’, 117 the
ECtHR applied once again the so-called Bosphorus presumption.
In is in this respect that the ruling in Avotiņšmarks a new step in the
relastioship between the CJEU and the ECtHR. 118 The latter held that
the presumption of equivalent protection sketched out in Bosphorus
applies when two conditions are fulfilled: ‘the absence of any margin
of manoeuvre on the part of the domestic authorities and the
deployment of the full potential of the supervisory mechanism
provided for by European Union law’ . 119 Although such
considerations did not lead the Court to exclude the applicability of
the Bosphorus presumption in Avotiņš, the ruling explicitly states that
the failure by the national court hearing the case to ‘request a
preliminary ruling from the CJEU is apt to preclude the application of
the presumption of equivalent protection’ afforded by Union law. 120
Thereby, the ECtHR looks at the review undertaken by the CJEU as a
guarantee for the effective and equivalent protection of fundamental
rights within the EU, but it stills attentively examines on a case-by-
case basis whether that presumed protection is manifestively deficient
in the light of the Convention.
114 Ibid para 98.
115 Ibid para 101.
116 Ibid para 103
117 Ibid para 113.
118 L R Glas, J Krommendijk, ‘From Opinion 2/13 to Avotiņš: Recent
Developments in the Relationship between the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts’
(2017) 17 Human Rights Law Review, 567.
119 Avotiņš v Latvia App no 17502/07 (ECtHR, 23 May 2016) para 105.
120 Ibid para 111.
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4.2. Habeas corpus and fair trial rights in the execution of a EAW
Even though the ruling in Avotiņš deals with mutual recognition of
judicial decision in civil matters, the reasoning of the ECtHR may apply
mutati mutandis to criminal proceedings. Indeed, guarantees of judicial
scrutiny enshrined in the Convention also raise questions as to their
implementation where a Member State is requested to recognize and
execute a EAW issued by a foreign judicial authority. An illustration
thereof is the ruling in Chylinski v The Netherlands, which bears on
the right to actively seek review of detention on remand within the
EU system of judicial remedies. 121 The judicial authorities of the
executing Member State ordered and subsequently prolonged the
applicant’s detention on remand pending surrender. The detained
persons claimed in front of the national Courts having jurisdiction to
review the lawfulness of detention that the period of deprivation of
liberty exceeded the time-limits for surrender set forth in the
Framework Decision 2002/584/JAI. Therefore, they requested the
national judge to refer a question for preliminary ruling to the CJEU,
a request that the national court rejected. The complaint subsequently
filed with the ECtHR raises the question of whether the refusal by the
national judge to refer the case to the Court of justice amounts to a
violation of Article 5 §4 ECHR. 122
Although the Strasbourg Court found the complaint manifestly ill-
founded, the decision confirmed that the right to seek review of
detention pending trial applies to proceedings for the execution of a
EAW. 123 Noteworthy is the reference to the ruling in Dhahbi, which
outlines the conditions under which the refusal to submit a preliminary
ruling to the EU judge is consistent with the right of access to a court
within the meaning of Article 6 (1) of the Convention. 124 It would
therefore appear that the right to judicial review guaranteed by Article
5(4) must be interpreted in the light of the ruling in Dhahbi, which
imposes a duty on the national Courts of last instance to give reasons
for refusals to address question for preliminary rulings under Article
267 TFEU. 125 Accordingly, the Court pointed out in Chylinski that the
121 Chylinski and others v The Netherlands App nos 38044/12, 40958/12 and
50642/12 (ECtHR, 21 April 2015) para 42.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid para 49.
124 Dhahbi v Italy App no 17120/09 (ECtHR, 8 April 2014) para 31.
125 Chylinski and others v The Netherlands App nos 38044/12, 40958/12 and
50642/12 (ECtHR, 21 April 2015) para 43 ff.
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executing judicial authorities explained that ‘it was not necessary to seek
a preliminary ruling from the CJEU in order to determine the lawfulness
of the brief additional period of detention while awaiting the envisaged
surrender of the applicants to the respective issuing States, there being
adequate provision for such delays in domestic law’. 126 The ECtHR
further noted that even if the national judge would have referred the
case to the CJEU, the latter could not have delivered a ruling in time,
nor could it have provided guidance to the national judge in deciding
on the lawfulness of the applicants’ continued detention. 127
Few cases also raised questions on respect by the Member States of
Article 6 of the Convention when implementing the Framework-
Decision on the EAW. As mentioned above, extradition procedures as
well as procedures for the execution of a EWA are not themselves
subject to the requirements under Article 6 of the Convention, given
that such proceedings do not concern the determination of a criminal
charge. 128 However, the authority executing a request for extradition
may exceptionally be held liable for violating the right to a fair trial
where the individual ‘has suffered or risks suffering a flagrant denial
of a fair trial in the requesting country’. 129 In other words, the
ECtHR verifies whether the alleged breach of Article 6 of the
Convention ‘is so fundamental as to amount to a nullification, or
destruction of the very essence, of the right guaranteed by that
Article’. 130 In doing so, the Strasbourg Court takes into consideration
the foreseeable consequences of surrendering the applicant to the
requesting State with regard to both the general circumstances in the
latter country and the defendant’s personal situation. Examples of
flagrant denial of justice include the use of incriminating statements
obtained in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, 131 conviction in
absentia with no subsequent possibility of a fresh determination of the
merits of the charge, 132 a trial which was summary in nature and
conducted with a total disregard for the rights of the defence, 133 and
126 Ibid para 47.
127 Ibid para 48.
128 Monedero Angora v Spain App no 41138/05 (ECtHR Decision, 7 October 2008).
129 Soering v United Kingdom App no 14038/88 (ECtHR, 07 July 1989) para 113.
130 Ahorugeze v Sweden App no 37075/09 (ECtHR, 27 October 2011) para 115.
131 Othman (Abu Qatada) v the United Kingdom App no 8139/09 (ECtHR, 17
January 2012) para 267.
132 Sejdovic v Italy App no 56581/00 (ECtHR, 1 March 2006) para 84.
133 Bader and Kanbor v Sweden App no 13284/04 (ECtHR, 8 November 2005)
para 47.
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a deliberate and systematic refusal of access to a lawyer, especially for
an individual detained in a foreign country. 134
In a similar way the Member State executing a EAW might
exceptionally be held liable according to the ‘flagrant denial of
justice’ doctrine. In Stapleton versus Ireland, the Court underlined,
however, that the executing judicial authority should not ‘go beyond
the examination of a flagrant denial and determine whether there has
been established a real risk of unfairness in the criminal proceedings
in the issuing State’. 135 This is all the more true where the applicant’s
complaints in relation to the alleged unfairness entail the examination
of legal and factual issues, which would be more appropriately
reviewed by the courts of the requesting State. 136
The ECtHR adopts a similar approach toward the review to be
carried out by the State requested to execute a EAW that would
expose the surrender person to inhuman and degrading treatment. In
Ignaoua versus United Kingdom, the Court confirmed that at the time
of deciding whether to surrend the person, the executing authority
shall take into carefull consideration all relevant facts and evidence
for the purpose of establishing a real risk of violation of Article 3 of
the Convention. 137 In undertaking such an assessement, the requested
State can rightfully accord some weight ‘to mutual trust and
confidence underpinning measures of police and judicial cooperation
among EU Member States’. 138 Thus, consideration must also be paid
to guarantees and assurance given by the issuing State that, after
surrender, the person will not be extradided onward to another
country where he faces a real risk of inhuman and degrading
treatment. It is therefore for the applicant to provide the ECtHR with
reliable evidence rebutting the ‘Court’s own general assumption that
the Constracting States of the Council of Europe will respect their
international law obligation’. 139
134 Al-Moayad v Germany App no 35865/03 (ECtHR, 20 February 2007) para
101.
135 Stapleton v Irland App no 56588/07 (ECtHR, 4 May 2010) para 27.
136 Ibid para 29.
137 Habib Ignaoua and Others v the United Kingdom App no 46706/08 (ECtHR,
18 March 2014).
138 Ibid para 55.
139 Ibid.
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5. Conclusions
Over the last years, the need for a consistent protection of
fundamental rights at the European supranational level has given rise
to tangible tensions in the relationship between the CJEU and ECtHR.
This has led to a delicate judicial dialogue, whereby both Courts
strive to avoid conflicting rulings, but firmly reiterate either the
autonomy of Union law or the paramount duty for the Member States
to respect the Convention. This balancing exercice involves in fact
two separate although interrelated aspects.
From a substantive point of view, the ECHR provides for minimum
standards of protection that must be respected and at least equally
afforded by the corresponding provisions of the EU Charter. 140 Thus,
the case law of the Strasbourg Court influences and will nolens volens
have an impact on the interpretation of fundamental rights by the
CJEU. Depite the increasing ‘Charter-centrism’ in the latter’s case
law, 141 neither the autonomy of Union law nor the fundamental
importance of mutual trust preveted the Luxembourg Court from
acknowledging limits – although exceptional – to the constitutional
principle of mutual recognition, 142 limits that clearly recall the rulings
of the ECtHR. 143 On the other hand, even when scholars posit a
‘partial departure from the key principle of mutual trust’ in
Avotiņš, 144 the ECtHR repeatedly unnderlines in the same ruling the
special attention it attaches to the importance of both the equivalent
protection of fundamental rights under the Charter 145 and mutual trust
among the Member States for the EU integration process. 146
The quest for consistency should not however lead the CJEU and
the ECtHR to impinge on each other’s jurisdiction. In Kamberaj, the
EU judges stressed for instance that ‘the reference made by Article
140 Art. 52 (3) and 53 Charter.
141 L R Glas, J Krommendijk (n 112) 573 ff.
142 For a detailed analysis see K Lenaerts (n 9).
143 A striking example is the case law related to mutual recognition of judicial
decisions that result in the violation of Article 4 of the Charter and Article 3
ECHR. See in particular Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Aranyosi and
Căldăraru EU:C:2016:198, which reflects the reasoning of the ECtHR in MSS v
Belgium and Greece App no 30696/09 (ECtHR, 21 January 2011).
144 G Biagioni, ‘Avotiņš v. Latvia. The Uneasy Balance Between Mutual
Recognition of Judgments and Protection of Fundamental Rights’ (2016) 2
European Papers 579, 595.
145 Avotiņš v Latvia App no 17502/07 (ECtHR, 23 May 2016) para 103.
146 Ibid para 113.
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN ECHR AND EU LAW 157
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
6(3) TEU to the ECHR does not require the national court, in case of
conflict between a provision of national law and the ECHR, to apply
the provisions of that convention directly, disapplying the provision of
national law incompatible with the Convention’. 147 For its part, the
ECtHR recalled that its role is confined to ascertaining whether the
effects of decisions taken by national authorities, even when
implementing Union law, are compatible with the Convention. 148
This second aspect casts light on the fundamental role the
interlocutory procedure under Article 267 TFEU plays in the Europe-
wide protection of fundamental rights. Decisions whereby a national
court refers a question for preliminary ruling to the CJEU enable the
latter to interpret Union law in the course of the proceedings and,
thereby, give the EU judge the opportunity to prevent potential
conflits with the ECHR. By contrast, in case of unjustified refusals or
failures by national courts to bring questions on the interpretation of
EU law to the CJEU, the ECtHR may be called upon to review
respect of fundamental rights by the Member States when
implementing Union law even before the CJEU has been given the
opportunity to rule on the matter. 149
In this perspective, one may wonder whether the entry into force of
Protocol No. 16 to the ECHR 150 will indirectly impact the relationship
between the European courts. Indeed, the highest tribunals of the
Contracting States may request the ECtHR to give advisory opinions
on questions of principle relating to the interpretation or application of
the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention. 151 Compared to
the preliminary ruling procedure of Article 267 TFUE, however, the
advisory opinion of the ECtHR differs in two important aspects. First,
it is not binding, 152 unlike the judgments delivered by the CJEU.
Second, only highest courts have the possibility to request the
147 Case C-571/10 Kamberaj EU:C:2012:233, para 63
148 Ullens de Schooten and Rezabek v Belgium App nos 3989/07 and 38353/07
(ECtHR, 20 September 2011) para 54.
149 This aspect has been subject of discussion during the negotiations of the
accession of the EU to the ECHR. The question arose on how the ‘exhaustion of
domestic remedies’ under Article 35 of the Convention must take into account the
questions for preliminary rulings that a national court could refer to the CJEU. See
V Covolo, ‘Et la judiciarisation de l’espace pénal de l’Union fut ... mais où se
cache le juge pénal européen?’ (2011) 47 Cahiers de Droit européen 103, 143.
150 Protocol No. 16 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, CETS No.214, entered into force on 01.08.2018.
151 Art. 1 (1) Protocol No. 16 ECHR.
152 Art. 5 Protocol No. 16 ECHR.
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advisory opinion under Protocol 16 to the Convention, 153 whilst any
national tribunal may – and must in the case of courts of last instance
- refer a question for preliminary ruling to the EU juges. 154
Irrespective of the practical implementation of Protocol 16, its entry
into force further underlines the forefront role that national and most
particularly supreme courts play in detecting potential violations of
the ECHR that a wrong application of Union law is likely to entail.
Let us hope that the need for a consistent protection of fundamental
rights in Europe will push toward constructive judicial interactions
and not a dialogue of the deaf.
153 Art. 1 (1) Protocol No. 16 ECHR.
154 Art. 267 para 3 and 4 TFEU.
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CHAPTER IV
JUDICIAL REVIEW FOR THE PROTECTION OF DEFENCE
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
THE ICC AS A CASE STUDY
Anna Mosna
TABLE OF CONTENTS: 1. Introductory remarks. – 2. The right to appeal in front
of the ICC. – 2.1. Judicial review of final decisions. – 2.1.1. Procedural
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Procedural aspects relating to appeals against final decisions. – 2.2.
Judicial review of interim decisions. – 2.2.1. Interlocutory appeal, as
of right, of a decision with respect to jurisdiction or admissibility. –
2.2.2. Interlocutory appeal, as of right, of a decision granting or
denying release. – 2.2.3. Interlocutory appeal, with leave of the court,
pursuant to Article 82(1)(d) ICCSt. – 2.2.4. Procedural aspects of
interlocutory appeals. – 3. Concluding remarks.
1. Introductory remarks
The right to judicial review in criminal proceedings, in its different
manifestations, aims at ensuring trial fairness and guaranteeing defence
rights. It is not only instrumental to safeguard the effectiveness of
defence rights, but, according to Article 14 (5) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1 (ICCPR) and Article 2 of
Protocol 7 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights 3 (ECHR),
it is also expressly considered a fundamental right in its manifestation
as the right to appeal a conviction.
The right to judicial review in criminal proceedings is also crucial
1 Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 19 December 1966.
2 Adopted in Strasbourg on 22 November 1984.
3 Signed on 4 November 1950 in Rome, entered into force on 3 September 1953.
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with regard to international criminal justice. International criminal
justice can be defined as the system held up by international justice
organs which were established to address the most serious crimes of
international concern, such as the commission of war crimes, crimes
against humanity and genocide. 4
International criminal justice evolved together with the
development of the scope and nature of international criminal
tribunals and courts. The first evolution to be mentioned is the
development of international judicial institutions from having an ad
hoc nature (International Military Tribunals of Nuremberg 5 and
Tokyo, 6 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 7
(ICTY), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 8 (ICTR)) to
institutions having a permanent nature, like the International Criminal
Court 9 (ICC).
Further, while the first ad hoc tribunals were so-called ‘victor’s
courts’, established by the victors of WW-II (Nuremberg and Tokyo),
the ad hoc tribunals instituted at the end of the 20th century can now
be defined as impartial courts, established by the Security Council of
4 As far as the ICC is concerned, according to Article 5 ICCSt, also the crime of
aggression is included in the jurisdiction of the Court.
5 International Military Tribunal for the trial and punishment of the major war
criminals of the European Axis, established by the London Agreement, which
entered into force together with the Charter of the International Military Tribunal,
82 U.N.T.S. 280 on 8 August 1945.
6 International Military Tribunal for the Far East, established by an executive
decree of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan, American
General Douglas MacArthur of 19 January 1946. The same day, also the Charter of
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East was approved. It was amended
on 26 April 1946.
7 International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed on the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, established 25 May 1993 by resolution Sc/RES/
827 of the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations.
8 International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed
on the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and
Other Such Violations Committed on the Territory of Neighbouring States, between
1 January and 31 December 1994, established on 8 November 1994 by resolution
Sc/RES/955 of the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations.
9 Established by a majority of the Member States of the United Nations during
the Rome ‘UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court’, from 15 June to 17 July 1998.
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the United Nations (ICTY and ICTR). The ICC can be seen as another
progression, since it is an impartial court, the result of a treaty 10 ratified
by State parties. 11
Representing the most recent development of a branch of law still
‘under construction’, 12 the ICC is an ideal subject of study with
regard to the protection of the right to judicial review and other
defence rights in international criminal justice. Like other international
criminal justice organs, the ICC presents specific features that
influence its concept of a fair trial and of the rights this principle
entails. The ICC distinguishes itself from national criminal courts in
so far as the system in which it operates is a criminal law system, but
with humanitarian law as its subject matter. The interplay between the
field of international criminal law and international humanitarian law
involves the difficulty of reconciling the main concerns of the
respective branches of international law. The first field focuses mainly
on the rights of the accused and thus on the fair trial principle. The
latter, on the contrary, has its focal point in the protection of victims,
and more precisely on victims as a group. 13 The main concern is
therefore the efficiency of the international criminal justice system, so
that violations of humanitarian law are brought to justice. The contrast
between the hierarchy of values established respectively in criminal
and humanitarian law is reflected in the dilemma of fairness and
efficiency of justice. 14 This is a dilemma that international criminal
courts and tribunals have to face frequently because of the complexity
10 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9,
adopted by the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment
of an International Criminal Court on 17 July 1998.
11 R Haveman, ‘Introduction: A System Sui Generis’ in R Haveman, O Kavran, J
Nicholls, Supranational Criminal Law: a System Sui Generis (Intersentia, 2003) 3.
12 ICTY, Prosecutor v Blaškić, Case N° IT-95-14-PT, Trial Chamber, Decision on
the Objection of the Republic of Croatia to the issuance of Subpoenae Duces Tecum,
18 July 1997, paras 60-61: ‘the terms used therein carry their own specific meaning,
suited for an international judicial institution with criminal jurisdiction [...]
[t]erminology utilized which originates in one or another domestic legal system
does not convey its full meaning in the International Tribunal’s context’; see also R
Haveman (n 11) 5; ID, ‘The Context of the Law’ in R Haveman, O Kavran, J
Nicholls, Supranational Criminal Law: a System Sui Generis (Intersentia, 2003) 22.
13 M Sassoli, ‘Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law’ in A Cassese,
International Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press, 2009) 119; R Haveman, ‘The
Context of the Law’ (n 12) 32.
14 C Safferling, International Criminal Procedure (Oxford University Press,
2012) 63, according to whom requiring from a justice system to be both fair and
efficient is not necessarily a contradiction. To this end, ‘efficiency’ of criminal
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of their cases. Full protection of due process principles is costly and
time-consuming and it often requires compromises relating to the
efficiency of the procedure. 15 Conversely, the practice of the
international criminal courts demonstrates that in balancing the
importance of ‘smooth prosecutions’ and applying fair trial principles,
the tendency is to prefer the former. 16
Furthermore, international criminal justice is the result of a
particular combination of civil law and common law tradition, i.e. of
accusatorial (adversarial) and inquisitorial elements. 17 The
cohabitation of elements from different systems and philosophies
raises problems in relation to the different understanding of “fairness”.
Although every system is, in principle, consistent and fair in itself,
this consistency might be lost when single elements from different
systems are melded into a new legal order. 18 A new and unique
international procedural order 19 has to find a new balance and core
concepts such as that of a fair trial need to be reassessed in this
specific context. The hybrid nature of international criminal law and
its justice system does not allow any simple referral to national
systems when it comes to interpretation of its rules and principles. 20
The ICC presents an increased consciousness about the importance
of affirming and protecting fundamental rights, and hence also the right
to a fair trial: Article 21 (3) ICCSt expressly provides that the
interpretation of law must be consistent with ‘internationally
justice is not to be equalled to the concept of a quick and easy trial. Rather, efficiency
is to be understood as the ability to solve the conflict in a sustainable way.
15 C Buisman, ‘Defence and Fair Trial’, in R Haveman, O Kavran, J Nicholls,
Supranational Criminal Law: a System Sui Generis (Intersentia, 2003) 182.
16 Ibid 234.
17 G P Fletcher, ‘The Influence of the Common Law and Civil Law Traditions on
International Criminal Law’, in A Cassese, International Criminal Justice (Oxford
University Press, 2009) 104-107, who concludes by asserting ‘the general part of
the Rome Statute reveals a greater debt to common law modes of thinking and
drafting, but there is room within the Statute for incorporating civilian doctrines and
achieving a greater balance between the two systems’; K Ambos, ‘International
criminal procedure; “adversarial”, “inquisitorial” or mixed?'(2003) 3 International
Criminal Law Review 5; along these lines see also ICTY, Prosecutor v Blaškić,
Case N° IT-95-14-PT, Trial Chamber, Decision on the Objection of the Republic of
Croatia to the issuance of Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 18 July 1997, para 60.
18 R Haveman, ‘The Context of the Law’ (n 12) 36; C Deprez, ‘Extent of
Applicability of Human Rights Standards to Proceedings before the International
Criminal Court: On Possible Reductive Factors’ (2012) International Criminal Law
Review 725.
19 C Safferling (n 14) 58.
20 ICTY, Prosecutor v Erdemović, Case N° IT-96-22-A, Appeals Chamber,
Judgment, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, 7 October 1997, para 2.
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recognized human rights’. More generally, according to Article 21
ICCSt, the ICC is required to aspire to the highest standards set by
international human rights treaties, customary international law and
general principles of law. 21 The Rome Statute contains an exhaustive
set of rights for both the suspect and the accused, codifying
fundamental rights laid down in international human rights
conventions, such as the ICCPR and the ECHR, mostly in the broader
interpretation conferred on them by the case law of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). However, this ‘internal’ safeguard
of consistency with human rights is not accompanied by a
corresponding ‘external’ safeguard. No international human rights
review is foreseen for proceedings of the ICC. Just as the ad hoc
tribunals, also the ICC is fully autonomous, being any kind of appeal
body for this court missing. The control is rather exercised from
within, through the Appeals Chamber. 22 An effective guarantee of
trial fairness and defence rights depends mainly on the judicial
remedies offered by the Rome Statute itself to accused persons for the
case of violation of their defence rights.
2. The right to appeal in front of the ICC
The right to judicial review in front of the ICC is laid down in
Articles 81 and 82 ICCSt on the appeal against decision of acquittal
or conviction or against sentence and on appeal against other
decisions, respectively. In accordance with these provisions, the
defendant may appeal final decisions of the Trial Chamber and
interim decisions of both the Trial and the Pre-Trial Chamber in order
to claim a violation of his defence rights.
2.1. Judicial review of final decisions
The final decision of a Trial Chamber may be appealed on the
21 See ICTY, Prosecutor v Milosevic, Case N° IT-99-37-PT, Trial Chamber,
Decision on Preliminary Motions, 8 November 2001, para 38; J K Cogan,
‘International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difficulties and Prospects’ (2002)
The Yale Journal of International Law 117.
22 This feature clearly derives from the common law tradition, where courts
operate in a system of coordinate authority; see also G P Fletcher (n 17) 110; see
also C Safferling ‘The Rights and Interests of the Defence in the Pre-Trial Phase’
(2011) Journal of International Criminal Justice 666.
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grounds listed in Article 81 ICCSt. Accordingly, under Article 81 (1) (b)
ICCSt, a convicted person, or the Prosecutor on that person’s behalf,
may lodge an appeal on the grounds of (i) a procedural error, (ii) an
error of fact, (iii) an error of law or on (iv) any other ground that
affects the fairness or reliability of the proceedings or decision.
Depending on the details of the concrete case, grounds (i), (iii) and
(iv) seem to constitute suitable vehicles to lodge an appeal on the
basis of the violation of defence rights.
2.1.1. Procedural error
Appealing a decision on the ground of a procedural error, under
Article 81 (1) (b) (i) ICCSt, refers to two possible scenarios. The first
scenario is a situation in which a Chamber does not comply with a
mandatory procedural requirement of the Statute and Rules of
Procedure and Evidence. Given the provision of Article 64 on
functions and powers of the Trial Chamber and the explicit mention,
in paragraph 2, of the duty of the latter to ‘ensure that a trial is fair
and expeditious and is conducted with full respect of the rights of the
accused’, the failure to grant one or more of the rights enshrined
under Article 67 constitutes a procedural error in the meaning of
Article 81 (1) (b) (i) ICCSt. However, such a violation of the rights
of the accused might not necessarily lead to the invalidation of the
appealed decision. To this end, Article 83 ICCSt, regulating
proceedings on appeal, requires in paragraph 2 that the procedural
error had ‘materially affected’ the final decision. This provision
reflects the case law deriving from the Special Court for Sierra
Leone 23 (SCSL), whose Statute was the first to mention also this
category of error as a ground of appeal. According to the SCSL
jurisprudence, ‘not all procedural errors vitiate the proceedings. Only
errors that occasion a miscarriage of justice would vitiate the
proceedings. Such are procedural errors that would affect the fairness
23 The Special Court for Sierra Leone was established on 16 January 2002 by an
agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations, in order
to ‘prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of
international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law’ committed in Sierra Leone
after 30 November 1996 and during the Sierra Leone Civil War. After its closure in
2013, the Residual Court for Sierra Leone was established by an agreement between
the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone to oversee the continuing
legal obligations of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
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of the trial. By the same token, procedural errors that could be corrected
or waived or ignored (as immaterial or inconsequential) without
injustice to the parties would not be regarded as procedural errors
occasioning a miscarriage of justice’. 24
The second situation, in which such a procedural error can occur, is
when a Chamber erroneously exercises its discretion. The review of the
Appeals Chamber concerns the manner – correct or not – in which the
Trial Chamber exercised its discretion. To this aim, it has to be assessed
whether the exercise of the discretion is based on an erroneous
interpretation of law, whether it is exercised on patently incorrect
conclusion of fact, or whether the decision is so unfair and
unreasonable so as to constitute an abuse of discretion. According to
ICC case law, in this case the requirement of the decision being
materially affected by the procedural error also applies. 25
2.1.2. Error of law
An error of law occurs when a Chamber’s decision is based on an
incorrect interpretation of the governing law. This includes the
application of the wrong legal standard. This was the case in the Al
Bashir case. 26 In this case, the Pre-Trial Chamber denied the
prosecution’s application for a warrant of arrest against Omar Hassan
Ahmad Al Bashir for his alleged responsibility for the crime of
genocide. For the issuance of an arrest warrant, Article 58 (1) (a)
ICCSt requires the establishment of ‘reasonable grounds to believe
that the person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court’. In evaluating the existence of this condition in relation to the
existence of genocidal intent by way of proof of inference, the Pre-
Trial Chamber stated that ‘such a standard would be met only if the
24 SCSL, CDF Case, Case N° SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgement, 28
May 2008, para 35; see also A Hartwig, ‘Appeal and Revision’ in C Safferling (n 14)
535.
25 ICC, Situation in Uganda in the case of the Prosecutor v Joseph Kony and
others, Case N° ICC-02/04-01/05-408, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Appeal
of the Defence against the ‘Decision on the Admissibility of the Case under Article
19 (1) of the Statute’, 10 March 2008, para 80; A Hartwig (n 24) 536.
26 The present example refers to an error of law established in a decision on an
interlocutory appeal. The applicability of the grounds of appeal listed in Article 81
ICCSt to both appeals against final decisions and appeals against other decisions
seems to allow to draw on examples originating from one category to clarify
concepts in relation to the other.
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materials provided by the Prosecution in support of the Prosecution
Application show that the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn
therefrom is the existence of reasonable grounds to believe in the
existence of a GoS’s dolus specialis/specific intent to destroy in
whole or in part the Fur, Masalit and Zagahawa groups’ 27 In this
interpretation the standard of proof imposed by Article 58 (1) (a)
ICCSt would have resembled rather the considerably higher threshold
of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ than the one implied in the requirement
of ‘reasonable grounds to believe’. According to the Appeals
Chamber, this reading led to the application of an erroneous standard
of proof that resulted in an error of law that materially affected the
decision not to issue a warrant of arrest in respect of the crime of
genocide. 28 As can be seen from this case law, with respect to this
ground for appeal, a material effect on the decision, required by
Article 83 (2) ICCSt, is also necessary in order for the appeal to succeed.
When it comes to violation of rights of the accused, however, the
similarity of the concepts of procedural error and error of law is
particularly evident. An error of law could indeed derive from a
wrong interpretation of procedural law, such as a misconception
regarding the scope of the rights of the accused. In order to
differentiate between the two categories, the error of law may only be
applied as long as no formal violations of the Statutes or the Rule of
Procedure and Evidence are concerned. 29
2.1.3. Any other ground that affects the fairness or reliability of the
proceedings or the decision
Article 81 (1) (b) (iv) ICCSt contains a ‘catch-all’ provision. The
vague and unspecified formulation, relating to ‘any other ground that
affects the fairness or reliability of the proceedings or decision’,
27 ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan in the case of the Prosecutor v Omar Hassan
Ahmad Al Bashir, Case N° ICC-02/05-01/09, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the
Prosecution’s Applicatoin for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al
Bashir, 4 March 2009, para 158.
28 ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan in the case of the Prosecutor v Omar Hassan
Ahmad Al Bashir, Case N° ICC-02/05-01/09-73, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the
Appeal of the Prosecutor against the ‘Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for
a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir’, 3 February 2010, para
33, 39 and 41.
29 A Hartwig (n 24) 537.
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should allow the convicted person to exercise his right to appeal in an
exhaustive manner.
Again, it does not seem easy to distinguish this ground for appeal
from the procedural error under Article 81 (1) (b) (i) ICCSt. In this
regard, it could be stated that procedural errors should refer to formal
violations, while the residual ground for appeal under Article 81 (1)
(b) (i) ICCSt includes violations of a substantive nature. 30
2.1.4. Procedural aspects relating to appeals against final decisions
The procedure for an appeal under Article 81 ICCSt is regulated by
Article 83 ICCSt and Rules 150-153 ICC RPE. Accordingly, an appeal
against a conviction or acquittal under Article 74 ICCSt may be filed
within 30 days from the date on which the party filing the appeal is
notified of the decision. The appeal is to be filed with the Registrar,
who then transmits the trial record to the Appeals Chamber. 31
The Appeals Chamber has the same powers of the Trial Chamber. If
the Appeals Chamber decides to uphold the appeal of the convicted
person, it may reverse or amend the decision or sentence or order a
new trial before a different Trial Chamber. The Appeals Chamber
may also remand a factual issue to the original Trial Chamber for it
to determine the issue and to report back accordingly, or may itself
call evidence to determine the issue. 32 It is important to note that the
Rome Statute contains the principle of the prohibition of reformatio in
peius. As the last period of Art. 83 (2) ICCSt states, ‘[w]hen the
decision or sentence has been appealed only be the person convicted
or by the prosecutor on that person’s behalf, it cannot be amended to
his or her detriment’. In this respect, the Rome Statute offers a more
exhaustive protection than international human rights conventions,
such as the ECHR and the ICCPR.
30 Ibid 537.
31 Rules 150 and 151 ICC RPE.
32 In case of prosecutor filing the appeal according to Article 81 (1) (a) ICCSt,
the Appeals Chamber may, if it considers to uphold the appeal, order a new trial
before a different Trial Chamber, according to Article 83 (2) (b) ICCSt. This
underlines the difference between appeals by prosecution and defence: the only
relief the court can grant in an appeal by the Prosecutor form acquittal on a
particular charge is an order for a retrial. It is not open for the Appeal Chamber
itself to reverse or amend a decision of a Trial Chamber acquitting an accused on a
given charge as distinct from annulling that decision as prelude to a new trial: see
ILC, Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court with commentaries, 1994, 61.
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As has already been pointed out, by virtue of Article 83 (2) ICCSt,
in order to uphold an appeal, the Appeal Chamber must come to the
conclusion that the proceedings appealed from were unfair in a way
that affected the reliability of the decision or sentence, or that the
decision or sentence appealed from was materially affected by error
of fact or law or procedural error. In fact, a similar approach can
already be seen in commentaries contained in the ILC Draft Statute
for an International Criminal Court: ‘[n]ot every error at the trial
need[s to] lead to reversal or annulment: the error had to be a
significant element in the decision taken. This is expressed in
paragraph 2 by the requirement that the proceedings must have been,
overall, procedurally unfair or the decision must be vitiated by the
error’. 33
To conclude, it can be stated that, although the wording of Article
81 (a) (b) ICCSt grants the defendant a very broad right to appeal, the
provision under Article 83 (2) ICCSt might relativize this right
considerably.
2.2. Judicial review of interim decisions
The defendant may file an interlocutory appeal against decisions of
an interim nature, exhaustively listed in Article 82 ICCSt. Among the
decisions that the defendant can appeal pursuant to the provision in
question are (a) decisions with respect to jurisdiction and
admissibility; (b) decisions granting or denying release of the person
being investigated or prosecuted and (d) decisions that involve an
issue that would significantly affect the fair and expeditious conduct
of the proceedings or the outcome of the trial, and for which, in the
opinion of the Pre-Trial or Trial Chamber, an immediate resolution by
the Appeals Chamber may materially advance the proceedings. 34
33 ILC, Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court with commentaries,
1994, 61; A Hartwig (n 24) 540.
34 Article 82 (1) (c) ICCSt further refers to decisions of the Pre-Trial Chamber to
act on its own initiative under Article 56 (3) ICCSt. Although Article 82 (1) (c) ICCSt
mentions this category of decisions among the decisions ‘either party’ may appeal, in
light of the provisions of Article 56 (3) ICCSt, the restriction to the Prosecutor as the
party entitled to appeal seems likely: Article 56 (3) (a) ICCSt rules on measures for the
preservation of evidence essential for the defence at trial, taken by the Pre-Trial
Chamber on its own initiative in cases, in which the failure by the Prosecutor to
request such measures is deemed unjustified. With respect to these measures in
favour of the defendant, Article 56 (3) (b) ICCSt rules that ‘[a] decision of the Pre-
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As to the errors, on the basis of which the impugned decision may
be appealed, it is recognized that the categories of errors listed in Article
81 (1) (a) ICCSt, and the interpretation thereof, apply within the scope
of Article 82 ICCSt. 35 However, when it comes to the right to lodge an
interlocutory appeal, a distinction must be made between decisions that
can be appealed as of right (Article 82 (1) (a) and (b) ICCSt) and
decisions that can only be appealed with leave of the Chamber of first
instance (Article 82 (1) (d) ICCSt).
2.2.1. Interlocutory appeal, as of right, of a decision with respect to
jurisdiction or admissibility
According to Article 82 (1) (a) ICCSt, the defence is entitled to
appeal, as of right, any decision with respect to jurisdiction or
admissibility. This reference encompasses decisions the Pre-Trial or
Trial Chamber issued on the basis of a challenge to jurisdiction or
admissibility under Article 19 (6) ICCSt. This rule provides explicitly
that the decisions at issue ‘may be appealed to the Appeals Chamber
in accordance with Article 82’.
It also seems that decisions issued in accordance with Part 2 of the
Rome Statute as a whole, including decisions relating to Article 21
ICCSt, are included by the reference to jurisdiction and admissibility.
The Appeals Chamber held that applications sui generis as atypical
motions could, under certain circumstances, be acknowledged. As a
result, in light of Article 21 (3) ICCSt, a violation of defence rights,
of the right to a fair trial and, more in general, of human rights, could
constitute a ground for appeals under Article 82 (1) (a) ICCSt. 36 This
is what occurred in the Lubanga case, where the defence disputed the
jurisdiction of the Court by reference to the ‘doctrine of abuse of
Trial Chamber to act on its own initiative under this paragraph may be appealed by the
Prosecutor’. Therefore, the present analysis will not deal with the (apparently only
formal) right of the defendant to appeal this kind of decisions.
35 ICC, Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case N° ICC-01/04-01/06-568
OA3, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Appeal against the Decision
of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision Establishing General Principles
Governing Applications to Restrict Disclosure Pursuant to Rule 81 (2) and (4) of
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence”, 13 October 2006, para 19; Prosecutor v
Bemba, Case N° ICC-01/05-01/08-962 OA3, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the
Appeal of M. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against the Decision of Trial Chamber III
of 24 June 2010 entitled ‘Decision on the Admissibility and Abuse of Process
Challenges’, 19 October 2010, para 63; see also A Hartwig (n 24) 542.
36 A Hartwig (n 24) 543-544.
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process’ and on the basis of the violation of the fundamental rights of the
accused. The Appeals Chamber stated that the doctrine of abuse of
process ‘had ab initio a human rights dimension in that the causes for
which the power of the Court to stay or discontinue proceedings were
largely associated with breaches of the rights of the litigant, the
accused in the criminal process, such as delay, illegal or deceitful
conduct on the part of the prosecution and violations of the rights of
the accused in the process of bringing him to justice [...] More
importantly, Article 21 (3) of the Statute makes the interpretation as
well as the application of the law applicable under the Statute subject
to internationally recognized human rights’. 37 In this sense, the ICC
Appeals Chamber stated that the deprivation of fundamental fair trial
guarantees may outweigh the interest of the world community in the
conduct of the trial and thus may proceed to discontinue the
proceedings: ‘[w]here the breaches of the rights of the accused are
such as to make it impossible for him to make his defence within the
framework of his rights, no fair trial can take place and the
proceedings can be stopped’. 38 In other words, the Appeals Chamber
acknowledges that questions relating to Article 21 (3) ICCSt and,
thus, also to defence rights, may affect the jurisdiction of the Court
and may, therefore, form the basis for an appeal pursuant to Article
82 (1) (a) ICCSt.
To conclude, it should be considered that even though Article 83
ICCSt explicitly refers only to proceedings under Article 81 ICCSt,
the ICC case law has come to the conclusion that the standard
provided by Article 83 (2) ICCSt applies also to ‘other appeals’
pursuant to Article 82 ICCSt. 39 In fact, in Katanga and Ngudjolo
Chui, the Appeals Chamber held that in case of an interlocutory
appeal, as a prerequisite, the error relied upon by the appellant also
must have materially affected the decision. 40 In introducing this
37 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the
Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case N° ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), Appeals
Chamber, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the
Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to
Article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006, 14 December 2006, para 36.
38 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the
Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case N° ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), Appeals
Chamber, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the
Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to
Article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006, 14 December 2006, para 39.
39 A Hartwig (n 24) 545.
40 ICC, Prosecutor v Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, Case N° ICC-01/04-01/07-
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restrictive condition, the Appeals Chamber reversed the previous
jurisprudence according to which the application of the standard in
question was excluded for appeals pursuant to Article 82 ICCSt. 41
2.2.2. Interlocutory appeal, as of right, of a decision granting or
denying release
Article 82 (1) (b) ICCSt establishes the right to appeal a decision
granting or denying release of the suspect or accused. The “decision”
referred to in Article 82 (1) (b) ICCSt relates to a decision issued in
accordance with Article 60 ICCSt. The sensitivity of the fundamental
freedom at stake in proceedings under Article 60 ICCSt makes the
importance of the respect of the rights of the accused even more evident.
It is not a coincidence that precisely with regard to interim release
the Appeals Chamber of the ICC has developed an extensive case law
and has elaborated on important material and procedural issues. 42 In
this context, even if under a slightly different perspective, it might also
be apposite to recall the Lubanga case, where the question of interim
release was posed as a possible consequence of a conditional stay of
proceedings, which resulted from a gross violation of defence rights. 43
2.2.3. Interlocutory appeal, with leave of the court, pursuant to Article
82(1)(d) ICCSt
The last sub-paragraph of Article 82 contains another “catch-all”
provision for issues not included in the forgoing paragraphs. Article
1497 OA8, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Germain Katanga
against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility
of the Case, 25 September 2009, para 37; Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo,
Case N° ICC-01/04-01/06-1487 OA12, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Appeal
of the Prosecutor against the Decision of the Trial Chamber I entitled ‘Decision on
the Release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’, 21 October 2008, para 44.
41 ICC, Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case N° ICC-01/04-01/06-568
OA3, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Appeal against the Decision
of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled ‘Decision Establishing General Principles Governing
Applications to Restrict Disclosure Pursuant to Rule 81 (2) and (4) of the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence’, 13 October 2006, para 12 ff.
42 A Hartwig (n 24) 545-546.
43 ICC, Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case N° ICC-01/04-01/06-1487
OA12, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor against the
Decision of the Trial Chamber I entitled ‘Decision on the Release of Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo’, 21 October 2008.
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82 (1) (d) ICCSt states the right of the defendant to appeal a decision
that involves an issue that would significantly affect the fair and
expeditious conduct of the proceedings or the outcome of the trial,
and for which, in the opinion of the Pre-Trial or Trial Chamber, an
immediate resolution by the Appeals Chamber may materially
advance the proceedings. As can be derived from the letter of the law,
this provision is intended to apply to any type of interlocutory
decision. The wide scope attributed by the Rome Statute to this
provision is, however, significantly restricted by the stipulation of
certain requirements, first of all a procedural prerequisite: the leave of
the chamber that delivered the impugned decision. In this regard, the
Pre-Trial Chamber II, in the Situation of Uganda, has stated that any
determination of the Prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal must
be guided by three principles. Firstly, the restrictive character of the
remedy provided for in Article 82 (1) (d) ICCSt. Secondly, the need
for the applicant to satisfy the Chamber as to the existence of the
specific requirements stipulated by this provision. Thirdly, the
irrelevance of or non-necessity at this stage of the Chamber to address
arguments relating to the merit or substance of the appeal. 44 As these
guidelines seem to have a general character, arguably they can be
referred also to applications for leave to appeal submitted by the
defence. Hence, Article 82 (1) (d) ICCSt seems to be accessible only
under “limited and very specific circumstances” also for the
defence. 45 In addition, the decision as to whether leave to appeal is
conceded is not, in itself, appealable. As a result, a denial of leave to
appeal must be deemed definitive.
The other two requirements that must be demonstrated by the party
seeking leave are substantive in nature. First, the decision of the first
instance judge must entail ‘an issue that would significantly affect the
fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings or the outcome of the
trial’. In this regard, the concept of ‘issue’ must be understood as an
identifiable subject or topic that needs resolution and not just a simple
question on which there is disagreement. Moreover, this issue must
44 ICC, Situation in Uganda, Case N° ICC-02/04-01/05-20-US-Exp, Pre-Trial
Chamber, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Leave to Appeal in the Pre-
Trial Chamber II’s Decision on the Prosecutor’s Applications for Warrants of Arrest
under Article 58, 19 August 2005, para 15.
45 ICC, Situation in Uganda, Case N° ICC-02/04-01/05-20-US-Exp, Pre-Trial
Chamber, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Leave to Appeal in the Pre-
Trial Chamber II’s Decision on the Prosecutor’s Applications for Warrants of Arrest
under Article 58, 19 August 2005, para 16.
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‘significantly affect’ either the outcome of the trial or the fair and
(cumulatively) expeditious conduct of the proceeding. It is clear that
the term “fair” is strongly linked to the concept of fair trial. The same
holds true for the reference to expeditious conduct of the proceedings,
which relates – even if in a peculiar way, as described above – to the
notion of trial fairness. According to the ICC Appeals Chamber in its
ruling in the Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the core
of Article 82 (1) (d) ICCSt lies in the immediate tackling of
procedural errors that otherwise might put the integrity of the
proceedings at risk. 46 The second substantial condition must be read
in the same light. Article 82 (1) (d) ICCSt requires that an immediate
resolution of the issue by the Appeals Chamber may materially
advance the proceedings. The rationale is to avoid, as early as
possible, through an ‘immediate resolution’, potential errors so as to
allow the proceedings to ‘move forward’, ensuring that the right
course is followed. 47 Only if these requirements are fulfilled, the
Chamber of first instance is entitled to grant the leave to appeal. The
grounds for the appeal to be lodged pursuant to Article 82 (1) (d)
ICCSt, can be based on the list contained in Article 81 (1) (a) ICCSt. 48
This being said, two problematic aspects – a conceptual and an
application related one – of the necessity to obtain the leave from the
first instance Chamber in order to file an appeal must be pointed out.
First, the fact that the green light to lodge an appeal must be given by
the very institution that issued the decision to be impugned, entails
the risk for an inherent bias in the examination of the existence of the
requirements laid down in Article 82 (1) (d) ICCSt. The fact that the
decision on the matter is not subject to appeal, intensifies this
problem even further. It might have been preferable, when drafting
the existing regime governing the ICC, to allow parallel routes, as it
is the case in some domestic orders, such as England and Wales.
There, the assessment in question is conducted by the lower court as
well as directly by the higher court. Taking again inspiration from a
46 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Case N° ICC-01/04-168
OA3, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary
Review of the Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 Decision Denying Leave to
Appeal, 13 July 2006, para 11.
47 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Case N° ICC-01/04-168
OA3, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary
Review of the Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 Decision Denying Leave to
Appeal, 13 July 2006, para 14, 15 and 19; A Hartwig (n 24) 549.
48 A Hartwig (n 24) 549.
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national system, this time Sweden, another solution could have been
providing for the decision on the application for leave to appeal to be
only a matter for the higher court, the Appeals Chamber, in the case
of the ICC. 49
Second, practice shows that interlocutory appeals are generally
disfavoured. They are regarded as inefficient, because ‘they disrupt
the momentum of the case; rob the trial court of the power to conduct
the trial as it sees as fit; and risk exposing the appellate court to
appeals alleging numerous errors during the course of the case, many
of which might be corrected by the trial court or become moot if the
trial is allowed to proceed’. 50 The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber expressed
this position as follows: ‘in striking the balance between the
convenience of deciding certain issues at an early stage of the
proceedings, and the need to avoid possible delays and disruptions
caused by recourse to interlocutory appeals, the provisions enshrined
[...] in the ICC Statute, favour as a principle the deferral of appellate
proceedings until final judgment, and limit interlocutory appeals to a
few, strictly defined, exceptions’. 51
As much as the intent to avoid unreasonable delays of the
proceedings must be appreciated, such a restrictive interpretation
might undermine the core function of interlocutory appeals. As has
already been mentioned, interlocutory appeals are of great importance
to the proceedings and the development of law, especially the
interpretation of the Rome Statute and the provisions in the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence. Moreover, it must be considered, that an
early review of the Appeals Chamber on certain questions might even
contribute to avoiding lengthy trials, and that the Appeals Chamber
might help to ensure certainty and consistency in the application of
the law. 52 In this sense, it appears that this restrictive attitude by first
instance Chambers makes the right to appeal under Article 82 (1) (d)
ICCSt and, at the same time, also those defence rights whose
49 H Friman, ‘Interlocutory appeals in the early practice of the International
Criminal Court’ in C Stahn, G Sluiter, The Emerging Practice of the International
Criminal Court (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009) 556.
50 M C Fleming, ‘Appellate Review in the International Criminal Tribunals’
(2002) Texas International Law Journal 144.
51 ICC, Situation in Uganda, Case N° ICC-02/04-01/05-20-US-Exp, Pre-Trial
Chamber, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Leave to Appeal in the Pre-
Trial Chamber II’s Decision on the Prosecutor’s Applications for Warrants of Arrest
under Article 58, 19 August 2005, para 19.
52 A Hartwig (n 24) 549-550.
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protection is pursued through the interlocutory appeal, more theoretical
and illusory than practical and effective. 53
2.2.4. Procedural aspects of interlocutory appeals
Appeals ‘against other decisions’ are governed by Rules 154-158
ICC RPE. Accordingly, an appeal pursuant to Article 82 (1) (a) and
(b) ICCSt may be filed within five days from the date upon which the
party filing the appeal is notified on the decision. The appeal is to be
filed with the Registrar who then transmits the trial record to the
Appeals Chamber. 54 As far as appeals that require leave of the Court
are concerned, the party shall, within five days of being notified of
that decision, make a written application to the Chamber that gave the
decision, setting out the reason for the request for leave to appeal.
Once the decision has been brought down, the Chamber shall notify
all parties who participated in the proceedings. 55
Despite the specific rules for the initial phase of the appeals being
different depending on the necessity to obtain leave for appeal, the
following procedure for the appeal applies to all interlocutory appeals.
Rule 156 ICC RPE states that as soon as an appeal has been filed, the
Registrar shall transmit to the Appeals Chamber the record of the
proceedings of the Chamber that made the decision that is the subject
of the appeal. The following appeals proceedings shall be in writing,
unless the Appeals Chamber decides to convene a hearing.
The judgment on the appeal, as regulated by Rule 158 ICC RPE, in
contrast to what is established in Article 83 (2) ICCSt, seems to be
limited to the following three options for the Appeals Chamber:
confirm, reverse or amend the decision appealed. The ICC regulatory
framework does not expressly provide the power of remand for the
Appeals Chamber in relation to appeals under Article 82 ICCSt. This
impression is corroborated by the fact that, according to Article 83 (2)
ICCSt, the Appeals Chamber may exercise this power only in relation
to decisions by the Trial Chamber and not in relation to decisions by
the Pre-Trial Chamber. 56 However, the ICC Appeals Chamber has on
several occasions exercised the power of remand in relation to
53 Airey v Ireland App no 6289/73 (ECtHR, 9 October 1979) para 24; Artico v
Italy, App no 6694/74 (ECtHR, 13 May 1980) para 33.
54 Rule 154 ICC RPE.
55 Rule 155 ICC RPE.
56 P N D C BWaite, ‘An Inquiry into the ICC Appeals Chamber’s Exercise of the
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interlocutory appeals, basing this power on the Chamber’s inherent
powers. 57 The need to refer to the Court’s inherent jurisprudence, in
order to justify the exercise of the power of remand, derives from the
fact that Article 83 ICCSt is not directly applicable to interlocutory
appeals. This is confirmed by the fact, that where dispositions of
Article 83 ICCSt were provided to apply also to this latter category of
appeals, the legal framework of the ICC has expressly extended the
scope of those dispositions: this is, for instance, the reason for the
explicit recall of the rule contained in Article 83 (4) ICCSt by Rule
158 RPE.
Likewise, Article 83 (2) ICCSt – in relation to the need for the error
forming the ground of appeal to materially affect the impugned decision
– does not per se apply to appeals under Article 82 ICCSt. However, it
has already been pointed out how the Appeals Chamber after arguing, in
the Lubanga case, against the applicability of this provision to
interlocutory appeals, 58 in later judgments nonetheless adopted the
standard of Article 83 (2) ICCSt in this context. 59 What has been
observed in relation to appeals against final decisions appears to be
even more true with regard to interlocutory appeals. Considering their
fundamental importance for the correct development of the
proceedings, rules introducing procedural hurdles for the filing of
such an appeal must be critically evaluated, in light of the risk of
them unreasonably limiting effective protection of defence rights. The
addition by interpretation of a further, substantive threshold, not
foreseen by the Statute or the Rules of Procedure, such as the
Power of Remand’ (2010) The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals
315.
57 Also the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY operated according to its inherent
jurisprudence: see ICTY, Prosecutor v Delalic’ et al., Case N° IT-96-21-A, Appeals
Chamber, Judgment on Sentence Appeal, 8 April 2003; P N D C B Waite (n 56)
316 and 321-323.
58 ICC, Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case N° ICC-01/04-01/06-568
OA3, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Appeal against the Decision
of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled ‘Decision Establishing General Principles Governing
Applications to Restrict Disclosure Pursuant to Rule 81 (2) and (4) of the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence’, 13 October 2006, para 12 ff.
59 ICC, Prosecutor v Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, Case N° ICC-01/04-01/07-
1497 OA8, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Germain Katanga
against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility
of the Case, 25 September 2009, para 37; Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo,
Case N° ICC-01/04-01/06-1487 OA12, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Appeal
of the Prosecutor against the Decision of the Trial Chamber I entitled ‘Decision on
the Release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’, 21 October 2008, para 44; A Hartwig (n
24) 553.
178 PART II, CHAPTER IV
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
extension of the requirement under Article 83 (2) ICCSt, might result in
an excessive restriction of the right to appeal and other underlying
defence rights. Not only is such an interpretation questionable with
regard to the principle of the ubi lex voluit dixit, ubi noluit tacuit, but,
even from a teleological perspective, it does not appear justifiable,
since the consequences hardly seem to have effects in bonam partem.
3. Concluding remarks
To conclude, it can be stated that a well-functioning review system
is an important guarantee for the effectiveness of defence rights granted
by the law and for trial fairness in general. Especially for young
institutions, such as the ICC, fair trial guarantees and the provision of
an effective review mechanism together form the basis for the trust
the international community is supposed to place in them. In this
regard, it might be appropriate to recall one of the main lessons from
the experience of the Nuremberg Tribunal, that is, trial fairness for the
defendants is the main yardstick against which the legitimacy of the
whole exercise will be measured. 60
Since violations of rights granted by the law can always occur, it is
crucial that each system has a review mechanism which is able to
redress damages and re-establish the fragile balance trial that
comprises fairness. As has been displayed above, the ICC system
does not provide for any external review. In other words, the ICC is
its own watchdog: the ICC controls itself from within, through the
Appeals Chamber. This means that the protection of defence rights
rests solely on the integrity of the judges in applying the Rome
Statute and the human rights standards foreseen in Article 21 (3)
ICCSt. 61
The present analysis has shown that fundamental defence rights,
albeit exhaustively enshrined in the Rome Statute, are less protected
than one might think at a first glance at the Statute. First of all, there
are legal restrictions for a concrete enforcement of fundamental rights,
such as the necessity under Article 83 (2) ICCSt of a material impact
of the alleged error on the decision and the requirement of a leave to
appeal for certain appeals. Furthermore, practice shows that progress
60 S Zappalà, Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings (Oxford
University Press, 2003) 164.
61 C Safferling (n 22) 666.
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in terms of trial fairness guarantees and protection of the rights of the
accused must be relativized due to a rather restrictive approach by the
ICC jurisprudence in the identification of cases, in which a violation
of those rights is deemed to be relevant for the sake of judicial
review. This restrictive line of the ICC can be observed in relation to
the approach to granting leave to appeal, with regard to the evaluation
of the material impact of the lamented error as well as in the
interpretative extension of this requirement beyond the scope
attributed to it by the Rome Statute itself.
The provision contained in Article 83 (2) ICCSt deserves particular
attention, as it reveals a fundamentally questionable standpoint with
regard to procedural rights protection. The requirement of an alleged
error to have ‘materially affected’ the impugned decision, in order for
an appeal to be upheld, mirrors the anti-formalistic and empirical
approach propagated by the ECtHR. 62 The Strasbourg Court, has
expressed in various judgments that it is not its function to deal with
errors of fact or of law allegedly committed by a national court unless
and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms
protected by the Convention. 63 The restrictive approach of the ECtHR
can be understood and eventually justified under two points of view.
First, a practical one: the number of contracting parties and the
workload deriving from it would not allow any other approach than
limiting the jurisdiction only to those gross violations of defence
rights that simultaneously amount to a violation of the ECHR itself.
In this sense, it cannot be implied that denounced violations of
national law that do not reach the relevance threshold set by the
ECHR system, are irrelevant also within the internal procedural
framework. Second, the ECtHR would not even have the means for a
formalistic control since it does not operate within a ‘closed system’.
The role of the ECHR consists in the reasoning through general
principles that can be then applied, as a guideline, within the
respective domestic order.
Neither of these arguments apply to the ICC. First, the ICC has a
relatively limited workload due to the limited jurisdiction ratione
62 On this topic see also M Caianiello, Premesse per una Teoria del Pregiudizio
Effettivo nelle Invalidità Processuali Penali (Bononia University Press, 2012)
63 Schenk v Switzerland App no 10862/84 (ECtHR,12 July 1988) para 45;
Teixeira de Casrto v Portugal App no 44/1997/828/1034 (ECtHR, 9 June 1989 para
34; Jalloh v Germany App no 54810/00 (ECtHR, 11 July 2006) paras 94-97; Lee
Davis v Belgium, App no 18704/05 (ECtHR,28 July 2009) para 40 ff.
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materiae and the principle of complementarity. Second, the ICC
functions in a closed and self-consistent system. The ICC Appeals
Chamber does not have the task of giving guidelines to the Chamber
of first instance. The Appeals Chamber faces a concrete question
within a criminal proceeding. From this perspective, the position and
nature of the ICC is closer to that of a national criminal court than to
that of a supranational human rights court. Arguably, effective defence
rights protection, especially with regard to judicial review, might be
better guaranteed through a more formalistic approach, according to
which a procedural sanction is generally foreseen in case of breach a
procedural rule, regardless of it having materially affected the vitiated
act or not.
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CHAPTER V
MUTUAL RECOGNITION AND ABSOLUTE STANDARDS
OF EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL PROTECTION
Valentina Covolo
TABLE OF CONTENTS: 1. The European Arrest Warrant as a case study. – 2.
Presumption of equivalent and effective protection of fundamental
rights. – 3. An exceptional ground for postponement: Real risks of
inhuman and degrading treatment. – 4. Real risks to breach the
essence of the right to a fair trial, a further restriction on the duty to
execute a EWA. – 5. Judicial review in implementing grounds for non-
execution. – 6. Balancing effectiveness of mutual recognition
instruments with the right to an effective remedy and fair trial. – 6.1.
Constitutional guarantees of judicial review impairing the primacy and
effectiveness of Union law. – 6.2. National margin of discretion. – 7.
Conclusions.
1. The European Arrest Warrant as a case study
The right to an effective remedy guaranteed by Article 47 of the
Charter infuses into national criminal procedure minimum standards
of judicial protection with the aim of ensuring the effective
implementation of individual rights conferred by Union law. 1
Pursuant to Article 53 of the Charter, the provision shall not be
interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting fundamental rights as
recognized by the Member States’ constitutions. Nonetheless, the
possibility for the Member States to provide a higher level of
protection may face limitations in cross-border criminal proceedings.
Indeed, restrictions on the right to judicial review guaranteed under
1 H Hofmann, ‘Article 47. Specific provisions’ in S Peers, T Hervey, J Kenner, A
Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: a commentary (Hart Publishing,
2014) 1211, 1212 ff.
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domestic law may result from the application by national authorities of
EU instruments of mutual recognition of judicial decisions. The latter
presupposes the ‘automaticity in the operation of inter-state
cooperation’ 2 for the sake of the prompt and effective administration
of justice in transnational cases. In particular, mutual recognition of
judicial decisions restricts, by its very nature, the scrutiny able to be
undertaken by national judicial authorities executing a decision taken
by their counterparts in another country. 3
Accordingly, the CJEU has repeatedly stressed that ‘EU law
imposes an obligation of mutual trust’ between Member States,
which prevents the executing authority from verifying whether the
issuing authority has observed fundamental rights. 4 The high
degree of confidence results from the assumption that each of the
national legal systems are capable of providing an equivalent and
effective protection of fundamental rights, 5 both as regards the
adequacy of domestic rules and their correct application. 6
Nonetheless, mutual recognition of judicial decisions is not
absolute: scrutiny by the executing authorities is allowed, however
only on limited grounds for non-execution. In this regard, the
CJEU has been called upon to rule on the conditions under which
national judicial authorities must ‘refrain from reviewing decisions
taken by their counterparts in other Member States without
infringing an individual’s right of effective judicial protection’. 7
According to the case law, the balance between the right to an
2 V Mitsilegas, ‘The Limits of Mutual Trust in Europe’s Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice: From Automatic Inter-State Cooperation to the Slow
Emergence of the Individual’ (2012) 31 Yearbook of European Law 319, 324.
3 Legal scholars refers to a ‘negative mutual recognition’or a ‘negative obligation
(...) no to check whether the other Member State has in a specific case respected
human rights. V Mitsilegas (n 2) 321; Z Ðurđević, ‘The Directive on the Right of
Access to a Lawyer in Criminal Proceedings: Filling a Human Rights Gap in the
European Union Legel Order’ in Z Ðurđević, E Ivičević Karas (ed), European
Criminal Procedure Law in Service of Protection of European Union Financial
Interests: State of Play and Challenges (2016, Croatian Association of European
Criminal Law) 9, 11.
4 Opinion 2/13 EU:C:2014:2454, para 194.
5 Case C-491/10 Aguirre Zarraga EU:C:2010:828, para 70.
6 Recital 4 Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 20 October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal
proceedings [2010] OJ L 280/1
7 D Düsterhaus, ‘Judicial Coherence in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
– Squaring Mutual Trust with Effective Judicial Protection’ (2015) 8 Review of
European Administrative Law 151, 157 – 158.
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effective remedy and mutual recognition tips in favor of the latter in
as far as the review undertaken in the executing State compromises
the primacy, unity and effectiveness of Union law. 8
The question is common to all instruments of mutual recognition in
criminal matters. The framework decisions on freezing orders, 9
confiscation, 10 as well as the European Investigation Order, 11 contain
provisions that seek to define the respective jurisdictions of issuing
and executing judicial authorities. Despite this, the following analysis
will focus on the Framework Decision 2002/584 on the European
Arrest Warrant (EAW), 12 as the most prominent illustration of the
challenges that mutual trust poses to the right to effective judicial
protection within the EU criminal justice area. First, the position of
the Court referred to above has been particularly well developed in
this field. Second, the procedure for the execution of a EAW
explicitly falls within the scope of application of the EU Directives on
the rights of suspects and accused persons in criminal proceedings.
2. Presumption of equivalent and effective protection of
fundamental rights
Mutual recognition is rooted in mutual trust, a principle whose
fundamental importance in the area of freedom, security and justice
has been particularly emphasized by the CJEU. As stated in Opinion
2/13 concerning the accession of the EU or the ECHR, mutual trust
requires the Member States:
(...) to presume that fundamental rights have been observed by the
other Member States, so that not only may they not demand a
8 Case C-399/11 Melloni, Opinion of AG Bot EU:C:2012:600, para 189.
9 Art. 11 Council Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA of 22 July 2003 on the
execution in the European Union of orders freezing property or evidence [2003] OJ
L196/45.
10 Art. 9 Council Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA of 6 October 2006 on the
application of the principle of mutual recognition to confiscation orders [2006] OJ L
328/59.
11 Article 14 Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 3 April 2014 regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal
matters [2014] OJ L 130/1.
12 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European
arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, as amended by the
Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 [2002] JO L 190/1.
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higher level of national protection of fundamental rights from
another Member State than that provided by EU law, but, save in
exceptional cases, they may not check whether that other
Member State has actually, in a specific case, observed the
fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU. 13
The presumption of equivalent protection led the CJEU to adopt a
strict and almost literal interpretation of the Framework Decision 2002/
584 in Radu. 14 In that case, the person subject to the EAW opposed his
surrender on the ground that the issuing authorities did not hear him
beforehand, in breach of Article 47 and 48 of the Charter. In its
ruling, the Court first noted that the Member State issued an arrest
warrant for the purpose of prosecution. Contrary to the execution of
criminal sentences delivered in absentia, the failure by the issuing
authorities to hear the surrendered person does not figure among the
grounds for non-execution provided under the Framework Decision. 15
In addition, the Court noted that requiring the national judicial
authorities to hear the requested person before issuing a EAW would
extinguish any ‘element of surprise’ needed to stop the person
concerned from taking flight and, thereby, ‘would inevitably lead to
the failure of the very system of surrender provided for by
Framework Decision’. 16 In these circumstances, the executing
authorities cannot refuse the execution of the EAW and, consequently,
verify whether the issuing State observed beforehand the right to be
heard of the surrendered persons.
Admittedly, the reasoning adopted by the Court may be understood
as leaving room for a different solution if the EAW is issued for the
purpose of the execution of sentences. It is nonetheless worth
mentioning that the CJEU limited itself to recalling the ‘high degree
of confidence which should exist between the Member States’, 17
without undertaking a balancing test between mutual recognition and
fundamental rights. The latter approach was, however, suggested by
Advocate General Sharpston. Although the Framework Decision
provides an exhaustive list of grounds for non-execution, the
obligation of the Member States to act upon a EAW should be
13 Opinion 2/13 EU:C:2014:2454, para 192 (emphasis added).
14 Case C-396/11 Radu EU:C:2013:39.
15 Ibid para 38.
16 Ibid para 40.
17 Ibid para 34.
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interpreted in line with the duty to respect fundamental rights enshrined
in Article 1(3) of the Framework Decision. 18 Therefore, the Advocate
General suggested the acknowledgement of an additional ground for
refusal where it is shown that the human rights of the surrendered
person have been infringed, or will be infringed, as part of or
following the surrender process in the issuing State. Drawing on the
ECtHR case law, the suggested ground for refusal could have been
based on a stringent test aimed at assessing the severity of the
fundamental rights’ violation at stake:
In cases involving Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention and/or
Articles 6, 47 and 48 of the Charter, the infringement in question
must be such as fundamentally to destroy the fairness of the
process. The person alleging infringement must persuade the
decision-maker that his objections are substantially well founded.
Past infringements that are capable of remedy will not found such
an objection. 19
3. An exceptional ground for postponement: Real risks of inhuman
and degrading treatment
Although the CJEU did not follow the Opinion of Advocate
General Sharpston in Radu, it accepted the need to temper, in
exceptional circumstances, the automatic application of mutual
recognition of judicial decisions in case of serious violations of
absolute fundamental rights. 20 The preliminary ruling in Aranyosi
called into question detention conditions in the issuing Member State
that pose a real risk to the surrendered person of inhuman and
degrading treatment. 21 Against this background, the Court
acknowledged that:
[W]here the judicial authority of the executing Member State is in
possession of evidence of a real risk of inhuman or degrading
18 Case C-396/11 Radu, Opinion of AG Sharpston EU:C:2012:648, para 68 – 70.
19 Ibid para 97 (emphasis added).
20 For a detailed commentary, G Anagnostaras, ‘Mutual confidence is not blind
trust! Fundamental rights protection and the execution of the European arrest
warrant: Aranyosi and Căldăraru’ (2016) 53 CMLRev 1675.
21 Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Aranyosi and Căldăraru
EU:C:2016:198.
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treatment of individuals detained in the issuing Member State,
having regard to the standard of protection of fundamental rights
guaranteed by EU law and, in particular, by Article 4 of the
Charter, that judicial authority is bound to assess the existence of
that risk when it is called upon to decide on the surrender to the
authorities of the issuing Member State of the individual sought
by a European arrest warrant. 22
The ruling thus enhances the consistent interpretation of mutual
recognition principles by the CJEU where the person subject to a
national decision is exposed to particularly serious violations of
fundamental rights. 23 Indeed, the Court had already adopted a
similar reasoning with regards to the transfer of asylum seekers in
N.S. Accordingly, a Member State may refrain from transferring an
asylum seeker to another Member State, where the former cannot
be unaware that systematic deficiencies in the asylum procedure
and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers in the latter State
are likely to expose them to inhuman and degrading treatment
within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter. 24 While both
judgments admit that detention conditions may serve as an obstacle
to the execution of decisions taken in another Member State,
restrictions to mutual recognition of arrest warrants are more
stringently interpreted given the very specific consequences of a
failure to surrender the alleged offender. As emphasized by
Advocate General Bot, the issue in NS was ‘to ascertain which of
the Member States was responsible for examining an asylum claim’
and, therefore, admit ‘an exception to a rule of territorial
jurisdiction’. 25 By contrast, the refusal to execute a EAW issued
for the purpose of a criminal prosecution would prevent the issuing
authorities to ensure public order and public security with ‘the risk
that the offence would remain unpunished’. 26 Consequently, aside
from specific grounds for non-execution set forth under the
Framework Decision 2002/584, risks of inhuman and degrading
22 Ibid para 88.
23 Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Aranyosi and Căldăraru, Opinion
of AG Bot EU:C:2016:140, paras 39 ff.
24 Case C-411/10 N.S. EU:C:2011:865.
25 Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Aranyosi and Căldăraru, Opinion
of AG Bot, para 55.
26 Ibid para 56 ff.
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treatment resulting from detention conditions in the issuing State
cannot automatically lead to a refusal to execute the EAW.
In the light of this, the ruling in Aranyosi provides detailed guidance
on the review to be undertaken by the executing State. First, the
assessment undertaken by the executing authority goes beyond the
mere ‘finding that there is a real risk of inhuman or degrading
treatment by virtue of general conditions of detention in the issuing
Member State’. 27 The scrutiny entails in fact a ‘two-step’ test. The
judicial authority must initially rely on information that is objective,
reliable, specific and properly updated on the detention conditions
prevailing in the issuing Member State such as, for instance,
judgements of the ECtHR – in order to identify a real risk that the
surrender proceeding will lead to a breach of Article 4 of the
Charter. Only if faced with substantial grounds to believe that the
individual concerned will be exposed to inhuman or degrading
treatment 28 will the executing judicial authority be furthermore
‘bound to determine whether, in the particular circumstances of the
case, there are substantial grounds to believe that, following the
surrender of that person to the issuing Member State, he will run a
real risk of being subject in that Member State to inhuman or
degrading treatment, within the meaning of Article 4’. 29
Second, pursuant to Article 15(2) of the Framework Decision, the
executing authority is under the obligation to request the issuing
authority to provide ‘as a matter of urgency all necessary
supplementary information on the conditions in which it is envisaged
that the individual concerned will be detained in that Member
State’. 30 In the event the information provided discounts the existence
of a real risk that the surrendered person would be exposed to
inhuman and degrading treatment, the EAW must be executed. The
individual concerned will have the possibility to challenge the
lawfulness of detention conditions in the issuing Member State
according to the legal remedies provided under the law of that
country. 31 If, on the contrary, the information provided by the issuing
authority does not exclude a real risk of inhuman and degrading
treatment in the particular circumstances of the case, the requested
27 Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Aranyosi and Căldăraru, para 91.
28 Ibid para 93.
29 Ibid para 94.
30 Ibid para 95.
31 Ibid para 103.
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State cannot refuse, but can simply postpone the execution of the
EAW. 32 In this event, the executing authority may decide to hold the
person in custody for a limited period of time that must respect the
requirement of proportionality. Conversely, when the executing
authority grants provisional release, it is under the obligation to take
‘any measure necessary so as to prevent the person concerned from
absconding and to ensure that the material conditions necessary for
his effective surrender remain fulfilled for as long as no final decision
on the execution of the European arrest warrant has been taken’. 33
4. Real risks to breach the essence of the right to a fair trial, a
further restriction on the duty to execute a EAW
Despite the emphasis put by the CJEU on the absolute character of
the right enshrined in Article 4 of the Charter, one could have wondered
whether the reasoning in Aranyosi could apply mutati mutandis to
particular serious breaches of fundamental rights that can be subject to
limitations, such as the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 47 of
the Charter. 34 In LM, the CJEU gave a positive answer. 35 The facts
in the main proceedings deal with three EAWs issued by Poland for
the purpose of prosecuting a person accused of drug trafficking
offences. After having been arrested in Ireland, the person concerned
opposed to the surrender, claiming that the execution of the EWA
would expose him to a flagrant denial of justice. This risk would have
resulted from the reforms undermining the independence of the Polish
judiciary at all levels, which led the Commission to propose for the
first time in history to activate the procedure of Article 7 TEU. 36
Against this background, the High Court of Ireland asked the CJEU if
and what kind of review shall the executing authority carry out where
32 Ibid para 98. Regarding this aspect see S Gáspár-Szilágyi, ‘Joined Cases
Aranyosi and Căldăraru. Converging Human Rights Standards, Mutual Trust and a
New Ground for Postponing a European Arrest Warrant’ (2016) 24 European
Journal of Crime Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 197.
33 Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Aranyosi and Căldăraru, para 102.
34 The CJEU consistently held, indeed, that the right of access to a tribunal and
the right to a fair trial are not absolute. See for instance, Joined cases C-317/08, C-318/
08, C-319/08 and C-320/08 Alassini v Telecom Italia EU:C:2010:146, paras 63 – 64.
35 Case C-216/18 PPU LM EU:C:2018:586.
36 Reasoned Proposal of the European Commission in accordance with Article
7(1) of the Treaty on European Union regarding the rule of law in Poland, COM
(2017) 835 final.
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there are cogent evidence of a real risk of serious breach of the right to a
fair trial because the judicial system of the issuing State does not operate
anymore within the rule of law.
The Court of Justice first recalled that the principle of mutual
recognition does not imply ‘blind mutual trust’. 37 Indeed, the high
level of trust between the Member States is based on ‘the premiss that
the criminal courts of the other Member States [...] meet the
requirements of effective judicial protection, which include, in
particular, the independence and impartiality of those courts’. 38 The
latter requirements are inherent features of the right to a fair trial,
‘which is of cardinal importance as a guarantee that all the rights
which individuals derive from EU law will be protected and that the
values common to the Member States set out in Article 2 TEU, in
particular the value of the rule of law, will be safeguarded’. 39
Based on these considerations, the Court thus acknowledged that,
under exceptional circumstances, the executing judicial authority shall
undertake the two-step test outlined in Aranyosi where the execution
of the EAW exposes the requested person to a real risk of breach of
the fundamental right to a fair trial on account of systemic or
generalized deficiencies that affect the independence of the issuing
Member State’s judiciary. It is important to note, however, that this
new limitation on mutual recognition of judicial decisions in criminal
matters specifically concerns a requirement, the one of judicial
independance that, according to the court, forms part of the essence of
the right, 40 which according to Article 52(1) of the Charter cannot be
subject to limitations.
As a first step, the executing judicial authority must undertake an
objective assessment aimed to establish whether there is a real risk of
breaching the right to a fair trial in its essence on account of systemic
or generalized deciciencies that compromise the independence of the
issuing State’s judiciary. In doing so, the executing authority shall
base its assessment on ‘material that is objective reliable, specific and
properly updated concerning the operation of the system of justice in
37 The CJEU already took this stace in Aranyosi and Căldăraru. See notably K
Lenaerts, ‘La vie après l’avis: Exploring the Principle of Mutual (Yet not Blind) Trust’
(2017) 54 CMLRev 805.
38 Case C-216/18 PPU LM, para 58.
39 Ibid para 48.
40 Ibid.
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the issuing Member State’, notably the reasoned proposal of the
Commissionunder Article 7 TEU. 41
If the national court comes to the conclusion that the risk of violating
the essence of the right to fair trial is real, it must also undertake, as a
second step, an individual assessment. This consists in verifying
whether there are substantial grounds for beliving that the requested
person will actually and personally run that risk having regard to the
particular circumstances of the case. 42 In this respect, attention must
be paid to the ‘personal situation [of the resquested person], as well as
to the nature of the offence for which he is being prosecuted and the
factual context that form the basis of the European arrest warrant’. 43
Despite the emphasis put by the CJEU on the imperative need for
an individual assessement, 44 this second tier raises problematic issues.
Indeed, the CJEU requires the judicial authority of the issuing State to
identify the court of the executing State that ‘has jurisdiction over the
proceedings to which the requested person will be subject’ in order to
determine whether the independence of that competent court is
affected. 45 The national judge is therefore confronted with a quite
difficult – almost impossible – task: to figure out at an early stage of
the criminal proceedings which will be the competent trial court,
whose jurisdiction is plausibly defined by complex procedural rules of
a foreign State and might depend on the charges pressed at the end of
the investigation. One could also consider, however, other courts in
the executing State as having jurisdiction over the proceedings, such
as for instance the juge called upon to review detention pending trial,
or the competent Appellate Court at a subsequent stage of the
criminal proceedings. In this light, how could systemic deficiencies
imparing the independence of a State’s judiciary as a whole do not
necessarily amount to a flagrant denial of justice in the individual
case? The answer provided by Advocate General Tanchev does not
seem convincing. According to his opinion, ‘the lack of independence
and impartiality of a tribunal can be regarded as amounting to a
flagrant denial of justice only if it is so serious that it destroys the
fairness of the trial’. 46 It is however ‘hard to conceive that a lack of
41 Ibid para 61.
42 Ibid para 68.
43 Ibid para 75.
44 Ibid para 69.
45 Ibid para 74.
46 Case C-216/18 PPU LM, Opinion of AG Tanchev EU:C:2018:517, para 93.
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independence, of an alleged lower intensity, can be downgraded to a
mere irregularity that does not inevitably taint every subsequent step
of the proceedings’. 47 This holds particularly true with respect to the
requirement of external independence as interpreted by the ECtHR in
the assessment of a ‘flagrant denial of justice’, a case-law to which no
reference whatsoever can be found in the preliminary ruling. As
Mirandola rightly notes, the ECtHR takes into account the specific
circumstances of the individual case ‘only if there are no sufficient
elements to argue for a lack of independence in the general legal
framework, and not as a further step to take when independence is
not sufficiently ensured at legislative level’. 48
It is essential to note the place held by the second step of the test
within the chain of arguments put forward by the CJEU. By requiring
the executing judicial authority to undertake an individual assessment,
the CJEU is cautious not to paralyse the entire system of surrender
vis-à-vis Poland. It indeed stresses that only the European Council can
take the decision to suspend the application of the EAW in respect to
a Member State that does not comply with the rule of law, as a result
of the procedure under Article 7 TEU. 49
While trying to limit automatic refusals to cooperate that would
endanger the entire system of surrender, the CJEU also recalls that
‘the executing judicial authority must, pursuant to Article 15(2) of
Framework Decision 2002/584, request from the issuing judicial
authority any supplementary information that it considers necessary
for assessing whether there is such a risk’ exposing the requested
person to a violation of his fundamental right to an independent
tribunal. 50 This may lead, however, to a kafkiaesque situation in
which the judicial authority of a Member State practically asks his
homologue in another EU country to provide objective guarantees of
i ts own judicial system’s and, therefore, i ts own judicial
independence. 51 As for the consequences of this dialogue, the CJEU
did not follow the opinion of the Advocate General. Whilst for the
47 S Mirandola, ‘European Arrest Aarrant and Judicial Independence in Poland:
Where can mutual trust end? (Opinion of the AG in C-216/18 PPU LM)’, European
Law Blog, 24 July 2018, <http://europeanlawblog.eu/2018/07/24/european-arrest-
warrant-and-judicial-independence-in-poland-where-can-mutual-trust-end-opinion-of-
the-ag-in-c-216-18-ppu-l-m/>.
48 Mirandola (n 47).
49 Case C-216/18 PPU LM, paras 70-73.
50 Ibid para 76.
51 Ibid para 77.
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latter the persistence of the real risk of flagrant denial of justice in the
individual case would only have the effect to postpone the execution
of the EAW, 52 in the view of the Court the executing authority ‘must
refrain from giving effect’ to the request for surrender where the
information provided by the issuing State does not discount the
existence of a real risk of breaching the fundamental right to an
independent tribunal. 53
5. Judicial review in implementing grounds for non-execution
In contrast, the executing authority may, in a limited way, review
the respect of fundamental rights by the issuing authorities when such
rights constitute grounds for non-execution of the EAW. In these
circumstances, the CJEU stressed that the surrender procedure aims at
ensuring a high degree of protection of defence rights. In Dworzecki,
a Dutch Court questioned the conformity of national procedural rules
governing the right to information of the accused who is subject to a
EAW with Article 4a (1)(a)(i) of the Framework Decision 2002/584.
The provision provides that a judicial authority may refuse to execute
a EAW issued for the purpose of executing a custodial sentence or a
detention order if the person did not appear in person at the trial
resulting in the decision, unless the arrest warrant states that the
person was ‘either summoned in person’ or actually received ‘by any
other means official information of the schedules date and place of
that trial in such a manner that it was unequivocally established that
he or she was aware of the scheduled trial’. At the outset, the CJEU
stressed that the above mentioned conditions set forth in 4a (1)(a)(i)
of the Framework Decision have an autonomous meaning in order to
ensure the uniform interpretation and application of Union law. 54
The Court went on to consider the goals of the ground for refusal in
the case of convictions delivered in absentia. On the one hand, Article 4
of the Framework Decision is not designed to regulate the forms and
methods, including procedural requirements that the Member States
apply in implementing the surrender procedure. 55 On the other hand,
the provision is aimed at ensuring a high level of protection that
52 Case C-216/18 PPU LM, Opinion of AG Tanchev EU:C:2018:517, para 131.
53 Case C-216/18 PPU LM, para 78.
54 Case C-108/16 PPU Dworzecki EU:C:2016:346, para 28 ff.
55 Ibid para 44.
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enables the executing authority to consider that the rights of the person
subject to the EAW have been respected in the issuing State. 56
Consequently, the fact that, according to the arrest warrant, the
summons was served at the address of the requested person on an
adult resident of the household, who undertook to hand the summons
over to the requested persons, does in itself fulfill the requirements
under Article 4a (1)(a)(i) of the Framework Decision. In such
circumstances, it is for the issuing authority to indicate in the EAW
elements on the basis on which it relies on, that the person concerned
was effectively and officially informed. 57 As for the assessment
undertaken by the executing authority when applying the optional
ground for non-execution under Article 4, the Court stressed that it
may take into consideration other circumstances of the case, notably
the conduct of the person concerned as well as the eventual right to
retrial guaranteed by the law of the issuing State.
In Piotrowski, the CJEU recently confirmed that grounds for
refusals set forth in the Framework Decision 2002/584 and the
judicial review undertaken by the executing authorities when
implementing such grounds must be interpreted strictly. 58 The case in
the main proceedings called into question the mandatory non-
execution of a EAW issued by Poland against a minor who could not
be held ‘criminally responsible for the acts on which the arrest
warrant is based under the law of the executing State’. 59 The question
arose whether the provision requires the executing Belgian authority
to undertake an assessment in abstracto (i.e. establish whether the
minor subject to the EAW can theoretically be held criminally
responsible under the law of the executing country having regard to
his age) or calls for an assessment in concreto (i.e. allowing the
executing authority to take into consideration individual circumstances
which condition the prosecution and conviction of a minor subject
according to the law of the executing State).
In line with the conclusions of Advocate General Bot, 60 the Court
rejected this second option. Although the best interests of a child who is
subject to criminal proceedings ‘are always a primary consideration’, 61
56 Ibid paras 37 – 38.
57 Ibid para 49.
58 Case C-367/16 Piotrowski EU:C:2018:27, para 48.
59 Art. 3 (3) Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA.
60 Case C-367/16 Piotrowski Opinion of AG Bot EU:C:2017:636.
61 Case C-367/16 Piotrowski, para 37.
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‘observance of those rights [aimed to protect minors] falls primarily
within the responsibility of the issuing Member State’ that seeks to
prosecute him or enforce a sentence pronounced against him. 62 Yet,
the principle of mutual recognition requires the executing State to
trust and therefore presume that the issuing State complies with Union
law fundamental rights guarantees with regard to the surrendered
person. 63 Hence, by taking into consideration objective and subjective
circumstances, such as the level of maturity of the minor, his family
situation, and the youth protection measures previously adopted, the
review in concreto undertaken by the executing authority would imply
a new assessement of criminal responsibility of the minor, which`in
fact amounts to a substantive re-examination of the analysis
previously conducted in connection with the judicial decision adopted
in the issuing Member State’. 64 In the view of the Court, such an in
depth review based on additional considerations that were not
foreseen in the Framework Decision contradicts the very essence of
the principle of mutual recognition.
An interesting note in the ruling is the reference to Directive 2016/
800/EU harmonizing procedural safeguards for children who are
suspects or accused persons in criminal proceedings. 65 Even though
the ABC Direct ive must be regarded as ‘ t rus t -enhancing
legislation’, 66 it does not establish common rules governing the
criminal liability of minors referred to under Article 3 (3) of the
Framework Decision. As emphasized by both the Court and the
Advocate General, the EU Directive simply provides minors subject
to criminal proceedings and proceedings for the execution of a EAW
with procedural safeguards ‘in order to ensure that, as stated in recital
8 of that directive, the best interests of a child (...) are of primary
consideration. 67 One should add to this – surprisingly not emphasized
in the preliminary ruling – that the right to an individual assessment
62 Ibid para 50.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid para 52.
65 Directive (EU) 2016/800 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11
May 2016 on procedural safeguards for children who are suspects or accused persons
in criminal proceedings [2016] OJ L 132/1.
66 The formula, which perfectly reflects the link established by Article 82 TFEU
between harmonization and mutual recognition in criminal matters, is used by K
Lenaerts (n 37) 811.
67 Case C-367/16 Piotrowski, para 37.
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guaranteed under Article 7 Directive 2016/800/EU is included among
the safeguards that benefit minors who are subject to a EAW. 68
It therefore follows that the question for preliminary ruling in
Piotrowski does not deal with breaches in the issuing State of
harmonized defence rights that Union law grants to surrendered
persons. Indeed, violations of defence rights guaranteed by the
ABC Directives do not constitute grounds for refusal under the
Framework Decision 2002/584. 69 Such violations by the issuing
State should not fall, as a matter of principle, within the scope of
review undertaken by the executing authority. Were it otherwise,
the executing State would verify, instead of trusting, whether
another Member State actually complies with EU fundamental
rights and thereby would ‘call into question the premise that those
two Member States are equally capable of providing effective
judicial protection of those rights’. 70
5. Balancing effectiveness of mutual recognition instruments with
the right to an effective remedy and fair trial
5.1. Constitutional guarantees of judicial review impairing the primacy
and effectiveness of Union law
Mutual trust does not only prevent the executing authorities from
verifying whether fundamental rights have been or will be respected
in the issuing State. When the executing authority invokes a ground
for non-execution set forth in the Framework Decision 2002/584, it
cannot apply higher standards of protection provided under its own
constitutional legal order where this would impair the effective
implementation of the surrender procedure established by Union law.
The CJEU adopted this approach in the landmark judgment
68 Art. 17 Directive 2016/800/EU.
69 In this regard it is worth noting that even though Article 4a Framework
Decision 2002/584/JHA provides for a ground for refusal where the EAW is
issued for the purpose of enforcing a judgments rendered in violation of the right
to be heard in person, the corresponding procedural safeguards guaranteed by 8
and 9 Directive 2016/343/EU do not apply to proceedings for the execution of a
EAW.
Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9
March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence
and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings [2016] OJ L 65/1.
70 K Lenaerts (n 37) 821.
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Melloni. 71 The Court was called upon to interpret Article 4a (1) of
Framework Decision 2002/384 that established an optional ground for
refusal when a EAW is issued for the purpose of executing a sentence
rendered in absentia.
By adopting a strict reading of the wording and purpose of the
provision, the Court first stressed that the Framework Decision 2002/
384/JHA provides ‘an exhaustive list of the circumstances in which
the execution of a European arrest warrant issued in order to enforce
a decision rendered in absentia must be regarded as not infringing the
rights of the defence’. 72 In particular, Article 4a (1) requires the
judicial authorities to surrender a person, despite his absence at trial
in the issuing State, if the person was informed in due time of the
scheduled trial and of the fact that a decision could be handed down
if he did not appear for the trial or, being aware of the scheduled trial,
engaged a lawyer to defend him at trial. 73 It thus results from the
wording and the purpose of the provision that Article 4a (1) precludes
the executing judicial authorities from making the surrender of the
person convicted in absentia conditional upon the conviction being
open to review in his presence.
In addition, the Court held that Article 4a (1) complies with Articles
47 and 48 of the Charter. 74 Indeed, by setting the conditions upon which
the person concerned must be deemed to have waived voluntary and
unambiguously his right to be present at trial, the provision reflects
the interpretation of the right to a fair trial consistently held by the
ECtHR, as a fundamental guarantee that is not, as emphasized by the
CJEU, an absolute right. 75 The ruling further stresses that a stringent
interpretation of the grounds for non-execution is in line with Article
53 of the Charter. Building on the primacy of Union law, the CJEU held:
[w]here an EU legal act calls for national implementing measures,
national authorities and courts remain free to apply national
standards of protection of fundamental rights, provided that the
level of protection provided for by the Charter, as interpreted by
71 C-399/11 Melloni EU:C:2013:107.
72 Ibid para 44.
73 Art. 4a (1) Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA.
74 The question on whether European guarantees in in absentia proceedings are
sufficient remain however unanswered. On this aspect, M Böse, ‘Human Rights
Violations and Mutual Trust: Recent Case Law on the European Arrest Warrant’ in
S Ruggeri, Human Rights in European Criminal Law (2015, Springer) 135, 141-142.
75 Case C- 399/11 Melloni, paras 49 – 50.
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the Court, and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are
not thereby compromised (...) Allowing a Member State to avail
itself of Article 53 of the Charter to make the surrender of a
person convicted in absentia conditional upon the conviction
being open to review in the issuing Member State, a possibility
not provided for under Framework Decision 2009/299, in order to
avoid an adverse effect on the right to a fair trial and the rights
of the defence guaranteed by the constitution of the executing
Member State, by casting doubt on the uniformity of the standard
of protection of fundamental rights as defined in that framework
decision, would undermine the principles of mutual trust and
recognition which that decision purports to uphold and would,
therefore, compromise the efficacy of that framework decision. 76
Consequently, Article 47 of the Charter must be understood as
prescribing absolute standards of the right to an effective judicial
review and the right to a fair trial, in as far as the application of
stronger guarantees provided under the constitutional order of the
executing Member State would frustrate the correct implementation of
the Union instrument of mutual recognition.
5.2. National margin of discretion
Although the ruling inMelloni places paramount importance on the
obligation for Member States to give effect to a EAW, it does not
systematically rule out the possibility for the executing judicial
authority to apply higher or additional fundamental rights standards of
protection then those guaranteed by Union law. This has been
confirmed by the CJEU in Jeremy F. 77 The French Constitutional
Court referred a question for preliminary ruling on whether national
procedures enabling the surrendered person to bring an appeal with
suspensive effect against the decision to execute a EAW or a decision
giving consent to an extension of the warrant or to onward surrender
is compatible with the Framework decision 2002/384. 78 At the outset,
the CJEU recalled the ‘special importance’ that the right to an
76 Ibid paras 60 and 63.
77 Case C-168/13 PPU Jeremy F. EU:C:2013:358.
78 Besides the right to access a court, the preliminary ruling further raised
questions related to constitutional review in the field of Union law. See for instance,
F-X Millet, ‘How much lenience for how much cooperation? On the first
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effective remedy holds both in extradition and surrender proceedings, 79
while clarifying the scope of review that respectively falls within the
jurisdiction of the issuing and the executing authorities. On the one
hand, remedies available in the issuing Member State enable the
person to be surrendered to challenge ‘the lawfulness of the criminal
proceedings for the enforcement of the custodial sentence or detention
order, or indeed the substantive criminal proceedings which led to that
sentence or order’. 80 By contrast, the dispute in the main proceedings
calls into question the judicial review of the decision to execute a
EAW adopted in the executing State. Thus, appeals against such an
act neither encroach upon the jurisdiction of the judicial authorities in
the issuing State, nor does it impinge on the effective protection of
fundamental rights in the issuing State.
The Court further noted that the Framework decision leaves to the
discretion of the national competent authorities the specific manner of
implementation of the surrender procedure. 81 Indeed, no express
provision obliges nor precludes the Member States to allow the
surrendered person to bring an appeal against the decision to execute
a EAW82. Consequently, the CJEU held that:
provided that the application of the Framework Decision is not
frustrated (...) it does not prevent a Member State from applying
its constitutional rules relating inter alia to respect for the right to
a fair trial. It follows that (...) the Framework Decision must be
interpreted as not precluding Member States from providing for
an appeal suspending execution of the decision of the judicial
authority which rules on giving consent either to the prosecution,
sentencing or detention with a view to the carrying out of a
custodial sentence or detention order of a person for an offence
committed prior to his surrender pursuant to a European arrest
warrant, other than that for which he was surrendered, or to the
surrender of a person to a Member State other than the executing
Member State, pursuant to a European arrest warrant issued for
an offence committed prior to his surrender. 83
preliminary reference of the French Constitutional Council to the Court of Justice’
(2014) 51 CMLRev 195.
79 Case C-168/13 PPU Jeremy F, para 42.
80 Ibid para 50.
81 Ibid para 52.
82 Ibid paras 37 – 38.
83 Ibid paras 53 and 55.
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Such a possibility, however, comes up against certain limits,
consisting in the prohibition of disregarding specific rules set out in
the Framework decision and, thereby, frustrate its very objective of
establishing accelerated and simplified surrender proceeding. 84 In
particular, the additional remedy provided under the law of the
executing State must nonetheless comply with the time limits
specifically set forth by the Framework Decision for taking the final
decision on the execution of the arrest warrant.
6. Conclusions
The increasing number of legal instruments adopted by the EU in
criminal matters means that the CJEU is persistently confronted with
a delicate and challenging exercise: the necessary ‘triangulation’
between the fundamental rights standards provided under the EU
Charter, the level of protection guaranteed under the abundant and
ever evolving case law of the ECtHR and in the constitutional legal
orders of the Member States. 85 The question is all the more thorny
where Article 47 of the Charter touches upon the very structure of the
national criminal justice systems when they must ensure the
effectiveness of Union law. Against this background, general
provisions governing the application of the Charter do not entirely
answer the question. Admittedly, Article 52(3) and 53 require the EU
to provide at least the same level of protection of fundamental rights
enshrined in the Charter as that guaranteed under the corresponding
guarantees afforded by the ECHR, ‘without thereby affecting the
autonomy of Union law’. 86 Likewise, where the Member States are
implementing Union law, they shall provide, as a minimum, the same
level of protection afforded by the Charter, 87 which might be more
extensive when compared to the Convention. 88 But can the Member
State apply higher constitutional guarantees in line with the ECHR
84 H Labayle, R Mehdi, ‘Le droit au juge et le mandat d’arrêt européen : lectures
convergentes de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne et du Conseil
constitutionnel’ (2013) 4 RFDA 691, 695 ff.
85 M Daniele, ‘La triangolazione delle garanzie processuali fra diritto
dell’Unione europea, CEDU e sistemi nazionali’ (2016) 4 Diritto penale
contemporaneo 48.
86 S Peers, T Hervey, J Kenner, A Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights: a commentary (Hart Publishing, 2014) 1498.
87 Art. 51(1) EU Charter.
88 Art. 52(3) EU Charter.
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where they are likely to frustrate the primacy and effectiveness of Union
law? The CJEU answered in the negative, 89 in as far as it is not possible
for the national judge to interpret domestic law in compliance with EU
legal instruments. 90 In these circumstances, Article 47 of the Charter
must be understood as providing maximum standards of protection. 91
Hence, the procedural autonomy that Member States enjoy under
Union law is conceptually different from the national margin of
appreciation under the Convention. 92 The latter only aims at
providing minimum common standards of protection and, therefore,
leaves room for discretion in implementing those standards where
domestic authorities are better placed ‘to evaluate local needs and
conditions’ that are likely to collide with European fundamental
rights. 93 In contrast, Union law does not only provide minimum
requirements for the protection of fundamental rights. It further relies
on the national criminal enforcement systems and harmonized national
criminal procedures for the sake of ensuring the effective
implementation of EU rights and obligations. From this perspective,
the national procedural autonomy draws its raison d’être from the
principle of indirect administration. Deference to national law thus
reflects the institutional sharing of competence between the EU and
the Member States. Therefore, procedural autonomy reaches its limits
in those Union legal provisions that pre-empt the leeway of the
Member States in implementing both individual rights and repressive
measures provided under Union law. These considerations put the
procedural autonomy of national criminal justice at the heart of
fundamental questions inherent in the construction of an integrated
European penal area, among which is ensuring the effective judicial
protection of defence rights that are now harmonized by the ABC
Directives.
89 C- 399/11 Melloni.
90 Case C-168/13 PPU Jeremy F
91 M Safian, D Düsterhaus, ‘A Union of Effective Judicial Protection:
Addressing a Multi-level Challenge through the Lens of Article 47 CFREU’ (2014)
33 Yearbook of European Law 3, 38.
92 Ibid 4.
93 W Schabas, The European Convention of Human Rights. A Commentary
(Oxford University Press, 2015) 78 ff.
202 PART II, CHAPTER V
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
PART III
DEFENDING THE RIGHTS OF
SUSPECTS AND ACCUSED PERSONS
IN FRONT OF NATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS

CHAPTER I
BELGIUM
Michele Panzavolta 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS: 1. Constitutional guarantees. – 2. Investigative measures
subject to prior judicial authorization. – 2.1. Competent judicial
authorities. – 2.2. Scope of review. – 2.3. Exceptions. – 2.4. Remedies
available to the defendant. – 3. Deprivation of liberty: Arrest and pre-
trial custodial measures. – 3.1. Information about available remedies. –
3.2. Arrest, habeas corpus and judicial review. – 3.3. Detention
pending trial. – 3.4. Arrest and detention order for questioning. – 4.
Specific remedies for alleged breach of defence rights in the pre-trial
stage of criminal proceedings. – 4.1. Restrictions on the right to access
the case file. – 4.2. Derogations on the right to access a lawyer. – 4.3.
Decisions finding that there is no need for interpretation. – 4.4.
Decisions finding that there is no need for translation. – 4.5. Violations
of the right to information. – 5. Sanctions against illegal or improperly
obtained evidence. – 5.1. Infringements to the right of access the case
file. – 5.2. Statements obtained in breach of the right to access a
lawyer. – 5.3. Breaches of the right to translation and interpretation. –
5.4. Failure to provide information about rights and about accusation.
– 6. Appeals against conviction and sentence. – 7. Appeals in
cassation. – 8. Access to the Constitutional Court. – 9. EAW and
judicial review. – 9.1. Competent judicial authorities. – 9.2. Judicial
review by the Belgian executing authorities.
1. Constitutional guarantees
The Belgian Constitution spells out the fundamental rights of
1 This chapter is the follow up of the earlier national report which I drafted in
cooperation with Marie Horseele, Frank Verbruggen, Katrien Veresschen. I wish to
thank my colleagues for their invaluable input in the preliminary report. While
credits need to be equally shared with all my colleagues, any errors in the text are
my sole responsibility.
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individuals. Article 12 protects the right of liberty of people, by also
making reference to the principle of legality, which principle is also
affirmed in article 14 of the Constitution. Article 12 section 2
stipulates in fact that ‘nobody can be prosecuted but in the cases and
with the forms foreseen by the law’. By making reference to the
prosecution (and not to the punishment) of an individual, the
provision clearly encompasses the principle of legality also within
procedural law. Furthermore, while the word ‘case’ refers to
substantive criminal law, the term ‘forms’ (‘de vorm’ in Dutch/ ‘la
forme’ in French) is a clear reference to the procedural provisions.
Literally read the provision does not however confer the right to a
review of the status of detention, although it could be argued that
such right derives from the provision of section 2 and from that of the
following section. Article 12 section 3 in fact states that a person can
be deprived of the liberty without judicial authorization only for 48
hours.
There is no express provision under Belgian Constitution
concerning the right of defence. Likewise there is no express
provision concerning the right of access to a court. An indirect form
of protection could be at most be inferred from Article 13 of the
Belgian Constitution, which asserts the right to a lawfully established
judge (‘juge naturel’). 2
It should be noted, however, that Article 13 and 6 ECHR (the latter
implicitly comprising – according to the case-law of the European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR) – the right to access to court) have direct
effect into the Belgian legal order. Indeed, the Belgian Supreme Court
(Court of Cassation) as well as the Belgian Supreme Administrative
Court (Hoge Raad, Conseil d’Etat) have explicitly held that Belgium
is a monist system, by which international treaties (once signed) have
direct effect into the Belgian legal order. Moreover, the Belgian
Constitutional Court draws heavily on the case-law of the ECtHR and
it is often the case that national constitutional provisions are read in
line with the reading given by the Strasbourg level to equivalent
rights in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The
Court has proved to be ready to quash an act of Parliament if it
infringes a provision of the Belgian Constitution ‘read in conjunction
with’ the ECHR.
Likewise, the Belgian Constitution does not expressly guarantee the
2 Art. 13 of the Belgian Constitution reads ‘No one can be diverted, against his
will, from the judge that the law has assigned to him.’
206 PART III, CHAPTER I
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
right to appeal against conviction and sentences. The recognition of such
right within the Belgian legal order derives from the 2012 ratification of
Protocol 7 of the ECHR: since then the international provision has direct
effect into the Belgian legal order with a role equivalent to a
constitutional rule.
2. Investigative measures subject to prior judicial authorization
2.1. Competent judicial authorities
The Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) distinguishes between
two main types of invest igat ions. One is the prel iminary
investigation conducted by the Public Prosecutor (information in
French, opsporingsonderzoek in Dutch) 3 and the other is the
judicial investigation led by the Investigating Judge (instruction in
French, gerechtelijk onderzoek in Dutch). 4 The first type is more
informal and, safe for some exceptions, it does not allow the
Prosecutor to perform intrusive or coercive activities but with the
consent of the concerned person. 5 The judicial investigation is
more formal, being led by the Investigative Judge and it permits
the judge to take the needed coercive or intrusive measures.
The traditional rule is that the Public Prosecutor must give way
to the investigating judge if coercive or intrusive activities need to
be pe r f o rmed , by r eque s t i ng t he open ing o f a j ud i c i a l
investigation. In this case, the Public Prosecutor must make a
written request to the Investigative Judge, handing over the case-
f i le . Coercive measures taken by the Invest igat ive Judge
encompass, for instance, house searches 6 and access to private
domiciles, 7 the taking of bodily samples and other corporal
analysis, 8 digital searches and interceptions of interceptions of
communications, 9 localizat ion of communicat ions. 10 The
Investigative Judge can order any coercive investigative activities
upon a written request by the Public Prosecutor, by a private party
3 Art. 28bis CCP.
4 Art. 55 CCP.
5 See the exceptions below.
6 Art. 89bis CCP.
7 Art. 89ter CCP.
8 Art. 90 CCP.
9 Art. 90ter CCP.
10 Art. 88bis.
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(the defence or the civil party) 11 or of his own motion. The
Investigative Judge orders the investigative measure by sending a
written warrant to the police officers that conduct the criminal
investigation in the field.
Over the time, however, the lawmaker has introduced the possibility
for the Public Prosecutor to obtain a judicial authorization for coercive
measures from the Investigating Judge without having to start a judicial
investigation, i.e. without ceasing the lead of the investigation to the
judge. This possibility is called ‘mini-instructie’ (mini-judicial
investigation). 12 When requested of a measure in the context of a
mini-instructie, the Investigative Judge decides on the prior
authorization of the investigative measure and oversees its execution.
Subsequently, the case-file is sent back to the Public Prosecutor for
the following investigative steps. The Investigative Judge, however,
retains the possibility to take over the criminal investigation, after
being requested of the authorization of the act in a mini-instructie,
thus formally opening a judicial investigation motu proprio. 13 The
possibility of a mini-instructie is however excluded for some specific
coercive measures: the issuing of an arrest warrant, a secret digital
search or the interception of communications, 14 a house search, 15 the
decision to adopt a special procedure for hearing threatened
witnesses. 16 In these four cases, the Public Prosecutor has no
alternative but to request the opening of a judicial investigation. In
other words, the carrying out of these acts mandates that the judge
take the lead of the investigation.
2.2. Scope of review
The scrutiny exercised by the judge on the authorization of the
measure depends on the requirements set out by the law for each
coercive/intrusive measure. The judge (and the prosecutor, in the
cases where he is empowered to act without judicial authorization) 17
11 Art. 61quinquies CCP.
12 Art. 28septies CCP.
13 He does not have this power when he refuses to authorize the requested
investigative measure.
14 Art. 90ter.
15 Art. 89bis.
16 Art. 86bis CCP.
17 See infra.
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must follow the conditions provided for by the law for each specific
activity.
As a general rule, all investigative activities can be ordered only if
they can obtain relevant and useful information for the case. The CCP
does not explicitly set out a general obligation to motivate the
warrant. However, some provisions of the Belgian Code of Criminal
Investigation require a warrant for a specific investigative measure to
be reasoned. 18 Likewise, the provisions of the code concerning
investigative activities do not always explicitly require an assessment
of the necessity, subsidiarity or proportionality of the investigative
measure. 19 The principles are however to be considered implicit in
the system, at least with regard to coercive measures. The Prosecutor
or the Investigating Judge should always assess whether a measure is
necessary to move the investigation forward, whether the measure is
proportionate to the investigative aim and whether less intrusive
measures are available to reach the same investigative aim. 20
When the act becomes more intrusive the law adds further
conditions. Sometimes the availability of the act is limited to more
serious crimes. In some cases, the law expressly clarifies that the
judge must control the proportionality of the measure: this is for
instance the case when the judge orders the localization of
communications, 21 or to produce the subscriber data of internet
users. 22 A proportionality check is expressly required also when
requesting passengers’ data. 23 In these three instances, the law also
mandates the authority to control the subsidiarity of the measures, by
ensuring that no other measures would be available or would be
useful to find the needed information. A subsidiarity check is also
expressly mandated in further instances: for example, when ordering a
secret digital search or an interception of communications, 24 an
18 Eg a warrant authorizing an interception of communications under Art. 90 ter
CCP or a warrant ordering the extraction of DNA-material provided in Art. 90-
undecies CCP.
19 It is only in some cases that the provisions of the CCP make explicit mention
of these requirements. Eg a warrant authorizing the collection of traffic data, or the
interception of communication under Art. 91quater CCP.
20 This conclusion can also be derived particularly by the case-law of the ECtHR,
notably with regards a warrant authorizing a house search.
21 Art. 88bis CCP.
22 Art. 46bis section 3 CCP.
23 Art. 46septies CCP.
24 Art. 90ter CCP.
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access in private places 25 or when authorizing the establishing of digital
contacts with people on the internet. 26
2.3. Exceptions
As mentioned above, the principle that only the judge can authorize
coercive acts undergoes some exceptions. Firstly, there are some coercive
acts which the Public Prosecutor can take of its own initiative: he can
seize items relevant for the investigations; 27 he can order a search in a
computer system as long as the search is not secret or he can order the
seizure of digital data; 28 he can request subscriber information to
internet service providers; 29 he can order a post operator to stop
communications directed to the suspect (or connected to the suspect)
and seize it; 30 he can request financial information from banks; 31 he
can order the police to enter private places (but not houses or domicile
places); 32 he can authorize the police officers to establish digital
contact with people on the internet under a false identity; 33 he can
obtain the passenger’s records. 34 The list of measures which the
Prosecutor can autonomously take and which interfere with people’s
liberties has grown over the years. In some cases it is based on the
assumption that the interference with fundamental rights is very
limited; 35 in other cases it is the sign of the intent to give the
Prosecutor more powers in the context of the preliminary investigations.
It is important to note that the when the Prosecutor has the power to
order a coercive measure, this does not open the way to a further control
of the judge. In other words, the Prosecutor’s authorization is in itself
sufficient and does not require a subsequent validation by the judge. It
is only in very limited instances that the law requires a validation by
the judge of the prosecutorial order. 36
25 Art. 46quinquies CCP.
26 Art. 46sexies CCP.
27 Art. 39 CCP.
28 Art. 39bis CCP.
29 Art. 46bis CCP.
30 Art. 46ter CCP.
31 Art. 46quarter CCP.
32 Art. 46quinquies CCP.
33 Art. 46sexies CCP.
34 Art. 46septies CCP.
35 Eg the cases under Art. 46 bis and 46 quarter.
36 See for instance Art. 88 bis section 6 CCP.
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Second, the Public Prosecutor can order investigative measures
without the prior authorization of the Investigative Judge when a
person is caught red handed in the act of committing of a crime (in
flagrante delicto). When a crime is discovered in flagrante delicto 37
or in situations which are equated by law to a discovery in flagrante
delicto (that is, when a suspect is caught immediately after the
commission of a crime, or when he is caught in the act of fleeing, or
when he is found shortly after the crime in possession of the tools
used to commit the crime or of other objects or documents connected
to the crime), the prosecutor enjoys larger prerogatives. 38 The
underlying assumption is that in these situations there is a greater
need to act swiftly and a lower risk of arbitrariness from the Public
Prosecutor. These special investigative powers of the Public
Prosecutor persist as long as the public prosecutor does not interrupt
his investigation on the spot, and in any case within 24 hours.
It should be noted, however, that some investigative measures
cannot be ordered by the Public Prosecutor even in cases of in
flagrante delicto, safe for very specific types of crimes. As an
illustration thereof, one could mention the case of the interception of
communications. Even in cases of flagrante delicto, the Public
Prosecutor can order the interception of communication without the
warrant of an Investigative Judge only in case of kidnapping or
malevolent phone calls. 39
A final exception is the case of the proactive inquiry (proactive
recherché). In this case the police can resort to special investigative
techniques (bijzondere opsporingsmethoden) under the control of the
Public Prosecutor (observation, infiltration and use of informants).
2.4. Remedies available to the defendant
The defendant cannot file an appeal against an investigative
measure taken by the Investigative Judge (or by the Prosecutor).
However, there are some remedial actions that are available to the
defendant either immediately during the investigations, either at the
end of the investigative stage.
The first possibility is named ‘kort geding' and it has a limited
37 Art. 41, para 1 CCP.
38 Art. 41, para 2 and Art. 46 CCP.
39 Art. 90ter, para 6 CCP.
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scope. If the measure has caused damage to the property of someone, the
person who suffered the damage can request the Investigating Judge 40
or the Prosecutor 41 the removal or the lifting of the measure. If the
Prosecutor dismisses the request or provides no answer, the person
can take the case in front of the Chamber of accusation (Chambre des
mises en accusation, Kamer van inbeschuldigingstelling). Likewise
the decision of the investigating judge can be appealed in front of the
Chamber of accusation. In the majority of cases, this course of action
is taken against decisions to seize goods. Although infrequent, it
could however also be taken against any other investigative decision,
provided that it has caused damage to the person property.
The second possibility is to challenge the validity of the measure at
the end of the investigative stage (or at the beginning of the trial if the
defendant is taken to trial directly). This can be done in connection with
the rules on nullities. In some cases in fact, the law states that some of
the conditions to adopt or execute an investigative activity are so
essential that their lack of respect causes the measure to be null and
void. The nullity of the measure can be challenged at the end of the
judicial investigation in front of the judge tasked to control the
legality and correctness of such investigation. The decision of the
Chamber of the council (Raadkamer) can then be appealed in front of
the Chamber of accusation. If the defendant is taken directly to trial
by the Public Prosecutor (which can happen if no judicial
investigation is opened), then the nullity challenge can be brought
directly in front of the trial judge.
3. Deprivation of liberty: Arrest and pre-trial custodial measures
3.1. Information about available remedies
The Belgian system of deprivation of liberty is only to a limited
extent regulated in the CCP. The largest part of the relevant rules is in
fact to be found in a separate act, the statute of 20 July 1990 on pre-
trial custody. 42 The Belgian system is organized around a system of
mandatory controls, whereby the decision to arrest a person and keep
her in custody is placed under scrutiny at regular intervals. This does
40 Art. 61quater CCP.
41 Art. 28sexies CCP.
42 Wet betreffende de voorlopige hechtenis in Dutch / Loi relative à la détention
preventive, OJ 14.08.1990, hereinafter Pre-Trial Custody Act.
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not exclude that further remedies are available at the initiative of the
parties. 43 It is not the case however that the suspect is informed of
the available remedies. No provision of the CCP carries an explicit
obligation to inform the suspect neither of the automatic controls nor
of the further remedies that can be triggered by the defence. The lack
of information is problematic in two ways: with regard to the
automatic controls, because it might affect the effectiveness of the
defence if the suspect is left completely unaware of the subsequent
procedural steps; with regard to the controls available on request,
because the lack of information might preclude the suspects from
availing themselves of the possibility.
3.2. Arrest, habeas corpus and judicial review
There are two possible scenarios for arresting a person. The first is
the case of a person caught in the act of committing a crime (in flagrante
delicto) or in equivalent situations (e.g. fleeing immediately after the
commission of a criminal offence or being in possession of objects
related to the crime shortly after the commission of the crime). In this
case, the person can be arrested by the police or even by a private
individual. The crime must be of some gravity, which means that
minor offences (in Dutch overtredingen, in French contraventions) are
excluded. Under Belgian law the formal decision to arrest must in this
case be taken by a policeman who holds the rank of ‘officer’, 44
although the moment of arrest – which is relevant for determining the
duration of the deprivation of liberty - is to be determined from the
moment a person can no longer freely decide to come and go as
pleased. When a suspect is arrested by a private individual, the
moment of arrest coincides with the moment in which a police
(wo)man has been informed.
The second is the situation of arrest of somebody who has not been
caught in the act of committing a crime. Here it is the Public Prosecutor
who can order to arrest a person under the condition that there exist
serious elements pointing to the guilt of the person. 45 If a judicial
43 See infra.
44 Police officers have greater seniority than police agents. Police agents can
however prevent the suspect of a crime caught red handed from fleeing but they
have to immediately hand the person over to the police senior officer for the
decision on arrest.
45 The equivalent of the Anglo-Saxon subjective probable cause.
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investigation has been opened, the arrest can be ordered under the same
conditions by the Investigating Judge.
There is finally a third possibility. The Investigative Judge has the
power to order that the person be brought in front of him for
questioning, a situation which in practice equates to that of arrest.
This decision is called order (or warrant) ‘to bring the suspect’ (bevel
tot medebrenging/ mandat d’amener). 46
In all these situations, (arrest by the police, arrest by the Prosecutor
or the Investigating Judge, order to bring the suspect issued by the
Investigative Judge) the authorities can deprive the person of their
liberty for 48 hours. 47 The 48 hours period is the result of a recent
change in the law (and in the Constitution) enacted by the Parliament,
which doubles the initial limit of 24 hours (although the old law
provided for some possibility to extend the 24 hours period, which
possibilities have now been abolished).
The arrested person (included the person apprehended by order of
the judge) enjoys several rights. The main rule is to be found in
Article 47bis § 4 CCP which states that suspects deprived of their
liberty should be informed of the rights they enjoy according to the
law on pre-trial custody. The following provision mandates that such
communications be given in writing by means of a letter of rights. 48
According to the act on pre-trial custody, arrested suspects have the
right to be assisted by a lawyer, the right to have a third person
informed of the deprivation of liberty, 49 the right to medical
assistance. 50 Furthermore, if the arrested person is questioned, the
person is entitled to the communication of the further rights provided
for by Article 47 § 2 CCP and by Article 24bis/1 CCP.
The safeguards surrounding arrest and habeas corpus can be
divided in different categories. The first one encompasses the rights of
the arrested person and information on the reasons for deprivation the
liberty. As was just mentioned, arrested persons enjoy several rights
46 Art. 3 of the Pre-Trial Custody Act. See infra.
47 Art. 1, section 1, 1°, Article 2 section 1, and Art. 3 section 2 of the Pre-Trial
Custody Act.
48 Art. 47 §5 CCP.
49 The right to have a third person informed can be postponed by the Prosecutor
or the Investigating Judge (depending on the phase of the investigations) if there is a
urgent need to either prevent negative consequences for the life, liberty or physical
integrity of people or to prevent situations that could harm the effectiveness of the
proceedings.
50 Art. 2bis of the Pre-Trial Custody Act.
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from the moment of deprivation of liberty: the right to a lawyer, the right
to have a third party informed, the right to medical assistance. The law
does not expressly state that the arrested person should be informed of
the reasons of the arrest at the moment of arrest. A similar requirement
can however be inferred from the provision of Article 5 § 2 ECHR.
There is instead an express provision concerning the judicial order to
accompany the suspect. The judge has in fact to give reasons for the
order, 51 which is then served on the stopped person. 52 Reasons are
also given in the custodial order issued by the investigating judge. 53
Furthermore, the investigating judge has to question the suspect
before issuing the custodial order and before the beginning of the
interrogation the judge has to concisely inform the suspect of the facts
and circumstances on which he will be questioned. 54
Secondly, the arrested person has the right to be brought before a
judge within 48 hours. Without a further judicial intervention the
person must necessarily be released. The same judicial order to bring
the person is valid only for 48 hours, despite the fact that it was
issued by a judicial authority. Here too the judge will have to take a
second decision (custody order) if s/he wants to keep the person in
custody. Although a judicial intervention is needed to keep the person
in detention for longer, Belgian law does not require judicial
intervention if detention ceases within the first 48 hours.
A further guarantee lies in the mandatory involvement of a
prosecutorial figure when the person is deprived of the liberty by the
police. When a person is arrested by the police in a case of flagrante
delicto or when the police has deprived a person of his liberty as a
protective measure, the Public Prosecutor must necessarily
intervene. 55 This offers them the opportunity to assess the legality of
the arrest as soon as they are informed thereof by the police and take
the subsequent necessary decisions. However such a control is not
formalized in a written decision. If the prosecutor believes that the
arrest did not meet the legal requirements, he can release the person
immediately.
51 Art. 3 of the Pre-Trial Custody Act.
52 Art. 7 and 8 of the Pre-Trial Custody Act.
53 Art. 16 § 5 of the Pre-Trial Custody Act.
54 Art. 16 of the Pre-Trial Custody Act in connection with Art. 47bis, § 2 CCP,
which also applies to interrogations by the Investigative Judge under Art. 70bis CCP.
55 In the exceptional situation that the arrest is ordered by the Investigative Judge
after the opening of a judicial investigation, it is then for the judge to assess the legality
of the arrest.
BELGIUM 215
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
The decision of arrest taken by the police or by the Public
Prosecutor cannot be appealed before a court. However, since the
person must be taken before the judge if the detention is to last more
than 48 hours, the judicial authority has the opportunity to scrutinize
the existence of the legal conditions to keep a person in custody.
Nonetheless, the judge’s intervention cannot be considered a form of
review of the arrest, as it is confirmed by the fact that the judge is
not even competent to take a decision if the arrested person is
released within the first 48 hours. The law in fact stipulates that,
when the authorities (the Public Prosecutor or the Investigating Judge)
have ordered the arrest of a person outside of a situation of flagrante
delicto, they can release the arrested person as soon as the detention
is no longer necessary. 56 The competent judge will in fact have to
evaluate whether or not, after the arrest (or the judicial order to bring
the person), the conditions exist to issue a subsequent custody order
(which conditions are stricter than those for arresting a person), but
the judge is not specifically required to review the legality of the arrest.
The judicial order to bring the person before the court is not
amenable to appeal, neither is it subjected to some forms of further
review of scrutiny. It is however interesting to note that Article 15 of
the Law of 20 July 1990 on pretrial detention explicitly states that the
Investigative Judge and the registrar (and also the court) can be
criminally fined, can be subjected to disciplinary actions and can –
contrary to the ordinary rule – even be held personally liable for
damages when they issue an illegal order.
3.3. Detention pending trial
The suspect who represents a danger for public security can be
placed in detention during the investigative phase, and even after the
trial has started and while the trial is running. The decision to place a
person in pre-trial custody is taken by the Investigating Judge. It is
solely this authority that is competent for ordering a detention longer
than 48 hours.
When the arrested person is brought in front of the Investigative
Judge, the latter decides whether or not to emit a custodial order
(bevel tot aanhouding, mandat d’arrêt), by which the person
56 Art. 2, 5° of the Pre-Trial Custody Act, which is also applicable when the
arrest is made in flagrante delicto.
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remains in custody. The issuing of a custodial order requires the
existence of some substantive conditions. First, the crime must be
punishable with a prison sentence of at least one year. Second,
there must be serious elements that the crime was effectively
committed by the person. Third, there must be an absolute need
for the public security to keep the person in custody. Such a
requirement is more stringent if the crime of which the person is a
suspect is not of the most serious kind. The relevant legal
threshold is whether the crime can be punished with a prison term
of more than fifteen years. If the crime remains below this
threshold (i.e. its maximum prison penalty does not exceed 15
years), there must then be one of three legally identified reasons:
a) there are serious reasons to believe that the suspect might
commit new crimes of a certain gravity (not misdemeanours); b)
there are serious reasons to believe that the suspect might escape
justice; c) there are serious reasons to believe that the suspect
might tamper with the evidence or might collude with others. 57
Furthermore the judge must hear the suspects, 58 so that they can
give reasons to dispel the suspicion or to exclude the need to keep
them in custody. 59
The custodial order can be issued by the investigating judge even
outside of a situation of arrest. The judge can for instance issue a
custodial order after the issuing of an order to bring the person (bevel
tot medebrenging); or it can issue a custodial order upon the request
of the public prosecutor without the person having been previously
arrested, because the person is on the run or has fled.
The judicial custodial order possesses however a limited temporal
validity. On its basis the person can remain in custody only for five
days. 60 Within this timeframe a new decision must be taken to
confirm the custody order. It is once again a judicial decision, but this
time it is in the hands of the Chamber of council (Chambre du
57 Art. 16 § 1 section 4 of the Pre-Trial Custody Act.
58 Unless the suspects have fled or could not be found, as provided by Art. 16 § 2
of the Pre-Trial Custody Act. If the judge does not proceed to the questioning the
suspect must be immediately released.
59 It is worth mentioning that the custodial order can be issued by the
Investigating Judge even outside of a situation of arrest. The judge can for instance
issue a custodial order after the issuing of a bevel tot medebrenging. Or it can issue
a custodial order upon the request of the Public Prosecutor without the person
having been previously arrested, because the person is on the run or has fled.
60 Art. 21 § 1 of the Pre-Trial Custody Act.
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conseil, Raadkamer). 61 As already said, and despite its name, the
Chamber of council is today composed by a single judge, who is not
involved in the investigations, unlike the investigating judge. This
second judicial figure is therefore more distant from the case and can
have a more unbiased reading of the information contained in the file,
which enhances the impartiality of the control.
The Belgian system of custody is structured along the idea of
periodical controls. Periodically the decision to keep someone in
custody must be reassessed in order to ensure that the conditions to
keep the person detained still exist. This is achieved by confining the
validity of each decision within strict temporal boundaries. The
decision of the Council Chamber to confirm the detention remains
valid only for a month. 62 A longer detention requires therefore a new
confirmation decision. The second decision of confirmation is also
only valid for a month. The Council Chamber will thus have to
intervene once more for the person to be kept longer in detention.
From then on (i.e. from the third decision), each further confirmation
is valid for two months. Periodically (on a bimonthly basis) the
Council Chamber will therefore have to reconsider the need to keep
the person in custody. 63 Each decision of confirmation is taken after a
hearing where the suspect and his lawyer have the right to bring
forward their arguments. 64
The control of the Council Chamber is ex officio, meaning that it
takes place without any formal request by the parties. If the Council
Chamber does not perform its control, the person is immediately
released. The control is therefore mandated only if the authorities
intend to keep the person in detention.
The custody order of the Investigating Judge cannot be appealed in
front of higher courts. 65 The reason for not allowing an appeal is simply
due to the fact that in any case the decision of the Investigating Judge
must be mandatorily reviewed by the Council chamber within five
days. The possibility of appeal is available against the decisions
Council Chamber. The appeal is brought before the Chamber of
accusation.
The decisions of the Chamber of accusation on appeal can be
61 Art. 21 § 1 section 2 of the Pre-Trial Custody Act.
62 Art. 21 § 6 of the Pre-Trial Custody Act.
63 Art. 22 of the Pre-Trial Custody Act.
64 See infra.
65 Art. 19 § 1 of the Pre-Trial Custody Act.
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challenged before the Court of cassation. A recent statute had introduced
a strong limitation to this further right of appeal by providing that only
the appeal decision against the first decision of confirmation of the
Council of chamber (on appeal) could be taken before Court of
Cassation. 66 The limitation was however quashed by a recent decision
of the Constitutional Court, which restored the previous situation. 67
3.4. Arrest and detention order for questioning
As was mentioned above, the Investigating Judge can obtain the
appearance of the suspect in order to question him (bevel tot
medebrenging/ mandat d’amener). 68 The order to bring the suspect
before the judge largely corresponds to a decision of arrest. It can be
taken if a judicial investigation has been opened 69 but it could also be
adopted by the judge at the prosecutor’s request within a mini
instructie (mini-judicial investigation).
The police agents must apprehend the person and they have to bring
it before the Investigating Judge for questioning. Unlike the decisions to
arrest, the order to bring the person expressly stipulates the reasons
behind the order. Furthermore the order is specifically intended to
question the suspect. The questioning must take place without
unnecessary delay from the moment in which the order is served. 70
4. Specific remedies for alleged breach of defence rights in the pre-
trial stage of criminal proceedings
4.1. Restrictions on the right to access the case file
Under Belgium criminal procedure, the suspect enjoys a limited
right to discovery. The phase of the investigation is in fact a stage
characterized by secrecy. This applies to the preliminary investigations
of the Prosecutor as well as to the judicial investigation led by the
66 Art. 31 of the Pre-Trial Custody Act.
67 Decision of the Constitutional Court of 21 December 2017, n. 148/2017.
68 Lastly, the law also provides for a similar order with regards to persons other
than the suspect: it is in that case an order to bring the person. This can be done if the
presence of another person is necessary with a view to collecting some evidence.
69 The Public Prosecutor could also request the opening of a judicial investigation
when filing the request to the judge for the issuing of an order to bring the suspect.
70 Art. 5 law of the Pre-Trial Custody Act.
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Investigative Judge. The principle entails that, as a rule, the suspect does
not have access to file during this stage.
There are, however, some exceptions, which have grown over the
time. First of all, the suspect can always ask the Prosecutor (in the
phase of the information/opsporingsonderzoek) to have access to the
file, which request can be granted by the competent authority. 71 The
Prosecutor has (a rather long) term of four months to take a decision
on the request. He can turn down the request for the reasons
expressly listed in the law. This is the case if the needs of the
investigation require that secrecy be kept or if the lifting of the
secrecy might be dangerous for people or could undermine the
privacy of people. In any case the Prosecutor should reject the request
if the person does not offer a good reason to inspect the file. The
request is turned down also if the file contains only the complaint or
if the counsel already had access to the file. Moreover, the request
will be rejected if meanwhile a judicial investigation has been opened,
or the case has been referred to the trial court. 72
A similar request can be made to the Investigating Judge in the
context of a judicial investigation. 73 The judge has to take a decision
within a month from the request. He can also allow the request only
in part, by giving access to only some elements of the case-file. The
Public Prosecutor can oppose the decision of the Investigative Judge
to grant access to the defence by appealing the decision before the
chamber of accusation. 74 The judge can refuse the request for the
reasons listed in the law (which mostly correspond with those
available to the prosecutor, although some grounds are here not
repeated). Such reasons are: 1) if the needs of the investigation so
demand, or 2) if access might cause danger to people or might put the
privacy of others at risk and, in any case, 3) whenever the claimant
does not offer a legitimate reason for inspecting the file, thus
justifying the lifting of the veil of secrecy. 75
The suspect enjoys in both the aforementioned cases only a power
to request the access and it is in the hands of the discretion of the
71 Art. 21bis CCP.
72 Art. 21bis § 5 CCP. The list of grounds for rejections has been introduced only
recently in consequence of the introduction of the possibility to appeal the refusal of
the prosecutor to allow access to the file.
73 Art. 61ter CCP.
74 See infra.
75 These reasons corresponds in large part to those for which the prosecutor can
refuse the request.
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authorities whether or not to lift the secrecy of the investigations. The
reasons for which the request can be turned are so largely drafted that
it is impossible to speak of a right to access the case-file. In practice
it happens seldom that the authorities allow access to the file before
they have completed the investigative activities. The parties can
however file an appeal against the dismissal of the request before the
Chamber of Accusation. Until recently this possibility was given only
against decision of the Investigating Judge. The Constitutional Court
found a breach of the principle of equality in that the dismissal of the
Prosecutor was not amenable to appeal. 76 The lawmaker extended in
consequence the same possibility of appeal against the decision of the
Prosecutor.
A second minor exception to the secrecy of investigations lies in the
right of the suspects to have a copy of the transcript of their
interrogation. A further exception applies in case of custodial
measures applied before trial. Indeed, the suspect placed in pre-trial
custody has the right to access the case-file just before the hearing in
front of the Council Chamber. 77 The suspects and their lawyer enjoy
in this case a right to access to the elements of the case-file. No
derogation is allowed. The Court of Cassation even ruled it an
infringement that access to the file was given only to the counsel, and
not to the suspect. 78 The defence has the right to have access to all
the pieces of evidence that the Investigating Judge has at his disposal
and that are relevant for the imposition and maintenance of the
detention. 79 If the suspect is not granted access to the file, his right of
defence is infringed upon and he must be released from pre-trial
detention. 80 The person has the right to consult the case-file every
time the Council chamber reviews the pretrial detention at regular
intervals (at the latest 24 hours before the hearing).
The secrecy of the investigation naturally ends when the
investigating authority believes that all relevant activities have been
carried out and moves the case to the next procedural stage. In case a
76 Belgian Constitutional Court, judgement n° 6/2017 of 25 January 2017.
77 Art. 21, § 3.
78 See Cass. 30 December 1997, P.97.1690.N, Rechtskundig Weekblad 1998-99,
364.
79 Cass 13 August 1987, Rechtskundig Weekblad 1987-88,989; Cass 9 August
2011, P.11.1401.F.
80 Tribunal Correctionnel Namur 16 June 1992, JLMB 1993, 25; Tribunal
Correctionnel Namur 23 September 1999, Revue droit pénal 2000, 1092; R
Verstraeten, Handboek Strafvordering (5th edn, Maklu, 2012) 611.
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judicial investigation has been opened, the Prosecutor sends the file to
the Council Chamber that decides whether the case should be sent
before a court. The decision of the Council Chamber is taken at a
hearing where the defence can participate. Before the hearing, the
entire file is disclosed to the defence. Likewise, if no judicial
investigation has been opened and the Prosecutor refers the case
directly to the trial court, the defence has the right to have access to
all elements of the file. The suspect has an unlimited right to consult
the case-file at the registries office and to receive a copy of the case-
file at the latest 15 days before the hearing of the Council Chamber. 81
The right to have access to the case file can consist of the right to
consult it at the registries office on the one hand, and to receive a copy
of the case file on the other hand. The right to consult the case file at the
registries office is free of charge. The right to receive copies is charged
with a fee per page with an absolute maximum. 82 A person with limited
financial resources can however receive legal aid for these charges.
As mentioned above, during a criminal investigation led by the
Public Prosecutor, the latter enjoys quite some discretion on whether
or not to grant access to the case-file despite the recent introduction
of an exhaustive list of grounds for which access can be refused.
Such grounds are in fact worded rather broadly. The needs of the
investigation can for instance cover a large range of situations.
Furthermore the law requires that the person show a good reason for
inspecting the file. If interpreted restrictively, this requirement could
easily lead to a large number of refusals. During a criminal
investigation led by an Investigative Judge, the law foresees fewer
reasons for refusing access to file. Nevertheless it remains true that
the grounds for refusing access are sufficiently broad to give the
judge quite some room for manoeuvre.
Apart from these general aspects, there are also specific rules
concerning restrictions to the right to access the case –file in specific
situations. This is for instance the case with regard to the protection
of methods of secret investigations and of the identity of the agents/
officers involved therein. With regard to special investigative methods
(observation, infiltration) the law provides that the information
concerning the secret methods and techniques employed, and the
information concerning the security and the identity of the policemen
81 Art. 127 CCP.
82 Copies are charges with 0,25 euros per page, with an absolute maximum of
1250 euros.
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involved in the activities be kept only in a separate file to be maintained
confidential at all times. 83 The suspect cannot have access to this
confidential file, nor can the other parties. Besides the prosecutor (or
the Invest8igative Judge in case of a judicial investigation), it is only
the Chamber of accusation that can access the information within this
separate confidential file with a view to exercising the legality control
on these activities. Furthermore there are special rules which apply to
the interceptions of communications: in this case the law provides for
a selection of the information collected before their addition to the
file. 84 Furthermore, for some investigative measures (interceptions of
communications, 85 observation and infiltration 86) the results are
added to the case-file only after the termination of the measure in
order not to jeopardize the ongoing measure.
As was mentioned, the defendant can challenge the refusal to access
the case file during the investigation. During a judicial investigation, the
defendant has the right to appeal the decision of the Investigative Judge
to refuse access to the file. The refusal is appealed to the Chamber of
accusation within eight days from the notification of the decision of
the investigating judge. 87 The defendant can also address his request
directly to the Chamber of accusation if the Investigative Judge fails
to take a decision on the formal request of the defendant to access of
the case-file within a period of one month and 15 days. 88
There was instead until recently no possibility to appeal against the
refusal to access the case-file during the preliminary investigation of the
Public Prosecutor. The situation changed in consequence of a decision of
the Belgian Constitutional Court, where the Court held that the
Constitution and the ECHR both require a right to appeal the
decision. Furthermore, the Court stressed the asymmetry with the
situation of a request made to the Investigative Judge during a judicial
investigation, where instead an appeal is possible. 89 The Court
83 Art. 47septies (and 56bis) and 47novies CCP. The law provides in particular
that the policemen draft two set of reports concerning the secret activities carried
out. One is the set of full reports, which contain all information and which remain
secret. The second is the set of open reports which are and which be placed in the
ordinary file and then disclosed to the parties according to the ordinary rules.
84 Art. 90sexies and 90septies CCP.
85 Art. 90sexies, § 4 CCP.
86 Art. 47septies, 47novies, 56bis last sentence CCP.
87 Art. 61ter, § 5 CCP.
88 Art. 61ter § 7 CCP.
89 Belgian Constitutional Court, judgement n° 6/2017 of 25 January 2017.
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concluded that until a legislative amendment was adopted, Article 61ter,
§§ 5 and 6 CCP had to be applied by analogy to the case of a request
made to the Public Prosecutor. The situation has now been remedied
by the lawmaker with the Statute of 18 March 2018, 90 which entered
into force on 12 May 2018. The statute rewrote Article 21-bis and in
doing so it also introduced the possibility of appealing the refusal of
the Public Prosecutor in front of the Chamber of accusation. 91 The
claimant has eight days to file the challenge. Moreover the law also
introduced the possibility of bringing the request of access to the file
to the Chamber of accusation if the Prosecutor remains passive and
does not respond to the request within the time legally foreseen (three
months, or four months in cases of mini-instructie) increased by
fifteen days. 92
4.2. Derogations on the right to access a lawyer
The implementation in Belgian law of the right of access to a
lawyer has undergone a winding path and it has required several
legislative steps. The first one was taken as early as 2011, just after
the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the Salduz
case. The first law of 2011 93 was based on the distinction between
the right to consult with a lawyer and the right to have a lawyer
present during the interrogation. The latter right was accorded only to
suspects in custody, while the right to consult was given to all
suspects for crimes for which an order of pre-trial custody could be
imposed, with the exclusion of traffic offences. The act of 2011
recognized the right to access to a lawyer too narrowly. It was
successfully challenged in front of the Constitutional Court in 2011. 94
The Constitutional Court listed several defects of the new act. It
highlighted that the right to consult with a lawyer was excluded for a
number of offences which could potentially lead to a prison sentence
90 Wet houdende wijzigingen van diverse bepalingen van het strafrecht, de
strafvordering en het gerechtelijk recht, Loi modifiant diverses dispositions du droit
pénal, de la procédure pénale et du droit judiciaire, OJ 02.05.2018.
91 Art. 21 bis §7 CCP.
92 Art. 21bis § 8 CCP.
93 Wet tot wijziging van het Wetboek van strafvordering en van de wet van 20 juli
1990 betreffende de voorlopige hechtenis (wet Salduz)/ Loi modifiant le Code
d’instruction criminelle et la loi du 20 juillet 1990 relative à la détention préventive
(loi Salduz), OJ 05.09.2011.
94 Constitutional Court, judgement no 7/2013 of 14 februari 2013.
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and sometimes not even a lighter one. It also noted that in case of
violation the rule did not require exclusion of the statements obtained
in violation of the Salduz rules, but it permitted instead to use them
for corroboration.
The decision of the Constitutional Court was then followed by a
new act of 2014. 95 The act instated the changes brought about by the
Constitutional Court, but it fell short of enacting sufficient rules for
transposing Directive 2013/48/EU. Even after the law of 2014, only
suspects deprived of their liberty had right to the presence of the
lawyer during the questioning. The Salduz rules were applicable only
to the first interrogation and not to following interrogations. 96
Furthermore, the possibility to have access to a counsel was not given
for the other investigative acts foreseen in the directive.
The last step was taken in the last months of 2016, with the law of
21 November 2016. 97 The act constitutes implementation of the
Directive and it is intended to bring Belgian law in line with the
European rules on this matter. The distinction between the right to
consultation before the questioning and the right to the counsel’s
presence during questioning is maintained, but both rights are now
more largely granted than before.
Article 47bis § 2 provides that all suspects charged with a crime for
which a prison sentence could be imposed have the right to consult with
a lawyer before every interrogation. The right to consult with a lawyer
before an interrogation is therefore not applicable for crimes for which
the person does not face the risk of a prison sentence (e.g. crimes
punished only with a fine). All suspects who face a possible prison
sentence or other sentence entailing deprivation of liberty must be
informed of their right to prior consultation with a lawyer. Likewise,
they all have the right to the assistance of the counsel during the
interrogation. There remains a difference, however, between those
suspects facing a possible prison sentence who are deprived of their
liberty and those who are not. In the former case, the authorities are
95 Wet van 25 april 2014 houdende diverse bepalingen betreffende Justitie/Loi
portant des dispositions diverses en matière de Justice, OJ 14 May 2014.
96 This entailed in essence that the suspect needed not be informed a second time
of his Salduz rights.
97 Wet van 21 november 2016 betrefende bepaalde rechten van personen die
worden verhoord/ Loi relative à certains droits des personnes soumises à un
interrogatoire, JO 24.11.2016. See Y Liégeois, ‘De ‘Salduz+’ wet van 21 november
2016: een nieuw hoogtepunt in het recht van toegang tot een advocaat onder dictaat
van Europa’ (2017) Nullum crimen, 105.
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required to contact a lawyer for the person, while in the latter case they
can remain passive after they have provided the information. It is the
responsibility of the free suspect to contact a counsel and arrange all
that is required for an effective legal assistance.
The circular of the college of General Prosecutors 98 summarizes
the current situation by distinguishing between four interviewing
regimes depending on the person to be interviewed. 99 The ‘Salduz I'
category refers to interviews of people who are not suspects. The
‘Salduz II' category comprises the interviews of suspects of crimes for
which no prison sentence can be imposed: they have no right to be
informed of the right to counsel, although they can ask to be assisted
by a lawyer if they so wish. The ‘Salduz III’ category is the
interviewing regime of suspects of crimes for which a prison sentence
can be imposed and who are not deprived of their liberty: they ought
to be informed of the right to counsel before the interrogation but it is
their entire responsibility to arrange for the legal assistance. The
‘Salduz IV’ category refers to suspects of crimes who could face a
prison sentence and who are deprived of their liberty: these suspects
must be informed of the right to counsel and the authorities are
required to take an active stance in providing the suspects with a
counsel of choice.
The category of suspect that receives the greatest protection is the
latter, since they are in the vulnerable position of being deprived of
their liberty. Article 2bis of the law on pretrial custody stipulates that
everyone who is deprived of their liberty (whether as a result of an
arrest or of a warrant to bring the person) has from that moment and
before the first subsequent interrogation by the police, the Prosecutor,
or the Investigating Judge, the right to consult confidentially with a
counsel of choice. In order to reach the elicited counsel or another
counsel, contact is taken with the special permanent office managed
by the bar council (Orde van Vlaamse balies, Ordre des barreaux
francophones et germanophone). It is here for the prosecuting
authority to take the initiative to contact the counsel, whether the one
elicited by the arrested suspect or another one in case the suspect
98 The General Prosecutors are the chiefs of each prosecution office at the level
of the Court of Appeal. They compose a college that is entitled to issue directives and
guidance on issues related to criminal justice through circular letters.
99 Omzendbrief COL 08/2011, <https://www.om-mp.be/sites/default/files/u1/
col_08_2011_-_versie_2017_fr_0.zip> (last accessed 30 July 2018).
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does not give the name of a specific lawyer, but only with regard to the
first interrogation.
Moreover, the law goes into further detail with regard to the
position of the arrested person. The private consultation must take
place within two hours from the moment in which the counsel is
contacted. The lawyer and the client can agree for the consultation to
take place telephonically. The consultation can last for thirty minutes
and it is only in exceptional circumstances that the interviewing
authority can allow a longer contact time. The questioning can begin
once the consultation is over. If it turns out to be impossible to hold a
confidential consultation within two hours, there must be in any case
a telephonic consultation with the permanent office managed by the
bar, before the interrogation can begin. The persons to be heard have
the right to be assisted by their lawyer during the interview, as long
as the interview is conducted within the two hours from the moment
in which the counsel was contacted. The interview can be interrupted
for a maximum period of fifteen minutes, with a view to allowing
further consultation between the suspect and the lawyer, either upon
request of the suspect or the counsel, or when new criminal facts
come to light which could give rise to new charges. 100
The right to counsel for the suspect deprived of his liberty is not
absolute, not only in that it can be restricted but also because it can
be waived (art. 2bis § 6 law on pretrial custody). It is only the adult
suspect who can waive the right. For juveniles the right to counsel is
mandatory. The waiver must be done in writing, in a document which
the suspect signs and dates, and where the suspect is informed of the
possible consequences of waiving the right. The suspect is also
informed that he can revoke his waiving decision. A point of
ambiguity is whether the waiver of the right can be done only after
having had telephonic contact with a counsel. In this respect Art. 2
bis § 3 of the law on pretrial custody provides that the suspect can
waive the right to be assisted by a lawyer after a telephonic
confidential discussion with the appointed counsel or the counsel of
the permanent office, in which case the interrogation should be audio
and video recorded – if possible – in order to allow a later control of
the interrogation. The provision would seem to imply that the
telephonic contact with the lawyer is a mandatory precondition for
100 Ie new criminal facts other than those which should have constituted the
object of the interview and of which the person was informed according to Art.
47bis, § 2 CCP.
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waiving the right. Nevertheless, another provision in the same article
leads to a different conclusion. Article 2bis § 6, just after recognizing
the possibility to waive the right to counsel, establishes that the
suspect can request to have a telephonic contact with a counsel before
taking the decision to waive the right. It appears therefore that a
telephonic conversation with a lawyer is not always necessary for a
valid waiver. Regardless of whether the counsel is present, the
interviewing authority can always autonomously decide that the
interrogation of the arrested suspect shall be audio and video recorded.
The law is far less detailed with regard to the rules applicable to the
questioning of ‘Salduz III' suspects. Art. 47bis § 2 stipulates that each
suspect for an offence for which a sentence of deprivation of liberty
can be imposed should be informed that he has the right to consult
with a lawyer of choice and to be assisted by the lawyer during the
interrogation. This information is provided together with a concise
description of the facts and circumstances on which the suspect will
be heard and the communication of further rights. The suspects must
in fact also be informed i) that (after disclosing their identity) they
can freely decide whether or not to make a statement or to answer the
questions posed, ii) that they have the right not to self-incriminate,
that their statements can be used in evidence, iii) that they can ask for
the interrogation to be fully recorded, iv) that they have the right to
leave the interrogation room whenever they want, v) that they can
request the authorities to take a specific investigative measure, vi) that
they can use documents.
The law then draws a differentiation between the situation of the
suspect who receives a written invitation to appear for the
interrogation and the situation of the suspect who is orally invited. If
the suspect is invited orally to the interrogation, the competent
authority must inform the suspect of all the aforementioned rights
before the beginning of the interrogation and postpone the
interrogation to allow the consultation with the counsel. However, the
law does not clarify how long the consultation can last, whether it can
take place telephonically and whether the counsel must arrive within
two hours in order to assist the client during the interrogation, as it
happens for apprehended suspects. It would seem sensible to make
here analogic application of the more detailed rules that are applicable
for suspects in custody, since the regime of safeguards applicable to
apprehended suspects should not be less favorable than that applicable
to other suspects.
After having been informed of his rights, the adult suspect can
decide to waive the right to counsel. The decision of the free suspect
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to waive the right to counsel is less formalized than the waiver of the
suspect in custody. The waiver must be done in writing in a document
which contains the information on the right to counsel and which
warns on the consequences of the waiver. In any case the suspect is
informed that he can withdraw his decision to waive the counsel.
Furthermore, specific rules apply for the case in which the suspect
received a prior written invitation. If the suspect is summoned in writing,
the summon must contain the information on the right to counsel and the
other rights. Once provided in the written document, the information
need not be given a second time before the beginning of the
interrogation. The law explicitly states that if the suspect is
summoned in writing, the suspect is presumed to have consulted a
lawyer and to have taken the necessary steps in order to receive
proper legal assistance during the interrogation. If the person appears
at the interrogation without a lawyer, they shall only be reminded that
they have a right to freely choose whether or not to give a statement
or answer the question and that they have a right not to incriminate
themselves. The presumption is consistent with the premise that free
suspects (i.e. who are not deprived of their liberty) are responsible for
arranging for legal assistance. It is nonetheless to be doubted whether
such a regime is entirely in line with the provisions of the Directive
2013/48/EU. The presumption leads in fact to a situation that is
factually equivalent to a waiver of the right to counsel. 101 According
to Article 9 of the Directive, waiver of the right must be done
voluntarily, unequivocally and with knowledge of the consequences
that the waiver entails. Furthermore, the Directive provides that the
waiver must be done in writing, which would not be the case here.
In all cases of interrogation (interrogation of a free suspect,
interrogation of a suspect in custody), the prerogatives of the lawyer
during the interrogation are spelled out in Article 47-bis point 7) CCP.
The provision addresses a point of longstanding discussion with
regard to the demeanor of the counsel during the interrogation. The
law clarifies the goals that the legal assistance should pursue. The
assistance is intended to a) protect the right not to incriminate
themselves of the persons interviewed, their free choice to give a
statement, remain silent or to answer the questions; b) ensure that the
101 A sign of this equivalence is the fact that the legal provision on the position of
the suspect invited in writing does not say anything concerning the waiver, while
specific rules are laid out in the case of oral invitation (as was already mentioned in
the text).
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person is treated properly during the interrogation without use of
unjustified force, intimidation or compulsion; c) ensure that the clients
are informed correctly of their rights and that the interrogation is
conducted lawfully. To this end the lawyer can point to any violations
that occurs and request that his observation be recorded.
Besides this role as a watchdog of the clients’ rights, the discussion
centered mostly on the possibility for the counsel to take a more active
stance during the interrogation. It was in particular debated whether and
to what extent the lawyer could intervene on the merits of the
interrogation and of the questions posed. The law now explicitly
clarifies that during the interrogation the counsel can ask for
clarifications on the questions asked, and s/he can make remarks over
the investigations and the interrogation. The counsel can also request
during the interrogation that a certain investigative act be taken,
although the request is not binding for the prosecuting authorities. It
is however precluded to the lawyer to answer a question in the place
of the suspect and to obstruct the course of the interrogation. The
interrogation is lead by the prosecuting authorities and the counsel
cannot exercise any leading role in the asking of questions.
It is important to mention that the counsel should receive by the
interviewing authorities some essential information on the charges
before the interrogation begins. The provision of Article 47-bis point
6) states that the interviewing authorities should give concise
information over the facts on which the person will be heard. This
does not correspond to a right of information on the case-file. A
delicate point is whether the interviewing authorities must give
information on the crucial pieces of incriminating evidence against the
client. Finally, Belgian law guarantees the right to have a lawyer
present during a confrontation, a line-up and a reconstruction of a
crime at the scene. 102
There are several situations in which the right of access to a lawyer
can be restricted. It has already been pointed out that the arrested person
has a right to consult confidentially with a counsel as long as the
consultation takes place within two hours from the moment when the
counsel was called. The interviewing authorities can therefore begin
an interrogation without the assistance of a lawyer after having waited
for two hours. 103 Furthermore, the same article provides that in cases
of force majeure (overmacht) the interrogation of the arrested person
102 Art. 62 CCP.
103 Art. 2bis § 2 of the Pre-Trial Custody Act.
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can begin even without consultation but only after that the suspect has
been reminded of the rights mentioned in article 47bis, § 2, 2) en 3)
CCP.
Other possible reasons for derogations are to be found in other
provisions of that same article. According to Article 2bis § 9 of the
law on pretrial custody, the Prosecutor or the Investigating Judge
(depending on the stage of proceedings) can exceptionally in light of
particular (bijzonder, particulières) circumstances of the case – and
with a reasoned decision – derogate to the rights of consultation prior
the interrogation and of assistance during the interrogation if there are
compelling reasons to justify the derogation. 104 The lawmaker typifies
the compelling reasons for which a derogation of the rights can be
allowed. The first is a urgent need to prevent negative consequences
for the life, the liberty or the physical integrity of a person. In such a
case the interview is carried out with the sole purpose of collecting
essential information to prevent the aforementioned negative
consequences. The second reason is the need to take immediate action
in order to prevent that the investigation would suffer significant
harm. The interview can in this case be carried out only with a view
to collecting the information that is essential to prevent harm to the
proceedings.
Article 2bis § 10 of the act on pre-trial custody establishes that,
without prejudice to Article 184ter CCP, the Prosecutor or the
Investigating Judge (depending on the stage of the proceedings) can
exceptionally derogate to the condition of promptness (zonder onnodig
uitstel) foreseen in §§ 2 and 5, if the geographical distance from
where the suspect is makes it impossible to allow access to a council
within that timeframe and the exercise of these rights cannot be
realized by means of telephone or videoconference. This provision is
not applicable to the suspect who finds himself within the boundaries
of the State according to Article 7 of the Constitution.
If the rules on the protection of the right to counsel are not
respected, there are several consequences possible. With regard to the
violation of the right of access to counsel in the context of the
interrogation of the suspect, the natural remedy is the exclusion of the
statements so obtained. Point 9) of Article 47-bis CCP provides that
no conviction can be passed on the basis of statements obtained in
violation of Salduz rights. In particular, the Article provides that the
104 Art. 2bis § 9 of the Pre-Trial Custody Act.
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statements cannot be used if there was a violation of the information that
must be given to the suspects before the interrogation, or if there was a
violation of the right to consult with the lawyer and/or to be assisted by
the lawyer. The statements cannot be used also if the person was heard
as a witness, gave self-incriminating statements during the interview,
and was not then given the right to information and to access to counsel.
Although the law simply states that the conviction cannot be based
on statements obtained in violation of Salduz rights, it is clear that that
any use of the statements is precluded. The irregular statements cannot
be used even for corroboration, i.e. to support other pieces of
evidence. 105
The provision expressly refers to the prohibition to use statements
for convicting the person, therefore allowing the possibility to use the
statements irregularly obtained in favour of the defendant. The
statements remain therefore in the dossier. The Court of cassation has
in fact clarified that, since the violation of the Salduz rules does not
constitute a nullity, the irregular statements need not be taken out of
the file. 106
Furthermore, the case-law has endorsed the idea that the irregular
statements cannot be used only against the maker of the statement but
they can be used to convict other accomplices. The Court of cassation
has at least in some decisions identified some limits to the use against
third parties of the irregular statements, that is when the maker of the
statements has later retracted its statements 107 and when the
irregularity would seriously affect the reliability of the evidence. 108
Besides the exclusion of the statements, the violation of the rules on
access to the counsel and assistance by the counsel can have other, more
drastic consequences. It was already highlighted that the violation of the
rules does not entail a nullity. Nonetheless, if the breach is very severe
the judge could hold the proceedings to be inadmissible because of the
breach of the right to a fair trial. 109 A similar decision can however be
105 This is the consequence of a decision of the Constitutional Court that found
that the earlier provision, for which the conviction could not be based ‘solely’ on
the irregular statement, breached the Constitution.
106 Cass., 16 February 2016, P.14.1935.N, Tijdschrift Strafrecht 2017, 202.
107 Cass., 30 April 2013, P.12.1133.N, Tijdschrift Strafrecht, 2014, 117.
108 Cass., 1 April 2014, P.12.1334.
109 For the general statement that the proceedings are inadmissible if in grave
breach of the right to fair trial: Cass., 18 March 2014, P.13.1407.N, Tijdschrift
Strafrecht, 2014, 252.
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taken only in cases where the violation persists and can no longer be
remedied.
4.3. Decisions finding that there is no need for interpretation
Before sketching the shape of the right to interpretation and
translation in Belgian criminal procedure, two preliminary remarks are
necessary. First, it should be pointed out that the Belgian lawmaker
was rather slow in implementing the Directive 2010/64/EU. This
happened only with the Law of 28 October 2016, 110 which contains a
partial implementation of the aforementioned European Directive.
Second, it must be observed out that the topic can only be understood
properly in the context of the extensive rules of the Belgian
legislation on the use of languages in criminal proceedings. Belgium
is in fact a trilingual country, with French, Dutch and German as
official languages. For this reason the rules on the choice of language
in criminal proceedings are particularly developed.
The provisions of the CCP on the language of the proceedings are
integrated by the rules provided for by the law 15 June 1935 on the use
of languages in judicial cases (hereafter, Language Act). 111 According
to these rules, criminal cases are normally handled in French or in
Dutch, depending on where the case is conducted. During the
investigations, the official investigative reports (processen-verbaal,
procès-verbaux) are drafted in either French, Dutch or German,
depending on the language of the region. In the municipalities of the
Brussels area, the choice is between French and Dutch depending on
the language spoken by the person involved, or on the necessity of
the case. When performing their activities, the Prosecutors and the
Investigating Judges make use of the official language of the judicial
authority to which they belong.
The language of the trial is established on the basis of the location
110 Wet van 28 Oktober 2016 houdende verdere omzetting van de Richtlijn 2010/
64/EU van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 20 oktober 2010 betreffende het
recht op vertolking en vertaling in strafprocedures en van de Richtlijn 2012/29/EU
van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 25 oktober 2012 tot vaststelling van
minimumnormen voor de rechten, de ondersteuning en de bescherming van
slachtoffers van strafbare feiten, en ter vervanging van Kaderbesluit 2001/220/JBZ,
JO 24.11.2016.
111 Wet van 15 juni 1935 op het gebruik der talen in gerechtszaken/ Loi
concernant l’emploi des langues en matière judiciaire, JO 22.06.1935.
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of the judicial authority which is handling the case. The law clarifies that
the trial procedure before police courts and correctional courts of first
instance should be done in French, in Dutch, or in German,
depending on the province and judicial arrondissment 112 where the
competent court. The law establishes which language should be used
before the courts of each judicial arrondissements. 113 For the court of
assize the law clarifies the language of the proceedings on the basis
of the province where the Court is located. 114
Given the rules above, defendants have nonetheless the possibility
during the trial stage to request that the case be sent in front of
another Belgian court that speaks their language. 115 This possibility to
request the transferral of the trial to another court does not always
correspond to a right to obtain such a transferral. If the case is dealt
with by a lower court the defendant has no right that the case be
taken elsewhere: the tribunal can decline the request of the defendant
on the basis of the circumstances of the case. 116 When the case is
dealt with by the Court of Assize, the defendants enjoy instead a right
that the case be tried in front of a court which speaks their language. 117
The need for an interpreter obviously arises when the suspect does
not have knowledge of the language used in the proceedings. 118 In this
112 The judicial arrondissments are the geographical units in which the country is
divided with regard to the organization of the judiciary at the level of police courts and
correctional courts.
113 The official language is the French language for the judicial arrondissments
Hainaut (Henegouwen), Liège (Luik), Luxembourg, Namur (Namen) and Brabant
wallon (Waals-Brabant), and for the French-speaking courts in the arrondissment of
Brussels. The Dutch language is the official language for the arrondissments of
Antwerpen (Anvers), Oost-Vlaanderen (Flandre orientale), West-Vlaanderen
(Flandre occidentale), Limburg (Limbourg) en Leuven (Louvain) and for the Dutch-
speaking courts of the arrondissement of Brussels. Further rules also apply for the
Courts in the Brussel judicial arrondissement (see Articles 15 and 16 of the
Language Act). German is used before the courts in the arrondissment of Eupen.
114 French for the provinces Henegouwen, Luxemburg, Namur and Waals-
Brabant, Dutch for the provinces of Antwerpen, Oost-Vlaanderen, West-Vlaanderen,
Vlaams-Brabant and Limburg. And, depending on the language spoken by the
defendant, Dutch or French in the administratief arrondissment of Brussel capital,
German or French in the province of Lieges.
115 Art. 23 of the Language Act.
116 Art. 23 section 4 of the Language Act, which in essence leaves the decision to
the discretion of the court, without giving further guidance.
117 Art. 20 of the Language Act, which also requires that the defendant file his
request in advance, during the committal procedure.
118 On this topic see, A-M Baldovin, ‘Le renforcement du droit à l’assistance
linguistique dans le cadre des procédures pénales’ (2017) Rev.dr.pén. 236; Y Van
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respect, Article 31 Language Act states that suspects have the right to
speak the language of their choice during all questioning in the
investigations, whether in front of the Prosecutor, in front of the
Investigating Judge or in front of the Council Chamber or the
Chamber of accusation. If the interrogating officers do not know the
chosen language, they should then appoint a sworn interpreter.
Article 31 section 3 further clarifies that the party who does not
understand the language in which the proceedings are conducted is
assisted by a sworn interpreter, who translates all spoken
statements. 119 A new addition by the Law of October 2016 further
states that the necessity of an interpreter is evaluated by the
competent authority, in light of the phase of the procedure. The last
section of Article 31 Language Act establishes that the costs of
translation are borne by the State. 120
The right of suspects to be assisted by a sworn interpreter during an
interview is further emphasized by Article 47bis § 6, 4) CCP. The
provision refers here not only to the situation where the suspect (or
the victim) does not speak or understand the language of the
procedure, but also to cases where the interviewed person suffers
from a listening or speaking deficit. If no sworn interpret is available,
the interviewed person is given the possibility to note down her
statements autonomously, without leaving the task to the interviewing
officers or a third person. 121 A further provision is to be found with
regard to the questioning of people in custody. 122
As was seen above, the decision concerning the need for
interpretation or translation can be taken by the judge or the
Prosecutor depending on the phase of the procedure. During the
preliminary investigations, the competence lies with the Public
Den Bosch, ‘Het recht op vertolking en vertaling in strafzaken & de omzetting van de
EU-richtlijnen’ (2017) Tijdschrift Strafrecht 96.
119 There is a seprate provision for the trial phase. Art. 152 bis CCP states that if
the defendant (like the civil party) does not understand or speak the language of the
procedure or suffers from a speaking or hearing deficit, the Court appoints motu
proprio a qualified interpreter. If the person suffers form a speaking or hearing
deficit he or she also has the further right to be assisted by a person of confidence
(see also Art. 282 and 283 CCP for the Court of Assize).
120 A provision which predates the implementation Act of October 2016.
121 A similar, only slightly milder, rule applies to the interview of persons other
than the suspect. See Art. 47bis § 6, 4) second period CCP. In this case, in the absence
of a sworn interpreter it is possible that the statements given by the interviewed person
are noted down (in the language in which they are given) by a third person.
122 Art. 2bis § 4 of the Pre-Trial Custody Act.
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Prosecutor. During the judicial investigation it is the judge who decides
on the presence and assistance of an interpreter.
A very sensitive issue concerns the determination of the ability of
the person to speak or to understand the language in which the
proceedings take place. It is generally considered insufficient that the
person can utter or understand some words in the language of the
proceedings. 123
Furthermore, it is observed that a person who does not speak
(sufficiently) the language cannot be expected to request the
assistance of an interpreter. The proceedings authorities have therefore
a duty to actively check if the person understands the language of the
proceedings. 124
Another problem refers to the difficulty of finding an appropriate
and qualified interpreter. In some cases and for rare languages, it
might be difficult to find a person available. In these circumstances
the case-law gives precedence to the need for proceedings to move on
over the right of the individual. If all reasonable efforts have been
exhausted to find an interpreter and have nonetheless failed, the
proceedings can move on. 125
The rules on the right to have an interpreter are protected by a
procedural sanction. Article 40 of the Language Act provides for a
nullity if the rules on the right to an interpreter are violated. This
however does not entail that the proceedings will automatically be
void if the defendant is deprived of his right to an interpreter. The
irregularity affects the activity (for instance, the interrogation) where a
violation of the rules took place. The law provides that the irregularity
is cured by every decision given after full arguments from both parties
and which is not merely interlocutory. 126 The rule is in essence based
on the idea that the defendant must take an active stance to ensure the
presence of an interpreter and lament the violation of his right. If the
claim is not raised, the decision taken cures the violation.
123 L Arnou, ‘De andere taal in de strafprocedure en de rechten van verdediging’
(2017) Nullum crimen 519, 522; L Huybrechts, ‘De Europese Richtlijn betrefende het
recht op vertolking en vertaling in strafprocedures en de Belgische wet en rechtspraak’
(2011) Nullum crimen 4, nr. 15.
124 L Huybrechts (n 128).
125 Chamber of Accussation (K.I.) Antwerpen 21 May 1993, Tijdschrift Strafrecht,
2004, 77. See also S. Vandromme, ‘De wegens taalperikelen onmogelijke ondervraging
door de onderzoeksrechter bij de aflevering van een aanhoudingsbevel’ (2004) Rev. dr.
pén. 5, 21.
126 See Art. 40 section 2 of the Language Act.
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The provision covers all forms of violations, including a wrong
decision on whether an interpreter was needed. The assessment on the
need of an interpreter is a factual judgment, which must be taken in
light of the concrete circumstances of the case. If the violation is so
severe that the entire right to a fair trial is persistently compromised,
the proceedings can be declared inadmissible.
4.4. Decisions finding that there is no need for translation
Just like the right to an interpreter, the right to translation must be
seen in the larger context of the rules concerning the use of languages in
criminal trials. 127 A set of provisions in the CCP and the Language Act
guarantee the said right throughout the criminal proceedings. In
particular, the provisions of the CCP identify the specific procedural
acts and documents for which a translation must be offered. 128 Article
22 of the Language Act integrates this rule with a provision of more
general application.
In the pre-trial stage, Articles 145 and 189 CCP provide that the
accused who does not understand the language has the right to a
translation in a language he understands of the relevant passages of
the warrant (which contains the indictment and the date and time of
appearance before the court. An equivalent provision is to be found in
Article 216quater CPP, which refers to an alternative way for
summoning the accused before the correctional courts or police
courts. Although the right to translation is explicitly limited to the
relevant passages of the summon, all provisions make clear that the
translation must be done in a way that gives the accused information
over the charges (the charged facts and their legal qualification) and
allows them to exercise an effective defence. The request for
translation must be made at the registrar of the competent court. The
translation must be done in a reasonable time and it is made at the
expenses of the State.
127 See supra.
128 This is particularly the case of the trial judgement. Art. 164 CCP provides for
the right to translation of the judgement to the defendant who does not understand the
language. Just like with the summoning warrant, the provision confers a right to
translation of the relevant passages of the judgement, but it makes clear that the
translation should allow the accused to be informed of the facts for which he was
convicted and to defend himself effectively. See also Art. 353 CCP with regard to
the procedure before the Court of Assize.
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A similar rule applies before the Court of assize. The procedure
before the Court of Assize is however structured in more phases.
Before the trial hearing there is a preliminary hearing, for the
selection of the jury and the preparation of all other practical aspect.
The law provides now that the accused has the right to a translation
of the charges when summoned for the preliminary hearing (Article
275 CCP). The accused has also the right to have a translation of the
relevant passages of the decision of the preliminary hearing on the
admitted witnesses, of the summoning of jurors and of the summon of
the accused.
A specific rule also applies for the custody order. According to
Article 16 § 6 of the Pre-trial Custody Act, suspects have the right to
a translation in a language they understand of the relevant passages of
the custody order (relevante passages van het bevel), so that they be
informed of the facts with which they are charged and they can
defend themselves effectively. It is not necessarily the case that the
translation must be in writing. The law explicitly makes possible that
the translation be offered orally, in which case mention of the oral
translation is to be made in the order. In order to obtain the
translation, the suspect must make a request (to the clerk of the
competent Tribunal in first instance) within three days from the
reception of the order. The translation must be given in a reasonable
time and it is paid by the State.
The rules of the CCP are then complemented by Article 22 of the
Language Act. The articles gives the suspect, the defendant and the
convicted the right to have further documents translated (other than
those for which translation is already provided for by the CCP) if
they do not understand the language of the proceedings. The request
is made to the Prosecutor or the Investigating Judge depending on the
stage of the proceedings and it must contain the supporting reasons.
The request can be made during the investigations or during the trail
stage, but in the latter case it must be made within 8 days from the
moment the accused was summoned for trial. Furthermore the request
is inadmissible if it does clearly indicate the acts of the procedure for
which the translation is requested. The requested authority must
decide within fifteen days. The request can be allowed in its totality
or only in part. Article 22 of the Language Act expressly states that
the translation is limited to the passages of the file that are essential
in order to ensure that the accused can defend themselves effectively.
When the request is allowed, the translation must be provided within
a reasonable time and it is made at the expenses of the State.
Just like for the right to interpretation, the violation of the right to
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translation entails a nullity. 129 The remarks made earlier 130 are also
applicable here.
4.5. Violations of the right to information
Throughout the procedure the defendant enjoys the right to
information in several circumstances. The general rule is that the
information on rights is given at the moment of first contact with the
judicial or prosecutorial authorities. The defendant has in fact the
right to receive information on his rights before the interrogation. 131
In particular the suspects must be briefly informed of the facts upon
which they will be interviewed and that: they have the right to consult
with a counsel before the interrogation (if the right is applicable); they
can choose, after having answered the questions on their identity,
whether or not to answer the other questions; they are not compelled
to self-incriminate themselves; their statements can be used as
evidence in judicial proceedings; they can request that all questions
and answers be precisely recorded; that they are free to stay or to
leave the interrogation whenever they want, unless they are in state of
arrest or custody; they can request that investigative activities be
carried out or that other people be heard; they can make use of
documents in their possession and they can request that these
documents be added to the file.
Furthermore the persons deprived of the liberty are informed that
that they enjoy the rights provided for by Article 2 bis of the Pre-
Trial Custody Act and of the further rights foreseen in case a pre-trial
custody order is taken, including the right to receive a copy of the
order and to obtain a translation of it. 132
In both cases the information is also to be given in writing (Article
47 bis CCP § 5), while the relevant European directive made the letter of
rights compulsory only for people deprived of their liberty (see Article 4
directive 2012/13/EU).
A further moment of information on the rights takes place at the end
of the judicial investigation. Upon completion of the investigations, the
Investigating Judge sends the file to the Prosecutor. If the latter also
129 Art. 40 of the Language Act.
130 Supra, 4.3.
131 Art. 47bis, § 2 CCP.
132 See supra.
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believes that the investigation is complete, he can apply to the Chamber
of the Council, which he does by drafting his conclusions (requisitions
finales, eindvordering). In its conclusion the Prosecutor sums up the
facts he wants to prosecute before the criminal court, and their legal
qualifications. 133 The conclusions of the Prosecutor are then to be
discussed before the Council of Chamber in an adversarial hearing. At
this stage (i.e. before the hearing) the defence is informed that they
have a right to access the entire investigative file. When no judicial
investigation has been opened, the suspect receives communication of
the charges (facts and legal qualifications) with the summon for the
trial. 134
The violation of the right to information is not explicitly protected
by a nullity. If the violation of the right of information concerns an
activity of collection of evidence (the interrogation of the suspect).
5. Sanctions against illegal or improperly obtained evidence
It was already mentioned that if investigative activity are carried out
in violations of certain provisions they are affected by a nullity, which
entails that the judge (either at the end of the investigation or at the
trial) must declare the nullity and exclude the results of the irregular
activity and all subsequently obtained evidence. 135 The possibility to
declare an act void by a nullity is limited to the situation where the
procedural sanction is expressly codified. If an investigative activity is
affected by a nullity, this means therefore that all the information it
has brought about cannot be used. This is however not the only case
of exclusion of evidence.
The general rule on exclusion of evidence is contained in Article 32
of the Preliminary Title of the CCP. The provision was recently
introduced to codify the case-law of the Court of cassation (which
goes by the name of ‘Antigoon’ case-law). 136 It was in fact the Court
of cassation to first establish that evidence could be excluded either
when the evidence is unreliable, when it is obtained with violation of
procedural rules for which a nullity is prescribed, and when it is
obtained in violation of the right of defence. The position of the Court
133 Art. 127, § 1 CCP.
134 Art. 43 CCP.
135 See supra.
136 The case-law was intiated with the decision in the Antigoon case (Cass., 14
October 2003, NJW 2003, 1367), and it was then further confirmed by later decisions.
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of cassation represented a restrictive turn when compared to the previous
situation, where the majoritarian opinion considered that evidence could
be excluded every time it was obtained in violation of a procedural rule
codified in the code. With its decision in the Antigoon case, the Court of
cassation reduced the grounds of exclusion to three hypotheses.
These three grounds are now codified in Article 32 of the
Preliminary Title CCP. The provision states that evidence is to be
excluded: 1) in case of failure to comply with requirements which
respect is prescribed on pain of nullity, 2) when the illegality has
affected the reliability of the evidence, or 3) when the use of the
evidence would be incompatible with the right to a fair trial.
In its case-law the Court also specified how the third criterion
‘incompatible with the right to a fair trial’ has to be interpreted. The
following circumstances can be taken into account: the fact that the
government committed the irregularity intentionally, that the
seriousness of the criminal offence far exceeds the irregularity, that
the illegally obtained evidence only concerns the proof of a material
element of the criminal offence, that the irregularity has influenced
the protected fundamental right or that the irregularity is a purely
formal requirement.
In a judgement of 24 April 2013 the Court of Cassation added a
fourth criterion for exclusion of evidence. The Court ruled that
evidence is by definition inadmissible when an infringement is made
on a substantial procedural requirement which relates to the
organization of courts and tribunals. Since the legislator did not
include this fourth criterion in Article 32 of the Preliminary Title of
the CCP, it is deemed to no longer exist as the list of grounds for
exclusion of evidence of Article 32 is considered to be limitative.
The exclusion of evidence affects not only to the evidentiary
element that is directly tainted by the irregularity. Indeed, Belgian law
accepts the doctrine of ‘the fruits of the poisonous tree’, according to
which all the evidence that is clearly connected with or is the result
of the excluded evidence has to be disregarded as well. It is thus for
the judge to establish which elements of proof are intertwined with
the illegal evidence. Nevertheless, the application of the doctrine is
now strongly limited by the narrower scope of the exclusionary rule
of Article 32 of the Preliminary Title CCP.
During the trial stage, exclusion of evidence does not mean that the
illegally obtained pieces of proof will be physically removed from the
case file. The judge at the trial court only has ‘to ban the evidence
from the rest of the proceedings’, which means that he cannot take
the unlawful elements into account in his decision-making process.
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Conversely, evidence that is declared inadmissible during the pre-trial
investigation stage will be removed from the case file and deposited
at the court registry. 137
The implications of the case-law of European courts should also be
considered. The European Court of Human Rights has very recently
endorsed the Belgian exclusionary rules. 138 Whether Article 32 of the
Preliminary Title CCP is in accordance with the case law of the Court
of Justice is more uncertain. In a recent Hungarian case the Court of
Justice decided that each violation of a fundamental right protected by
the Charter of the EU should induce the exclusion of the evidence
obtained through that violation. 139
The exclusion of evidence is the ordinary remedy against illegal
evidence. Nothing excludes however that the illegality of the evidence
be connected to a more severe violation of the fair trial right of the
defence. If the defendant can prove that the right to a fair trial was so
badly affected that the violation still persists and cannot be restored,
then the judge can declare the proceedings inadmissible. The Court of
cassation has however observed that this is normally not the case when
the evidence is tainted. It has in particular observed that the ordinary
consequence of a piece of evidence obtained in violation of the rules
of the fair trial (in the case, the absence of the lawyer) is the exclusion
of the evidence and not the inadmissibility of proceedings. 140 The
judge can instead declare the criminal proceedings inadmissible when
the evidence was gathered in consequence of police provocation. 141
137 Art. 131 §2 and Art. 235bis §6 CCP. It is worth clarifying that the Belgian
system provides since 1998 for a system called ‘purge of nullities’ (zuivering van
nietigheden). It is based on the idea that nullities must insofar as possible be
identified and formally declared already at the final stage of the investigative stage,
without waiting for the trial stage. This system applies however only if a judicial
investigation has been opened. The elements that the Council chamber finds void
(together with those that are subsequently tainted) are taken out of the file, so that
they will not prejudice the approach of the trial judge (Art. 131 CCP). However, the
issue concerning the irregularity of the elements could still be raised during the trial
phase, unless in those cases in which the decision of the Council Chamber has been
confirmed on appeal by the Chamber of Accusation.
138 Kalnėnienė v België App no 40233/07 (ECtHR, 31 January 2017).
139 Case C-419/14 WebMindLicenses EU:C:2015:832.
140 Cass., 18 January 2017, AR P.16.0626.F, Rev. dr. pen. Crim., 2017, 630.
141 Art. 30, § 3 Preliminary Title CCP.
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5.1. Infringements to the right of access the case file
As was mentioned, the general rule is that suspects do not have
access to the case file during the investigations save for specific
exceptions. When these exceptions apply, the refusal to disclose
materials or the incomplete disclosure represent a violation of the
defendant’s rights. The violation does not however represent a nullity
and there is therefore no possibility to exclude the evidence or quash
the proceedings. When a violation of the right is established, the
judge will have to take remedial measure, in order to ensure that the
right of the defendant be restored. When no restoration is possible and
the violation is therefore still persistent, the judge must instead
declare the proceedings inadmissible for violation of the right of fair
trial.
5.2. Statements obtained in breach of the right to access a lawyer
The rules on the remedies against statements obtained in breach of
the right to counsel have already been described. The relevant rule is to
be found in Article 47bis § 6, point 9 CCP. One last thing must be
pointed out. The rule is to be integrated with the general rule of
Article 32 of the Preliminary Title CCP. This means that all violations
of procedural rules that do not fall in the scope of application of
Article 47bis § 6, point 9 CCP, could still lead to the exclusion of the
statements if Article 32 Preliminary Title CCP can apply. This is for
instance the case for the violations of the right to counsel concerning
confrontations, line-up and reconstructions of the crime scene.
However, failure to guarantee the right to a lawyer is not explicitly
prescribed under penalty of nullity. In other words, the exclusion
could be possible only if the violation of the rules leads to the
unreliability of evidence or to the violation of the fair trial rights.
The relation between Article 47bis, §6, paragraph 9 CCP and
Article 32 of the Preliminary Title CCP is nonetheless obscure. The
Court of cassation ruled that the judge does not automatically need to
declare statements made in breach of the provisions concerning the
right to legal assistance null or irrevocably in violation of the right to
a fair trial. 142 So the Court seems to indicate that infringements to the
right to legal assistance summed up in Article 47bis, §6, paragraph 9
142 Cass., 16 February 2016, NC 2016, vol. 6, 497.
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CCP do not necessarily imply an exclusion according to Article 32 of
the Preliminary Title CCP.
5.3. Breaches of the right to translation and interpretation
It was already mentioned that the violations of the relevant rules
entails a nullity on the basis of Article 40 of the Language Act. The
nullity entails that evidence has to be excluded. If the nullity concerns
procedural activities, such activities are also void. The judge must
here carefully evaluate to what extent the procedure has been tainted.
If the violation has been remedied or it can been remedied, the judge
must take the necessary steps. Such steps may also include declaring
a part of the proceedings void. If the violations is so serious that it in
no way can be restored, then the judge must declare the
inadmissibility of the proceedings.
The application of Article 32 CCP can also derives from other
aspects. In case a different kind of breach of the right to interpretation
and translation has been made, the question whether the evidence has
to be excluded will depend on the facts of the case. An incorrect
translation or interpretation can affect the reliability of the
evidence 143 or might be in conflict with the right to a fair trial. 144
All depends on the assessment made by the judge.
5.4. Failure to provide information about rights and about accusation
The person receives information on the charges at different stages
of the procedure. Before the interrogation, the person is briefly
informed of the facts upon which he or she will be questioned.
Failure to provide with this information does not constitute a nullity.
It remains to be seen whether the failure could not constitute an
affront to the rights of the defence, which could even worsen if
indeed the statements obtained were to be used against the defendant.
Knowledge of the accusation is an essential element for the accused
to exercise a proper and effective defence.
When the suspect is apprehended, he receives information on the
charges. Failure to comply with this information does not entail a
143 Art. 32 CCP, second ground.
144 Art. 32 CCP, third ground.
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nullity. It may however represent a violation the fair trial, if the missing
or late information has an impact on the proper exercise of the defence
rights.
There is no doubt that inadequate information on the charges before
the beginning of the trial constitutes a cause of inadmissibility of the
proceedings. This applies to cases where the defence is not served
with an information on the charges just like to cases where the
information on charges is unclear and/or ambiguous, to the extent that
the defendant cannot properly defend himself. 145
6. Appeals against conviction and sentence
The Belgian procedural system generally provides for the
possibility to appeal decisions. As was mentioned, while the right to
appeal is not formally recognized in the Belgian Constitution, the
right finds application thanks to the ratification in 2012 of the 7th
Protocol to ECHR. 146 Belgium has also ratif ied the 1966
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which
in its Article 14 § 5 holds that ‘everyone convicted of a crime shall
have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a
higher tribunal according to law’. It is open to debate whether the
provision intends ‘review’ as to mean a fresh decision in second
instance on the merits of the case. At any case, the Belgian State has
submitted a declaration whereby paragraph 5 of the article ‘shall not
apply to persons who, under Belgian law, are convicted and sentenced
at second instance following an appeal against their acquittal of first
instance or who, under Belgian law, are brought directly before a
higher tribunal such as the Court of Cassation, the Appeals Court or
the Assize Court’.
With regard to the appeals against the trial judgements, one should
differentiate between the right to appeal before the Court of cassation 147
and the right to appeal before other courts acting as courts of second
instances. 148 The latter courts can take a new decision on the merits
145 Cass., 31 October 2000, AR P.00.1280.N, Arr.Cass. 2000, nr. 589 and Cass.,
23 May 2001, AR P.01.0218.F, Arr.Cass. 2001, nr. 306.
146 Before the ratification of the said Protocol, the Court of cassation held that
there was no right as such to a decision in second instance. See Cass., 17 December
2003, AR P.03.1450 F, Arr.Cass., 2003, nr. 655.
147 See infra.
148 See P Traest, J Meese, ‘De rechtsmiddelen verzet en hoger beroep: actualia’
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of the case, with examination of evidence. The appellate Court can hear
new evidence and order that further investigative activities be
performed. The parties can directly request the Court to take this
decision. The filing of the appeal suspends the execution of the sentence.
As a general rule, all final trial judgements are amenable to appeal.
But while some judgements can be taken before a Court of second
instance and then also before the Court of cassation, other judgements
can only be challenged before the Court of Cassation. The latter is the
case of the judgements of the Court of Assize. 149 The Court of
Assize consists of a hybrid panel with a jury of lay people and this
special composition is the reason why a challenge of the decision in
front of a second instance court is not possible. The final judgements
taken by the other courts (Correctional Courts, Police Courts) can
instead be challenged before a second instance court (the Correctional
Court for Appeals against decisions of the Police Courts, the Appeal
Courts for appeals against decisions of the Correctional Courts).
Judgements rendered in absentia can be challenged in two
alternative ways. 150 The defendant can introduce an opposition
(verzet), which, if admissible, 151 triggers a retrial before the Court
that delivered the first judgement. 152 In alternative the defendant can
file an appeal in front of a higher court against the decision rendered
in absentia. 153 The defendant can choose to oppose against both the
in P Traest, AVerhage, G Vermeulen, Strafrecht en strafprocesrecht: doel of middel in
veranderde samenleving? Wolters Kluwer, 2017) 515; F Verbruggen, R Verstraeten,
Strafrecht en strafprocesrecht voor bachelors deel II (Maklu, 2016) 436-440.
149 A second possibility are the judgements which the Court of Appeal can
exceptionally deliver as a court of first instances, e.g. jdugements in proceedings
against ministers or judges.
150 On these issues, see J Rozie, S Rutten, A Van Oevelen, Verstek en verzet in
burgerlijke zaken en strafzaken, national en Europees (Intersentia, 2012) 85; F
Verbruggen, R Verstraeten (n 151) 447-453.
151 According to Art. 187, §5 CCP, an opposition is declared inadmissible if it is
lodged in an incorrect form or if the time limit has expired, unless the opposing party
can invoke ‘force majeure’. It is also declared inadmissible if the initial judgement was
not delivered in absentia or if the opposing party already appealed against the
judgement. However, this list of grounds of inadmissibility is not exhaustive.
152 There are however two cases in which an admissible opposition will not lead
to a retrial. These two cases are called cases where the opposition is declared ‘undone’
(‘ongedaan’ that is in essence equivalent to an annullment of the opposition). The first
is when the opposing party is absent and not represented by a lawyer at the hearing
following the opposition. The second is when the opposing party had knowledge of
the summons for the initial proceedings and cannot invoke ‘force majeure’ or a
legitimate excuse for the non-appearance (wettige reden van verschoning).
153 This possibility is of course precluded for judgements delivered by the Court
of assize.
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criminal and the civil conviction or to only one of them. However, it is
not allowed to lodge an opposition twice in the same instance. 154 In any
event, the defendant must have an interest when appealing the decision.
A decision of acquittal or a decision that declared the dismissal of the
proceedings (verval) cannot be appealed.
A recent reform has restricted the scope of the appeal before second
instance courts. 155 Before the reform the filing of an appeal did not need
to offer reasons. The appeal against the decision always triggered a new
decision on all aspects of the criminal case, while the new rules restrict
the power of the courts of appeal to decide only on the grounds that are
specifically submitted by the appealing parties in their appeal
declarations. The defendant is in fact now required to submit a
statement of the grounds of appeal. 156 The law expressly provides
that the appeal grounds that need to accompany the declaration of
appeal must be specific.
Because of the new obligation for appellants to introduce specific
grounds of appeal, the time requirement for filing an appeal before
the courts of second instance has been extended. Defendants have
now thirty days to appeal judgements before appellate courts to obtain
a new decision on the merits. In case of decisions in absentia the
time limit runs from the moment the defendant is served with the
decision. 157 The reform of 2016 has also codified the ‘subsequent
appeal’ (volgappel) of the Public Prosecutor. When the defendant
appeals, the Public Prosecutor has now ten extra days to file an
appeal. 158 As we shall see, the Prosecutor’s initiative has the effect of
lifting the prohibition to impose a harsher sentence on the defendant.
The procedure before the appellate body can have different
154 ‘Opposition sur opposition ne vaux’, Art. 187 §8 CCP.
155 The reform was passed with the Statute of 5 February 2016, which goes under
the name of ‘Poputporri II’ (Wet van 5 februari 2016 tot wijziging van het strafrecht en
de strafvordering en houdende diverse bepalingen inzake justitie, JO 19 February
2016).
156 Art. 204 CCP. The statement is to be submitted either before the registry of
the court that delivered the initial judgement, or before the registry of the appellate
court. The defendant in custody, can deposit the statement by the prison governor,
See Art. 1 Law 25 July 1893.
157 Art. 203, §1 CCP. If the defendant is not served with the decision in person,
the time limit is of fifteen days running from the day on which the defendant gained
knowledge of decision. The time limit keeps running if the defendant does not have
knowledge of the sentence, until the limitation period for the execution of the
punishment expires.
158 Art. 203 § 1, second sentence CCP.
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outcomes. The Court can uphold the judgement if it finds it procedurally
correct and just. Otherwise, it can quash or reform the initial judgement.
Even when the decision is quashed due to procedural irregularities, the
appellate court is required to take a new decision on the merits of the
case. 159
The Belgian system applies the traditional principle of the
prohibition of reformatio in pejus. If the defendant is the only
appellant, his position cannot worsen before the appellate body: 160 the
sentence cannot be harsher, 161 the amount of civil damages cannot be
increased. 162 The rule is not applicable when the judgement is
appealed by other parties (the Public Prosecutor or the civil party), in
which case the defendant could receive a less favourable decision.
There is however a rule which mitigates this latter possibility. If the
Court intends to adopt a decision that is less favourable to the
defendant (such as in cases where an acquittal is reversed into a
conviction or a harsher penalty is imposed), the decision of the judges
sitting in the panel must be unanimous. 163
7. Appeals in cassation
Article 147 of the Belgian Constitution establishes that there is only
one Court of cassation for the entire country, which cannot decide on the
merits of the case. 164 Following the French tradition, the Court of
cassation is in fact established with a view to ensuring the proper and
uniform application of the law. Article 608 of the Code of the
Judiciary (Gerechtelijk wetboek) implements the Constitutional
provision by granting the Court of cassation jurisdiction only on
violation of the law or breach of procedural conditions that are either
substantial or entail a nullity. 165 It is normally said that the Court of
cassation is competent only to assess questions related to the
159 Art. 215bis CCP. An exception to this rule is the case in which the court
declares itself incompetent. See Art. 214 and 213 CCP.
160 Cass., 16 September 1975.
161 Cass., 11 October 2005, AR P.05.988 N.
162 Cass., 27 februari 1985, AR 3987, Arr.Cass., 1984-85.
163 Art. 211 bis CCP.
164 ‘Cette Cour ne connaît pas du fond des affaires’.
165 See M Traest, ‘Krachtlijnen van het cassatieberoep in strafzaken’ (2007)
Nullum crimen 116. See also Art. 612 of the Code of the Judiciary.
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interpretation and application of the law and it cannot solve questions
related to the reconstruction of facts. 166
Defendants have a right to challenge judgements delivered in last
instance that are not or no longer amenable to appeal or opposition in
front of the Court of cassation. 167 Interlocutory decisions can be
appealed but only after the decision in last instance. 168 The law limits
the possibility of interlocutory appeals only to a list of specific cases:
decisions concerning the competence of the judge, decisions
concerning the principle of liability with regard to civil damages,
decision concerning the opening of a special investigation in order to
find the profits of the crime. 169 The judgements of the Court of
cassation are final and they can no longer be appealed unless the law
provides for an explicit exception. 170
The defendant can file an appeal before the Court of cassation
within fifteen days from the decision that is challenged. As a result
of a reform of 2014, the declaration of appeal must be signed by a
qualified counsel. 171 The possibility for the defendant to apply to
the Court of cassation without the assistance of a lawyer is limited
to decisions concerning detention on remand. 172 Just like for the
appeal before second instance courts, the defendant must have an
effective interest for appealing decisions before the Court of
cassation. 173 As already mentioned, the filing of an appeal before
the Court of cassation suspends the execution of the judgement that
is challenged. 174
The defendant lodging an appeal in front of the Court of Cassation
can adduce the grounds the grounds of the appeal only by means of a
written brief, which must be deposited at the registry of the Court no
later than fifteen days before the hearing in front of the Court of
cassation. 175 The opposing party can respond with a brief that must
166 The specific role of the Court of cassation has an influence also on the role of
the Prosecutor, who is considered to act here also as an amicus curiae.
167 Art. 418 CCP.
168 Art. 420 CCP. This does not necessarily mean that the appeal against
interlocutory decision always requires an appeal against the final decision.
169 Art. 420 CCP.
170 `Pourvoi sur pourvoi ne vaut’, Art. 419 CCP.
171 I.e. lawyer holding a certificate in training in proceedings before the Court of
Cassation, Art. 425, § 1 CCP.
172 Art. 426 CCP.
173 Art. 416 CCP.
174 Art. 428 CCP.
175 Art. 429 CCP.
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be submitted at the latest eight days before the hearing. 176 The Court
can however identify breaches in the legality of the challenged
decision motu proprio. 177
As mentioned above, the review undertaken by the Court of
Cassation only concerns errors of law. The scope of review is limited
by the act of appeal to the Court of Cassation. It can address either
the entire conviction, only the criminal or civil conviction, or only the
penalty that is imposed. However, it is not possible to appeal to the
Court of Cassation against only parts of the penalty that is imposed.
Although the scope of review is also limited by the statement of the
grounds of appeal, the judge can raise grounds concerning the
criminal conviction of his own motion. 178
The Court of cassation can reject the appeal, by declaring it
inadmissible or unfounded. Otherwise, it quashes the challenged
decision, in whole or in part. 179 Precisely because the Court of
cassation is not a trier of facts, it cannot deliver a new decision on the
merits of the case. Hence, when the Court finds the decision to be
vitiated the Court must quash the decision and send it to a lower
court of the same instance of the court which delivered the quashed
judgement. If the Court finds that the challenged decision is vitiated
in a way which makes it impossible to have a retrial in front of a
lower court, it then just quashes the decision for good. 180
8. Access to the Constitutional Court
Belgium permits judicial scrutiny on the provisions of the
Constitution, which role is carried out by the Constitutional Court.
The powers of the Constitutional Court are set out by the Special
Statute on the Constitutional Court of 6 January 1989 (hereafter
SSCC). 181 The Court has jurisdiction for the annulment of laws or for
176 Art. 429 , section 3 CCP.
177 See on this issues, R Verstraeten, H Desmedts, ‘De cassatieprocedure in
strafzaken na de wet van 14 februari 2014: brengt vernieuwing ook verbetering?’
(2015) Nullum crimen 345.
178 F Verbruggen, R Verstraeten (n 148) 456-458.
179 Art. 434 CCP.
180 Art. 435 CCP.
181 Bijzondere wet van 6 januari 1989 op het Grondwettelijk Hof/ Loi spéciale du
6 janvier 1989 sur la Cour constitutionnelle, JO 07.01.1989.
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the issuing of preliminary rulings concerning the compatibility of the
laws with regard to the Constitution.
In the first case, 182 the Constitutional Court is competent for
ensuring the compliance of federal laws and decrees and regional laws
with the Constitutional rules on: a) the federal organization of the
country (and the related division of competences between federal and
regional organizations), b) the protection of fundamental rights, 183 c)
the rules on the legality of taxation 184 and on non-nationals. 185
Besides the ‘institutional’ petitioners (federal government, local
governments, parliamentary assemblies), proceedings in front of the
Constitutional Court can be instituted by every individual who can
show to have a sufficient and concrete interest in the annulment. In the
second case, 186 the Constitutional Court has the power to issue
preliminary rulings. In particular, judicial courts are empowered to
refer questions to the Constitutional Court for preliminary rulings,
concerning among others the protection of fundamental rights. 187 The
Constitutional Court rules only on the legal question and it does not
deal with the facts and the merits of the underlying case.
With regard to criminal cases, it is not infrequent that the criminal
courts request a preliminary ruling concerning the compatibility of a
relevant provision of criminal law with the fundamental rights of
people protected by Title II of the Constitution. When an issue of
compatibility is raised during a criminal case, courts are in principle
required to suspend the criminal proceedings and to request a
preliminary ruling to the Constitutional Court. The SSCC
differentiates between lower courts and higher courts in terms of the
obligation to file a ruling. The obligation is stricter (almost
absolute) 188 for higher courts, such as the Court of Cassation, since
182 Art. 1 SSCC.
183 Title II of the Constitution.
184 Art. 170 and 172 of the Constitution.
185 Art. 191 of the Constitution.
186 Art. 26 SSCC.
187 In particular the Court can issue preliminary rulings concerning a) the
violation of the division of competence of the federal state, b) any conflicts between
federal laws, federal decrees, and regional laws; c) the protection of fundamental
rights (title II of the Constitution), d) the rules on the legality of taxation (Art. 170
and 172 Constitution) and on non-nationals (Art. 191 Constitution). See on these
issues A Alen, K Muylle, Handboek van het Belgisch Staatsrecht (Mechelen,
Kluwer, 2011) 539-553; L De Geyter, ‘Commentaar bij art. 10-18 Bijz.Wet 6
januari 1989’ (2015) Comm.Pub. 131.
188 A Alen, K Muylle (n 190) 544.
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there are no remedies available against their judgements. There are
however exceptions to the duty to refer a prejudicial question that
apply to both the lower and the higher courts. One of these
exceptions concerns urgent cases, such as cases in which the
defendant is held in detention on remand. In this situation, the court is
not under a duty to refer a question, unless there are serious doubts
on the compatibility of a legal provision with the fundamental rights
and there is no case pending before the Constitutional Court in which
the same question is referred.
9. EAW and judicial review
9.1. Competent judicial authorities
The Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant (EAW)
was implemented in Belgium with the Law of 19 December 2003. 189
In order to identify the competent judicial authorities, it is necessary
to differentiate between the active and passive procedure. When
Belgium issues the European arrest warrant, the issuing of an EAW
with a view to prosecution is a competence of the Investigating
Judge. 190 It is instead the competence of the Public Prosecutor to
issue a EAW with a view to the execution of a custodial order. 191
The same Public Prosecutor is responsible for the issuing of an EAW
with a view to the execution of a conviction passed in Belgium. 192
On the passive side, when Belgium is the requested State, the EAW
is executed by arresting the sought person when she is found on Belgian
soil. The arrested person is informed of her rights and receives the letter
of rights, with among others the information on the right to be assisted
by a counsel, both in Belgium but also in the requesting State, and by an
interpreter. 193 After the arrest the person subject to the EAW is brought
before the Investigating Judge. It is then the Investigating Judge who
must hear the person and decide whether the person will remain or
189 Wet betreffende het Europees aanhoudingsbevel/Loi relative au mandat
d’arrêt européen, JO 22.12.2003.
190 Art. 32, § 1 EAW Act.
191 Art. 32, § 1 EAW Act. The law clarifies that the internal decision to place a
person in custody remains in the hands of the investigating judge or of the tribunal, as
it is required by the national rules depending on the stage of the proceedings
(investigation or trial).
192 Art. 32, § 2 EAW Act.
193 Art. 10 section 1 EAW Act.
252 PART III, CHAPTER I
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
not in custody. If the Investigating Judge realizes during the interview of
the person that there are manifest reasons for refusing the execution of
the EAW, he can immediately adopt the refusal decision. The Public
Prosecutor can appeal the refusal in front of the Chamber of
Accusation, 194 with a possibility of further appeal before the Court of
cassation. 195 If during the interview the person consents to surrender,
it is for the Public Prosecutor to decide on the execution. 196
Besides the abovementioned case, the competence for deciding on
the execution of the EAW rests with the Chamber of the council. 197 The
decision is taken at the end of a hearing where the person has the
possibility to participate with her counsel. The person subject to the
EAW is informed of the hearing at the latest the day before. The
person and the counsel have access to the file at least a day before
the hearing. 198
9.2. Judicial review by the Belgian executing authorities
As for the remedies available to the person subject to the EAW, he
can appeal the decision of the Council Chamber before the Chamber of
accusation within 24 hours. 199 The decisions of the Chamber of
accusation can be challenged before the Court of Cassation, but only
with regard to reasons related to the improper interpretation or
application of the law and the violation of procedural rules.
As regards the grounds for review, it is worth recalling that two sets
of defence rights are relevant in the procedure for the execution of the
EAW issued by a foreign authority and sent to a Belgian authority: a)
the rights concerning the possibility to defend oneself with regard to
the deprivation of liberty 200 and b) the defence rights concerning the
decision on the execution of the EAW. 201
In some instances, the case-law has asserted that Article 6 ECHR in
its tenet related to criminal law does not apply to EAW procedures. 202
194 Art. 14 §2 EAW Act.
195 Art. 14 §7 EAW Act.
196 Art. 13 §3 EAW Act.
197 Art. 16 §1 EAW Act.
198 Art. 16 EAW Act.
199 Art. 17 § 1 EAW Act.
200 Connected to Art. 5 ECHR.
201 Connected to Art. 6 ECHR.
202 Cass., 28 September 2010, P.10.1512.N.; Cass., 10 January 2012,
P.12.0024.N.
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Such a position was taken mostly to exclude that the lack of assistance
by a counsel for the person subject to EAW would affect the
procedure. 203 The same conclusion was reached in a case where the
defence alleged that their right were breached because they could not
access the file prior to the interrogation. 204 The Court of cassation
observed in these decisions that the Chamber of council is not tasked
with the responsibility of taking a decision on the merits of the
existence of a crime, but simply it is required to deliver a decision on
the surrender of a person.
Likewise, the Courts have taken a negative stance on the possibility
for the Council Chamber to refuse the EAW on the basis of a lack of
respect of the right to be tried in a reasonable time. 205 It is however
possible for the Council of Chamber to refuse the execution of the
EAW not only for the grounds already codified in the framework
decision, but also if the execution of the EAW would breach the
fundamental rights of the individual as they are enshrined in Article 6
TEU.
203 S Dewulf, ‘Het mistige spanningsveld tussen het Europees aanhoudingsbevel
en het recht op een eerlijk proces van artikel 6 EVRM’ (2012) Nullum crimen 308.
204 Cass., 14 July 2009, P.09.1074.F. The Court has however observed that the
right to access the file before the hearing in front of the Council of Chamber is
instead a crucial safeguard.
205 Cass., 9 December 2014, AR P.14.1825.N.
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1. Constitutional guarantees
Even if there is no text in the Constitution of 1958 and in the
1 The sections of the present report are authored as follows: Sections 1, 2 and 3
by R Parizot; Section 4 by J Bourgais; Sections 5 to 8 by J Bossan et C Poirier; Section
9 by B Aubert.
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Declaration of the human and civic rights of 1789 (Déclaration des
droits de l’homme et du citoyen, hereinafter DDHC), 2 the French
Constitutional Court (Conseil constitutionnel) recognized a
constitutional status to the right to access a court in a decision of
1996 3 on the basis of Article 16 DDHC. 4 By contrast, the right to
appeal has no constitutional status. 5 It is provided by the preliminary
Article of the Code of criminal procedure (CCP), which states that
‘Every convicted person has the right to have his conviction examined
by a second tribunal’. France ratified Article 2 of Protocol 7 of the
European Convention of Human Right (ECHR) with a declaration
(‘The Government of the French Republic declares that, in accordance
with the meaning of Article 2, paragraph 1, the review by a higher
court may be limited to a control of the application of the law, such
as an appeal to the Supreme Court’) and a reservation (‘The
Government of the French Republic declares that only those offences
which under French law fall within the jurisdiction of the French
criminal courts may be regarded as offences within the meaning of
Articles 2 to 4 of this Protocol’).
The right to review the lawfulness of detention in criminal
proceedings is not expressly enshrined in the Constitution, nor in the
DDHC. However, Article 66 of the Constitution provides that ‘No
one shall be arbitrarily detained. The Judicial Authority, guardian of
the freedom of the individual, shall ensure compliance with this
principle in the conditions laid down by statute’). Based on this, the
jurisprudence considers that a person deprived of his/her liberty shall
be brought promptly before a judge and shall be able to contest the
legality of his detention in line with Article 5 paragraphs 3 and 4
ECHR. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the French
constitutional system is a monist system. National courts directly
enforce fundamental rights guaranteed under the Convention pursuant
to Article 55 of the Constitution. 6
2 In 1971, the French Constitutional Court (Conseil constitutionnel)
acknowledged the constitutional value of the DDHC.
3 Conseil constitutionnel (Constitutional Council), 9 Apr. 1996, no 96-373.
4 Art. 16 DDHC reads ‘Any society in which no provision is made for
guaranteeing rights or for the separation of powers, has no Constitution’.
5 Conseil constitutionnel (Constitutional Council), 12 Feb. 2004, no 2004-491
DC, no 4; 14 May 2012, no 2012-243/244/245/246 QPC, no 13.
6 Art. 55 of the Constitution, according to which ‘Treaties or agreements duly
ratified or approved shall, upon publication, prevail over Acts of Parliament,
subject, with respect to each agreement or treaty, to its application by the other party’.
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
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2. Investigative measures subject to prior judicial authorization
2.1. Competent authorities and scope of review
In the case of a preliminary inquiry conducted under the supervision
of the Public Prosecutor, house searches and seizures can only be
authorised by a judge. 7 The same requirement applies to the
interception of communication or taking of audio recordings.
However, for less serious invasions of privacy, the Constitutional
Council has permitted that the authorisation comes from a prosecuting
judge. 8 This is the case in the search of vehicles 9 or visits to
professional premises to carry out checks to combat illegal
employment. 10 Likewise, in the case of flagrante delicto and when
the invasion of privacy is measured, the Constitutional Council allows
members of the police force to act on their own authority. 11 This is
the case for vehicle searches, 12 house searches, 13 or even for the geo-
localisation mechanism (for a maximum duration of 15 consecutive
days 14), or even – and this being more questionable – for the taking
of bodily samples, such as blood. 15
Depending on the seriousness of the invasion of privacy and the
procedural framework (whether preliminary inquiry or judicial
investigation), the measure can be authorised by the juge des libertés
et de la détention (henceforth ‘liberty and custody judge’) or the juge
d’instruction (an independent investigating magistrate). This is for
instance the case of searches and seizures 16 and interception of
communication. 17 In all cases, the authorisation must be in writing
and reasoned. The authorized act must be justified by the necessity of
7 Conseil constitutionnel (Constitutional Council) 27 Dec. 1990, no 90-281; 2
March 2004, no 2004-492, §6.
8 Conseil constitutionnel (Constitutional Council) 22 Apr. 1997, no 97-389 DC.
9 Art. 78-2-2 CCP.
10 Art. 78-2-1 CCP.
11 Conseil constitutionnel (Constitutional Council) 13 Mar. 2003, no 2003-467
DC.
12 Art. 78-2-3 CCP.
13 Art. 56 CCP.
14 Art. 230-33 CCP.
15 Art. 706-47-2 CCP. See F Desportes and L Lazerges-Cousquer, Traité de
procédure pénale (Economica, 2015) no 402.
16 Art. 76 CCP for preliminary hearing, Art. 151 CCP for an inquiry.
17 Art. 100 CCP in the case of an inquiry (interceptions forbidden in an inquiry,
unless in the case of organised crime, Art. 706-95 CCP).
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the inquiry or investigation. Specific time limits are set out in the legal
texts.
Such authorisation aims to strike a balance between banning all
invasions of personal freedom (for which the judiciary authority is
responsible according to Article 66 of the Constitution) and what is
necessary for the inquiry or investigation (to establish the truth
regarding an offence).
Apart from extraordinary powers granted to the law enforcement
authorities by the state of emergency that was declared in France in
November 2015, there are exceptions to this system of authorisation
in the case of flagrante delicto. In this case, vehicle searches 18 and
seizures can be carried out automatically by police officers without
initial inspection.
2.2. Remedies available to the defendant
As regards the available remedies, we need to distinguish between
the inquiry and the judicial investigation. During the preliminary
inquiry, there is no possibility of recourse against the decisions taken
by the investigating authorities. During the preliminary judicial
investigation, however, the CCP allows for a series of appeals set out
in Articles 186 and following provisions of the CCP. These appeals
must be filed within ten days, directly with the investigating chamber
for the most part, some of which are filtered by the President of the
investigating chamber. The investigating chamber is the second degree
of investigation in the court of appeal. It is made up of three
councillors and presided over by one of the former as president of the
court. Appeals are possible for the following cases: Appeals against a
judge’s decision to remand someone in custody or on probation; 19
Appeals against a judge’s decision to reject a request for a second or
additional assessment; 20 Appeals against a judge’s decision to reject a
request for a certain act, 21 more specifically a medical psychological
examination, 22 an assessment 23 or an investigative act. 24 This appeal
18 Art. 78-2-3 CCP.
19 Art. 186 CCP.
20 Art. 186 CCP.
21 Art. 186-1 CCP.
22 Art. 81 CCP.
23 Art. 82-1 CCP.
24 Art. 156 CCP.
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is subject to validation by the investigating chamber after being declared
admissible by its president.
In practice, the investigating chamber should only confirm or
invalidate the ruling of the investigating judge without giving him
orders. In this way if the investigating chamber quashes a decision
refusing a procedural step, the chamber cannot give an injunction to
the investigating judge to accomplish this step.
However, this principle does not apply in two cases. The first is
when the investigating chamber is not concerned about a specific step
but rather for the entire case (when there is an appeal against the
closing order of the investigation); the court can in this instance order
specific measures. The second hypothesis is when the investigating
chamber decides to use its power to take over the case (pouvoir
d’évocation).
To conclude, one can only highlight the lack of recourse during the
preliminary inquiry phase. Accordingly, potential nullities of an inquiry
step can only be raised during the investigation (if there is one) before
the investigating chamber or directly before the trial court.
3. Deprivation of liberty: Arrest and pre-trial custodial measures
3.1. Information about available remedies
There are two forms of deprivation of liberty before trial in France:
arrest or police custody (garde à vue) and detention pending trial
(détention provisoire). The person placed under arrest is informed of
his/her rights immediately upon arrest. He is not informed of any
possibility of contesting his arrest in that there is no appeal provided.
However, Article 63-1 CCP states that, based on Act no 2014-535 of
27 May 2014 transposing Directive 2012/13/UE of the European
Parliament and Council on the right to information in criminal
proceedings, he is informed:
(...) ‘of the nature of the offence which is being investigated, of the
rights mentioned under Articles 63-2, 63-3 and 63-4 as well as of
the provisions governing the length of police custody provided
for by Article 63. A mention of this information is entered in the
official report and signed by the person under custody; in the
event of a refusal to sign, this is noted. The information
mentioned under the first paragraph must be given to the person
held in custody in a language that he understands, where
appropriate by using written forms. Where the person is deaf and
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cannot read nor write, he must be assisted by a sign language
interpreter or by some other person qualified in a language or
method of communicating with the deaf. Use may also be made
of any other means making it possible to communicate with
persons who are deaf. Where a person is released after detention
without the district prosecutor having made a decision as to
prosecution, the provisions of Articles 77-2 are brought to his
attention. Save in exceptional and unavoidable circumstances, the
steps taken by investigators to communicate the rights mentioned
in Articles 63-2 and 63-3 must be taken no later than three hours
from when the person was placed in custody’.
When a person is placed on detention pending trial, he receives
different information. Thus, if the liberty and custody judge foresees a
detention pending trial, he will inform the person that the decision can
only be made after an audience in the presence of both parties, that
the person has the right to ask for an extension to prepare his defence
and that, if he does not already have a lawyer, he may choose one, or
one will be chosen for him for the debate. 25 Once the issue of
detention pending trial has been decided, the judge must notify the
person concerned but nothing is said about the information that must
be given in terms of the right to appeal this decision (information
given by the investigating judge (juge d’instruction) to the person
under investigation do not concern the appeal of the decision of
detention pending trial, 26 even though a right to appeal does exist. 27
3.2. Arrest, habeas corpus and judicial review
Arrest (garde à vue) is decided by a judicial police officer under the
control of the judicial authority (the public prosecution department or
the liberty and custody judge for an arrest implying a longer period of
detention). According to Article 62-2 CCP, arrest (garde à vue) is a
coercive measure decided by a judicial police officer, under the
control of the judicial authority, whereby a person is kept in custody
and available to investigators because of one or several plausible
reasons to suspect that he/she has committed, or has attempted to
25 Art. 145 CCP.
26 Art. 116 CCP.
27 Art. 186 CCP.
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commit, an act in relation to a felony or a misdemeanour that is
punishable by a prison sentence. This measure must constitute the
only way to reach at least one of the following objectives: To allow
the execution of investigations involving the presence or the
participation of the person; To ensure the presentation of this person
before the district prosecutor in order for this magistrate to assess the
course to be given to the inquiry; To prevent the person from
modifying material evidence or clues; To prevent the person form
pressuring witnesses, including victims, as well as their family, or
relatives; To prevent the person from consulting with other persons
susceptible to be co-perpetrators or accomplices; To ensure the
enforcement of the measures aiming at stopping the felony or a
misdemeanour. Arrest (garde à vue) in France may lasts for 24 hours
plus 24 hours (unless in cases of organised crime and terrorism where
it can be prolonged). In any case, if arrest lasts more than 48 hours, it
is under the control of the liberty and custody judge.
The person placed under arrest has certain rights of which they must
be informed pursuant to Article 63-1 CCP:
`Any person placed in police custody is immediately informed by a
judicial police officer, or under the latter’s supervision, by a judicial
police agent, of the nature of the offence which is being
investigated, of the rights mentioned under Articles 63-2, 63-3
and 63-4 as well as of the provisions governing the length of
police custody provided for by Article 63. A mention of this
information is entered on the official report and signed by the
person under custody; in the event of a refusal to sign, this is
noted. The information mentioned under the first paragraph must
be given to the person held in custody in a language that he
understands, where appropriate by using written forms. Where the
person is deaf and cannot read nor write, he must be assisted by
a sign language interpreter or by some other person qualified in a
language or method of communicating with the deaf. Use may
also be made of any other means making it possible to
communicate with persons who are deaf. Where a person is
released after detention without the district prosecutor having
made a decision as to prosecution, the provisions of Articles 77-2
are brought to his attention. Save in exceptional and unavoidable
circumstances, the steps taken by investigators to communicate
the rights mentioned in Articles 63-2 and 63-3 must be taken no
later than three hours from when the person was placed in custody.’
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3.3. Detention pending trial
A person may be placed in detention pending trial essentially for
preliminary judicial investigation, and the former can only be decided
by the liberty and custody judge, upon court referral through reasoned
decision by the investigating judge, or potentially directly by the
Public Prosecutor. 28
The decision of the liberty and custody judge is subject to two
conditions. On the one hand is the seriousness of the offence.
Detention pending trial is only possible in the context of crime or for
offences with a potential prison sentence of three years or more, or
when the person voluntarily avoids obligations pertaining to judicial
control or house arrest with electronic surveillance. 29
On the other hand is a twofold requirement of necessity and
subsidiarity. First, the liberty and custody judge must find that pre-
trial detention is the only way to achieve one of the objectives
described in Article 144 CCP: to preserve evidence which are
necessary to show the truth; to avoid pressure on witnesses or victims
and their families; to avoid fraudulent consultation between the
accused and his co-perpetrators or accomplices; to protect the
accused; to ensure that the accused remains at the disposal of the
judicial authorities; to end the offence or avoid its reoccurrence; in
criminal matters, to put an end to the exceptional and persistent
disturbance of public order caused by the gravity of the offence, the
circumstances of its commission or the importance of the harm it has
caused (except media coverage of the case). Secondly, he must find
that it is absolutely necessary and preferable to other less coercive
measures. Indeed, before the trial, the principle is that the accused
remains free. However, if the requirements of the investigation
demand it, or as a security measure, the person may be subjected to
judicial supervision or, if this is not sufficient, to assign him to house
arrest under electronic surveillance. It is only if these means are
insufficient, and exceptionally, that the person can be placed in pre-
trial detention. 30
However, it should be noted that pre-trial detention, which is
normally only possible during the investigation under the conditions
mentioned above, may exceptionally be considered outside the
28 Art. 137-4 CCP.
29 Art. 143-1 CCP.
30 Art. 137 CCP.
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investigation. It is possible in case of immediate hearings 31 or in case of
appearance after prior admission of guilt. 32 It is decided by the liberty
and custody judge at the request of the public prosecutor.
As soon as the public prosecutor has given his/her opinion, the
application for release may be taken at any time by the investigating
judge. Either requested by the public prosecutor 33 or requested by the
person (or his lawyer) to the investigating judge. 34 The investigating
judge may accept the release. If the investigating judge refuses, within
five days after the communication to the public prosecutor, he has to
transmit the request together with his reasoned opinion to the liberty
and custody judge who shall rule within three working days. If the
liberty and custody judge rejects the release or fails to reply within
three days, the person may refer the matter to the investigating
chamber. 35 In sum, the investigating judge, the liberty and custody
judge and, lastly, the investigating chamber are competent depending
on the specific circumstances of the case.
Detention on remand is subject to statutory time limits. In case of
offences punished by a maximum imprisonment terms of 10 years,
the time limit is of four months, 36 renewable by four months under
certain conditions and within the absolute and exceptional limit of
two years and four months, or three years but only in case of terrorist
association. 37 In case of offences punished by an imprisonment term
of at least 15 years, the time limit is of one year, 38 renewable for six
months and within the absolute and exceptional limit of four years
and eight months. In any case, pre-trial detention automatically stops
at the end of judicial investigation in correctional matters, unless the
judge gives a special reasoned order, 39 whereas it continues after the
end of the judicial investigation in criminal matters until the hearing
of the Assize Court. 40
The release may be ordered ‘at any time’ by the investigating judge,
31 Art. 396 CCP.
32 Art. 495-10 CCP.
33 Art. 147 CCP.
34 Art. 148 CCP.
35 Art. 186 for appeal and Art. 148, last paragraph in case of non-response of the
liberty and custody judge on time.
36 Art. 145-1 CCP.
37 Art. 706-24-3 CCP.
38 Art. 145-2 CCP.
39 Art. 179 CCP.
40 Art. 181 CCP.
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after having heard the public prosecutor. It is requested by the public
prosecutor, 41 the concerned person or his/her lawyer 42 to the
investigating judge. If the person applies for his/her own release, he/
she can do so ‘at any time’ 43 without having to respect any time limit
between two applications, the only condition being that the previous
application has already been processed. In each case, the judge
whether there are still conditions and reasons justifying continued
detention. 44 In addition, if pre-trial detention exceeds one year in
criminal matters or eight months in correctional matters, decisions
ordering the extension or rejecting the requests for release must also
include the special grounds that justify in the light of the specific
circumstances of the case the need to undertake further investigations
and the foreseeable time limit for the achievement of the procedure. 45
The person detained on remand must be informed of the causes for
detention. 46 In addition, as a person under investigation (the persons
under investigation are placed in pre-trial detention exceptionally), the
person benefits from the right to be informed about the charges
against him 47 and the right to access the case file. 48 According to the
lawyer interviewed for this study, the right to be informed on the
reasons of pre-trial detention is in practice respected, since a copy of
the order for pre-trial detention is given to the accused. This copy
shall contain the statement of the charges and the causes for the
detention on remand. The only criticism that can be made is that this
order for pre-trial detention is not always sufficiently reasoned, in that
it does not provide sufficient reasons that justify detention in the light
of the personal situation and specific factual circumstances of the case.
The right to be heard in person takes place at least every 4 months
in cases involving a misdemeanour (pre-trial detention limited to one
year 49) and after 1 year in cases involving a felony, and then every 6
months within the limits of 2 years. 50 The interviewed investigating
judge stressed that although the CCP requires the investigating judge
41 Art. 147 CCP.
42 Art. 148 CCP.
43 Art. 148 CCP.
44 Art. 143-1 and 144 CCP.
45 Art. 145-3 CCP.
46 Arts. 143-1 and 144 CCP specifying the conditions of detention on remand.
47 Art. 116 (2) and (7) CCP.
48 Art. 116 (6) CCP.
49 Art. 145-1 CCP.
50 Art. 145-2 CCP.
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to heard the persons under detention if he has not been heard in 4
months despite request, lawyers often do not request such a hearing.
They usually submit a request for release after 8-9 months, on the
ground that the right to be heard was not respected. The interviewee
added that it was not always easy for investigating judges to hear
persons every 4 months due to high number of cases to manage (the
investigating judge interviewed manages 108 cases on his own). That
being said, this time limit in practice is not of 4 months but 3 months
because investigating judges often want to hear the person before the
decision to extend the pre-trial detention. Therefore, investigating
judges make a request after 3 months to the liberty and custody
judge, namely a month before the expiry of the initial time limit of
pre-trial detention.
The right to interpretation and translation is guaranteed under
Article 116 CCP and again, in general terms, in the preliminary
Article on criminal procedure for the entire proceedings about
documents essential to the exercise of the rights of defense.
The right to legal assistance is mentioned in preliminary Article and
Article 116 CCP. Where it finds detention pending trial illegal, the
competent authority may end pre-trial detention at any time by
releasing the individual, under judicial supervision or electronic
surveillance at home, if needed. In addition, an individual who has
been remanded in custody and who receives a final decision to be
dismissed, discharged or acquitted, may seek full reparation for the
moral and material damage caused by such detention. 51
3.4. Arrest and detention order for questioning
A distinction must be made between the persons questioned
because they are suspected of having committed an offense and those
one seeks to question without any tangible suspicion about them. As
regards persons in respect of whom there are reasonable grounds to
suspect that they have committed or attempted to commit an offense,
they may, as the judicial police officer decides, be heard freely and
notified a certain number of rights 52 or heard in custody. 53 As
regards persons in respect of whom there is no plausible reason to
51 Art. 149 CCP ff.
52 Art. 61-1 CCP introduced by the 27 May 2014 Act.
53 See supra Section b) Arrest, habeas corpus and judicial review.
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suspect that they have committed or attempted to commit an offense,
they may be heard freely. However, since the 27 May 2014 Act,
Article 62 CCP provides that, if required by the investigation, these
persons may be held under constraint for the time necessary for their
hearing and within the limit of four hours. This measure is decided by
a judicial police officer. If, during the hearing, there are plausible
reasons to suspect that the person has committed or attempted to
commit a crime or an offense that could lead to imprisonment, he
may only be kept under constraint at the disposal of the investigators
under custody, and all the rights provided under Article 63-1 CCP
shall be notified to him. 54 Finally, it is possible to compel a witness
to appear before the investigating judge 55 during the hearing.
With regard to judicial remedies, Article 13 CCP simply provides
that ‘Within each appeal court’s territorial jurisdiction the judicial
police is placed under the supervision of the public prosecutor and
under the control of the investigating chamber in accordance with
article 224 onwards’. In reality, nothing is anticipated, except to file a
complaint for arbitrary detention. 56
As regards the person not suspected but detained for four hours, the
text is not very clear on his right to be informed of the reasons for arrest
and detention. Indeed, Article 62 CCP provides such information for
unsuspected persons freely heard. But regarding unsuspected persons
heard under constraint, nothing is said unless suspicions appear, in
which case they go under the custody regime and are informed of it.
The person is not entitled to the assistance of a lawyer. Article 62
CCP simply states that if suspicions appear, the persons are detained
under police custody and informed of their right to legal assistance.
4. Specific remedies for alleged breach of defence rights in the pre-
trial stage of criminal proceedings
4.1. Restrictions on the right to access the case file
As far as voluntary hearing 57 (within the framework of an
investigation supervised by the district prosecutor) is concerned,
despite the lack of legal provisions, the 19 December 2014 Circular,
54 Ibid.
55 Art. 109 CCP.
56 Art. 432-4 Criminal Code.
57 Audition libre.
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adopted as part of the transposition of Directive 2012/13/EU,
encourages the authorities to allow access to the file to the suspect
and to their lawyer in the same conditions as those provided for
custody. 58 Thus, in the context of voluntary hearings, the suspect and
the lawyer should be able to have access to the elements of the file.
As far as judicial investigation 59 is concerned, Article 114 CCP
guarantees access to the file for the benefit of lawyers, or, if not, of
parties who don’t have a lawyer (if they have expressly waived this
right). Prior to the 27 May 2014 Transposition Act, only access to the
file for the benefit of lawyers was given in Article 114 CCP.
As far as voluntary hearing (in the framework of an investigation
supervised by the district prosecutor) is concerned, according to the
19 December 2014 Circular, the consultation of the hearing statement
by the suspect and their lawyer 60 seems to be allowed at the end of
the hearing. If there is reasonable suspicion, the person must be heard
in custody. Therefore, they would benefit from the rights inherent to
this measure. 61 According to Article 77-2 CCP (derived from the 3
June 2016 Act), after a one-year period, the person who is suspected,
for one or more plausible reasons, of having committed or attempted
to commit an offence punishable by deprivation of liberty, and who
has been heard voluntarily or in custody, may request the district
prosecutor to have access to the case file. The same provision also
states that, at any stage of the proceedings, the district prosecutor may
disclose any or all elements of the case file to the suspect or to the
victim, in order to collect their observations or their lawyers’. As far
as judicial investigation is concerned, the lawyer who was chosen or
appointed ex officio at the time of the first appearance may read the
file upon their arrival. 62 Additional procedural safeguards depend on
whether the ‘person is under judicial examination’ (personne mise en
examen) 63 or is considered as an ‘assisted witness’ (témoin assisté). 64
58 J Leroy, ‘Art. 53 à 73 - Fasc. 40 : les personnes soupçonnées ne faisant pas
l’objet d’une garde à vue’, in Jurisclasseur Procédure pénale (LexisNexis) para 67,
<http://www.lexis360.fr> As regards custody, see Art. 63-1 (3) and 63-4-1 CCP.
59 Information judiciaire.
60 Provided for in Art. 63-4-1 CCP as regards custody.
61 Art. 63-4-1 CCP.
62 Art. 116 CCP.
63 The term ‘Personne mise en examen’ refers to the suspect being formally
accused by the investigating judge.
64 The ‘témoin assisté’ is the person assisted by a lawyer where evidence suggest
that they may have been involved in the offence (as opposed to strong and
corroborated evidence against the personne mise en examen).
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In the first case, the case file shall be made available no later than four
working days before each interrogation of the person under judicial
examination or before each hearing of the civil party: ‘After the first
appearance of the person under judicial examination or the first
hearing of the civil party, the case file is also put at the permanent
disposal of the lawyers during working days, subject to the
requirements of the proper functioning of the investigating judge’s
office’. 65
If new elements are filed within the four-day period, the
investigating judge must bring them to the knowledge of the person
and their lawyer before proceeding to an interrogation about their
contents. 66 Before the investigating chamber, the case file is also held
at the disposal of the lawyers of the person under judicial
examination’, for a minimum period of five days before the hearing
(48 hours as regards detention on remand). 67 The person under
judicial examination has also a right to obtain a copy of the file:
`After the first appearance or first hearing, the lawyers of the parties
or, if they do not have a lawyer, the parties may obtain a copy of
any or all of the documents and instruments of the case file. This
copy must be delivered within one month after the request. If the
case file has been digitized, it shall be transmitted in a digitized
form, if necessary by telecommunication, in accordance with the
procedures provided in Article 803-1’. 68
In the case where the person is granted the status of assisted
witness, 69 Article 113-3 CCP gives access to the file in accordance
with the provisions of Article 114 CCP relating to the person under
judicial examination (consultation four days before each interrogation
or hearing; the person can get a copy of the documents after the first
appearance or hearing). Thus, the assisted witness benefits from the
same right of access to the case file as that of the person under
judicial examination.
As far as voluntary hearing (in the framework of an investigation
65 Art. 114 CCP.
66 Cass. Crim. (Court of Cassation) 20 Feb. 1990, no 89-86.666. See F Saint-
Pierre, ‘Défense pénale’, in Répertoire de droit pénal et de procédure pénale
(Dalloz) para 68 <http://www.dalloz.fr>.
67 Art. 197, 208 and 209 CCP.
68 Art. 114 CCP.
69 See supra (n 64).
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supervised by the district prosecutor) is concerned, the suspect should be
able to consult the documents in conditions similar to those specified by
Article 63-4-1 CCP for the person remanded in custody. 70 However, as
regards custody, Article 63-4-1 states that the lawyer may read the
minutes of his client’s hearing. They cannot obtain a copy of it,
however, they can take notes. The person in custody may consult this
document or a copy of it. Therefore, the same should apply to the
suspect heard voluntarily, and to their lawyer.
As far as the judicial investigation is concerned, the complete file of
the investigation proceedings must be made available to the person
under judicial examination and their lawyers. 71 However, documents
related to an on-going investigative measure that the judicial police is
enforcing upon request of the investigative judge (ie commissions
rogatoires) may not appear in the file before the completion and
enforcement of that request. 72 Digital documents such as DVDs of
the reconstruction or modelling of crime scenes must be included in
the case file. Parties must be provided access to it. 73 Only the seals
are not included in the case file. The lawyer can request a copy of
them in accordance with the procedure of Article 82-1 CCP. 74 There
are restrictions to the procurement of copies of documents. Following
the lawyer’s request to obtain a copy of all or parts of the documents
and acts of the file (to show to their client) or following the party’s
request (if they’re not represented);
`the investigating judge has five working days from receiving the
application to refuse to deliver to the parties some or all of the
copies requested or of their reproductions by making a specially
reasoned order in respect of the risks of pressure on the victims,
the persons under judicial examination, their lawyers, the
witnesses, the investigators, the experts or any other person
taking part in the proceedings’. 75
If the investigating judge refuses to deliver a copy of the requested
documents, paragraph 9 of Article 114 CCP allows the parties or their
70 19 December 2014 Circular, para 1.2. See J Leroy (n 58) para 68.
71 Art. 114 CCP.
72 Cass. Crim. (Court of Cassation) 20 May 2008, no 07-88.672.
73 Cass. Crim. (Court of Cassation) 3 June 2015, no 15-81.801.
74 F Saint-Pierre (n 66) para 68.
75 Art. 114 CCP.
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lawyers ‘within two days of its notification, [to] refer the investigating
judge’s decision to the investigating chamber’s president, who rules
within five working days by making a written, reasoned and
unappealable decision’.
In addition, the person under judicial examination and the assisted
witness 76 (as well as the civil party and the district prosecutor) may file
a request for annulment of the proceedings before the investigating
chamber. 77 The applicable time periods are specified in Article 173-1
CCP: six months from the interrogation of the person under judicial
examination or from the assisted witness’ hearing, for steps taken
before. If a procedural step is taken after the last interrogation, Article
175 CCP specifies the applicable time limits (one month in the case
of detention on remand; three months otherwise). For the nullity to be
pronounced, the provisions of Article 802 CCP require to prove actual
damage to the interests of the party concerned. Case law tempers this
principle by admitting damage inherent to certain violations
(automatic nullity exempting from proving damage). According to
well established case law, it is the case in the event of a breach of the
rights of the defence, which include the right to a lawyer. The
existence of damage is therefore inherent to a breach of this right.
The investigating chamber decides whether the nullity shall be limited
to the illegal step or whether it shall be extended to other steps, or
even to the entire procedure. Case law limits the nullification to the
steps of which the illegal step was the necessary medium. 78
If the case file is incomplete, the lawyer of the person under judicial
examination has to denounce it, by a letter or by an observation recorded
in the minutes of the interrogation. In such a case, the nullity of this
interrogation would be incurred. 79 Otherwise, the incompleteness of
the case file would not be found prejudicial to the rights of the
defendants. 80
The appeal to the investigating chamber’s president against the
investigating judge’s refusal to issue copies of documents 81 was
provided for before the 27 May 2014 transposition Act. French law
76 A definition of both concepts is provided above (n 63 and 64).
77 Art. 173 (3) CCP.
78 `Le support nécessaire’. Eg Cass. Crim. (Court of Cassation) 12 Apr. 2005, no
04-86.780.
79 Cass. Crim. (Court of Cassation) 8 Apr. 2015, no 15-80.783; 29 Jan. 2003, no
02-86.774.
80 F Saint-Pierre (n 66) para 68.
81 Art. 114 (9) CCP.
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was already more protective than Directive 2012/13/EU. The latter
merely requires the decision refusing access to certain documents to
be ‘taken by a judicial authority or [to be] at least subject to judicial
review’. 82 French law fulfills these two conditions in a cumulative
manner: a decision taken by the investigating judge and an appeal
before the investigating chamber’s president.
The criminal chamber of the Court of Cassation has found that
Article 63-4-1 CCP, which lists exhaustively the documents that can
be consulted by a person in police custody or by their lawyer, 83 is
not incompatible with Article 6(3) of the European Convention on
Human Rights. The Court ruled that the non-transferral of the case
file in its entirety at this stage of the procedure did not deprive the
person of an effective right to a fair trial as long as the access to
these documents was guaranteed before the judicial investigation
bodies and the courts. 84
As a conclusion, French legislation is by its nature ambivalent.
Although the right to access the file is very restricted within the
framework of an investigation supervised by the district prosecutor,
this right is effective when a judicial investigation is opened. In the
latter case, French law provides a specific remedy against the
refusal to deliver documents. 85 The short deadlines set out in
paragraph 9 of Article 114 CCP ensure the efficiency of this remedy
(the investigating chamber’s president has five working days to rule
on the remedy). Regarding this, French law ensures a higher
protection than the minimum requirement set out in Article 7 of
Directive 2012/13/EU.
4.2. Derogations on the right to access a lawyer
With regard to voluntary hearing, 86 if the person is suspected of
having committed an offence punishable by imprisonment (restrictive
condition not conforming to Article 3 of Directive 2013/48/EU), they
must be informed, prior to the hearing, of their right to be assisted by
82 Art. 7 (4) Directive 2012/13/EU.
83 Official report of the placement in custody, minutes of the person’s hearings,
medical certificate.
84 Cass. Crim. (Court of Cassation) 4 Oct. 2016, no 16-82309, Recueil Dalloz
2017, 247 – 250.
85 Art. 114 (9) CCP.
86 Audition libre.
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a lawyer 87. Additionally, Article 61-1 CCP specifies that ‘if the
inquiry proceedings allow it, when a summons is addressed to the
person for their hearing’, this summons mentions the right to be
assisted by a lawyer. With regard to police custody 88, Article 63-3-1
CCP guarantees, from the start of the custody, that the person may
choose a lawyer or may request one to be appointed to them. Article
63-4 CCP guarantees the possibility of a confidential conversation
with the lawyer lasting a maximum of 30 minutes, renewable where
police custody is extended, at the start of the extension. In addition,
the person may request their lawyer to attend their hearings and
confrontations. 89 In this case, the first hearing, unless it only
concerns the person’s identity, cannot begin without the lawyer
being present before the expiry of a two-hour long period following
the notification of the president of the bar or the duty lawyer. The
lawyer may take notes during hearings and confrontations. 90 In both
cases (voluntary hearing and police custody), the lawyer may ask
questions at the end of the hearing or the confrontation he is
attending. 91 The judicial police officer or agent may oppose these
questions only if they are likely to disrupt the proper course of the
inquiry. Such refusal is recorded in the official report. At the end of
each interview with the person, and of each hearing or confrontation
they attended, the lawyer may make written observations. They may
specify the questions that were refused by the judicial police officer
or agent. These observations are added to the case file. They also
may send their observations to the district prosecutor during police
custody.
With regard to judicial investigations, 92 if the summons procedure
for the first appearance before the judge set out in Article 80-2 CCP has
not been followed (in the alternative case of a bench warrant etc 93), the
investigating judge must inform the person of their right to have a
lawyer attending the first appearance, before proceeding to
interrogation. Upon arrival, the lawyer ‘may consult the case file at
once and freely communicate with the person’. 94 The lawyer may
87 Art. 61-1 CCP.
88 Garde à vue.
89 Art. 63-4-2 CCP.
90 Art 63-4-2 (1) CCP.
91 Art 63-4-3 CCP, by reference to Art. 61-1 CCP.
92 Information judiciaire.
93 See art. 133-1 CCP.
94 Art. 116 CCP.
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present their observations to the investigating judge during the first
appearance. 95 Once the person is under judicial examination, unless
they expressly waive this right, they may only be interrogated or
confronted in the presence of their lawyer or when their lawyer has
been duly called upon. 96 Similarly, the assisted witness ‘benefits from
the right to be assisted by a lawyer, who is informed prior to the
hearings and who has access to the case file’. 97 The lawyer may ask
questions or make ‘brief observations’. 98
With regard to evidence gathering in the context of an investigation
supervised by the district prosecutor, the person suspected of having
been involved in committing an offence punishable by a prison
sentence 99 may be assisted by a lawyer ‘when they take part in a
reconstruction of the scene of a crime’ and ‘during the identity parade
at which they figure’. 100 The person must be informed of this right
before the procedure. These safeguards are guaranteed by Article 61-3
CCP. This article, in force since November the 15th 2016, was
introduced by the 3 June 2016 Act, 101 reinforcing measures against
the financing of organised crime and terrorism, and improving the
efficiency and guarantees of criminal procedure. 102 Initially, article
61-3 CCP only pertained to offences punishable by a prison sentence
up to ten years, 103 and did not cover more serious crimes. 104 It was
promptly modified 105 in order to include all offences punishable by a
prison sentence. The directive allows the lawyer to attend all
reconstructions and identity parades. 106 Under French law, the lawyer
may not attend searches in principle. However, there are exceptions
95 Art. 116 (4) CCP.
96 Art. 114 CCP.
97 Art. 113-3 CCP.
98 Art 120 (1) CCP related to both the person under judicial examination and the
assisted witness.
99 Crime ou délit puni d’emprisonnement.
100 Art. 61-3 CCP as regards the flagrant offence investigation ; Art. 76-1 CCP
(by reference to art. 61-3) , as regards the preliminary inquiry.
101 No 2016-731.
102 Journal Officiel de la République Française 4 June 2016.
103 Délits.
104 Article 61-3 only refered to ‘délits’ (category of offences punishable by a
maximum prison sentence up to ten-year long) and not to ‘crimes’ (category of
offences punishable by a prison sentence longer than ten years).
105 On November the 20th, 2016.
106 As far as the suspect attends the reconstruction or the parade. See art. 3 para 3
c) Directive 2013/48/EU.
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(presence of the president of the bar association in the case of searches
of a lawyer’s office or domicile). 107
With regard to evidence gathering in the context of a judicial
investigation, Article 154 CCP states 108 that the lawyer may attend
identity parades and reconstructions of the scene of a crime in the
case of the carrying out of a rogatory commission. Apart from
rogatory commissions, the right to have a lawyer attending identity
parades and reconstructions set out in Article 3(3) of Directive 2013/
48/EU does not seem to have been transposed into national legislation
for acts supervised by the investigating judge themselves. A
reconstruction is an act sui generis, not regulated by the CCP. This
act is composed of:
`acts defined by the texts, and the judge must, in this case, respect
the forms of these acts. Thus, when the judge carries out a
reconstruction, (...) they in fact carry out a visit to the scene of
the occurrence, or an interrogation, or witnesses’ or civil parties’
hearings and they must respect the rules set for these specific
acts’. 109
Thus, because a reconstruction normally includes an interrogation
(act for which the right to a lawyer exists), the right to a lawyer
should be respected. However, as regards the identity parade
supervised by the investigating judge himself, the right to a lawyer is
not provided for in the national legislation. 110 A far as other acts are
concerned, Article 82-2 of the CCP states that:
`where the person under judicial examination under the provisions
of Article 82-1 of the CCP makes a formal request to the
investigating judge to visit a particular place, or to hear a
witness, a civil party or other person under judicial examination,
that person may request that this be done in the presence of their
lawyer’.
The investigating judge may refuse the person’s request to be
107 Art. 56-1 CCP.
108 By reference to Art. 61-3 relating to flagrant offence investigations.
109 JP Valat, ‘Art. 79 à 84 - Fasc. 20 : Juridiction d’instruction du premier degré’,
in Jurisclasseur Procédure pénale (LexisNexis) para 121, <http://www.lexis360.fr>.
110 Ibid para 117.
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assisted by their lawyer. Article 82-1 CCP 111 specifies that, ‘the
investigating judge must make a reasoned order within one month
from receiving the application, when he decides not to grant it’.
As far as police custody in the context of an investigation
supervised by the district prosecutor is concerned, paragraph 3 of
Article 63-4-2 CCP states:
`When the inquiry requires the person’s immediate hearing, the
district prosecutor may authorise, by a written and reasoned
decision, on the judicial police officer’s request, that the hearing
starts before the expiry of the [two-hour long] time period’.
Paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 63-4-2 CCP add:
` In exceptional circumstances, at the judicial police officer’s
request, the district prosecutor or the liberty and custody
judge 112, according to the distinctions provided for by the next
paragraph, may authorise, by a written and reasoned decision, the
postponement of the lawyer ’s attendance at hearings or
confrontations, if this measure appears indispensable for
compelling reasons regarding the particular circumstances of the
inquiry, either in order to allow the proper course of urgent
investigations aiming at collecting or secure evidence, or to
prevent serious and imminent violation of a person’s life, liberty
or physical integrity.
The district prosecutor may only postpone the lawyer’s attendance
for a maximum of twelve hours. Where the person is in custody for
a crime punished by a prison sentence longer or equal to five years,
the liberty and custody judge may, at the district prosecutor’s
request, authorize to postpone the lawyer’s attendance, beyond
the twelfth hour, until the twenty-fourth hour. The district
prosecutor and the liberty and custody judge’s authorizations are
written and reasoned in reference to the conditions provided for
by the previous paragraph regarding the precise and detailed
elements arising from the facts of the case’.
The postponement of the access to a lawyer provided for by
paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 63-4-2 CCP appears to be compatible
111 Art. 82-2 CCP refers to this article.
112 Juges des libertés et de la détention.
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with Article 3(6) Directive 2013/48/EU. The reasons provided by the
CCP are those set out in the directive (to avert serious adverse
consequences for the life, liberty or physical integrity of a person; to
prevent substantial jeopardy to criminal proceedings). However, the
vague formulation of paragraph 3 of Article 63-4-2 CCP relating to
the failure to respect the two-hours long waiting period (‘when the
inquiry requires the person’s immediate hearing’) do not seem
compatible with reasons set out in the directive.
As far as judicial investigation is concerned, notwithstanding the
procedure for first appearance, 113 Article 117 CCP allows the
investigating judge to carry out immediate interrogation and
confrontations, ‘in a case of urgency arising from the condition of a
witness in danger of death, or from the existence of evidence on the
point of disappearing’. 114 Moreover, the investigating judge may
refuse the lawyer’s (and the district prosecutor’s) questions during
interrogations and confrontations if they are, ‘likely to disrupt the
proper course of the investigation, or to threaten personal dignity. Any
such refusal must be recorded in the official report’. 115 As far as the
first derogation, set out in Article 117 CCP, is concerned, it appears
compatible with the compelling reasons provided for in the directive
(to avert serious adverse consequences for the life, liberty or physical
integrity of a person; to prevent substantial jeopardy to criminal
proceedings). As far as the second derogation is concerned, the
directive 116 provides that the lawyer ‘participate[s] effectively’ when
the person is questioned. The possibility for the judge to oppose
questions, as set out in paragraph 2 of Article 120 CCP, does not
seem to compromise the effectiveness of the lawyer’s participation.
As far as the investigation supervised by the district prosecutor is
concerned, French law does not allow for the challenge of steps taken
in the course of a preliminary police inquiry or of a flagrant offence
investigation, which are not followed by a judicial investigation, until
criminal proceedings before the trial Court. 117 As far as judicial
investigation is concerned, the person under judicial examination may
request to be assisted by a lawyer (during a visit to the scene of the
113 Art. 116 CCP.
114 Art. 117 CCP.
115 Art. 120 (2) CCP relating to both the person under judicial examination and
the assisted witness.
116 Art. 3(3) b) Directive 2013/48/EU.
117 As regards the action of nullity before the trial court, see Art. 375 CCP.
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occurrence for instance), within the framework of Articles 82-1 and 82-2
CCP. Within this framework, last paragraph of Article 81 CCP 118
specifies that ‘where the investigating judge fails to decide on the
application within one month, the party may apply directly to the
president of the investigating chamber, who decides (...)’. Article 186-
1 CCP adds that the parties (including the person under judicial
examination) may lodge an appeal against the orders taken by the
investigating judge as set out in Article 82-1. The investigating
chamber’s president ‘rules, by an order not susceptible of appeal,
whether or not to refer this appeal to the investigating chamber’. 119
In addition, the person under judicial examination and the assisted
witness (as well as the civil party and the district prosecutor) may
also request the nullity of investigation steps before the investigating
chamber. 120 The provisions of Article 802 CCP require the proof of
actual damage to the interests of the party concerned, for the nullity
to be pronounced. Case law tempers this principle by admitting
damage inherent to certain violations (automatic nullity exempting
from proving damage). According to constant case law, it is the case
in the event of a breach of the rights of the defence, which include
the right to a lawyer. The existence of damage is therefore inherent to
a breach of this right. The criminal chamber of the Court of Cassation
ruled that ‘the hearings carried out after the person under judicial
examination had requested a lawyer’s assistance, were irregular’.
Therefore, the investigating chamber had ‘to pronounce their nullity,
and where relevant, had to extend the effects of the nullification to
the steps of which they were the necessary medium’. 121
The lawyer interviewed within the framework of this research, has
reported recurrent cases where police officers have deterred defendants
from exercising their right to be assisted by a lawyer on the grounds that
lawyers are helpless, considering the very restricted access to the case
file that they have. Because they directly infringe the implementation
of the right to be assisted by a lawyer, these reported behaviours seem
very questionable. And one must question the practices consisting of
justifying the non-exercise of a right by the lack of effectiveness of
another right. Furthermore, these practices question the absence of
118 Referred to successively by Art. 82-2 and 82-1 CCP.
119 Art. 186-1 CCP.
120 Art. 173 CCP.
121 Cass. Crim. (Court of Cassation) 5 Nov. 2013, no 13-82682.
FRANCE 277
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
appeal in French law during the stage of an investigation supervised by
the district prosecutor.
4.3. Decisions finding that there is no need for interpretation
In principle, the authority which carries out the suspected or
prosecuted person’s hearing must check whether this person
understands French. If it is not the case, an interpreter must be
appointed ex officio. 122 As regards investigations supervised by the
district prosecutor (voluntary hearing and police custody), the
preliminary article CCP provides for a right to interpretation to all
suspected persons. This includes the suspect heard voluntarily.
Voluntary hearings and hearings taking place during police custody
are carried out by a judicial police officer under the supervision of the
district prosecutor. Pursuant to Articles 61-1 (voluntary hearing) and
63-1 CCP (police custody), the judicial police officer notifies the
suspect of their right to interpretation before proceeding to the
hearing. Pursuant to Article D594-1 CCP, they must appoint an
interpreter ex officio if the person does not understand French. With
regard to judicial investigations, during interrogations and
confrontations, the person under judicial examination 123 and the
assisted witness 124 both benefit from the right to interpretation.
Article 102 CCP 125 states that ‘the investigating judge may call upon
an interpreter who has reached the age of majority’. The third
paragraph of Article 121 CCP adds that ‘if the person under judicial
examination is deaf, the investigating judge officially appoints [...] a
sign-language interpreter or another qualified person able to
communicate with deaf people’. The judge may also use any technical
device enabling communication with the person. Article 102 CCP
grants the assisted witness the same guarantees. Furthermore, the
parties, including the person under judicial examination, may take the
initiative. The first paragraph of Article 82-1 CCP states that ‘in the
course of the investigation the parties may file with the investigating
judge a written and reasoned application (...) for any other step to be
taken which seems to them necessary for the discovery of the truth’.
122 Art. D594-1 CCP.
123 Art. 116 CCP.
124 Art. 113-3 (2) CCP.
125 Relating to the assisted witness and to the person under judicial examination
by reference to this provision in Article 121 CCP.
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The request for interpretation may be made within this framework. 126
The second paragraph of Article 82-1 CCP adds that, ‘ the
investigating judge must make a reasoned order within one month
from receiving the application, when he decides not to grant it’.
In French law, no remedy is available against acts carried out within
the framework of an investigation supervised by the district prosecutor
that does not lead to the opening of a judicial investigation. Therefore,
the following paragraphs only relate to remedies against acts carried out
in the framework of a judicial investigation. Following a request for
interpretation made by the person under judicial examination (in the
framework of Article 82-1 CCP), ‘where the investigating judge fails
to decide on the application within one month, the party may apply
directly to the president of the investigating chamber, who decides
(...)’. 127 In addition, the parties (including the person under judicial
examination) may lodge an appeal against the investigating judge’s
orders delivered under Article 82-1. In this case, the investigating
chamber’s president ‘rules, by an order not susceptible of appeal,
whether or not to refer this appeal to the investigating chamber’. 128
An action of nullity may also be lodged. 129 In principle, for the
nullity to be pronounced, the provisions of Article 802 CCP require
the proof of actual damage to the interests of the party concerned.
Case law tempers this principle by admitting damage inherent to
certain violations (automatic nullity exempting from proving damage).
According to established case law, it is the case in the event of a
breach of the rights of the defence. It was also ruled that the
unjustified absence of an interpreter where there was some doubt
‘about the suspect’s understanding of the proceedings, [was] likely to
irremediably breach the rights of the defence’. 130 In such a case, the
sanction is the nullity of the act and the subsequent cancellation 131 of
any reference to the nullified acts in the case file.
126 Cass. Crim. (Court of Cassation) 25 May 2005, Bull. Crim. no 157, quoted by
J Pradel, Procédure pénale (Paris, Cujas, 2015) 697.
127 Art. 81 final para CCP (referring to art. 82-1 CCP).
128 Art. 186-1 CCP.
129 See supra Section 4.1 Restrictions on the right to access the case file.
130 Cass. Crim. (Court of Cassation) 9 Feb. 2016, no15-84277.
131 The elements unlawfully obtained must be rendered unreadable.
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4.4. Decisions finding that there is no need for translation
In principle, the suspected or prosecuted person has a right to the
translation of documents that are essential to their defence and to the
fairness of their trial. Unless they expressly waive this right, these
essential documents must be handed over to them or notified, as
prescribed under the CCP. 132 The latter provides a list of documents
that must be automatically translated 133 (eg minutes of the first
appearance before the investigating judge, orders relating to detention
under remand, committals for trial). Additional documents may also
be translated. Article D594-6 CCP states that, on their own initiative
or at the person’s request, the district prosecutor and the investigating
judge may order the translation of a document that they consider
essential to the exercise of the defence and to the fairness of the trial.
These may include rulings on the requests made by the person under
judicial examination, official reports of interrogations and
confrontations, etc. 134 However, translation may be restricted, as
stated in Article D594-7 of the CCP:
`The translation of essential documents may relate only to the
passages of such documents which are relevant in order to enable
the person to know the facts alleged against them. The relevant
passages of such documents are determined, depending on the
stage of the proceedings, by the district prosecutor, by the
investigating judge (...)’.
As far as an order refusing the person’s release from detention is
concerned, the sole reasons for the decision may suffice. 135
Furthermore, ‘an oral translation or an oral summary of the essential
documents’ 136 that must be delivered or notified to the suspected or
prosecuted person may also suffice.
In French law, no remedy is available against acts carried out within
the framework of an investigation supervised by the district prosecutor,
which is not followed by a judicial investigation. Therefore, the
following paragraphs only relate to remedies against acts carried out
132 Preliminary Art. CCP (III).
133 Art. D594-6 CCP.
134 C Guéry, Dalloz action Droit et pratique de l’instruction préparatoire (Paris,
Dalloz, 2015) para 143.74, <http://www.dalloz.fr>.
135 Ibid.
136 Art. 803-5 CCP.
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in the framework of a judicial investigation. Similarly to what is
provided for the right to interpretation, remedies are available
following a refusal to a request for translation made by the person
under judicial examination (within the framework of Article 82-1 of
the CCP). 137 The appeal against the investigating judge’s refusal is
admissible even where the investigating judge has not replied in the
form of an order. 138 An action of nullity is possible as well. It seems
that the action of nullity before the investigating chamber, which is
available to the person under judicial examination and to the assisted
witness, is possible where there has been a breach of the right to
translation. 139
Interviewing stakeholders within the framework of this research
showed that only committals for trial are translated in practice. The
other documents subject to translation under the CCP are not
translated. 140 In addition, contrary to what is stated in the CCP, 141 in
practice, oral translation seems to be the rule, and written translation,
the exception. This misreading, as much on the part of judges as on
the part of lawyers, is naturally detrimental to the effectiveness of the
right to translation. Thus, a more effective communication about the
substance of this right during the practitioners’ continuing education
would seem appropriate.
4.5. Violations of the right to information
Within the framework of an investigation supervised by the district
prosecutor, according to Article 61-1 CCP, the suspect must be informed
of the nature of the offence prior to a voluntary hearing: ‘If the course of
the investigation allows for it, where a summons is addressed to the
person for the purpose of their hearing, this summons mentions the
offence alleged against them’. The person under police custody is
informed ‘immediately’ of the offence at the time of their placement
in custody. 142 The legal qualification of the matters must appear on
137 See above Section 4.3 Decisions finding that there is no need for
interpretation.
138 Cass. Crim. (Court of Cassation) 4 Nov. 2015, no 15-84.012. In this case, the
judge replied in the form of a simple letter.
139 See supra Section 4.1 Restrictions on the right to access the case file.
140 Art. D594-6 CCP.
141 Art. 803-5 (3) CCP.
142 Art. 63-1 CCP.
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the official report 143 under penalty of nullity. 144 Within the framework
of a judicial investigation, at the end of the first appearance, the judge
informs the person placed under judicial examination of ‘the matters
or the legal qualification of the matters of which he is accused, if
these matters or their legal qualification differ from those of which he
has previously been informed’. 145 At the other end of the process,
‘the indictment order contains, under penalty of nullity, a presentation
and the legal qualification of the matters to which the accusation
relates’. 146 The order must indicate ‘the legal qualification of the
actions he is charged with and state precisely the grounds for which
there is or is not sufficient evidence against him’. 147 The assisted
witness gets similar information. ‘During his first hearing as an
assisted witness, the investigating judge [...] informs him of the initial
submission, the complaint or the denunciation’. 148
There does not seem to be any specific remedy relating to the right
to information. The action of nullity available to the person under
judicial examination and to the assisted witness is possible. 149 The
criminal chamber of the Court of Cassation has considered that the
absence of a letter of rights necessarily causes damage to the person’s
interests, if it isn’t justified by any insurmountable circumstances.
Therefore, that person does not need to prove damage. 150 In addition,
during the interrogation of first appearance before the investigating
judge, the compulsory formalities, including the information of the
right to a lawyer, of the right to interpretation and of the right to
translation, 151 must be observed under penalty of nullity of the act
itself and of the later stages of proceedings. 152
Because no other remedy seems available as regards the right to
information, the length of the proceedings before the investigating
chamber (action of nullity) seems particularly detrimental to the
143 Procès-verbal.
144 Cass. Crim. (Court of Cassation) 16 June 2015, no 14-87.878, quoted by F
Saint-Pierre (n 65) para 55.
145 Art. 116 CCP.
146 Art. 181 CCP relating to serious crimes (crimes punishable by a maximum
prison sentence longer than ten years).
147 Art. 184 CCP.
148 Art. 113-4 CCP.
149 Art. 173 CCP.
150 Eg Cass. Crim. (Court of Cassation) 2 May 2002, no 01-88453, relating to
police custody.
151 Art. 116 CCP.
152 Cass. Crim. (Court of Cassation) 15 March 1973, Bull. Crim. no 134.
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efficiency of this right. In addition, interviewing stakeholders within the
framework of this research has revealed a lack of consistency in
practices, which is regrettable. It seems that templates of official
reports for hearings, which support the effectiveness of the right to
information, are made available to judicial police officers.
Nevertheless, it appears that these templates are not made available to
investigating judges. A generalisation of these good practices, and of
those in place as regards summons to voluntary hearings, 153 would
seem beneficial.
5. Sanctions against illegal or improperly obtained evidence
In French law, rules governing the admissibility and use of
evidence require the judge to verify whether it has been gathered
in accordance with the law. The judge cannot base any ruling on
evidence that has been annulled. In criminal matters, the question
related to the admissibility of evidence does not fall within the
compe tence of t r i a l cou r t s o f f i r s t i n s t ance , bu t o f the
investigating chamber in case of a judicial investigation. Thus,
Article 170 CCP provides that ‘in the course of the investigation
the investigating chamber may in any matter be referred for
annulment a procedural instrument or procedural document by the
investigating judge, by the district prosecutor, by the parties or by
an assisted witness’.
In this case, three types of nullity are likely to invalidate evidence
that has been illegally gathered. First of all, some evidence can be
discarded due to a nullity of public order of the nullified act without
it being necessary to show that it was caused by a grievance. For
example, the kind of evidence concerned would be that obtained in
the framework of an improper arrest. In this hypothesis, the criminal
chamber of the Court of Cassation maintains that documents for
which the arrest is the main medium must be annulled 154 or even the
execution of an investigative act by the judicial police that had no
prior authorisation from the public prosecutor. 155
Subsequently, some evidence may be discarded because of a
substantial nullity of private order invalidating the act on condition
153 See supra Section 4.2 Derogations on the right to access a lawyer.
154 For example Cass Crim (Court of Cassation), 22 June 2000, Bull Crim no242.
155 Based on Art. 77-1-1 CCP.
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that the latter caused a grievance to the claimant. 156 For example, the
criminal chamber of the Court of Cassation maintained that the error
consisting in not notifying a person officially in a report of his/her
rights is a cause for nullity as it is in violation of the interests of the
person concerned. 157
Finally, legal precedence considers that certain violations of rights
are cause for nullity without it being necessary to show a grievance,
being of a nullity of private interest classed with those of a public
order. Thus the Court of Cassation maintains that ‘the principle of
equality of arms resulting from a fair and adversarial procedure,
obliges that the parties of the criminal trial have the same rights; that
it must be so and especially in the case of one party’s lawyer being
present at the hearing of an expert carried out upon request and in the
presence of the public prosecutor’. 158
Nevertheless, it is the case that ‘all grounds for the annulment of the
procedure transmitted to it must, without prejudice of the court’s right to
raise them of its own motion, be then submitted to it. Failing such
submission, the parties are not permitted to raise them except where
they could not have known about them’. 159
5.1. Infringements to the right of access the case file
At the moment of police custody, there cannot be any nullity for the
moment according to French law, which remains refractory to give
access to the file during this measure. Thus, despite the transposition
of Directive 2012/2013/EU on the right to information in criminal
proceedings by a 2 June 2014 Act, the question of the right of access
to the full penal file remains. Thus, in a 21 October 2015 judgment,
the criminal chamber of the Court of Cassation made it very clear that
‘the failure to communicate to the lawyer of the person in custody all
the documents of the procedure is not such as to deprive him/her of
an effective and concrete right to a fair trial as the access to these
documents is guaranteed before the investigating and trial courts’. 160
So far, only a few jurisdictions have attempted to move the lines by
canceling the custody of an accused whose lawyer had not been able
156 Art. 171 CCP.
157 Cass Crim (Court of Cassation), 6 December 1995, Bull Crim no369.
158 Cass Crim (Court of Cassation), 11 May 2010, appeal no 10-80953.
159 Art. 174 CCP.
160 Cass crim (Court of Cassation), 21 October 2015, appeal no 15-81032.
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to consult the police investigation record during this measure. 161
However, they have never been followed by the Criminal Chamber.
It is therefore necessary to await the implementation of Directive
2013/48/EU, which requires the lawyer to play an active role during
interview, which seems to imply access to the file from the beginning
of police custody. During the investigation, Article 197, paragraph 3
CCP provides that the case file is available to the lawyer. However,
this right of access to the file is considered as an absolute right by the
Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation. Thus, in a judgment on
11 May 2000, the Court held that Article 197 paragraph 3 CCP states
that a party’s lawyer should be given access to the investigation file
and should produce any statements before the investigating Chamber,
and that this provision had to be observed or risk nullity. 162
5.2. Statements obtained in breach of the right to access a lawyer
Breaches of the right to access a lawyer constitute an ‘automatic’
nullity, which can be pronounced without a grievance. A violation
leads to the annulment of the defective act without it being necessary
to show that it caused a grievance. For example, in a 5 November
2013 decision, the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation held
that ‘hearings taken after the defendant sought legal assistance were
irregular’, so that it was for the Chamber ‘to annul them and, if
necessary, to extend the effects of that annulment to the acts of which
they were the necessary support’. 163
5.3. Breaches of the right to translation and interpretation
Article 63-1 CCP stipulates that ‘a person in police custody shall be
informed immediately by a judicial police officer or, under his or her
supervision, by a judicial police officer in a language he/she
understands, and if necessary, by means of the form provided for in
the thirteenth paragraph: [...] – ‘when appropriate, the right to be
assisted by an interpreter’.
The unjustified absence of an interpreter, while doubts exist ‘as to
the suspect’s understanding of the proceedings, is likely to compromise
161 See for instance Criminal Court of Paris, 30 December 2013.
162 Cass Crim (Court of Cassation), 11 May 2000, appeal no 10-81313.
163 Cass Crim (Court of Cassation), 5 November 2013, appeal no 13-82682.
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irremediably the rights of the defence’. 164 In such a case, the sanction is
the nullity of the police custody and the cancellation (the elements
obtained illegally must be made illegible) of any mention relating to
the acts declared null and void.
Similarly, Article 706-71 paragraph 7 CCP provides that ‘in the
event of necessity arising from the impossibility for an interpreter to
travel, the assistance of the interpreter during a hearing, interview or
c o n f r o n t a t i o n m a y a l s o b e c a r r i e d o u t b y me a n s o f
telecommunications’. The jurisprudence of the Criminal Chamber of
the Court of Cassation demands that this impossibility be ascertained
in the minutes of notification of the rights of the detainee.
Consequently, in the absence of a reference to the inability of the
interpreter to move to custody, the proceedings are punishable by
nullity. 165 The same applies if there were no circumstances that
would justify the impossibility of appealing to another interpreter than
the one requested. 166
5.4. Failure to provide information about rights and about accusation
Article 63-1 CCP stipulates that ‘a person in police custody shall be
informed immediately by a judicial police officer or, under his or her
supervision, by a judicial police officer in a language he/she
understands, and if necessary, by means of the form provided for in
the thirteenth paragraph: (1) Placement in police custody, as well as
the duration of the measure and the extension or extensions to which
it may be subjected; (2) The alleged qualification, date and place of
the offense which he/she is suspected of having committed or
attempted to commit, and the grounds referred to in paragraphs 1 to 6
of Article 62-2 justifying his placement in custody; (3) the fact that
he/she benefits from: - the right.’
Again, any breach of the rules governing the granting of the rights
of the defence within police custody renders the measure null and void.
For example, the absence of notification of rights 167 and of information
on all offenses alleged to have been committed 168 is considered by the
Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation as necessarily infringing
164 Cass Crim (Court of Cassation), 9 February 2016, appeal no 15-84277.
165 Cass 1st Civ. (Court of Cassation), 12 May 2010, no 10-81.249.
166 Cass Crim (Court of Cassation), 3 December 1996, appeal no 96-84503.
167 Cass Crim (Court of Cassation), 2 May 2002, appeal no 01-88453.
168 Cass Crim (Court of Cassation), 16 June 2015, appeal no 14-87878.
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the interests of the person concerned from the moment when no
insurmountable circumstances justify it, so that he/she does not have
to show that he/she has suffered a grievance. Consequently, there is a
nullity of police custody and of the acts of which it was the necessary
support.
6. Appeals against conviction and sentence
Article 380-1, paragraph 1 CCP states that ‘convictions rendered by
the Assize Court in first trial may be appealed.’ by the defendant. 169
However, the appeal is admissible only if it concerns all the penal
provisions; in other words, it is inadmissible if it concerns only the
conviction decision or the sentencing provisions of the judgment. 170
The defendant must lodge the appeal within ten days from the
delivery of the judgment under Article 380-9 CCP. However, by way
of exception, if the public prosecutor a party other than the defendant
is the first to appeal within this ten-day period, the defendant will
have an additional five days for cross-appeal. 171 In such a case, the
defendant has a period of fifteen days after the delivery of the
judgment to appeal.
If the procedural conditions are respected, a new Assize Court will
be designated by the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation. 172 In
this way, it is called a turning appeal, because the appeal is brought
before another Assize Court. In this case, the composition of the
Assize Court of Appeal is different: whereas in the first trial it is
made of three professional judges and six citizens, it is composed of
three professional judges and nine citizens in appeal.
The appellate court, as a court of second instance, undertakes its
review both on the merits and on the law. In the event of an appeal to
a new Assize Court, there is an effect of devolution, which means
that the latter must re-examine the whole case. To do so, it examines
both the ‘old’ evidence, that is, the evidence on which relied the
Assize Court in the first trial for its decision, as well as the ‘new’
169 In addition to the defendant, one of the people who the arrest may have been a
grievance appeal against the latter (Art. 380-5 CCP). The prosecutor general may also
appeal against decisions of acquittal (Art. 380-2 (2) CCP) and declarations of absence
of responsability due to mental illness (Art. 703-132 (1) CCP).
170 Cass Crim (Court of Cassation), 2 February 2005, Bull. no 39.
171 Art. 380-10 CCP.
172 Art. 380-14 (1) CCP.
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pieces of evidence, that is, those that that could be brought to the debate
in the appeal.
However, it must be added that the President of the Assize Court
has certain powers, both in the preparatory and trial stages. Thus, in
the preparatory phase, Article 283 CCP provides that ‘the president, if
the investigation is incomplete or if new evidence has been revealed
since its closure, can demand any acts of information he/she considers
useful’, such as expert opinions or interviews.
It must be added however, that the President of the appellate court
also has discretion in the trial. Indeed, according to Article 310 CCP, ‘he
may, in his honor and conscience, take whatever measures he believes to
be necessary to discover the truth’. In such a case, the President may
order expert opinions or transport to the premises, as well as a
hearing of witnesses who have not been acquainted with the
proceedings and be provided with any new material ‘which appears to
him, according to the developments given to him during the audience,
useful to the manifestation of the truth’.
The courts of appeal cannot annul a decision given in first trial, this
power being limited to the Court of Cassation. The Assize Courts of
Appeal may reverse the decision of the first trial (for example, an
Assize Court of Appeal may pronounce an acquittal when the accused
was convicted in first trial and vice versa). The Assize Courts of
Appeal also have the possibility, on the basis of Articles 662 to 667-1
CCP, to refer the case to another court of the same order and to the
same degree.
The reasons for dismissal are the following: legitimate
suspicion, 173 public safety, 174 interruption of the course of justice, 175
detention of the accused in another place, 176 and finally the proper
administration of justice. 177 Apart from these assumptions, no referral
is possible.
7. Appeals in cassation
As regards the time limits for bringing an action before the Court of
Cassation, Article 568 CCP provides that ‘the public prosecutor and all
173 Art. 662 CCP.
174 Art. 665 (1) CCP.
175 Art. 665-1 and 667-1 CCP.
176 Art. 664 CCP.
177 Art. 665 (2) CCP.
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the parties shall have five clear days after the date on which the
contested decision was made in cassation’. As regards a possible
appeal to the European Court of Human Rights, the applicant must
have exhausted domestic remedies and filed his complaint within six
months from the date of the final domestic decision. 178
As regards a possible review of the case when a new fact or
unknown facts emerge at the time of the trial, no time limit is
imposed on the applicant to file his application. In other words, there
is no time limit for appeal in this matter, the application simply
having to be addressed to the Court of Revision and Review,
composed of magistrates of the Court of Cassation. The case can be
examined even if there has already been an appeal in cassation.
The role of the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation is
to examine whether the decision submitted to it is in conformity
with the rules of law. Indeed, it must review only the legality of
decisions rendered in so far as it does not rule in fact but only in
law. For this reason, it is considered not to constitute a third
degree of jurisdiction.
The Court of Cassation does not have the possibility to reverse
the decision of the appellate court in so far as it only decides on the
law. The Court of Cassation, however, has the power to annul the
decision of the appellate court, either in its entirety or only in
part, depending on whether the nullity vitiates all or some of the
provisions of the judgment. Moreover, the Court of Cassation has
the power, when it pronounces a judgment of cassation and
annulment in whole or in part of the decision, to refer the parties
to a court of the same order and degree as that which rendered the
annulled decision. 179 However, the Court of Cassation, in the
event of an annulment, has the possibility of not making any
refer ra l , in par t icular when the fac ts a l low i t to use the
appropriate rule of law.
8. Access to Constitutional Courts
In a criminal trial, the defendant may have access to constitutional
courts. Article 61 (1) of the Constitution provides that ‘when, in
proceedings before a court, it is maintained that a legislative provision
178 Art. 35 ECHR.
179 Art. 610 CCP.
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infringes the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, the
Constitutional Council may be seized of this matter upon referral
from the Council of State or the Court of Cassation, which shall take
a decision within a specified period’. This is called the ‘priority
question of constitutionality’ (PQC).
As stated in Article 61 (1) of the Constitution, the PQC can only be
raised in the context of an ongoing proceeding. Moreover, according to
the PQC application of the 24 February 2010 circular, only the parties to
the criminal trial, as well as the assisted witness and the prosecution, can
raise a priority question. This question may be raised during the
investigation or before the trial court, with the exception, however, of
the Assize Court sitting in first trial. Article R49-25 CCP provides
that ‘the court shall decide without delay, in accordance with the rules
of procedure applicable to it, on the transmission of the priority
question of constitutionality’ to the Court of Cassation.
If the court refuses to refer the matter to the Court of Cassation, this
means that it implicitly recognizes the constitutionality of the provision
criticized by way of preliminary ruling; if, on the contrary, it decides to
refer the matter to the Court of Cassation, the proceedings in progress
are suspended and it is necessary to delay the decision of the Court of
Cassation or even that of the Constitutional Council Court if it is in
turn referred to the Court of Cassation.
If the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation refers a PQC, the
Constitutional Council shall rule within a period of three months. The
procedure may lead to three different outcomes. First, the
Constitutional Council considers at the end of its examination that the
provision is in conformity with the Constitution. In such a case, that
provision remains in the domestic legal order and the court must
apply it, unless it finds it incompatible with a provision of an
international treaty or Union law. Second, the Constitutional Council
declares that the impugned provision is contrary to the Constitution.
In this case, and according to Article 62 of the Constitution, this
provision is ‘repealed from the publication of the decision of the
Constitutional Council or a later date fixed by that decision. The
Constitutional Council shall determine the conditions and limits within
which the effects which the provision has produced are liable to be
called into question’. Third, the Constitutional Council decides to
resort to the technique of interpretation reservations. In other words, it
declares a contested provision to be in conformity with the
Constitution, provided that this provision is interpreted or applied in
the manner that it indicates.
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9. EAW and judicial review
9.1. Competent judicial authorities
The Public Prosecutor’s Office, as well as the investigating judge or
sentencing court, which has issued an arrest warrant, is the competent
authority to issue a European Arrest Warrant (EAW). 180 The General
Public Prosecutor is the competent executing authority in France. 181
9.2. Judicial review by the French executing authorities
Articles 695-27 CCP (information provided by the General
Attorney in a language that the person understands) and 695-30 CCP
(assistance of an interpreter if necessary) provide for the presence of
an interpreter when necessary. These previsions refer to the provisions
of the preliminary article of the French CCP which, since the 5
August 2013 law, demands for this assistance. In such a case, the
interpreter must be able to be present ‘until the end of the
proceedings (...) including interviews with his lawyer which are
directly related to any questioning or hearing and, unless expressed
and informed renunciation by him, to the translation of the essential
documents to the exercise of his defence and to the fairness of the
trial, which must therefore be handed over to him or notified under
this Code’. 182
This provision is relayed by the provisions of Article 803-5 CCP,
which requires the verification of the level of French of the individual
in case of doubt on his understanding of the language and which,
exceptionally, authorizes:
‘an oral translation or an oral summary of the essential documents
to be delivered or notified to him. The lack of interpretation or its
quality may be challenged by the person who then makes
observations which are either mentioned in the minutes of the
hearing, examination or in the notes of the hearing if they are
made immediately be placed in the record of the proceedings if
they are subsequently filed’. 183
180 Art. 695-16 CCP.
181 Art. 695-26 CCP.
182 Preliminary Article CCP (III) para. 3.
183 Art. D594-2 CCP.
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French law does not however, expressly provide for the possibility
of appeal in relation to the written translation of the aforementioned
documents as it does for interpretation. 184 The case law does not
appear to have had such a dispute. Nevertheless, the judge would
probably decide in favor of this appeal: either by analogy (using
Article D594-2 CCP), either by resorting to substantive nullity or by
giving reasons for its decision on the provisions of the ECHR.
The French CCP provides that a document setting out all the rights
of the person arrested shall be given to him/her at the time of notification
of the measure. The person can keep it until the end of the measurement.
If the document is not available in the language he/she understands, oral
information shall be provided and a written document shall be given to
the person as soon as possible. 185
The previously cited Article 803-6 CCP provides for the assistance
of a lawyer during the entire surrender procedure. The hypothesis of
derogations from the right to legal assistance in proceedings relating
to the execution of the EAW is not specifically provided for in the
CCP. However, it may be considered that the postponement of the
assistance of the lawyer provided for in certain procedures (in
particular in the event of acts of terrorism) could apply. The
jurisprudence has also considered that the strike of members of the
Bar constituted an insurmountable circumstance that could validate a
hearing during which the accused is not assisted by a lawyer. The
motivation is threefold: the Council of the Order has not been able to
appoint a lawyer because of a strike whose outcome is not
determined; the national and European texts require a reasonable
period of time; the person being imprisoned in France and claimed by
Belgium, a date of surrender has already been foreseen. The referral
of the case is therefore prevented because of the ‘imperative need to
ensure the continuity of the course of justice’ and ‘in the state of the
insurmountable circumstance that constitutes the strike of lawyers’. 186
Article 695-22, 5° CCP provides for a compulsory ground for
refusal, which is mentioned only in recital 12 of the framework-
decision: ‘If it is established that the arrest warrant was issued for the
purpose to prosecute or convict a person on account of his or her sex,
race, religion, ethnic origin, nationality, language, political opinion or
184 Art. D594-2 CCP.
185 Art. 803-6 CCP.
186 Nabil X..., Cass Crim (Court of Cassation), 8 July 2015, cassation application
no 14-86399, not published and cassation application no 14-86400, Bull. 177.
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sexual orientation or gender identity, or that this person may be
adversely affected for any of these reasons’. Moreover, French
national judicial authorities do not refuse the execution of an EAW
because of the conditions of detention in the issuing Member State.
At most, they ask for further information in order to ensure that the
conditions of detention correspond to European standards. 187 This
practice corresponds to the requirements of the Aranyosi judgment in
which the CJEU insists on additional information and objective
checks to be carried out in a concrete and precise manner.
With regard to the execution of a decision rendered in absentia, the
surrender procedure in respect of a person who has been judged by
default is more restrictive since the 5 August 2013 Act no 2013-711.
A priori, the existence, in the issuing State of the EAW, of a trial by
default prohibits the surrender of the person. However, according to
Article 695-22-1 CCP, the surrender of a person may be authorized in
the following cases: if the person was informed unambiguously or had
been represented in the proceedings in the issuing State (subparagraph
1 and 2); where, having received the signification of the decision and
being informed that a new procedure allowing a further examination
on the merits, he/she did not wish to appeal (subparagraph 3); if the
issuing State undertakes to notify the court of its decision and to
inform him/her of the time-limits for appeal (subparagraph 4), in
accordance with the conditions described in subparagraph 3. French
law therefore respects the idea that the person sought and then
surrendered must Benefit the right to a new trial where the EWA was
issued for the purpose of executing a conviction rendered in absentia.
In this respect, the rules explained in the French CCP are equivalent
to those proposed by the Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA as
amended by the Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA.
Moreover, French law provides for two requirements concerning
the notification of a copy of the judgment in absentia, which do not
exactly correspond to the purpose referred to above. Before the
surrender, the individual fills in an application. He/she may ‘receive’
a copy of the decision taken by the issuing State which has led to a
conviction after having made a request to the General Attorney who
has to transmit it to the foreign authorities. The copy of the decision
is then delivered to the individual for information. This is a simple
communication, does not constitute the starting point of the time limit
187 See Cass Crim (Court of Cassation), 10 August 2016, cassation application no
16-84725.
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for lodging an appeal again the conviction. 188 In addition, prior to the
surrender, the issuing State undertakes to notify the individual, as
soon as he/she is surrendered, of the conviction and to inform him/her
of the time-limits for appeal 189 respecting the conditions described in
subparagraph 3 of the same article.
188 Art. 695-27, in fine CCP.
189 Art. 695-22-1, 4° CCP.
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1. Constitutional guarantees
The Grundgesetz (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany,
BL) 2 does not expressly guarantee the right to access a court. However,
1 The authors would like to thank the participants to the interviews conducted for
the present research and Frédéric Salewski for his helpful work.
2 Hereinafter BL (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany from 23. May
1949).
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many aspects of the right to access a court are contained in other
constitutional provisions or derived from them. Most importantly, the
legal protection guarantee is provided in Article 19 IV BL. Pursuant
the provision, if any person’s rights are violated by the public
authority, he may have access to the courts. Article 19 (4) BL reads:
‘Should any person’s rights be violated by public authority, he may
have recourse to the courts. If no other jurisdiction has been
established, recourse shall be to the ordinary courts. The second
sentence of paragraph (2) of Article 10 shall not be affected by this
paragraph’. The same applies to the right to appeal. In German
constitutional law does not expressly enshrine the right to appeal,
which is mainly codified in statutory law. 3 But it can also be derived
from the legal protection guarantee in Art. 19 IV BL. 4 It is
noteworthy, however, Germany did not ratified Article 2 of the
Protocol 7 of the ECHR, which provides the right to appeal against
convictions and sentences. 5
Likewise, the right to review the lawfulness of detention is also not
directly guaranteed by German constitutional law, yet it can be derived
from Art. 2 II 2 BL. 6 According to the provision, ‘Every person shall
have the right to life and physical integrity. Freedom of the person
shall be inviolable. These rights may be interfered with only pursuant
to a law’. This Article protects the freedom of the person and
therefore it is always touched (but not necessarily violated) in case of
a detent ion . There i s extens ive case law of the German
Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) 7 on this
topic. 8 Further, the principle of proportionality, which applies to all
coercive measures (including detention) is derived from the BL. 9
Moreover, the rights to an effective judicial remedy and the right to
3 See especially sections 304 ff. of the Code of Criminal Procedure; hereinafter
CCP.
4 C Enders, in V Epping, C Hilgruber (eds), Beck’scher Online-Kommentar
Grundgesetz (33rd edn, 01.06. 2017), Art. 19 GG n 74.
5 R Esser, Textbuch Deutsches Recht, Europäisches und Internationales
Strafrecht (3rd edn, 2017, Munich, C.F. Müller), A 40d 7. ZP EMRK.
6 H-H Kühne, Strafprozessrecht: eine systematische Darstellung des deutschen
und europäischen Strafverfahrensrechts (9th edn, 2015, Heidelberg, C.F.Müller), §
24, n 402.
7 Hereinafter BVerfG.
8 See only BVerfG, JR 2014, 488; BVerfG, StV 2013, 640; BVerfG, StV 2008,
198; OLG Hamburg, Judgment of 21.07.2016 – 2 Ws 146/ 16, StV 2016, 824.
9 H-H Kühne (n 6) § 24, n 406.
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access a court are guaranteed by the principle of fair trial in Article 6 of
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 10
Finally, the German system incorporates the ECHR in an
ambiguous way. In the constitutional framework, the ECHR does not
have constitutional value. 11 It is only valid as statutory law.
Nonetheless, the German BVerfG held that the entirety of the BL’s
provisions are to be interpreted as consistently as possible with
international law (principle of Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit). 12
Therefore, the legislature has to take the ECHR into account. 13 In
practice, this puts the ECHR and the case law of the ECtHR on a
higher rank than the requirements of the BL. This landmark decision
has partially been implemented into the BL by Article 25 of the BL.
According to the provision, ‘The general rules of international law
shall be an integral part of federal law. They shall take precedence
over the laws and directly create rights and duties for the inhabitants
of the federal territory’.
2. Investigative measures subject to prior judicial authorization
2.1. Competent judicial authorities and scope of review
The most important investigative measures are regulated in the
Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP). In general, coercive investigative
acts must be ordered by judge or by court. For instance, searches can
only be ordered by a judge. 14 The order should be given in written
form. In urgent cases, the order can be given verbally and even by
call. 15 The order has to indicate the offence and the basis of
10 B Valerius, in J-P Graf (ed), Beck’scher Online-Kommentar StPO mit RiStBV
und Mistra (BeckOK StPO) 27th edn 1.1.2017, EMRK Art. 6 n 5-8.
11 B Weißer, in R Schulze, M Zuleeg, S Kadelbach (eds), Europarecht –
Handbuch für die deutsche Rechtspraxis (3rd edn, 2015, Baden-Baden, Nomos),
second part: Besonderer Teil § 42 Strafrecht n 99-101.
12 M Hartwig, Völkerrechtliche Praxis der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2010
(2013) Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (ZaöRV),
735; Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitituional Court, BVerfG) Judgment of
4.5.2011, 2 BvR 2365/09, 1 BvR 740/10, n 92 ff.
13 M Hartwig (n 12) 735; BVerfG Judgment of 4.5.2011, 2 BvR 2365/09, 2 BvR
740/10, n 92 ff.
14 Section 105 CCP.
15 B Schmitt, in L Meyer-Goßner, B Schmitt (eds), Strafprozessordnung:
Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, Nebengesetze und ergänzende Bestimmungen (60th edn,
2017, Munich, C.H. Beck) § 105, n 3.
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suspicions. 16 Likewise, only a court has the power to order seizure, 17
usually without prior hearing of the suspect. 18 The order of the court
has to be issued in form of a written and reasoned decision. 19 A
physical examination of the accused may be ordered for the purposes
of establishing facts, which are of importance for the proceedings. 20
The authority to give such an order (prosecutor or police officers)
shall be vested by the judge. 21 The order can be given verbally at
first, 22 provided that the judge subsequently issues a written decision
stating the reasons, the facts and the concrete examination. 23 There
are currently reform proposals, allowing that the order can only be
given by the prosecution office. 24 Without the written consent of the
person concerned, molecular and genetic examinations may only be
ordered by a court. 25 The written order must include the concrete
charge, the reasons and the intention. 26 In principle, the use of an
undercover investigator is admissible with the consent of the public
prosecution office. 27 However, if the undercover investigation
concerns a specific accused individual, or involves the undercover
investigator entering private premises not generally accessible, the
authorization of the court is required. 28
The competent judicial authority verifies whether the legal
requirements are fulfilled and the proportionality of the measure. This
principle applies to all measures of law enforcement and is derived
from the BL. 29 Proportionality requirements is expressly codified
with regard to detention. 30 In case of undercover investigations,
review encompasses whether other means of investigating the serious
16 Ibid § 105, n 5, 5a.
17 W Meindel, M Andrä, in H Vordermayer, B Heintschel-Heinegg (eds),
Handbuch für den Staatsanwalt (5th edn, 2016) n 37 ff.; Section 98 s1 CCP.
18 Section 33 s4 of the CCP; B Schmitt (n 15) § 98, n 8.
19 B Schmitt (n 15) § 98 n 8.
20 Section 81a I CCP.
21 Section 81 II CCP.
22 BVerfG NJW 2010, 2864, 2865 Rn. 30; B Schmitt (n 15) § 81 a, n 25a.
23 B Schmitt (n 15) § 81 a n 27.
24 LTO, (Legal Tribune Online), <https://www.lto.de/recht/nachrichten/n/bmjv-
reform-richtervorbehalt-blutproben-staatsanwaltschaft-anordnung-polizei/>, last
accessed: 08.28.2017.
25 Section 81f CCP.
26 B Schmitt (n 15) § 81f, n 3.
27 Section 110b I CCP.
28 B Schmitt (n 15) § 110 b n 3; Section 110b II CCP.
29 See supra (n 4).
30 Section 116 CCP.
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criminal offence would offer no prospect of success or hardly
successful. 31
2.2. Exceptions for urgent cases
As an exception, in urgent cases some orders can also be given by
the public prosecution office and in case of even greater urgency, by the
assisting officials (eg police officers). The reasons and the facts, which
const i tu te an urgent case , must be documented (duty of
documentation). 32 The order may be given verbally. The duty of
documentation supports the judicial review and is derived from the
case law of the BVerfG. Particularities exist once again in case of the
use of undercover investigators. In urgent circumstances, consent of
the public prosecution office can be sufficient. 33 Where the decision
of the prosecutorial authorities cannot be obtained in time, the
investigation may be started and the decision shall be obtained
thereafter without delay. The measure must be terminated at once, if
the court does not give its consent within three working days. 34
2.3. Remedies available to the defendant
In the pre-trial stage of criminal proceedings, the remedies available
to the defendant differ depending on whether the measure was subject to
judicial authorisation. First, the defendant has the possibility to lodge a
complaint. Complaints can be submitted against the order authorizing
the measure or against already completed measures. 35 They can be
filed against court decisions that precede the final judgment and do
not involve compulsory measures. 36 Complaints engender a review of
questions regarding both fact and law. They are decided by the court
immediately above the court whose decision is being challenged. 37 A
31 Section 110 a CCP.
32 BVerfG, Judgment 5.3.2012 – 2 BvR 1464/11; BVerfG (2012) in
Strafverteidiger (StV) 2012, 385.
33 Section 110b II CCP.
34 Section 110b II CCP.
35 This is the prevailing opinion in jurisprudence and literature in the case of a
grievous violation on fundamental rights.
36 Section 305 CCP.
37 See especially sections 73, 120 and 135 of the Courts Constitution Act (CCA).
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complaint does not have suspensive effect, unless the court so decides,
and is not subject to any time-limit.
Furthermore, there are some remedies against measures that were
not ordered by a judge or a court. The person concerned by a
measure may at any time apply for a court decision if an official has
executed a measure without a court order (ie in the event of urgent
cases). 38 The scope of the judicial review encompasses the question
whether the legal prerequisites are being observed. 39 Although the
text of the CCP only stipulates a remedy in case of a seizure, this
judicial action applies mutatis mutandis for other measures. 40 The
decision can yield the result that the impugned measure was unlawful.
The applicant can challenge the order authorizing the measure or the
already completed measures. 41
In the case of secret measures, even after completion of the measure
and for up to two weeks following their notification, the accused and
other persons concerned may apply to the competent court for a
review of the lawfulness of the measure, as well as of the manner and
means of its execution. 42 This applies to all secret measures by an
analogy to section 101 VII of the CCP. 43
Finally, there is the possibility to review the lawfulness of
instructions and other measures by judicial authorities. 44 The scope of
application of this remedy is small and the importance in practice is
low. It should be noted, however, that German law does not provide
remedies against certain measures during the pre-trial stage of
proceedings. An example is the refusal of access to the case files
before the termination of the investigations. 45 In these cases, only a
disciplinary complaint is possible. At a later time, such errors in the
pre-trial stage may uphold an appeal on points of law only. Generally,
in the German system, appeals against investigative acts in the pre-
trial stage are not as important as in other legal systems. The evidence
has to be introduced in the main proceeding itself and in front of the
38 Section 98 II 2 CCP.
39 B Schmitt (n 15) § 98 n 17.
40 Ibid § 98 n 23.
41 This is the prevailing opinion in jurisprudence and literature in the case of a
grievous encroachment on fundamental rights.
42 Section 101 VII CCP.
43 Hegmann, in (n 10) , § 101, Rn. 48.
44 Section 23, 28 EGGVG (Introductory Law of the Courts Constitution Act
(ILCCA).
45 B Schmitt (n 15) § 147 n 38, 39.
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court (Prinzip der Unmittelbarkeit , Principle of immediacy). There is no
possibility for the preservation of evidences beforehand under German
Criminal procedure. 46
According to the interviewed practitioners, the above-mentioned
remedies are considered effective and raise rarely problems in
practice. The only difficulty lies in the fact that it is not always
guaranteed that the evidence gathered by means of unlawful measures
is excluded later at the trial stage. 47 This does not result however
from deficiencies in the legal protection provided by remedies
available to the defendant in the investigative stage. It is a direct
consequence of the German system of exclusionary rules. Further
problems, in particular delays in the proceedings, are related to the
shortage of personnel of the police, the courts and the prosecution
offices; this is one consequence of a false policy of austerity for years
and years at the expense of the legal authorities and the police. There
is no improvement of this undesirable development to be expected in
the future. This leads to the courts and the prosecution offices
remaining overloaded with work for the years to come.
3. Deprivation of liberty: arrest and pre-trial custodial measures
3.1. Information about available remedies
In December 2012, the Directives 2010/64/EU and 2012/13/EU
have been implemented in German law through the Gesetz zur
Stärkung der Verfahrensrechte von Beschuldigten. Section 114 b
and 136 CCP are the main legal provisions implementing the
Directive 2012/13/EU. 48 The right of information concerning
available remedies is mainly codified in section 114 b CCP. The
latter implements Article 4 section 3 Directive 2012/13/EU. It
provides that the arrested or accused person must be instructed as
to his rights without delay in writing and in a language, he
understands. 49
46 K Cornelius, ‘Konfrontationsrecht und Unmittelbarkeitsgrundsatz’ (2008)
NStZ, 244.
47 R Günther, in Münchener Kommentar zur Strafprozessordnung (MüKoStPO)
(1st edn 2014, Munich, C.H. Beck), § 100a n 144-146.
48 E Christl, ‘Europäische Mindeststandards für Beschuldigtenrechte – Zur
Umsetzung der EU Richtlinien über Sprachmittlung und Information im
Strafverfahren’ (2014) NStZ 376, 383.
49 Section 114b I 1 CCP.
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Most importantly, in the implementation of Article 4 Section 3, 50
Section 114 b II No. 8 CCP provides that the accused person may, if
remand detention is continued after he is brought before the
competent judge:
a. lodge a complaint against the warrant of arrest or apply for a re-
view of detention and an oral hearing,
b. in the event of inadmissibility of the complaint, make an applica-
tion for a court decision, and
c. make an application for a court decision against official decisions
and measures in the execution of remand detention. 51
At the beginning of the first examination at the investigation
procedure, the accused must be informed promptly with detailed
information about the criminal offence he is suspected of and of the
applicable criminal law provisions. 52 He must be advised that the law
grants him the right to respond to the charges, or not to make any
statement on the charges, and the right, at any stage, even prior to his
examination, to consult with a defence counsel of his choice. 53 He
must further be advised that he may request evidence to be taken in
his defence. In appropriate cases, the accused has to be informed that
he may make a written statement, and of the possibility of
perpetrator-victim mediation. The information is given orally or in
writing and has to be signed by the suspect in acknowledgment of
being informed. 54
3.2. Remand detention and provisional arrest
German criminal procedure provides for a single legal framework
governing arrest and detention pending trail. Thus, a uniform system
of arrest is applied in the pre-trial stage. The law sets forth different
grounds for detention (risk of escape, risk of re-offence and risk of
suppression of evidence), 55 but all reasons have the same legal
consequence with little exceptions. Such an exception is the so-called
provisional arrest. In urgent circumstances, the public prosecution
50 Draft bill of the Federal Ministry no Justice to the implementing the Directives
2012/13 EU and 2010/64/EU, 9.
51 Section 114 b II no 8 CCP.
52 Section 136 I CCP.
53 See supra.
54 Answer of the questioned experts.
55 Compare Sections 112 and 112a CCP.
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office and police officials are authorised to make a provisional arrest if
the legal requirements (ie issuance of an arrest warrant or of a placement
order) have been fulfilled. 56 The arrested person must, without delay,
been brought before the judge of the Local Court in whose district he
was arrested at the latest on the day after his arrest, unless he has
been released. 57 The judge has to interrogate the person brought to
him. He has to give him an opportunity to remove grounds for
suspicion and arrest and to present the facts that speak in his
favour. 58 During the examination, the accused must be informed
about the charges against him, of the applicable criminal law
provisions and of his right to reply to the accusation or to remain
silent. 59
Remand detention must be imposed by the judge in a written arrest
warrant. 60 The issued warrant of arrest shall indicate the following
information: first the name of accused; second, the offence of which
he is strongly suspected, the time and place of its commission, the
statutory elements of the criminal offence and the penal provisions to
be applied; third, the ground for arrest; as well as, fourthly the facts
disclosing the strong suspicion of the offence and the ground for
arrest, unless disclosure would endanger national security. This serves
as guidance to the review carried out by the judge. Furthermore, the
judge should disclose the reasons for his decision. 61
Provisional arrest can basically be ordered in two cases. If a person
is caught in flagrante delicto or is being pursued, any person is
authorized to arrest him provisionally, even without judicial order, if
there is reason to suspect escape or if he cannot be immediately
identified, he may also be provisionally arrested. 62 Furthermore, in
urgent cases, the public prosecution office and officials of the police
force are authorized to make a provisional arrest if the requirements
for the issuance of an arrest warrant or of a placement order have
been fulfilled. 63
56 Section 127 s2 CCP.
57 Section 128 s1 CCP.
58 D Herrmann, in H Satzger, W Schluckebier, G Widmeier (eds), StPO (2nd edn,
2016, Carl Heymanns Verlag) § 119 n 82.
59 U Eisenberg, StPO (9th edn, 2015) § 136 n 743.
60 Section 114 CCP.
61 Section 114 CCP; B Schmitt (n15) § 114 n 15.
62 K M Böhm, E Werner, in MüKoStPO (n 46) § 127 n 5; Section 127 s1 CCP.
63 Section 127 s2 CCP.
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3.3. Review of detention and complaints
There exist two different remedies under German criminal
procedure to ensure the judicial review of provisional arrest: the
review of the detention (Haftprüfung) and the complaint against the
detention (Haftbeschwerde).
In the former case, the court which has ordered detention is
competent to review whether the reasons for continued detention are
still present. 64 As long as the accused is in remand detention, he may
at any time apply for a court hearing. 65 There is no time limit or
formal requirements for such a request. 66 As long as a judgment
imposing imprisonment or a custodial measure of reform and
prevention has not been given, remand detention for one and the same
offence exceeding a period of six months shall be executed only if
there exists a particular difficulty or an unusual length of the
investigation or some other important reason do not yet admit
pronouncement of judgment and justify continuation of remand
detention. 67
An ex–officio review takes place after specific investigations are
concluded, which the judge had ordered because of their importance
for the subsequent decision. 68 The judge may order specific
investigations that may be important for the subsequent decision
concerning continuation of a remand detention. He may conduct a
further review after completion of such investigations. The old
legislative regime - under which an ex officio review had to take
place if the accused person had no defence counsel and detention lasts
for three months without any appeal lodged by the accused to the
competent court - was reformed with the act “zur Änderung des
Untersuchungshaftrechts”. 69 The regulation of this ex-officio review
was voided, as the access to a defence council is now mandatory in
case of detention. 70
The review of detention has no devolutive effect, which means that
the same instance is competent for both issuing the decision to detain
64 Section 117 CCP.
65 Section 117 I CCP.
66 J P Graf, in Karlsruher Kommentar zur Strafprozessordnung (Karlsruher
Kommentar) (7th edn, 2013, Munich, C.H.Beck) § 117 n 3.
67 Section 121 I CCP.
68 Section 117 III CCP; J P Graf (n 65) § 117 n 13.
69 Ibid § 117 n 15.
70 Section 140 I no 4 CCP.
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and reviewing that decision: This is one of the differences between
review of detention and complaint against detention. 71 Another
difference is that in the case of review of detention, the decision has
to be given after an oral hearing upon application by the accused, or
at the court’s discretion proprio motu. 72 Normally, the decision of the
review of detention is delivered faster than after the complaint of
detention, because the oral hearing has to be held without delay.
Unless the accused consents otherwise, it must be scheduled no more
than two weeks after receipt of the application. 73
Further, the accused can lodge a complaint. 74 The complaint must
be addressed to the court that issued the arrest warrant. 75 In case the
Judge(s) intends to deny the revocation of the arrest warrant, the court
has to refer the case to the next higher Instance (generally a Regional
Court), 76 which is competent for the final decision on the
complaint. 77 Generally, the decision is made without an oral hearing,
in appropriate cases after hearing the public prosecution office. 78
Upon application by the accused or on the court’s own motion, a
decision may also be given in the complaint proceedings after an oral
hearing. 79 The court can suspend a warrant of arrest. 80 The scope of
the judicial review is the persistence of the grounds for arrest and of
the concrete criminal charge, the question whether the accused is still
strongly suspected, and the proportionality of detention. 81 Where a
complaint has been lodged against the arrest warrant, a decision may
also be given in the complaint proceedings after an oral hearing upon
application by the accused or on the court’s own motion. 82
Lastly, the detained person has the possibility to apply for the
abrogation of the arrest with the public prosecution office. The
warrant of arrest must also be revoked if the public prosecution office
71 JP Graf (n 65) § 117 n 5.
72 D Herrmann (n 57) § 118 n 1, 2; also Section 118 I CCP.
73 Section 118 V CCP.
74 Section 304 s1 CCP.
75 Section 306 I CCP.
76 Section 73 S. CCP
77 Section 73 s1 of the Courts Constitution Act (hereinafter CCA).
78 Section 309 s1 CCP.
79 C Laue, in D Dölling, G Duttge, S König, D Rössner (eds), Gesamtes
Strafrecht (4th edn, 2017, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden) § 118 CCP n 2; also
Section 118 II CCP.
80 B Schmitt (n15) § 117 n 10.
81 Ibid § 112 n 8.
82 Section 118 II CCP.
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makes the relevant application before public charges have been
preferred. Simultaneously with this application, the public prosecution
office may order the release of the accused. 83
3.4. Defence rights and effective judicial review
The scope of judicial review is large. The judge takes a new,
independent review of the legal requirements of detention. 84 He has
concentrated, comprehensive decision making-competence. He can
uphold, suspend or change the arrest warrant. 85 In particular, the
judge can suspend execution of an arrest warrant justified merely by
a finding of a lack of the risk of escape, if the expectation is
sufficiently substantiated that the purpose of remand detention may
also be achieved by less severe measures. In particular, the
following alternative measures may be considered: first, an
instruction to report at certain times to the judge, the criminal
prosecuting authority, or to a specific designated office; second, an
instruction not to leave his place of residence, or wherever he
happens to be, or a certain area, without the permission of the judge
or the criminal prosecuting authority; thirdly, an instruction not to
leave his private premises except under the supervision of a
designated person; fourthly the furnishing of adequate security by
the accused or another person. 86
The competent reviewing authority may uphold, suspend or change
the arrest warrant, if they find the detention pending trial to be illegal.
They can also order less restrictive measures, for example the ones
enumerated in Section 116 I 2 of the CCP or in Section 116 II 2
CCP. These encompass an instruction not to leave his private
premises except under the supervision of a designated person or the
furnishing of adequate security by the accused or another person.
Further, the instruction not to have contact with co-accused persons,
witnesses, or experts may be considered. The warrant of arrest must
be revoked as soon as the conditions for remand detention no longer
exist, or if the continued remand detention is disproportionate to the
importance of the case or to the anticipated penalty or measure of
83 Section 120 III CCP.
84 J P Graf (n 65) § 117 n 11.
85 Ibid § 117 n 11.
86 P Kotz, in D Burhoff, P Kotz (eds), Handbuch für die strafrechtlichen
Rechtsmittel (2nd edn, 2016, ZAP-Verlag, Bonn) n 843; see also Section 116 I CCP.
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reform and prevention. 87 In particular, it is to be revoked if the accused
is acquitted, or if the opening of the main proceedings is refused, or if
the proceedings are terminated other than provisionally. 88
The person subject to detention pending review has several rights.
He has the right to be informed of the reasons for detention and the right
to access documents. A copy of the arrest warrant has to be handed over
to the accused at the time of his arrest; if he does not have a sufficient
knowledge of the German language, he must be provided with a
translation in a language he understands. 89 If it is not possible to
provide a copy and, where necessary, a translation to be given to him,
he must be informed without delay, in a language he understands, of
the grounds for his arrest and the accusations levied against him. In
that case, the copy of the warrant of arrest and, where necessary, a
translation, must subsequently be given to him without delay. 90
Further, if the accused is apprehended on the basis of the arrest
warrant, he must be brought before the competent court without delay. 91
The person subject to detention pending trail has the right to be
heard in person. As long as the accused is in remand detention, he
may at any time apply for a court hearing to determine whether the
warrant of arrest is to be revoked or its execution suspended. 92 He
has the right to translation 93 and also to interpretation. He must be
instructed as to his rights without delay in written form and in a
language, he understands. 94 The suspect has to be advised in a
language he understands that he may request the assistance of an
interpreter or a translator in for the entire criminal proceedings free of
charge. 95 The person subject to detention pending trail has the right
to legal assistance. The participation of defence counsel is
mandatory. 96 The accused may at any time, also before his
examination, consult with a defence counsel of his choice. 97 During
87 Section 120 I CCP.
88 Section 329 I CCP.
89 Section 114 a CCP.
90 B Schmitt (n 15) n 6, section 114a CCP.
91 Section 115 I CCP.
92 C-M Ulrich, ‘Handlungsmöglichkeiten des Strafverteidigers im
Haftverfahren?’ (1986) StV, 268; Section 117 I CCP.
93 See above.
94 B Wankel, in J Bockemühl (ed), Handbuch des Fachanwalts Strafrecht (7th
edn 2017, Carl Heymann Verlag, Köln) n 111; Section 114b I 1 CCP.
95 Section 114 b II 2 CCP.
96 Section 140 I no 4 CCP.
97 Section 114 b no 4 CCP.
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the judicial examination of the accused, the defence counsel can attend
the hearing. 98 The arrested accused must be instructed as to his rights,
without delay, and in writing, in a language he understands. 99 If written
instruction is clearly insufficient, additional oral instruction must be
given. 100 Further, an arrested accused shall be given an opportunity,
without delay, to notify a relative or a person trusted by him. 101
In sum, the review of detention and the complaint against a
detention are effective remedies. The interviewees stressed that the
review of detention sometimes moves too slowly in the higher
instances. The judge must have the files of the proceeding, as must
the police for their investigation and the defence lawyers. Therefore,
there are significant delays. Because of that, it is possible that, in the
case of an abrogation, the accused person is in detention much longer
than necessary. However, improvements can be expected with the
introduction of the electronic case files. Further, it is problematical
that sometimes the lower instances issue the arrest warrant in spite of
a doubtful body of evidence. All of these, however, are not problems
resulting from the legal setting, but rather from practical execution.
Better equipped personnel in the police services and the courts could
provide a remedy for this.
3.5. Arrest and detention for questioning
In the German criminal procedure, a lawful arrest for questioning
does not exist. Some voices in literature have implied that in some
cases the detention is abused as an arrest for questioning. 102 This is
done against the legislature’s intention and is therefore unlawful. The
questioned national experts, especially the lawyers, have revealed that
this is a problem particularly in the field of commercial criminal law.
In is worth noting, however, that detention may be ordered to force
a witness to testify. Such detention shall not extend beyond the
termination of those particular proceedings, nor beyond a period of
six months. 103 This does expressly not apply to the accused. A
98 Section 115 combined with Section 168 c s1 CCP.
99 Section 114b I 1 CCP.
100 Section 114 b I 2 CCP.
101 Section 114c I CCP.
102 C Roxin, B Schünemann (eds), Strafverfahrensrecht: ein Studienbuch (29th
edn, 2017, Munich, C.H.Beck) 238 ff.
103 Section 70 II CCP.
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suspect acquires the position of an accused when the prosecutor takes
action against him, if this is clearly intended to investigate a criminal
offense. 104 If, however, the public prosecutor only wants to hear him
as a witness, he is entitled to freedom of expression in accordance
with Sections 136, 163a CCP, so that even in the case of a general
statement refusal, detention may be ordered under Section 70 II CCP. 105
4. Specific remedies for alleged breaches of defence rights in the
pre-trial stage of criminal proceedings
4.1. Restrictions on the right to access the case file
Since 19 December 2012, the Directives 2010/64/EU and 2012/13/
EU have been implemented in German law by the Gesetz zur Stärkung
der Verfahrensrechte von Beschuldigten. This law implemented the right
to access the case file during judicial investigations. The counsel of the
suspected or accused person has the right to access the materials of the
case. 106 If the suspected or accused person has no counsel, he has the
right to access to the materials himself. 107
The right to access to the case file should be free of charge,
pursuant to Article 7(5) Directive 2012/13/EU. In Germany, the
access itself is free, but the Court Rees Act No. 9003 attachment 1
GKG foresees sending costs of 12,00 €. The BVerfG found this
compatible with the BL, because the suspect or the counsel have free
access and the fee ’s purpose is only to compensa te the
administrational effort and the postage. 108 The ECJ has not yet
judged this problem, but it is reasonable to consider the German
requirement compatible with the Directive.
The suspected or accused person usually benefits from this right
during the whole pre-trial stage. However, following Section 147 II-
VI of the CCP, it is possible to withhold the access. After it has been
noted in the file that the investigations have been concluded, the
counsel, suspected or accused person have an unconditional right to
access the materials. 109 In practice, however, it is sometimes hard to
104 BGH, NStZ 1997, 398.
105 See above.
106 Section 147 I CCP.
107 Section 147 VII CCP.
108 BVerfG, NStZ 1997, 43.
109 Argumentum e contratio Section 147 II CCP.
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gain access to the files for an accused without legal representation by a
defence lawyer.
The Gesetz zur Stärkung der Verfahrensrechte von Beschuldigten
further clarifies admissible restrictions in the light of Article 7(4)
Directive 2012/13/EU. The most important restriction applies where
the access to the materials of the case file would endanger the purpose
of the investigation. However, access can only be denied as long as
the investigations have not yet been designated as concluded in the
file. 110 If the accused is in remand detention or provisional arrest,
information of relevance for the assessment of the lawfulness of such
deprivation of liberty must be made available to defence counsel in
suitable form. 111 The inspection of records concerning examinations
and hearings to which the defence counsel’s presence was admitted
may not be refused at any stage of the proceedings. 112 The defence
counsel has the right to access the whole file, excluding pieces of
evidence. 113 Exceptions are possible if significant grounds present an
obstacle to the withdrawal. 114 The public prosecution office decides
whether to grant access to the case file in preparatory proceedings and
after final conclusion of the proceedings; in other cases, the presiding
judge of the court charged with the case is competent. 115
Decisions made whereby the public prosecution office refuses
access to the case file in accordance with Section 147 II CCP are
generally not subject to review. 116 After the questioning, this might
be problematic, since it bears the risk of abuse. Regional differences
can be noticed. For example, in Saarland the authorities are very
liberal. A questioned top prosecutor of Saarland could only recall one
case, to his knowledge, where an accused person gained access to the
material only after having lodged a disciplinary complaint. Other
cases of refusing the access were not mentioned. An exception applies
only if the access is granted to the victim. In this case, the accused
can challenge the public prosecution office’s decision in analogous
application of Section 406e IV 2 CCP. 117
110 See above.
111 See above.
112 Section 147 III CCP.
113 Section 147 IV CCP.
114 Section 147 IV CCP.
115 Section 147 V CCP.
116 H Laufhütte, in Karlsruher Kommentar zur Strafprozessordnung (Karlsruher
Kommentar) (7th edn, 2013, Munich, C.H.Beck) § 147 n 25.
117 BGH, StV 1993, 118.
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The impossibility to challenge the prosecutions office’s
decision is considered to be insignificant as the accused can
repeat his demand of access to the material in front of the court
after the bill of indictment has been submitted. 118 It is assumed
that this is sufficient to enable him to claim legal protection in a
timely manner. 119 If the public prosecution office refuses access
to the case file after noting the termination of the investigations
in the file, or if the accused is not at liberty, a decision by the
competent court may be applied for. These decisions can be given
without reasons if their disclosure might endanger the purpose of
the investigation. 120
4.2. Derogations on the right to access a lawyer
The EU Directive on the right to access a lawyer were implemented
in German law in the 2012. The accused person may request the
assistance of a defence counsel of his choice at any stage of the
proceedings. 121 Furthermore, the accused person has the right to
communicate with his defence counsel in writing as well as orally,
including when he is detained. 122 The lawyer’s presence must be
permitted during questioning. 123 This applies to questioning by a
judge or by a prosecutor. 124 Recently, this right has been extended to
the questioning by a police officer. 125 This codification only concerns
the accused’s right to have a lawyer present during questioning in the
pre-trial stage. The right to ask questions is only expressively
regulated by law for the main trial. 126 However, in practice, the
lawyer is granted the possibility to ask questions and submit
statements in the pre-trial stage as well.
This is derived from the right to a fair hearing. 127 The same right
118 H Laufhütte (n 115) § 147 n 25.
119 See above.
120 Section 147 V 2 CCP.
121 Section 137 I 1 CCP.
122 Section 148 I CCP.
123 Section 58 II CCP new version (nv); this amendment resulted from the
implementation of Directive 2013/48/EU.
124 Sections 168c I and 163 a III CCP.
125 Section 163 IV CCP nv; this amendment resulted from the implementation of
Directive 2013/48/EU.
126 Section 257 II CCP.
127 H-H Kühne (n 6) § 12 n 264.
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applies to a hearing during a judicial inspection. 128 The lawyer also
has the right to be present during a confrontat ion and an
identification procedure, such as a line-up. 129 There are no
derogations. Reconstruction of the scene of a crime are not explicitly
regulated by law. It can be subsumed, however, under the general
clause of the German CCP. 130 The Federal Ministry of Justice has
the opinion that a regulation is not necessary, because in most cases
the reconstruction of the scene of a crime implies a questioning that
triggers the right for the defence counsel to be present. 131 This must
be seen critically with view to the principle of legal clarity
(Bestimmtheitsgrundsatz). Although practitioners should adopt an
interpretation compliant with the EU Directive, a legal clarification
of this aspect would be welcomed. Another practical problem is the
low payment of duty and court-appointed counsels. Due to a very
poor salary, defence counsels quite often can only spend little time
on every single case. This leads to a superficial and sometimes
deficient defence.
In principle, German law does not restrict the right of access to a
lawyer. Section 138a of the CCP gives the possibility of excluding the
defence counsel under narrow conditions. For example if the defence
counsel is being involved in the offence which constitutes the subject
of investigation, or is accused of abusing communication with an
accused who is not at liberty for the purpose of committing criminal
offences or substantially endangering the security of a penal
institution, or is having committed an offence which in the event of
the conviction of the accused would constitute accessoryship after the
fact, obstruction of justice or handling stolen goods. Also in the event
of Endangering to National security. 132 The legal protection according
to § 138d of the CCP applies against the exclusion of the defence
counsel. The decision may be appealed against immediately. In very
exceptional cases involving special dangers, the accused can be fully
isolated (contact ban). This is only an option in cases related to
128 Section 168d I CCP.
129 Section 58 II CCP nv; this amendment resulted from the implementation of
Directive 2013/48/EU.
130 Referentenentwurf des Bundesminis ter iums der Just iz und für
Verbraucherschutz: Entwurf eines Zweiten Gesetzes zur Stärkung der
Verfahrensrechte von Beschuldigten im Strafverfahren (Draft bill of the Federal
Ministry of Justice implementing the Directive 2013/48/EU)11.
131 See above.
132 Section §138b of the CCP
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terrorist organizations, if there is a danger to life. 133 However, the
defence is only affected by such isolation to the extent that the
contact between defence counsel and the accused is interrupted; just
as contact to all other persons is interrupted unless they are granted
special permissions to see the accused. The derogation complies with
Article 3 VI of the Directive 2013/48/EU in the pre-trail stage but not
in the main-stage. 134 Therefore, this exception applies only to
prisoners against whom the public claim has not yet been brought or
who are finally convicted. 135 The measure is limited to thirty days. 136
Full isolation of the accused person happens very rarely. The court
will appoint a counsel if the defence counsel chosen by the accused is
excluded from the proceedings. 137 This may be the case in special
circumstances, for example where the defence lawyer is also
implicated in the crime which is the object of the investigation, or if
the defence lawyer abuses his or her contact with the accused to
conduct criminal activities, or if the lawyer poses a substantial danger
to the security of a prison. 138 This could be the case where the
lawyer smuggles drugs or weapons into the prison or is acting as a
courier between members of a criminal organisation. 139
In the German legal system, there also exists a remedy against the
contact ban and the fully isolation of the accused person. Where the
communication ban is imposed because of the risk of a terrorist
organizations, 140 a application challenging the decision is possible
pursuant Section 37 Introductory Law of the Courts Constitution Act
(Einführungsgesetz zum Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, EGGVG,
hereinafter ILCCA). The Higher Regional Court has subject-matter
jurisdiction for the review. 141 The prisoner, his defence counsel and
other persons concerned can challenge the decision. The scope of the
review encompasses the proportionality, the question of whether the
133 Sections 31 Introductory Law of the Courts Constitution Act (ILCCA) and
148 II CCP.
134 Referentenentwurf des Bundesminis ter iums der Just iz und für
Verbraucherschutz: Entwurf eines Zweiten Gesetzes zur Stärkung der
Verfahrensrechte von Beschuldigten im Strafverfahren (Draft bill of the Federal
Ministry of Justice implementing the Directive 2013/48/EU), 11 and 12.
135 Section 31 ILCCA.
136 Section 36 ILCCA.
137 Sections 138a – 138 d CCP.
138 G Pfeiffer, Strafprozessordnung (5th edn, 2005) §138a n 2.
139 J-P Graf, in BeckOK StPO (n 10) §138a n 6.
140 Section 31 and 33 ILCCP.
141 Section 25 II ILCCA.
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person is a member of the terrorist organisation, and if the legal situation
predicating the ban still exists. 142 The judgement is issued in form of an
order. 143 After the conclusion of the measure an appeal can still be
sought. 144
4.3. Decisions finding that there is no need for interpretation
In 19.12.2012, the Gesetz zur Stärkung der Verfahrensrechte von
Beschuldigten implemented the Directive 2010/64/EU is implemented
into German law. Previously, there was no right, independent of the
circumstances of the individual case to have a verdict translated into
the mother tongue. 145 Section 187 Courts Constitution Act
(Gerichtsverfassunggesetz, GVG, hereinafter CCA) stipulates the main
legal requirements implementing Directive 2010/64/EU. It provides
that the court shall appoint an interpreter or a translator for an
accused or convicted person that does not understand the German
language or is hearing or speech impaired, insofar as this is necessary
for the exercise of his rights under the Law of Criminal Procedure. 146
The requirement in Section 163 a V CCP provides that Section 187
CCA is applicable in the judicial inquiry as well.
The public prosecution office is competent for granting or rejecting
assistance of an interpreter during questioning and the pre-trial stage. 147
During the judicial examination, the judge is competent. In the German
criminal procedure, an interpreter will usually be assigned if it is
necessary. The public prosecution office has to investigate the case as
much as it is reasonable and necessary to enable the further procedure
leading to a main trial. 148 This includes interviewing the accused. It
is therefore useful for the public prosecution office to assign an
interpreter, if the accused person does not have sufficient knowledge
of the German language. Because of this, there is no jurisprudence
concerning the possibilities to challenge a decision denying the need
142 H Mayer, in Karlsruher Kommentar zur Strafprozessordnung (Karlsruher
Kommentar) (7th edn, 2013, Munich, C.H.Beck) § 37 ILCCA, n 6 ff.
143 Ibid § 37 ILCAA, n 11.
144 BVerfGE 49, 24, 51, NJW 1978, 2235.
145 OLG Köln, NJW-Special 2011, 762.
146 Section 187 CCP.
147 K Sackreuther, in BeckOK StPO (n 10) § 161a n 19-20, section 160 and
section 161 a of the CCP.
148 Ibid § 160 n 5.
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for interpretation. The absence of a necessary interpreter can be
challenged during the trial stage in the appeal on fact and law, in
most cases only absence during the main procedure will support such
an appeal. 149 During the investigation procedure, the judgment must
be based on the injury of the right for interpretation. Therefore, there
is no compelling need for the possibility to challenge a decision
denying the need for interpretation during the pre-trial stage of
proceedings, especially because the evidence, such as testimony, or
statements of the accused or the defendant have to be repeated in the
main hearing. 150 Hence, the accused person has the possibility to
revoke, to change or to improve his statements made during the pre-
trail stage. 151 The old statements may not be used directly by the
court. The German criminal procedure follows the principles of
immediacy and orality, which prohibits the direct use of pre-trial
statements. 152 The question of whether there is the possibility for the
accused person to challenge the decision in accordance with Section
23 ILCCA is not completely clear. In our view, there are no practical
interests for such a legal remedy. The questioned national experts
confirmed that the German system governing the right to
interpretation is treated very liberally in Germany. The judicial
practice seems to follow the principle ‘rather too much than too little’.
Sometimes this leads to an abusive use of the right to linguistic
assistance for delaying tactics by the defence. Generally, the right to
interpretation leads to the prolongation of the proceedings, very much
to the displeasure of all participants. Therefore, the defence counsel
sometimes makes a statement in the name of the defendant to
abbreviate the proceeding.
149 BGH NJW 1953, 114 ff; BGH NStZ 2002, 275; BGH, NStZ 2011, 233; T
Fischer, in Karlsruher Kommentar zur Strafprozessordnung (Karlsruher
Kommentar) (7th edn, 2013, Munich, C.H.Beck) Introduction n 322; different
opinion: BGH BeckRS 2002, 09201; H Dahs, B Müssig, in E Müller, R Schlothauer
(eds), MAH Strafverteidigung (2nd edn, 2014) n 134.
150 D Burhoff, Handbuch für die strafrechtliche Hauptverhandlung (8th edn,
2015) n 2690 ff.
151 See above.
152 But there is the (very restricted) possibility to hear an indirect witness;
compare S Schork, in D Dölling, G Duttge, S König, D Rössner(eds), Gesamtes
Strafrecht (n 78) § 250 StPO n 3-5.
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4.4. Decisions finding that there is no need for translation
The right to translation was implemented with the same law as the
right to interpretation. The formulation is very similar. If it is necessary,
the defendant has the right to translations of summons, warrants of
arrest, bills of indictment and other court decisions. 153 However, the
right to translation does not extend to final judgments against the
defendant, nor to judgments that are enacted against a co-defendant,
nor the testimony of a co-defendant being prosecuted separately. 154
This limitation has to be seen critically. The translation of a testimony
of a co-defendant and a final judgment against him are essential
materials to ensure that the defendant is able to exercise his right of
defence and to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings. Objections
can also be found in the literature. 155 According to the Federal Court
of Justice, a non-German-speaking defendant must be handed over a
translated version of the bill of indictment. 156 An example which is
relevant for practice is the case where the accused lodges a remedy
with a pleading in his mother tongue. The court language is German,
so a foreign language declaration does not have legal effects. 157
However, the declaration has to form an integral part of the file and
must be translated as essential to the exercise of the rights of the
defense. The translation right requires both, translations into the
mother tongue and translations from the mother tongue into the
procedural language. 158
There can be an exception to the right to translation, where an oral
summary or interpretation is sufficient. 159 The courts have expressed
the opinion that the exceptions are consistent with the derogations in
Article 3 (7) Directive 2010/64/EU. 160 The Higher Regional Court of
Stuttgart decided, that even if a defendant who does not understand
the German language lodges an appeal on law only against a
153 A Walther, in BeckOK StPO (n 10) § 181 CCA n 8 ff.
154 Higher Regional Court of Hamburg (OLG Hamburg), Judgement of
6.12.2013 – Ws 253/13, BeckRS 2014, 00586; Wistra 2014, 158.
155 See A Oehmichen, ‘Fachdienst Strafrecht: Neuigkeiten zum Strafrecht’
(2014) FD-StrafR, 354626.
156 BGH, NJW Spezial 2014, 570.
157 Section 184 CCA.
158 H Schneider (2015) StV, 379 ff.
159 Section 187 II 4, 5 of the CCA.
160 OLG Hamm, Judgement of 11.3.2014 – 2 Ws 40/14; OLG Hamburg, in
(2014) Zeitschrift für Wirtschaft, Steuer, Strafrecht (wistra), 158; OLG Köln, NStZ
2014, 229.
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judgement which has 278 pages, a written translation of the judgment is
not required, when he has a German legal counsel and an interpreter was
available for the oral interpretation of the reasoning after the
judgement’s pronouncement. 161 Whilst the decision was approved by
other Higher Reginal Courts, 162 the reception in the literature was
unanimous. 163 Several authors speak against the courts’ opinion. First,
an effective defence requires the collaboration of the accused himself,
he cannot be entirely replaced by the legal counsel, as the accused is
best informed of the facts. 164 Secondly, in practice, the written
judgments frequently differ from the oral reasoning and are way more
detailed. 165 In a preliminary question referred by the German
authorities to the CJEU, the General State Prosecutor argued that a
document such as the penal order in the sense of Sections 407 ff.
CCP constitutes an ‘essential document’, which must be translated if
the person to whom it is addressed to isn’t able to understand the
German language. The Court adopted the same conclusion in its
ruling. 166
According to established case law, foreign-language pleadings are
fundamentally irrelevant, even if the author does not adequately
control the German language. 167 That case law applies in any event
where the appellant is defended by a lawyer. However, the non-
defended accused may use a foreign language to lodge an appeal. 168
In order to exercise his rights of defence, the accused is not equally
dependent on official translations of his writings. Section 187 II CCA
does not grant any right to translation of judgements concerning the
execution of judicial decisions. 169
Directive 2010/64/EU provides that the Member States shall take
concrete measures to ensure that the interpretation and translation
provided meets the quality that is required. 170 In principle, the
appointment of the interpreter and translator is subject to judicial
161 OLG Stuttgart, StV 2014, 536.
162 See e.g. OLG Hamm StV 2014, 534; OLG Köln NStZ 2012.
163 Approving: E Christl (n 47) 376, 380; critical: J Bockemühl (2014) StV 537,
538 ff.; U Eisenberg (2013) JR 442, 445; M Yalcin (2013) ZRP 104, 106.
164 J Bockemühl (n 161) 539.
165 P Kotz (2012) StV 626, 629.
166 Case C-278/16, Sleutjes EU:C:2017:757
167 BGH, NStZ-RR, 2017, 122.
168 EuGH, NJW 2016 303 (305).
169 OLG Köln, StV 2014, 552.
170 Art. 5 (1) Directive 2010/64/EU.
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discretion. 171 This discretion is narrowed by Article 103 I BL,
according to which ‘In the courts every person shall be entitled to
hearing in accordance with law’. Therefore, the court must pay
attention to consult a highly-qualified translator; otherwise, this poses
a ground for an appeal of facts and law. 172 The interpreter shall swear
an oa th a f f i rm ing tha t he wi l l t r ans l a t e f a i t h fu l l y and
conscientiously. 173 A deliberately false translation is a punishable
offense (perjury). 174 This also guarantees a high quality of the
interpretation. Lastly, the interpreter or translator shall observe secrecy
concerning circumstances which become known to him in his
professional activity. 175
The court (or judge) is competent for granting or rejecting a request
of translation during the main-trial. During the investigation proceeding
(pre-trial) the public prosecution office is competent. The defendant has
the possibility to lodge a complaint. Complaints can be filed against
court decisions that precede the final judgment and do not involve
compulsory measures. 176 The chief judge of the competent court is
responsible for reviewing the decision of a request of translation; a
decision of the court instead of the chief judge is also possible. 177
This engenders a review of questions of both fact and law. In the end,
the complaint is decided by the court immediately above the court
whose decision is being challenged. 178
4.5. Violations of the right to information
Section 136 CCP provides the right to be informed about rights
during the proceeding. The information is given orally or in writing
and has to be signed by the suspect in acknowledgment of being
informed. 179 It is postulated that he should promptly be given detailed
information about the criminal offence he is suspected of and of the
applicable criminal law provisions. 180 He has to be advised that the
171 E Christl (n 47) 376, 381.
172 BVerwG NVwZ 1983, 668.
173 Section 189 I CCA.
174 OLG Koblenz, BeckRS 2017, 107877.
175 Section 189 IV CCA
176 Section 305 CCP.
177 OLG Hamburg, Judgement of 6.12.2013 – 2 Ws 253/13.
178 See especially sections 73, 120 and 135 CCA.
179 Answer from the questionned experts.
180 Section 136 I CCP.
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law grants him the right to respond to the charges, or not to make any
statement on the charges, and the right, at any stage, even prior to his
examination, to consult with defence counsel of his choice. 181 In
appropriate cases the accused must also be informed that he may
make a written statement and of the possibility of perpetrator-victim
mediation. 182
There is no possibility to challenge the failure to provide
information during the pre-trial stage of proceedings. Of course, there
is always the possibility to lodge a disciplinary appeal against the
processing official. The lack of information can lead to an exclusion
of evidence at the trial stage of the criminal proceedings. 183 The
instruction has to be made up and the information has to be given
subsequently. 184 The accused person must be especially cautioned
(qualifizierte Belehrung) 185 where the previous testimony is not
usable in any way. 186 Afterwards, in principle, there is the possibility
to lodge an appeal on law only. This takes effect only after the trial at
first instance.
5. Sanctions against illegal or improperly obtained evidence
German criminal procedure provides for two types of exclusionary
rules: the relative and the absolute exclusionary rules. 187 Absolute
exclusion of evidence is set in law without further prerequisites. The
relative exclusionary rules are developed by the case law of the
Federal Court of Justice on a case-by-case basis. 188 The jurisprudence
of the Federal Court of Just ice, approved by the Federal
Constitutional Court, takes into consideration the sense of the
prohibition, the individual interests of the accused and the
governmental interest of criminal prosecution. 189 Thereby, the Federal
Court of Justice has created the so called Abwägungslehre. 190 A
181 See above.
182 C Monka, in BeckOK StPO (n 10) § 136 n 14.
183 BGHSt 38, 214; BGHSt 47, 172; BGH NStZ 2008, 55, 56; BGHSt 38, 372.
184 C Monka (n 180) §114a n 21 ff.
185 BGH NStZ 2009, 281 ff.; BGH StV 2007, 450 ff.
186 C Monka (n 180) §114a n 27b.
187 See Section 338 CCP.
188 L Meyer-Goßner, in L Meyer-Goßner, B Schmitt (eds), Strafprozessordnung
(n 15) Introduction n 55.
189 Ibid 55a.
190 C Hauf (1993) NStZ 457.
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distinction is made according to whether the prohibition aims to protect
the accused’s interests or not. 191 This means, for instance, that a failure
to inform a witness of his or her right to refuse to give evidence does not
prevent the use of his or her testimony against the accused, because the
right to refuse to give evidence exists for the purpose of protecting the
person who is being questioned, not for the purpose of protecting the
accused person. Most of the exclusionary rules are relative ones. The
prohibition of the use of evidence following this jurisprudence is a
rare exception. 192
5.1. Infringements of the right to access the case file
As regards breaches of the right to access the case file, an
exclusionary rule is not stipulated in the written law. Only a relative
exclusionary rule comes into question. 193 In principle, there is no
possibility to censure the refusal of access to the material of the case
during the pre-trail. However, this can be subject to the appeal of law
only, 194 because the refusal may lead to the violation of the right to
be given an effective and fair legal hearing (Rüge der Verletzung
rechtlichen Gehörs). 195 The right to a fair hearing further prohibits
the removal of documents related to the circumstances of the case that
have been generated in the course of the proceedings. 196 The court
must verify whether the judgement relies on the violation of right to
an effective and fair legal hearing, 197 or rather of infringements to the
right of access to the case file.
5.2. Statements obtained in breach of the right to access a lawyer
Not informing an accused of the right of consultation with a defence
counsel evokes a relative exclusionary rule in relation to statements
191 H Lesch, in J Bockemühl (ed), Handbuch des Fachanwalts Strafrecht (7th
edn 2017, Carl Heymann Verlag, Köln) n 87.
192 Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice, BGH) in 44, Entscheidungen des
Bundesgerichtshofs in Strafsachen (Decisions of the German Federal Court of Justice
in Criminal Law Cases: hereinafter BGHSt), 243; BGHSt 51, 285.
193 See above.
194 Other Opinion OLG Hamm, NJW 1972, 1096.
195 OLG Köln, BeckRS 2015, 06568.
196 B Schmitt (n 15) § 147 n 14.
197 BVerfG NJW 1991, 2811.
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made by the accused. 198 The same applies to the breach of the right of
consultation in writing as well as orally, including when the accused
deprived from his liberty. 199 If the accused does not have access to a
lawyer during the main trial and defence counsel is required by law, a
lack legal assistance leads to an absolute ground for appeal on law
only. 200 The participation of a defence counsel is mandatory in the
following cases: the main hearing at first instance is held at the
Regional Court or the Higher Regional Court; the accused is charged
with a felony, or during detention; the assistance of defence counsel
appears necessary because of the seriousness of the offence, or
because of the difficult factual or legal situation; it is evident that the
accused cannot defend himself. 201 Exclusionary rules also apply if the
defendant has not been adequately informed of his right to access a
defence counsel at any time. 202 The same is true, if, following proper
information and despite a request, the contact with the defence
counsel was refused and the accused was nonetheless heard
immediately. 203 Only in the case of a mandatory defence, the absence
of the defence lawyer systematically leads to an annulment. 204 If the
involvement of a defence counsel is not required, either because of
the gravity of the offence or due to the difficulty of the factual or
legal situation, the fact that the accused is a non-German speaker does
not lead to mandatory defence, because of the protection guaranteed
under Section 187 CCA. 205
5.3. Breaches of the right to translation and interpretation
Breaches of the right to interpretation can also be notified in the
appeal of fact and law. 206 The accused who cannot participate in the
main trail because of language difficulties is equalled to an accused
who is absent. That is why breaches of the right to translation and
interpretation lead to an absolute ground for an appeal on fact and
198 BGHSt 38, 372, 373.
199 BGHSt 36, 332.
200 Section 338 no 5 CCP.
201 Section 140 CCP.
202 BGHSt 47, 172, BGH NStZ 2008, 55, 56.
203 BGHSt 38, 372.
204 L Meyer-Goßner (n 186) § 338 n 41.
205 OLG Nürnberg NStZ-RR 2014, 183.
206 BGHSt 3, 285; also BVerfGE 64, 135, 149.
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law. That means that the court does not have review whether the
judgement relies of the violation. If the defendant can communicate in
the German language, the temporary absence of the interpreter is
harmless. 207
5.4. Failure to provide information about rights and about accusation
Section 114b CCP does not provide for immediate consequences in
case of breaches of the right to information. However, the failure to
provide information or sufficient information about rights and about
the accusation results in a relative exclusionary rule. 208 Trial courts
do not often apply such rule. Because the competent authorities must
inform once again the accused at the first official questioning, 209 such
a guarantee cures previous procedural defects. 210 With regard to
failure to inform the accused about his right to consult a defence
counsel before a hearing, the trial court may found breaches of
defence rights in case the apprehended, without being subjected to a
judicial hearing, talked to fellow prisoners or even police officers
about the act which he is accused of or indicates at least the
circumstances surrounding the perpetration, during the period between
arrestment and first interrogation or appearance before the detention
judge. 211 If the defendant has not been informed about his right to
make a statement or to remain silent, this leads to an exclusionary
rule. 212 There is also an exclusionary rule if the defendant has not or
not adequately been instructed about his right to a defence counsel at
any time. 213
6. Appeals on facts and law
An appeal on fact and law is admissible against judgments of the
Criminal Court Judge and of the Court with Lay Judges. 214 This
207 L Meyer-Goßner (n 186) § 338, n 44.
208 BGH NSTZ 1992, 294; BayOblG STV 2002, 179.
209 Section 136 I 1 CCP
210 J P Graf (n 65) § 114b n 16.
211 Krauß, in: Graf (ed), Strafprozessordnung (Graf StPO), 3. edition 2016
(Munich, C.H. Beck) §114b n 10.
212 BGHSt 38, 214.
213 BGHSt 47, 172, BGH NStZ 2008 55, 56.
214 Section 312 CCP.
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means that the appeal on fact and law is not admissible against
judgments of the Regional Court or Higher Regional Court. In these
cases, there is no second instance review on the merits. This is
problematical considering the jurisdiction of the Regional Court to
deal with serious criminal offences, such as murder and rape. Having
regards the sanctions and potential judicial consequences in these
cases, it is questionable that there exists only one instance judicial
review on facts. An appeal on fact and law must be filed with the
court of first instance either orally to be recorded by the registry or in
writing within one week after pronouncement of the judgment. 215
In case of an appeal on points of both facts and law, the competent
court carries out a full and fresh review of the case. 216 The subject-
matter of the new main hearing is the accusation and not the appealed
judgment. 217 Hence, the court undertakes a review on the merits and
is not limited to errors of law. The appellate court can examine and
gather old and fresh evidence. As mentioned above, this invaluable
appeal is not admissible against convictions of the Regional Court.
The competent appellate court is a second instance trial court that
delivers a new judgment, which replaces the previous one. 218 The
judgment in first instance, as far as it relates to the legal qualification
of the offence and the related sanctions, may not be amended to the
defendant’s detriment where only the defendant or his statutory
representative filed the appeal on fact and law, or the public
prosecution office appealed on fact and law in his favour. 219 It is
significant that all the interviewed experts have confirmed that there
are no existing problems herein. Indeed, the appeal of fact and law is
a very effective remedy under German criminal procedure. This is due
to the fact that the appeal on fact and law is a completely new
instance with an original decision having force of res judicata.
7. Appeals limited on errors of law
An appeal limited on errors of law only is admissible against
judgments of the Criminal Divisions and of the Criminal Divisions
with Lay Judges and against judgments of the Higher Regional Courts
215 Section 314 CCP.
216 L Meyer-Goßner (n 186) Preliminary notes to § 312 n 1.
217 See above.
218 See above.
219 Section 331 I CCP.
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pronounced at first instance. 220 It has to be filed with the court whose
judgment is being contested, either orally to be recorded by the
registry or in writing, within one week after pronouncement of
judgment. 221 A judgment against which an appeal on fact and law is
admissible may be contested by an appeal on law in lieu of an appeal
on fact and law. 222 If one of the participants files an appeal on law
against the judgment, and another participant files an appeal on fact
and law, the appeal on law only, if filed in time and in the prescribed
form, shall be treated as an appeal on fact and law as long as the
appeal on fact and law is not withdrawn or dismissed as
inadmissible. 223 The appeal on law only serves to review the legal
basis of the judgement. 224 Consequently, the review is limited to
errors of law. 225 Failure to apply a legal norm or the erroneous
application of a legal norm, constitute an error on law. 226
The contested judgment must be quashed if the appeal on law is
considered well-founded. 227 Where the judgment is quashed solely
because of a violation of the law occurring on its application to the
findings on which the judgment was based, the court hearing the
appeal on law shall itself decide on the merits. 228
In other cases, the matter shall be referred back to another division
or chamber of the court whose judgment is being quashed or to another
court of the same rank located in the same Federal State. 229 Only the
notices of appeal on law and, in so far as the appeal on law is based
on defects in the proceedings, only the facts specified when the
notices of appeal on law were submitted, are subject to review by the
court hearing the appeal. 230 The case law interprets this provision
very restrictively, thus posing a high obstacle for lodging an appeal on
law only. Another difficulty arises from the wording of Section 349 II
CCP. This provision enables the court to reject the appeal by an order
if the judges unanimously deem the appeal on law to be manifestly
220 Section 333 CCP.
221 Section 341 CCP.
222 Section 335 CCP.
223 Section 335 III CCP.
224 L Meyer-Goßner (n 186) § 333 n 1.
225 Section 337 CCP.
226 Section 337 II CCP.
227 Section 353 CCP.
228 Section 354 I CCP.
229 Section 354 II CCP.
230 Section 352 I CCP.
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ill-founded. The order can be issued without giving any reasons of the
decision. We know of a case of an appeal of law only against a
decision of the Regional Court in Chemnitz, where the supporting
letter of the defence counsel compasses 549 pages. Nevertheless, the
appellate court decided that it is manifestly ill-founded. No reasons
were given. This shows that this legal provision can be abused in
order to save the time of the court. Once again, the immense
workload of German courts is leading to doubtful practices. This
aspect often has a detrimental effect on defendants and justice.
8. Access to the Constitutional Court
Every individual claiming a violation by a public authority of one of
his or her fundamental rights guaranteed in the BL may lodge a
constitutional complaint to the Federal Constitutional Court
(BVerfG). 231 All judgments are acts of public authority. If any legal
remedy with other courts exists, these remedies have to be exhausted
before the constitutional complaint may be lodged. 232 The BVerfG
may however derogate to this rule if the complaint is of general
relevance or if prior recourse to other courts were to the
complainant’s severe and unavoidable disadvantage. 233 The
constitutional complaint can be lodged and substantiated within one
month. 234 This time period begins with the delivery of the judgement.
Applications which initiate proceedings must be submitted to the
BVerG in writing. They must be substantiated and must list the
necessary evidence. 235 The reasons for the complaint must specify the
right that has allegedly been violated. 236 The Federal Constitutional
Court only reviews breaches of specific rights of the BL. 237
Accordingly, the court does not verify the correct application of the
statutory law by the ordinary court.
231 Section 90 I Law on the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC).
232 Section 90 I FCC.
233 Section 90 II FCC.
234 Section 93 I FCC.
235 Section 23 FCC.
236 Section 92 FCC.
237 BVerfGE 18, 85 (92).
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9. Judicial review and the EAW
9.1. Competent judicial authorities
In Germany, a European arrest warrant (EAW) 238 has to be issued
by the Higher Regional Courts in a written warrant of arrest. The
Attorney General within the prosecution office is competent for
executing the EAW. 239 Whilst executing the request, 240 he examines
whether the legal requirements for the execution are met.
9.2. Judicial review by the German executing authorities
Section 187 CCA stipulates that the court shall appoint an
interpreter or a translator for the accused or convicted person who
does not understand the German language as far as this is necessary
for the exercise of his rights under the Law of Criminal Procedure.
Section 77 of the German ILA provides that Section 187 CCA applies
in proceedings for the execution of a EAW. The application of § 187
CCA poses some problems. First, the provision is applicable only
with respects to the competent court and not to the Ministry of
Justice, which is responsible for receiving EAWs, or the General
Prosecutor Office as executing authority. 241 Secondly, Section 187
CCA applies to the exercise of criminal procedural rights. For this
reason, Section 77 I ILA calls for the application of the CCP and
CCA only as a meaningful application. The text of this section does
not preclude this. 242 It is doubtful whether this is in line with the
requirements of determinations of the Directive. Thirdly, the EAW can
only be subject to Section 187 I 1 CCA, so that the decision to grant
linguistic assistance would always be subject to discretion. 243 Even if
one accepts a reduction of the discretion due to particular
circumstances, this does not suffice for a clear implementation of the
Directive. 244 Therefore, the current regulations represent an
insufficient solution. No case law exists on the question whether there
238 Hierenafter EAW.
239 B Heintschel-Heinegg, in MüKoStPO (n 46) § 37 n 7.
240 Section 13 II of the Law on International Legal Assistance (ILA).
241 H Schneider (2015) StV 379, 384.
242 Ibid.
243 Section 187 I 1 CCA.
244 H Schneider (n 241).
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is the possibility to challenge a decision denying the need for
interpretation in proceedings for the execution of a EAW.
The surrender person benefit from the rights granted to suspects and
accused persons in national criminal proceedings (see above). This
includes the right to be informed about the reasons for arrest, the right
to be provided with a letter of rights at the time of arrest, as well as
the right to access a lawyer. The surrender person convicted in
absentia shall receive without delay a copy of the judgement after
surrender. 245
German judicial authorities fully review the proportionality of the
EAW issued by their counterpart in another Member State. 246 This is
derived from the German constitutional law and Article 49 III of the
European Charter of Fundamental Rights. The proportionality is to be
assessed on a case-by-case basis.
German law does not provide additional grounds for refusal other
than those set forth under the Framework Decision 2002/584/JAI. It is
worth mentioning that Germany implemented Article 5 (2) of the
Framework Decision allowing the Member States to oppose to
surrender if the offence is punishable by custodial life sentence and
the law of the requesting State does not provide review of the
detention at latest after 20 years. 247 Likewise, no additional grounds
for refusal based on breaches of defence rights can be found under
German law. Article 4a (1) of the Framework Decision 2002/584
provides that the execution of the EAW can be subject to the
condition, that, in the case of a decision rendered in absentia, the
issuing judicial authority gives an assurance deemed adequate to
guarantee the right to a new trial in the issuing Member State and to
be present in court. Accordingly, the national implementing measures
under German law provide a ground for refusal, if the decision is
rendered in absentia and without a defence counsel and if the
requesting State does not guarantee a new trail. 248 In case the
executing judgement results from a decision delivered in absentia, the
execution is permitted if it is conducted pursuant to a procedure in
accordance with the ECHR. 249 In particular, this implies a fair
245 Section 83 IV ILA.
246 OLG Stuttgart, Judgement of 25.02.2010 – 1. Ausl. 1246/09; NJW 2010,
1617.
247 Section 83 I no 4 ILA.
248 Kammergericht (Superior Court of Justice in Berlin, KG), Judgement of
10.10.2013 – (4) 151 AuslA 127/13 (194/13).
249 Section 49 I 2 ILA.
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hearing, a fair defence and a decision issued by an independent court. 250
Only blatant infringements of the provisions provoke the refusal to
surrender. 251
250 I Fromm, ‘Europäischer Haftbefehl, Auslieferungsverfahren und Ersuchen
um Übernahme der Strafvollstreckung’ (2016) Neue Justiz: Zeitschrift für
Rechtsentwicklung und Rechtsprechung (NJ) 360.
251 O Lagodny, in U Sieber, H Satzger, B Heintschel-Heinegg (eds),
Europäisches Strafrecht (2nd edn, 2014, Baden-Baden, Nomos) § 31 n 25.
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access a lawyer. – 4.3. Decisions finding that there is no need for
interpretation. – 4.4. Decisions finding that there is no need for
translation. – 4.5. Violations of the right to information about the
accusation. – 5. Sanctions against illegal or improperly obtained
evidence. – 5.1. Infringements of the right to access the case file. –
5.2. Statements obtained in breach of the right to access a lawyer. –
5.3. Breaches of the right to translation and interpretation. – 5.4.
Failure to provide information about rights and about accusation. – 6.
Appeals against conviction and sentence. – 7. Appeals in cassation. –
8. Access to the Constitutional Court. – 9. Judicial review and the
EAW. – 9.1. Competent judicial authorities. – 9.2. Defence rights in
the execution of a EAW. – 9.3. Judicial review and grounds for refusal.
1. Constitutional guarantees
Luxembourg Constitution does not expressly guarantee the right to
access a court. However, several provisions governing the organization
of the national judicial system reflects the guarantees of fair trial
enshrined in Article 6 ECHR. First, Article 84 of the Constitution
grants ordinary courts exclusive jurisdiction overs disputes related to
civil liberties. Second, any court or tribunal must be established by
law. Such a guarantee constitutes a fundamental right under Article 13
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
of the Constitution, which rules out the possibility to establish
extraordinary courts. 1 Third, other constitutional provisions set forth
further components of the right to fair trial, in particular the right to a
public hearing, 2 the duty to state reasons and the public
pronouncement of judgements, 3 irremovability of judges 4 and
independence of the judiciary vis-à-vis the government. 5 Furthermore,
Article 12 of the Constitution explicitly refers to both prior judicial
authorisation of pre-trial custody and ex-post review of the lawfulness
of detention. On the one hand and except in case of flagrante delicto,
no one can be arrested without a reasoned judge’s order that must be
served at the time of arrest or at the latest within twenty-four hours.
On the other, Article 12 of the Constitution specifies that the arrested
person has the right to be informed without delay about the available
remedies for regaining his liberty.
By contrast, no constitutional provisions guarantee the right to
appeal in criminal proceedings under Luxembourg law. However, the
Code of Criminal Procedure (Code de procedure pénale, hereinafter
CCP) provides that appeal can be lodged with a higher court having
jurisdiction to review both facts and points of law against any
judgement del ivered by a first instance court in criminal
proceedings. 6 Moreover, domestic courts have consistently given
direct effect to the right to appeal (double degré de juridiction)
enshrined in Article 2 of Protocol 7 ECHR, 7 which Luxembourg
ratified in 1989. 8 In this regard, it is worth recalling that
Luxembourg jurisprudence adopted over the years a monist approach
towards the legal status of international treaties in domestic law. 9 As
1 Art. 86 Luxembourg Constitution.
2 Art. 88 Luxembourg Constitution.
3 Art. 89 Luxembourg Constitution.
4 Art. 91 Luxembourg Constitution.
5 Art. 93 Luxembourg Constitution.
6 In particular, Art. 172 CCP refers to judgements delivered by national courts
having jurisdiction over offences punished by a fine only (tribunaux de police), Art.
199 CPP guarantees the right to appeal against judgments rendered by courts having
jurisdiction over offences punished by imprisonment not exceeding 5 years (tribunal
correctionnel), whilst Art. 221 CPP relates to judgements delivered by courts
having competence in case of most serious crimes (chambre criminelle du tribunal
d’arrondissement).
7 See for instance, CJS cass (Court of Cassation) 6 March 2008, n°2494; CSJ
cass (Court of Cassation), 18 November 2004, n° 2120.
8 Law of 27 February 1989 ratifying Protocol n°7 to the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Mém. A n°12, 07.03.1989.
9 J Gerkrath, ‘The Constitution of Luxembourg in the Context of EU and
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consequence thereof are the frequent references by criminal courts to
the ECHR and the related case law of the Strasbourg Court. 10
Luxembourg judges give direct effect to the fundamental rights
guaranteed under the Convention as well as to EU Directives
harmonising defence rights in criminal proceedings, which prevail
over national legal provisions.
2. Investigative measures subject to prior judicial authorization
2.1. Competent judicial authorities
Under Luxembourg law, investigative measures that imply the use
of coercion are subject, as a principle, to the prior authorisation
delivered by the Investigating Judge (juge d’instruction). 11 The latter
plays a central role in the pre-trial phase of criminal proceedings
through the exercise of both jurisdictional and investigative powers. 12
Indeed, the Investigative Judge is an independent judicial authority,
which is under the legal duty to investigate even-handedly (à charge
et à décharge) in regard to the prosecution and the defense. 13 Besides
the impartiality requirement, independence is further guaranteed by
the prohibition for the Investigating Judge to take part in the
judgement of a case he investigated. 14
Orders (ordonnances) whereby the Investigating Judge authorizes
coercive measures intervene in two situations. First, a case may be
referred to the Investigative Judge by the initial submission of the
Prosecutor (réquisitoire) or by a complaint of the victim who presents
a petition to become a civil party (partie civile). 15 A judicial
investigation (instruction) 16 is then carried out under the authority of
the Investigating Judge, who is empowered to take all measures,
International Law as ‘Higher Law’ in A Albi, The Role and Future of National
Constitutions in Europe and Global Governance (Asser Press, forthcoming 2017).
10 M Petschko, M Schiltz, S Tosza, ‘Luxembourg’ in K.Ligeti, Toward a
Prosecutor for the European Union, Vol 1, (Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing,
2013) 449 – 472, at 450.
11 Pursuant Article 28 (3) CCP, the Investigating Judge has the right to enlist the
assistance of the law enforcement agencies in the performance of his duties.
12 For a detailed analysis of the historical origins and the role of the Investigating
Judge, G Vogel, Lexique de procédure pénale (Brussels, Larcier, 2001) 96 ff.
13 Art. 51(1) CCP.
14 Art. 27(2) CCP.
15 Art. 28-1 (1) CCP.
16 Pursuant Article 49 CCP, judicial investigations are compulsory for felonies
(crimes) and optional in the case of misdemeanor (délits).
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which he considers necessary to establish the truth. 17 Second, in order to
reduce the burden of work on the Investigating Judge’s Office and
thereby the length of investigations, in 2006, the Luxembourg
legislature has enacted a reform of criminal inquiries strongly
influenced by the so-called ‘mini-instruction’ under Belgian law. 18
When conducting a preliminary investigation of minor offences
punished by imprisonment not exceeding one year, the Public
Prosecutor may request the Investigating Judge to order searches,
seizures, hearings of witnesses or expertise. 19 Once seized, the
Investigating Judge decides whether he authorizes the specific
measures referred to in the Public Prosecutor’s request or he takes
over the investigation. 20
With regard to formal legal requirements, the prior authorization of
investigative acts takes the form of a written order (ordonnance) that
must be dated and signed by the Investigating Judge. 21 Additional
formalities apply with respect to measures executed over a certain
period of time. For instance, orders authorizing monitoring of
telecommunication are valid for one month upon the date of the
order. 22 The Investigating Judge may prolong the surveillance
measure for an additional month without exceeding an overall period
of one year. 23 Given the intrusive character of special surveillance
measures, each prolongation must be approved by the President of the
17 Art. 51 (1) CCP. It should however be stressed that, when seized by the Public
Prosecutor, the Investigating Judge is bound by the facts put forward in the submission
(saisie in rem). Consequently, facts that are not referred to in the public prosecutor’s
request cannot be subject to the investigative judge’s enquiries. Such new facts must
be reported back to the Public Prosecutor, who has exclusive authority to decide
whether and how to investigate the case.
18 Projet de loi n°5354 portant introduction notamment de l’instruction
simplifiée, du contrôle judiciaire et réglementant les nullités de la procédure
d’enquête, 30.6.2004, 12.
19 Art. 24-1 (1) CCP.
20 Art. 24-1 (2) para 1 CCP. In the latter case, the Investigating Judge requests the
Prosecutor to seize him by a submission describing the facts and thereby defining the
material scope of the judicial investigation. Art. 24-1 (2) para 2 CCP.
21 Information, documents, objects and data collected by enforcing the authorized
investigative act must be inventoried in a police report (procès-verbal). This is for
instance the case for house searches (Art. 66 (5) CCP) and the so-called ‘special
surveillance measures’ which encompass interception and monitoring of
telecommunications (Art. 88-1 ff CCP).
22 Art. 88-1 CCP.
23 Similar rules apply to orders authorizing the real-time monitoring of bank
transactions that must specify the duration of the measure, which cannot exceed an
overall duration of three months. Art. 66 -3 CIC.
332 PART III, CHAPTER IV
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
pre-trial chamber of the Court of Appeal. 24 Finally, the strength of the
duty to state reasons incumbent to the Investigating Judge varies
depending on the exceptional character Luxembourg criminal
procedure confers to certain investigative measures and specific
fundamental rights that the enforcement of such measures is likely to
undermine.
2.2. Scope of review
Investigative acts ordered by the Judge must be proportionate and
necessary. As for the latter, Luxembourg CCP imposes a specific
obligation to justify the necessity of investigative measures that bare
an exceptional character and therefore are allowed only when
conventional investigation methods seems ineffective given the facts
and circumstances of the case. For instance, interception and
monitoring of telecommunications must be duly justified (décision
spécialement motivée) relying on the factual background of the
case. 25 By contrast, the duty to state reasons is less stringent with
regard to searches of premises. Such a measure is considered the
ultimate act of judicial enquiries (instruction) that the Investigating
Judge can order without justifying the urgency of the measure. 26
According to case law, the necessity of search warrants is sufficiently
motivated as long as the warrant indicates the goal of the search,
namely the need to collect objects and information necessary to
determine whether a specific criminal offence has been committed. 27
Searches of premises further illustrates the proportionality
requirement that prior judicial authorizations must fulfill. In particular,
the subject matter of searches and seizures must be sufficiently
circumscribed with the aim to prevent that items not relevant to the
material scope of the investigation are seized. 28 Thus defined, the
‘speciality principle’ (principe de spécialité) has been set out by the
Luxembourg Courts while reviewing the legality of searches and
seizure in the office of a lawyer. 29 In such circumstances, the
proportionality of the authorized search is reviewed proprio motu by
24 Art. 88-1 CCP.
25 Art. 88-1 CPP.
26 G Vogel (n 12) 145.
27 CSJ Ch. c. C. 9 July 2013 n°375/13.
28 CJS Ch. c.C. 23 April 2013, n°224/13.
29 CSJ Ch. c. C. 9 November 2012 n° 731/12.
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the competent court, 30 which sanctions the unlimited scope of the
investigative measure that would infringe the right of defense and
most particularly the legal privilege between lawyer and client. The
case law thereby reflects the requirements stemming from the ECHR.
Indeed, the Strasbourg Court found in the past Luxembourg
authorities liable for the violation of Articles 8 and 10 of the
Convention resulting from the disproportionate character of searches
conducted in the office of a lawyer 31 and a journalist. 32 In both
cases, the Court focused on the wide wording of the order taken by
the Investigating Judge, 33 who failed to ascertain beforehand whether
less intrusive measures other than searches could have been sufficient. 34
2.3. Exceptions for urgent cases
As an exception, the police can undertake coercive acts without the
prior authorization of the Investigating Judge in case of flagrante delicto
(enquête de flagrance). 35 This condition is met when the offence is in
the course of being committed or has just been committed, or where
immediately after the facts the person suspected is chased by hue or
is found in the possession of items, or has on or about him traces or
clues that give grounds to believe that he participated in the
commission of the offence. 36 Because of the particularly intrusive
character of the investigative measures in question, 2006 legislation
introduced an ex-post judicial review of preliminary investigations
(nullités de procédures d’enquête). 37 The aim is to protect the rights
of the persons involved as well as to ensure an early judicial scrutiny
of investigative acts undertaken by the police that often lead to the
30 CSJ Ch. c. C. 3 December 2013 n° 694/13.
31 Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg, App no 51772/99 (ECtHR, 25 February
2003).
32 Saint-Paul Luxembourg S.A. v. Luxembourg, App no 26419/10 (ECtHR, 18
April 2013).
33 Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg, App no 51772/99 (ECtHR, 25 February
2003) para 70.
34 Saint-Paul Luxembourg S.A. v. Luxembourg, App no 26419/10 (ECtHR, 18
April 2013) para 44.
35 In case of felony (crime), the police is empowered, in particular, to search the
scene of the crime and seize any item, document or data that were used or intended to
be used to commit the crime, are the object or the proceeds of such crime or, more
generally, are considered necessary to establish the truth.
36 Art. 30 CCP.
37 Art. 48-2 CCP.
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opening of a judicial investigation. 38 According to Article 48-2 CCP, the
Public Prosecutor and any person demonstrating a legitimate interest
have the possibility to submit to the pre-trial chamber of the District
Court (Chambre du conseil du tribunal d’arrondissement) a request
for annulment of the preliminary investigation or any act of such
investigation.
2.4. Remedies available to the defendant
In the pre-trial stage of proceedings, remedies available to the
defendant differ according to the nature of the Investigating Judge’s
order that is subject to review. On the one hand, jurisdictional orders
(ordonnance juridictionnelle) determine how the Investigative Judge
decides between different options that either are foreseen by the law
or derive from applications by the parties. 39 Examples are the order
refusing to conduct an investigative measure that a party has applied
for, such as the decision whereby the Investigating Judge refuses the
appointment of an expert requested by the parties, or the order stating
that a person has no standing before the court (irrecevabilité d’une
partie civile). 40 Jurisdictional orders are subject to appeal (appel)
before the pre-trial chamber of the Court of Appeal (Chambre du
conseil de la Cour d’appel). 41 On the order hand, orders that do
result from a claim are of an administrative nature. 42 This category
encompasses warrants since the Investigating Judge could alternatively
have adopted a passive attitude or have refrained from taking any
step. 43 Typical examples are orders for house searches or the
appointment of an expert without a request by the parties. 44 This
category of orders is subject to petitions instituting nullity proceedings
(nullités). 45
According to Article 126 CPP, the Public Prosecutor, the accused,
the person incurring civil liability and any third party holding a
38 Projet de loi n°5354 portant introduction notamment de l’instruction
simplifiée, du contrôle judiciaire et réglementant les nullités de la procédure
d’enquête, 30.6.2004, 19 ff.
39 M Petschko, M Schiltz, S Tosza (n 10) 453.
40 G Vogel (n 12) 133.
41 Art. 133 CPP.
42 G Vogel (n 12) 133.
43 M Petschko, M Schiltz, S Tosza (n 10) 454.
44 G Vogel (n 12) 133.
45 Art. 126 CCP.
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legitimate interest can submit to the competent court a request for
annulment of the whole judicial investigation or any act taken by the
Investigating Judge during the pre-trial stage of proceedings. 46
Requests for annulment are brought before the pre-trial chamber of
the competent District Court. 47 Only when the nullity is attributable
to a court magistrate or affects the legality of the order to refer the
case for trial or a dismissal of the criminal proceeding delivered by
the pre-trial chamber of the District Court, the request for annulment
is submitted to the pre-trial chamber of the Court of Appeal. 48 Both
chambers are composed of three professional judges 49 and constitute
the so-called ‘Instruction Courts’ (jurisdiction d’instruction). The
latter are tribunals within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR, which are
fully independent and distinct from trial courts. 50 Such a strict
distinction entails two consequences. Firstly, trial courts have no
power to review the legality of decisions taken by instruction courts,
in particular the order referring the case for trial. 51 Secondly, any
procedural flow that would invalidate an act of or the entire judicial
investigation falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the instruction
courts and, therefore, cannot be subsequently raised before trial
courts. 52
The division of jurisdictional competences among criminal courts
emphasizes the importance of admissibility requirements and, most
importantly, the time limit for bringing an action. The request
annulment must first identify with sufficient precision the contested
act(s). 53 Second, the defendant must bring a request for nullity, under
penalty of foreclosure, within 5 days from the moment he becomes
aware of the contested act. 54 The starting point of the time period
begins to run as soon as the applicant has knowledge of the existence
of the impugned order. 55 It is worth noting that Luxembourg courts
46 Art. 126 (1) CCP.
47 Art. 126 (1) CCP.
48 Art. 126 (2) CCP.
49 Art. 24 and 48 Law of 7 March 1980 on the judicial organization, Mém. A n°
12, 14.03.1980.
50 CSJ corr. 14 February 2006, no 77/06 V.
51 CSJ corr. 20 June 2006, no 329/06V.
52 CSJ corr. 10 July 2007, no 363/07 V; CSJ cass. 11 February 2010, no 2711.
53 CSJ Ch. c. C. 12 May 2009 no 342/09 and 344/09.
54 Art. 126 (3) CCP.
55 Opinion of the Conseil d’Etat, Projet de loi n° 2980 portant suppression de la
cour d’assises et modifiant la compétence et la procédure en matière d’instruction et
de jugement des infractions, 12.5.1986, doc. 2980/1.
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have consistently adopted a strict interpretation of the rule enshrined in
Article 126(3) CCP. In particular, the time limit for lodging request for
annulment does not depend upon the knowledge by the applicant or his
lawyer of the content and wording of the order. 56 Although
Luxembourg courts have declared themselves competent to review
whether the time limit of 5 days undermine the right of access a
tribunal guaranteed in Article 6 ECHR, it is for the applicant to show,
with regard to the specific circumstances of the case, an unjustified
restriction on his rights. 57 Finally, the time for lodging a request
applies to any ground for nullity raised, whether based on national or
international provisions, 58 and irrespective of the seriousness of the
alleged violation. 59 The case law has acknowledged one exception to
this rule, when the ground for nullity raised is based on facts and
circumstances that substantially compromised the regularity of the
judicial investigation by seriously infringing the right of the parties
and particularly defense rights. 60
With regards the scope of review, the pre-trial chamber does not
assess the advisability of the contested measure. 61 Their jurisdiction
encompasses all grounds for nullity affecting judicial investigations.
Within this framework, national courts also verify the compliance
with procedural guarantees granted by EU directives where the
provisions in question have a direct effect. 62 If the court founds a
nullity, it declares null and void the contested act as well as the
subsequent acts of the judicial investigation taken in consequence and
as a result (en suite et comme conséquence) of the former. 63 Thus,
evidence gathered by means of an investigative measure which is
declared void, are excluded. By contrast, the regularity of subsequent
orders taken by the Investigative Judge, irrespective of the annulled
act, is not affected. 64
Similar provisions apply when the defendant challenges the legality
of a specific measure authorized by the Investigating Judge during
56 CSJ Ch.c.C. 16 December 2011, n° 913/11 and 194/11.
57 CSJ Ch.c.C. 22 October 2012, n° 674/13.
58 CSJ cass. 31 January 2013, n° 7/2013.
59 CSJ Ch.c. C. 8 October 2013, n° 553/13.
60 G Vogel (n 12) 125.
61 Ibid 127.
62 On the right to access the case file guaranteed under Directive 2012/13/EU,
CSJ Ch.c.C. 11 November 2015, n° 897/15.
63 Art. 126 – 1 (1) CCP.
64 For instance, CSJ Ch.c.C. 26 October 2010, n° 770/10.
LUXEMBOURG 337
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
preliminary investigations. 65 In particular, persons concerned can raise a
ground for nullity within two months from the execution of the
contested act. 66 However, specific time limits apply with regards to
actions taken by the defendant. When the warrant led to the opening
of a judicial investigation, the accused must bring an action before the
pre-trial chamber of the District Court within 5 days, under penalty of
foreclosure, from the moment the Investigating Judge charges him
with a criminal offence (inculpé). 67 If no judicial investigation is
open, the accused must raise nullities of investigative acts before the
trial court prior to any defense on the merits of the case. 68 Finally, it
should be stressed that the defendant has the possibility to bring an
appeal before pre-trial chamber of the Court of Appeal against the
order (ordonnance) delivered by the pre-trial chamber of the District
Court, which rejects requests for annulment under Article 126 CCP. 69
3. Deprivation of liberty: Arrest and pre-trial custodial measures
3.1. Information about available remedies
The 2017 law implementing Directive 2012/13/EU enshrines the
right of arrested persons to be provided promptly with a written letter
of rights, indicating information about inter alia any possibility to
challenge unlawful arrest and detention as well as to request interim
release. 70 The newly adopted provisions echoes Article 12 of the
Constitution, which requires the competent authorities to provide
without delay information about the available remedies for regaining
liberty. 71 In particular, the law codifies the duty for the police officers
to inform the person arrested in flagrante delicto in a language he
understands, about judicial remedies available under Luxembourg law
against police custody (rétention). 72 Likewise, the letter of right
provides the person arrested on the basis of arrest warrants (mandat
d’arrêt) and detention orders for questioning (mandat d’amener) with
information about available remedies for challenging the lawfulness of
65 Art. 24-1 (5) ff. CCP.
66 Art. 24-1 (6) CCP.
67 Art. 124-1 (7) CPP.
68 Art. 124-1 (7) CPP.
69 Art. 133 CCP.
70 Art. 39 (2) and art. 52-1 (1) CCP.
71 Art. 12 Luxembourg Constitution.
72 Art. 39 (2) para 1 CCP.
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arrest. 73 It is worth noting that the judicial practice already complied
with Article 4 Directive 2012/13/EU before the 2017 reform of the
CCP. Indeed, when the Investigating Judge ordered detention-pending
trial after having questioned the accused, he communicated to the
latter an information sheet indicating available judicial remedies
against pre-trial custodial warrants and procedures governing requests
for provisional release. 74 In a similar way, the police provided the
person arrested red-handed with a written letter of rights (formulaire
infodroit), which exists in 17 different language versions. 75
3.2. Arrest, habeas corpus and judicial review
As a general principle, arrest and detention warrants are delivered
during the pre-trial stage of proceedings by the Investigating Judge. In
particular, he may issue an arrest warrant (mandat d’arrêt) against a
suspect who is fugitive or does not reside in Luxembourg if the
offence he/she is suspected of having committed is punished by
imprisonment. 76 Arrest warrants must be reasoned in a detailed
manner, specifying the particular circumstances of the case that leads
to the conclusion that the above-mentioned conditions are met. 77 As
regards procedural requirements, the Investigating Judge can deliver
an arrest warrant only after having consulted the Public Prosecutor. 78
The arrested person is brought before the Investigating Judge within
24 hours following his arrival at the penitentiary center. 79 Exception
to the competence of the Investigating Judge is the police custody
(rétention) in case of flagrante delicto within the meaning of Article
39 CCP. 80 In such circumstances, the Public Prosecutor may
73 Art. 52-1 (1) para 1 CCP.
74 See for instance CSJ Ch.c.C. 20 January 2014, n° 37/14.
75 Projet de loi n°6758 renforçant les garanties procédurales en matière pénale,
23.12.2004, doc. 6758/00, at 28
76 Art. 94-1 para 1 CCP. In practice, the arrest warrant is accompanied by the
authorization by which the Investigating Judge requests the police officers to
enforce the warrant (commission rogatoire) and empowers then to interrogate the
suspect. Art. 52 (1) CCP.
77 Art. 94-1 para 3 CCP.
78 Art. 94-1 para 2 CCP.
79 Art. 93 CCP.
80 As mentioned above, this condition is met when the offence is in the course of
being committed or has just been committed, or where immediately after the facts the
person suspected is chased by hue or is found in the possession of items, or has on or
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authorize the police officers to hold in custody the person against whom
there are sufficiently reliable and consistent evidence to justify pressing
charges. 81 The period of detention cannot exceed 24 hours from the
moment of the arrest. 82 Upon expiration of this period, the person
must be released or brought before the Investigating Judge, who
decides after the questioning whether detention should be prolonged.
Arrest warrants taken by the Investigating Judge are assimilated to
orders having an administrative nature. Therefore, the person under
arrest can submit a request for nullity (requête en nullité) of the
warrant before the pre-trial chamber of the competent court according
to the procedure set forth in Article 126 CCP. 83 The lawfulness of
police custody may be subject to judicial review pursuant Article 48-2
CCP. The provision provides the possibility for the defendant to
submit a request for nullity against the preliminary investigation or
any act of such investigation. 84 If the enquiries lead to the opening of
a judicial investigation, the defendant may introduce a request for
annulment to the pre-trial chamber of the District Court within 5
working days after his indictment. 85 In the contrary case, the request
for nullity shall be submitted to the competent Trial Court before
presenting any defence on the merits of the case. 86 In this context,
the competent court verifies whether procedural rules, such as the
maximum period of detention were respected. 87 Judicial review also
encompasses respect of defense rights, such as the right to
information 88 and the right to legal assistance. 89
In this regard, the law of 8 March 2017 considerably enhances the
rights of suspects that are subject to arrest warrants or in police custody.
As regards the former, the police officers must at the time of arrest
provide the arrested person with a written letter of rights indicating
the reasons for arrest (date and facts constituting the offence allegedly
about him traces or clues that give grounds to believe that he participated in the
commission of the offence.
81 Art. 39(1) CCP.
82 Art. 39(1) CCP.
83 See above.
84 Art. 48-2 CCP.
85 Art. 48-2 (3) CCP.
86 Art. 48-2 (3) CCP.
87 Ch.c.Lux. 18 December 2012, n° 3312/12.
88 Ch.c.C. 22 May 2009, n° 443/09.
89 Ch.c.C. 11 February 2011, n° 96/11. The assessment aims to ensure that the
procedural guarantees provided by law were adequate and effective in the specific
circumstances of the case. Ch.c.C. 8 July 2013 n° 374/13; Ch.c.C. 11 February
2011, n° 96/11.
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committed), available remedies for challenging the lawfulness of arrest
and regaining his liberty, as well the procedural guarantees that benefit
to him, namely the right to translation and interpretation, the right to of
access to a lawyer, the right to make statements or remain silent. 90 The
letter of rights also specifies that the arrested person will be brought
before the Investigating Judge within 24 hours. 91 If the information
cannot be provided in writing, an oral communication is provided, if
necessary with the assistance of an interpreter. 92 A written copy shall
be in any event provided without undue delay. If the arrested person
cannot be found, the arrest warrant is served on his last address of
residence. 93 Where the arrested person does not speak or understands
the language of the proceedings, arrest warrants are translated ex-
officio. 94 Moreover, the right to interpretation is explicitly guaranteed
during any questioning before the Investigating Judge, irrespective of
whether the person is under custody. 95 Luxembourg CCP further
guarantees the person subject to arrest warrants the right of access to
a lawyer 96, the right to be examined by a doctor, 97 the right to
communicate with consular authorities when the suspect is of foreign
nationality unless the exigencies of the investigation dictate
otherwise 98 and a third party. 99 In exceptional circumstances, the
police officers may temporarily derogate from the latter guarantee
upon authorization of the Investigating Judge. The conditions upon
which such a derogation is allowed are identical to those set forth
under Article 5(3) and 8 Directive 2013/48/EU. In order to make
90 Art. 52-1 (1) CCP.
91 Art. 52-1 (1) para 1 CCP.
92 Art. 52-1 (1) para 2 CCP.
93 Art. 102 para 1 CCP. In this case, the procedure is recorded in a report drawn
up by the police officers in presence of two nearest neighbors of the wanted person.
Art. 102 para 2 CCP.
94 Art. 3-3 (3) CCP .
95 Art. 3-2 CCP.
96 Art. 3-6 (1) CCP. In this regard, it worth mentioning that before the entry into
force of the 2017 law, Luxembourg CCP did not explicitly guarantee the right of access
to a lawyer during the interrogation conducted by the police officers. However, the
note of General Public Prosecutor of 13 May 2011 implementing guidelines for the
compliance with the ECtHR judgement Salduz v. Turkey acknowledged that legal
assistance must be provided during the police questioning. Indeed, denial of access
to a lawyer would amount to a violation of article 6 §3 c) ECHR. See A.T. v.
Luxembourg, App no 30460/13 (ECtHR, 9 April 2015), para 69 et seq.
97 Art. 52-1 (2) CCP.
98 Art. 52-1 (4) CCP.
99 Art. 52-1 (3) CCP.
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judicial review of alleged breaches of defence rights more effective, the
report of the police questioning following the arrest must indicate
whether the suspect was duly informed about the above-mentioned
procedural guarantees, eventual waiver of the right by the arrested
person of the right to access a lawyer, the length of the interrogation,
time and date of the arrest and of the subsequent appearance before
the Investigating Judge. 100 Finally, the arrested person and his lawyer
have access to the entire case file at the latest 30 minutes before the
questioning. 101
As a result of the 2017 legislative reform, Luxembourg CCP applies
the same procedural guarantees to police custody. 102 As regards the
right to access a lawyer, case law provides that the information
provided by the police officer shall encompass the right to free legal
aid. 103 Temporary derogations from the right to communicate with a
third party must be authorized by the Public Prosecutor. 104
3.3. Detention pending trial
As previously, mentioned, the person deprived of his liberty on the
basis of an arrest warrant or under police custody shall be brought within
24 hours before the Investigating Judge. 105 Following questioning, the
latter verifies whether the conditions for delivering a pre-trial
custodial warrant (mandat de dépôt) are met. 106 The substantial
grounds justifying detention pending trial vary depending on whether
the accused reside or not in the national territory. 107 As regards
residents, a warrant may be issued against the accused who has been
questioned by Investigating Judge where there are strong indications
that he/she has committed a criminal offence and that the presumed
facts would give rise to at least two years of imprisonment. 108 In
addition, one of the following criteria must be fulfilled: danger of
flight, risk of suppression of evidence - which is presumed when the
100 Art. 52-2 (6) CCP.
101 Art. 85 (1) CCP.
102 Art. 39 CCP.
103 Ch.c.C. 8 July 2013, n° 369/13, 370/13, 371/13, 372/13 and 374/13.
104 Art. 39 (4) CCP
105 Art. 93 CCP
106 Art. 94 para 1 CCP.
107 G Vogel (n 12) at 55.
108 Art. 94 para 1 CCP.
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facts are punished by imprisonment of more than five years (crime) - or
risk that the accused will commit further offences. 109 If the warrant is
delivered against a non-resident, less stringent criteria apply, namely
strong indications that the accused has committed a criminal offence
and the presumed facts would give rise to imprisonment. 110 Warrants
of pre-trial detention must be reasoned in a detailed manner,
mentioning specific circumstances of the case that leads to the
conclusion that the above-mentioned requirements are fulfilled. 111
Regard must be paid in particular to the gravity of the offence and the
soundness of the submitted evidence. 112
The Investigating Judge in charge of conducting the investigation
has exclusive jurisdiction to issue arrest and pre-trial detention
warrants. 113 The lawfulness of the decision is not subject to ex-officio
review by another judicial authority providing greater guarantees of
independence. It should also be noted that Luxembourg law does not
provide for a maximum length of detention pending trial, nor does it
require an automatic review at regular intervals. 114 Article 94-3 CCP
only foresees an ‘information procedure’, according to which the
Public Prosecutor is informed of the continued detention two months
after the first interrogation of the accused by the Investigating Judge
and every two months thereafter until the pre-trial chamber of the
competent court confirms the charges and decides whether the case
should be referred for trial. 115 Once informed, the competent
Prosecutor or the General Public Prosecutor may request interim
release if the conditions for continued detention are no longer
fulfilled. Finally, the Investigating Judge can, at any time, lift the pre-
trial custodial detention (mainlevée). 116
109 Art. 94 para 2 CCP.
110 Art. 94 para 3 CCP.
111 Art. 94 para 4 CCP.
112 M Petschko, M Schiltz, S Tosza (n 10) 456.
113 The Investigating Judge provides the guarantees of impartiality and
independence required under Article 5§3 ECHR.
114 Until 2006, Luxembourg law provided for an automatic review of detention
pending trial before the pre-trial chamber of the competent court, which was called
upon to prolong continued detention at intervals of one month. This automatic
review of pre-trial detention was repealed and replaced by an ‘information
procedure’. Projet de loi n°5354 portant introduction notamment de l’instruction
simplifiée, du contrôle judiciaire et réglementant les nullités de la procédure
d’enquête, 30.6.2004, at 29.
115 Art. 94-3 CCP.
116 Art. 94-2 CCP.
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Judicial review of pre-trial detention is undertaken upon request of
the accused. First, the person under pre-trial detention can submit a
request for annulment (requête en nullité) against the warrant issued
by the Investigating Judge before the pre-trial chamber of the
competent court. 117 This remedy enables the detained person to seek
judicial review of the lawfulness of detention, by assessing in
particular, whether the legal requirements for ordering detention
pending trial have been met. 118
The court undertakes an assessment in concreto and verifies
whether the challenged act is sufficiently reasoned. According to the
consistent case law, the warrant shall not necessarily recall in a
detailed and exhaustive manner all elements recorded in the case
file. 119 However, a decision is not sufficiently reasoned where it uses
stereotyped formulas, which do not refer to the concrete and actual
situation of the detained person. 120 Nonetheless, the Court can
substitute its own assessment of the challenged decision and decide
that the accused should continue to be detained if the conditions set
forth in Article 94 CCP are still met. 121 The judicial review
undertaken also encompasses the respect of defense rights guaranteed
under national law as well as international legal instruments that are
directly applicable. 122
Second, the accused held in pre-trial detention, can at any time,
submit a request for interim release. 123 For the sake of reducing the
number of manifestly unfounded judicial actions, the 2017 law
implementing EU Directives enables the person under detention to
submit subsequent requests for interim release at intervals of at least
one month. 124 As for the authority undertaking judicial scrutiny,
requests for interim release submitted during the judicial investigation
fall within the competence of the pre-trial chamber of the competent
117 Art. 126 CCP. The request must be introduced, under penalty of foreclosure,
within 5 days from the moment of the arrest.
118 CSJ Ch. c. C. 28 March 2012, n° 191/12.
119 CSJ Ch.c.C. 28 May 2014, n° 369/14; CSJ Ch.c.C. 7 July 2014, n°408/14.
120 CSJ Ch.c.C. 7 July 2014, n° 408/14
121 CSJ Ch.c.C. 28 May 2014, n° 369/14.
122 In particular, before the entry into force of the 2017 law implementing EU
directives on the rights of suspects and accused persons in criminal proceedings,
Luxembourg Courts acknowledged the direct effect of Article 3 Directive 2010/64/
EU guaranteeing the right to a written translation of decisions depriving a person of
his liberty. CSJ Ch. c.C. 20 January 2014, n° 37/14.
123 Art. 113 and 116 (1) CCP.
124 Art. 116 (3) para 2 CCP.
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District Court. 125 The latter rules as a matter of urgency within three
days after the submission of the request. 126 Moreover, the accused
can lodge an appeal against the decision rejecting a request for
interim release according to the procedure set forth in Article 133
CCP. 127 Likewise, the Public Prosecutor can appeal within one day
against the decision for interim release. 128 The accused remains in
detention until the expiry of the time limit for lodging an appeal.
The appeal is lodged before the pre-trial chamber of the Court of
Appeal, which rules within 10 days if the appeal was lodged by the
Prosecutor 129 and 20 days where the judicial action was instituted
by the defendant. 130 In the case where the court does not comply
with such a time-limit for taking a decision, the accused must be
released. 131
Requests for interim release under Article 116 CCP enable the
competent court to verify whether the legal requirements justifying
continued detention are still fulfilled. 132 In this regard, judicial review
entails an assessment in concreto based on the factual background of
the case and the situation of the detained person. 133 According to
case law, the risk of suppression of evidence must be actual and
supported by facts (risque réel et cinconstancié). 134 Likewise, the
professional, the economic and the family situation of the accused in
pre-trial detention is taken into account in order to appreciate whether
alternatives to detention are more suitable in the given case. 135 In
doing so, the court reviews the necessity and proportionality of
continued detention by verifying whether less restrictive measure
125 Art. 116 (1) a) CCP. If the request for interim release is jointly presented with
an action against the decision to refer the case for trial taken by pre-trial chamber of the
District Court, the competent court is the pre-trial chamber of the Court of Appeal. Art.
116 (1) b) CCP.
126 Art. 116 (3) CCP.
127 Art. 116 (8) CCP.
128 Art. 116 (7) CCP.
129 Art. 116 (7) CCP.
130 Art. 116 (8) CCP.
131 Art. 116 (7) CCP. In this case, the appeal lodged by the Public Prosecutor will
lapse. See for instance CSJ Ch.c.C. 17 February 2009, n° 106/09.
132 CSJ Ch.c.C. 17 July 2014, n° 526/14.
133 See for instance, CSJ Ch.c.C. 11 December 2012, n° 813/12.
134 CSJ Ch.c.C. 7 August 2012, n° 522/12.
135 The proportionality test also applies with respect to obligations attached to a
decision for interim release, such as release on bail. See for instance CSJ Ch.c.C 5 June
2009, n° 487/09.
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could be taken to achieve the legally defined objectives for which pre-
trial custody is allowed. 136
If the pre-trial chamber annuls the warrant issued by the
Investigating Judge, the acts are declared void and the accused is
released. 137 Likewise, when a request for interim release is submitted
by the detainee, the court is under the obligation to order interim
release where any of the conditions set forth under Article 94 for
continued detention are no longer met. 138 The release may be
conditioned upon the respect by the accused of specific conditions,
such as prohibition on visiting certain places or obligation to undergo
medical treatment (contrôle judiciaire). The power to impose
alternative measures to imprisonment is granted to both the
Investigating Judge when he decides to lift continued detention 139 and
the pre-trial chamber of the competent court called upon to rule on a
request for interim release. 140 Finally, the decision for interim release
is always conditioned on the respect of the accused of obligations to
appear in person that apply in respect of acts of the proceedings and
the execution of the judgement on the merits of the case. 141 Indeed, if
after having obtained interim release the accused does not appear, the
Investigating Judge or the competent court may issue a new pre-trial
detention warrant. 142
The person in detention has the right to access documents essential
in order to effectively challenge the lawfulness of continued detention.
First, the accused must receive a written copy of the decision ordering
detention pending trial, and indicating the reasons justifying
deprivation of liberty. 143 Second, access to essential documents
overlaps with the right to access the case file enshrined in Article 85
CCP. In particular, after the questioning by the Investigating Judge,
the person under detention pending trial and his lawyer can consult
at any time the entire case file 144 or request a copy of the file or
specific materials of it. 145 It should be noted that restrictions on the
136 CSJ Ch.c.C. 28 May 2014, n° 369/14.
137 Art. 126 CCP.
138 Art. 116 (5) CCP.
139 Art. 94-2 CCP.
140 Art. 116 (6) CCP.
141 Art. 113 CCP.
142 Art. 119 CCP.
143 Art. 97 CCP.
144 Art. 85 (2) CCP.
145 Art. 85 (3) CCP.
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access to the case file as provided under the new wording of Article
85 CCP 146 seems to apply irrespective of whether the defendant is
free or under detention. However, Luxembourg case law had held
that denial of access shall not undermine the fundamental rights of
the accused to adequately prepare his defense, to exert the rights
conferred by law and to institute judicial actions available to
him. 147 Moreover, the Luxembourg CCP guarantees the right of
the person who does not speak or understand the language of the
procedure to obtain a written translation of the warrant ordering
detention pending trial. 148 In 2014, the pre-trial chamber of the
Court of Appeal held that Article 3 Directive 2010/64/EU does not
require the Member States to provide immediately a written
translation of the pre-trial custodial warrant. 149 Pursuant Article 3-
3 CCP, such a document must be provided within a reasonable
time. In the case referred to, no violation of defense rights was
found since, during the questioning by the Investigating Judge, the
accused was assisted by a lawyer and an interpreter, who provided
an oral translation of the warrant as well of the documents
informing the accused about remedies available under national law
to challenge the lawfulness of arrest and detention. 150 In this
respect it is worth noting that the law of March 2017 implementing
Directive 2012/13/EU expressly guarantees the right to oral
interpretation during the questioning by the Investigating Judge as
well as when he appears before the pre-trial chamber called upon
to rule on a request for interim release. 151
In addition, Luxembourg law requires the person in detention to
appear in person before the Court having jurisdiction to review a
request for interim release. 152 To this end, Article 116 requires that
both the detainee and his lawyer be informed about the place and date
of the hearing. 153 The applicant has also the opportunity to submit
146 See question 14.
147 CSJ Ch.c.C. 23 October 2009, n° 810/09. In particular, denial of access to the
case file must be justify in a reasoned decision that puts into balance, on the one hand,
the needs related to the conduct of investigations, particularly as regards risks of
suppression of evidence and, on the other, the rights of the accused. CSJ Ch.c.C. 27
June 2012, n° 460/12.
148 Art. 3-3 (3) CCP.
149 CSJ Ch.c.C. 20 January 2014, n° 37/14.
150 Ibid.
151 Art. 3-2 CCP.
152 Art. 116 (3) CCP.
153 Art. 116 (4) CCP. Likewise, if the Prosecutor lodges an appeal against the
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written observations. 154 When the tribunal having jurisdiction on the
request is the pre-trial chamber of the District Court, the Investigating
Judge submits a written and reasoned report. 155 The failure to comply
with this procedural rule shall not prevent the court from ruling on
the request for interim release. 156 The right to be heard in person
constitutes a substantial formal requirement (formalité substantielle)
that enables the detained person to effectively defend himself and
challenge the lawfulness of pre-trial detention. 157 Consequently, the
violation of this right automatically leads to release.
Finally, the CCP guarantees arrested persons and persons formally
indicted by the Investigating Judge the right of access to a lawyer. 158 It
therefore encompasses persons under pre-trial custodial detention. As
regards to the scope of and restrictions on the right to legal assistance,
the rules laid down under article 3-6 CCP apply. 159
3.4. Arrest and detention order for questioning
The Investigating Judge can issue a warrant for the purpose of
questioning the accused 160 or hearing a witness duly summoned who
refuses to appear (mandat d’amener). 161 With respect to the accused
(inculpé), such a warrant can be issued if there is a risk of flight,
suppression of evidence, or if the whereabouts of the accused are
unknown. 162 The risk of flight is presumed when the potential charge
carries a term of imprisonment of more than five years (crime). 163
Luxembourg law requires the Investigating Judge to give specific
reasons for the warrant, in particular by reference to the factual
order for interim release, the accused in detention and his lawyer are informed about
the date and place of the hearing. Art. 116 (7) CCP.
154 Art. 117 para 2 CCP. In a similar way, the Public Prosecutor shall submit
written conclusions and be heard before the court. Art. 116 (3) CCP.
155 Art. 116 (3) CCP.
156 CSJ Ch.c.C. 6 March 2012, n° 127/12.
157 CSJ Ch.c.C. 18 February 2009, n° 108/09.
158 Art. 3-6 CCP.
159 See below question 15.
160 Art. 91 (3) CCP.
161 Art. 92 CCP. If the person refuses to comply with a mandat d’amener, the
police is entitled to use force (Art. 99 CCP). Such a binding character distinguishes
the mandat d’amener from the mandat de comparution. See Opinion of the Conseil
d’Etat, 28.12.1971, Projet de loi n°1549, portant modification du régime de la
détention préventive, at 909.
162 Art. 91 (3) CCP.
163 Art. 91 (3) CCP.
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circumstances of the case showing that the conditions set forth by the
law are met. 164 Warrants for the purpose of questioning the suspect
entails in practice the authorization given to the police officers to
enforce the warrant and interrogate the accused. 165 This is without
prejudice to the right of the arrested person to be brought before the
Investigating Judge within 24 hours following deprivation of liberty. 166
Warrants issued by the Investigating Judge are assimilated to orders
having an administrative nature. Therefore, the person arrested for the
purpose of questioning can submit a request for nullity (requête en
nullité) of the warrant before the pre-trial chamber of the competent
court according to the procedure set forth in Article 126 CCP.
As for pre-trial detention warrants, the right to access documents
essential to challenge the lawfulness of detention is first guaranteed
by the duty to provide the arrested person with a copy of the warrant
delivered for the purpose of questioning. 167 In this regard, it is worth
mentioning that the 2017 law implementing EU Directives
harmonizing defense rights in criminal matters has filled a legal
lacuna. Since its entry into force, police officers must, at the time of
arrest, provide the arrested person with a written letter of rights
indicating the reasons for arrest (date and facts constituting the
offence allegedly committed), available remedies for challenging the
lawfulness of arrest and regaining his liberty, as well the procedural
guarantees that may be of benefit to him, namely the right to
translation and interpretation, the right to of access to a lawyer, the
right to make statements or remain silent. 168 If the information cannot
be provided in writing, an oral communication shall be guaranteed, if
necessary with the assistance of an interpreter. A written copy shall be
provided in any event without undue delay. 169 Where the arrested
person does not speak or understands the language of the proceedings,
the warrant is translated ex-officio. 170 Access to documents essential
to challenge detention for the purpose of questioning is further
guaranteed through the right to access the case file. In particular, the
arrested person and his lawyer have access to the entire case file at
the latest 30 minutes before the questioning by the Investigating
164 Art. 94 para 4 CCP.
165 Art. 52 - 1 CCP.
166 Art. 93 CCP.
167 Art. 97 CCP.
168 Art. 52-1 (1) para 2 CCP.
169 Art. 52-1 (1) para 2 CCP.
170 Art. 3-3 (3) CCP.
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Judge. 171 Moreover, after the questioning, they can consult the entire
case file at any time 172 or request a copy of the file or specific
materials from it. 173
Furthermore, the person subject to a ‘mandat d’amener’ has to be
heard by the Investigating Judge within 24 hours following arrest. 174
It is worth recalling that right to interpretation is explicitly guaranteed
during any questioning before the Investigating Judge, irrespective of
whether the person is under custody. 175 Finally, Luxembourg law
guarantees the person subject to warrants for the purpose of
questioning the right of access to a lawyer within undue delay under
the conditions set forth under Article 3-6 CCP. 176 Legal assistance
must be further provided during police questioning and the
interrogation by the Investigating Judge. 177
4. Specific remedies for alleged breaches of defence rights
4.1. Restrictions on the right to access the case file
The 2017 law implementing inter alia the Directive 2012/13/EU
considerably strengthens the right to access the case file during
judicial investigations. First, among the most significant changes is
the right of the defendant to access the entire case file, exceptions are
made for materials related to acts the execution of which is underway,
before the first questioning in front of the Investigating Judge. 178 In
the case of the issuance of a non-binding summons for questioning
(mandat de comparution), the file must be available for consultation
at the latest 3 days before the interrogation. Accordingly, the
protection afforded by the new legal provisions goes beyond the
171 Art. 85 (1) CCP.
172 Art. 85 (2) CCP.
173 Art. 85 (3) CCP.
174 Art. 93 CCP.
175 Art. 3-2 (1) CCP.
176 See below question 15.
177 Art. 3-6 (4) CCP.
178 Art. 85 (1) CCP. Before the entry into force of the law implementing EU
directives harmonizing defence rights in criminal proceedings, Article 85 made the
case file available to the accused only after his first questioning before the
Investigating Judge, the eve of each subsequent interrogation and of any act
(devoirs) for which the assistance of a lawyer was admitted.
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restrictive interpretation previously adopted by case law. Indeed,
Luxembourg courts have consistently held that the lack of access the
case file before the first interrogation by the Investigating Judge does
not constitute a breach of Article 6 ECHR, 179 nor of Article 7
Directive 2012/13/EU. 180 Second, after the first questioning before
the Investigating Judge or any subsequent formal indictment, the
accused and his lawyer can access the case file at any time, without
prejudice to the good functioning of the Investigating Judge’s office
and except in case of urgency, to three days prior to any interrogation
or other acts for which the assistance of a lawyer is provided. 181
Whilst in the above-mentioned situations the defendant and his
legal counsel can consult the materials of the case at the registry of
the Court, the 2017 law provides for the transmission of the case file
to the parties. 182 Article 85(3) CCP enables the accused and his
lawyer to request free of charges a copy of the case file or of specific
materials after indictment. 183 The requested copies shall be provided
within one month. However, the Investigating Judge may oppose to
the communication of the requested documents within 5 days by
taking a duly reasoned order in the light of the specific circumstances
of the case. 184 Digitalized copies might also be provided if available.
Finally, access to the case file must be granted when the judicial
investigation is closed, at the latest 8 days before the pre-trial
chamber of the competent court decides whether the case shall be
referred for trial. 185 The accused receives a copy of the entire file,
exception made of items and documents, which were seized, within a
reasonable delay before the first hearing at the trial court. 186
The 2017 law further clarifies admissible restrictions in the light
of Article 7 §4 Directive 2012/13/EU. 187 Indeed, after the first
179 CSJ Ch.c.C. 5 Nay 2014, n° 291/14.
180 CSJ Ch.c.C. 28 February 2014, n° 69/14; CSJ Ch.c.C. 21 January 2014, n° 44/
14.
181 Art. 85 (2) par 1 CCP.
182 Such a communication was not contemplated before the reform of
Luxembourg CCP, not even when a request for access specific material of the case
was submitted. CSJ Ch.c.C. 4 October 2012, n° 363/12; CSJ Ch.c.C. 1 July 2014,
n° 463/14; CSJ Ch.c.C. 18 June 2014, n° 420/14.
183 Art. 85 (3) para 1 CCP.
184 Art. 85 (3) para 3 CCP.
185 Art. 127(6) CCP.
186 Art. 182-1 CCP.
187 Before the 2017 legislative reform, no specific legal provisions defined
legitimate grounds for restriction. According to the case law, the Investigating Judge
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questioning, the decision restricting access to the case file can be
adopted by the Investigating Judge either proprio motu or upon
request of the Public Prosecutor. 188 Access to the case file may
be refused by a reasoned decision and only in exceptional
circumstances, if such access may lead to a serious threat to the
life or the fundamental rights of another person or if such refusal
is strictly necessary to safeguard an important public interest,
such as in cases where access could prejudice an ongoing
invest igat ion or ser iously harm national securi ty. 189 The
restriction must be lifted as soon as it is no longer necessary and,
in any event, when the Investigating Judge orders the closing of
the investigation. 190 The same grounds may justify the decision
whereby the Investigating Judge rejects a request by the defendant
to obtain a copy of the case file or of a specific document. 191 In
this context, the restriction can also be justified where the
requested access to the case file entails risks of pressure on
victims, witnesses or any persons being a party or participating
into the proceedings. Nevertheless, access to experts’ reports can
never be denied. 192
A decision by the Investigating Judge denying access to the case
file constitutes a jurisdictional act and therefore can be subject to
appeal (appel) under Article 133 CCP. 193 In this regard, the 2017 law
specifies that the defendant can lodge an appeal against the decision
whereby the Investigating Judge exceptionally restricts the access to
the case file after indictment, 194 rejects the defendant’s request to
revoke such a restriction 195 or opposes to the communication of
materials of the case file requested by the parties. 196 According to the
appeal procedure under Article 133 CCP, the decision taken by the
Investigating Judge is notified within 24 hours to the accused, 197 who
can lodge an appeal with the pre-trial chamber of the Court of
shall decide taking into account the interests of the proceeding, especially risk of
suppression of evidence and the right to adequately assume one’s own defense. See
for instance, CA 13 March 2007, Pasicrisie 34, 16.
188 Art. 85 (2) para 2 CCP.
189 Art. 85 (2) para 2 CCP.
190 Art. 85 (2) para 2 CCP.
191 Art. 85 (3) para 5 CCP.
192 Art. 85 (3) para 3 CCP.
193 CSJ Ch.c.C. 1 July 2013, n° 359/13.
194 Art. 85(2) para 2 CCP.
195 Art. 85(2) para 3 CCP.
196 Art. 85(3) para 6 CCP.
197 Art. 133(5) CCP.
352 PART III, CHAPTER IV
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
Appeal 198 within 5 days from the date of the notification. 199 Although
the hearing is not public, 200 Luxembourg CCP guarantees the right of
the applicant and his lawyer to attend the hearing and put forward
their defence. To this end, they are informed as to the place, date of
the hearing at the latest 8 days beforehand, and have the possibility to
submit oral and written arguments. 201 Violation to these formal
requirements are subject to an action of nullities. 202
With regards to the scope and powers of review, the competent
Court must verify whether the contested decision is sufficiently
reasoned and whether one of the grounds set forth under article 85
CPP justifies the denial to access the case file in the light of the
specific circumstances of the case. 203 It is worth noting that before
the entry into force of the 2017 law, the competent court would
substitute its own assessment to the Investigative Judge’s decision by
putting into balance, on the one hand, the need to preserve the
secrecy of judicial investigations and in particular with regards risks
of suppression or loss of evidence and, on the other, the fundamental
rights of the accused to adequately prepare his defense, to exert the
rights conferred by law and to institute judicial actions available to
him. 204
4.2. Derogations on the right to access a lawyer
The 2017 law strengthening procedural guarantees in criminal
matters enhances the right to access a lawyer whilst operating an
almost verbatim implementation of Directive 2103/48/EU. 205 In
addition to the persons deprived from their liberty during the pre-trial
198 Art. 133(4) CCP.
199 Art. 133(5) CCP.
200 Art. 133(7) para 1 CCP.
201 Art. 133 (7) para 2 CCP.
202 Art. 133 (7) para 3 CCP.
203 CSJ Ch.c.C. 23 October 2009, n° 810/09.
204 CSJ Ch.c.C. 23 October 2009, n° 810/09.
205 The legislative reform broaden the scope of the right of access to a lawyer and
codifies the judicial practice. Indeed, although Luxembourg CCP did only guarantee
the access to a lawyer when the suspects is under police custody, a note of the
General Public Prosecutor allowed the access to a legal counsel during the
questioning undertaken by the police upon request of the suspected person who is
not under detention. Note of the General Public Prosecutor, 13 May 2011,
implementing guidelines for the compliance with the ECtHR judgement, Salduz v.
Turkey.
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stage of criminal proceedings, legal assistance is first granted to the
person against whom the Prosecutor requests the opening of a judicial
investigation (inculpé), 206 as well as to the persons questioned during
preliminary enquiries (enquête préliminare ou instruction
simplifiée), 207 investigations of flagrante delicto offences 208 and
judicial investigations. 209 Moreover, the new Article 3-6 CCP refers
to ‘persons’ questioned by the police, the Prosecutor or the
Investigating Judge, a category that might encompass witnesses. 210
The right to access a lawyer implies the possibility for the defendant
to appoint the counsel of his choice. If the designated lawyer cannot be
found or refuses to attend the questioning, the competent authority shall
appoint a duty counsel (avocat commis d’office). 211 By contrast, where
the person who was duly informed of his right to legal assistance
appears voluntary for interrogation without a lawyer, the competent
authority will proceed to the questioning unless the suspect or accused
expressly requests the presence of a lawyer. 212 Access to a lawyer is
further guaranteed by free legal aid that is granted to the defendant
who lacks sufficient resources or where serious reasons related to the
social, family and material situation of the person justify the granting
of free legal assistance. 213 Moreover, the 2017 law lays down more
precise requirements related to the waiver of the procedural
safeguards by implementing Article 9 Directive 2013/48/EU. 214
Indeed, the person may waive voluntarily and unequivocally his right
to legal assistance after having been provided with clear and sufficient
information about the content of the right, the possible consequences
of waiving it, as well as the possibility to revoke the waiver at any
subsequent stage of the criminal proceedings.
Legal assistance does not merely entail the presence of the lawyer.
206 Art. 3-6 (1) sub 9 CCP.
207 Art. 3-6 (1) sub 3 and 4 CCP.
208 Art. 3-6 (1) sub 2 CCP.
209 Art. 3-6 (1) sub 7 and 8 CCP.
210 By contrast, before the entry into force of the 2017 law, legal assistance was
not guaranteed to witnesses during police questioning. However, the instruction courts
seized of a request for nullity under article 48-2 CCP annulled the report of questioning
if at the time of interrogation there were sufficient reliable and consistent evidence
against the witness. In that circumstances, he shall be regarded as a suspect
benefiting from the right of access to a lawyer. CSJ Ch.c.C. 25 April 2013, n°229/13.
211 Art. 3-6 (2) CCP.
212 Art. 3-6 (9) CCP.
213 Law of 10 August 1991 on the lawyer profession, Mém. A n° 58, 27.08.1991.
214 Article 3-6 (8) CCP.
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The latter can, at the end of the questioning, request the police officer or
the Investigating Judge to ask questions to his client or make oral
observations. 215 The authority conducting the questioning may oppose
this only when the questions or remarks are such as to impair the
conduct of investigations. Refusals to give the lawyer the possibility
to ask questions and observations are recorded in the questioning report.
The right to legal assistance further entails the possibility for the
accused to meet and communicate in private with his counsel before
the questioning. 216 A statutory provision guarantees indeed the
confidentiality of communications between the defendant and his
lawyer. 217 The 2017 law thereby filled a legal gap, since the
Luxembourg CCP only guaranteed the right to communicate with a
lawyer after the first questioning before the Investigating Judge. 218 In
should be stressed, however, that the consultation with a lawyer
before interrogation was already allowed in practice as a result of the
ECtHR judgement in A.T. v. Luxembourg. 219 Indeed, the Court held
in 2015 that the actual wording of Article 84 CCP ‘gives the
impression that no communicat ion is possible before the
interrogation’. 220 This prevents the lawyer from providing ‘effective
and practical assistance, not just abstract via his presence’ during the
first questioning by the Investigating Judge 221 and, therefore,
constitutes a breach of Article 6§3 c) of the Convention.
Finally, the right of access to a lawyer entails the presence of a legal
counsel during investigative acts if the suspect or accused person is
required or permitted to attend the act concerned. 222 This
encompasses confrontations 223 and reconstructions of the scene of a
crime. 224 With regard to certain investigative acts, the legal assistance
provided goes beyond the mere attendance by the lawyer. For
instance, during confrontations the defendant’s counsel has the
possibility to request the Investigating Judge to ask witnesses any
questions that are useful to ascertain the truth. The Investigating
215 Art. 3-6 (4) CCP.
216 Art. 3-6 (3) CCP.
217 Art. 3-6 (7) CCP.
218 Art. 84(4) CCP.
219 A.T. v. Luxembourg, App no 30460/13 (ECtHR, 9 April 2015), paras 85 et seq.
220 Ibid para 87.
221 Ibid para 87.
222 Art. 3-6 (5) CCP.
223 Art. 82(2) CCP.
224 Art. 63 (2) CCP.
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Judge may also authorize the parties to directly ask questions to the
witness. Any refusal by the Investigating Judge must be recorded. 225
The new Article 3-6 (6) CCP clarifies the rules governing
temporary derogations to the right of access to a lawyer. In this
regard, the provision operates a literal implementation of Articles 3(6)
and 8 Directive 2013/48/EU. In exceptional circumstances and only
during preliminary or judicial investigations, the competent authority
may temporarily derogate from the application of the rights to legal
assistance to the extent justified in the light of the particular
circumstances of the case, on the basis of one of the following
compelling reasons: where there is an urgent need to avert serious
adverse consequences for the life, liberty or physical integrity of a
person; where immediate action by the investigating authorities is
imperative to prevent substantial jeopardy to criminal proceedings. 226
Such temporary derogations shall in addition be proportionate and not
go beyond what is necessary, be strictly limited in time, not be based
exclusively on the type or the seriousness of the alleged offence and
not prejudice the overall fairness of the proceedings. 227
As regards the authority entitled to authorize such derogation, one
should distinguish two situations. During judicial investigations, the
Investigating Judge, takes the decision on whether the right of access
to a lawyer is temporary restricted. 228 In the case of a preliminary
enquiry, a derogation may be authorized by the police officer after the
oral authorization of the Public Prosecutor that must be confirmed by
a written and reasoned act. 229 In the second case, the decision is
taken by a non-judicial authority but can nonetheless be submitted to
subsequent judicial review within the meaning of Article 8 (2)
Directive 2013/48/EU. Indeed, not only the report of the questioning
or the investigative act conducted without the defendant’s lawyer
being present, but also the decision itself that derogates from the right
to legal assistance can be subject to action for nullities.
Indeed, the 2017 law transposing Directive 2013/48/EU enhances
the judicial protection of the right to access a lawyer in a twofold
way. First, besides the possibility for the defendant to submit an
action for nullity against the report of the questioning or the
225 Art. 82(3) CCP.
226 Art. 3-6 (6) para 1 CCP.
227 Art. 3-6 (6) para 2 CCP.
228 Art. 3-6 (6) para 3 CCP.
229 Art. 3-6 (6) para 3 CCP.
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investigative act conducted without the presence of a lawyer, 230 the law
introduces the possibility to challenge directly the decision whereby the
competent authority derogates from the right to legal assistance. In both
cases, requests for nullity are submitted to the pre-trial chamber of the
competent court. 231 Second, the 2017 law clarifies the standards of
judicial review since it specifies the requirements governing
temporary derogations. Indeed, the Instruction Courts are entitled to
verify in the light specific circumstances of the case, 232 whether the
requirements set forth under Article 3-6 (6) CCP were met. Judicial
review aims notably to assess whether derogations on the right to
access a lawyer are reasoned, proportionate and do not undermine the
fairness of the proceedings. 233 If one the above mentioned
requirements is not fulfilled, the competent court must declare the
decision authorizing the temporary derogation null and void. The
nullity is further extended to subsequent acts taken in consequence
and as a result of the annulled decision. Therefore, the report of a
questioning conducted in breach of the right of access to a lawyer
would result null and consequently constitute an inadmissible evidence.
4.3. Decisions finding that there is no need for interpretation
The law of 8 March 2017 introduced a single provision defining the
right to interpretation in criminal proceedings with the aims to clarify the
scope of the procedural guarantee and, thereby, the remedies available to
the defendant. 234 According to the law, free assistance of an interpreter
is a right of a person who does not speak or understands the language of
the proceedings when he/she is questioned by the police or the
Investigating Judge as a person suspected of having committed an
offence, or when he/she appears before a trial court until the end of
the criminal proceeding. 235 Accordingly, the authority that conducts
the questioning has competence to grant free linguistic assistance. 236
230 See for instance CSJ cass. 31 January 2013, n° 3108.
231 Requests for nullities against decisions taken by the Investigating Judge under
Article 126 CCP or under Article 48-2 where the derogation is authorized by the
Prosecutor during preliminary enquiries.
232 CSJ Ch.c.C. 8 May 2012, n° 552/13.
233 Art. 3-6 (6) CCP .
234 Law of 8 March 2017 strengthening procedural guarantees in criminal
matters, Mém. A n° 346, 30.03.2017.
235 Art. 3-2 (1) CCP.
236 Art. 3-2(3) CCP.
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The right to interpretation further encompasses the communication
between the suspect and his lawyer. 237 In this regard, the 2017 law
operates a literal implementation of Article 4 (2) Directive 2010/64/
EU. Accordingly, interpretation is available for communication
between the suspected or accused persons and their legal counsel in
direct connection with any questioning or hearing during the
proceedings or with the lodging of an appeal or other procedural
applications. 238 Linguistic assistance is granted upon request of the
defendant or his lawyer by the authority that conducts the questioning,
namely the police officer or the Investigating Judge. If the request for
oral interpretation relates to a hearing, requests or judicial actions
available under national criminal procedure, the decision granting the
assistance of an interpreter is taken by the court having jurisdiction to
rule on the judicial action. The law designates thereby the pre-trial
chamber of the competent court and consequently prevents the
situation in which the Investigating Judge would decide whether to
provide linguistic assistance in connection with an appeal against an
act taken by the Investigating Judge himself. 239
As regards legal requirements for granting linguistic assistance, the
authority which interrogates the suspects has the obligation to verify
whether he speaks or understands the language of the proceedings if
there are doubts as to his linguistic ability. 240 If it appears that he
does not speaks or understand the language, the assistance of an
interpreter must be provided without delay. 241 The assistance of an
interpreter 242 as well as the information provided about the right to
interpretation 243 must be recorded.
Doubts may nonetheless arise as to the incorrect implementation of
Article 1(3) Directive 2010/64/EU. Indeed, according to Luxembourg
law, the right to interpretation does not apply to criminal proceedings
237 Art. 3-2 (4) CCP.
238 Art. 3-2 (4) CCP.
239 Projet de loi n°6758 renforçant les garanties procédurales en matière pénale,
23.12.2014, doc. 6758/00, 33
240 Art. 3-2 (3) CCP.
241 Art. 3-2 (3) CCP. It is worth mentioning that the right to interpretation
enshrined in Article 3-2 CCP includes appropriate assistance for persons with
hearing or speech impediments (Art. 3-2 (2) CCP). Moreover, where appropriate,
communication technology such as videoconferencing, telephone or the Internet
may be used, unless the physical presence of the interpreter is required in order to
safeguard the fairness of the proceedings (Art. 3-2 (5) CCP).
242 Art. 3-2 (6) CCP.
243 Art. 3-2 (8) CCP.
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re la t ing minor offences not punishable by imprisonment
(contraventions). 244 Admittedly, the Directive does not require
Member States to provide the assistance of an interpreter during the
pre-trial stage of proceedings, enabling an authority other than a court
having jurisdiction in criminal matters to impose penalties regarding
minor offences. However, the right to interpretation must still apply to
proceedings before a court having jurisdiction to review the appeal
against such a sanction. 245
Depending on the authority competent for granting the assistance of
an interpreter, Luxembourg law provides the defendant with different
judicial remedies. 246 In particular, the person undergoing interrogation
does not only have the possibility submit a request for nullity against
the report of the questioning.
Since the entry into force of the 2017 law strengthening procedural
guarantees, Luxembourg CCP provides the possibility to challenge
directly the decision whereby the competent authority decides whether
the assistance of an interpreter is needed. 247 Nullities pronounced by
the pre-trial chamber prevent admissibility of the questioning report at
trial.
Third, if the assistance of an interpreter is requested by the
defendant or his lawyer, the decision of the Investigating Judge can
be subject to appeal under Article 133 CCP. In addition, the 2017
law grants the possibility for the defendant to challenge the quality
of the interpretation provided and to make oral observations
regarding the lack of linguistic assistance that are recorded either
244 Art. 3-8 CCP. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that Article 184 CCP requires
that competent authorities to inform the accused who is summoned to appear before
the District Court about his right to interpretation, translation and access to a
lawyer. Since District Courts have jurisdiction to review appeals lodged against
convictions for minor offences pronounced in first instance, it seems that
Luxembourg law does not totally exclude the application of defence rights granted
by the ABC Directives at the trial stage of the criminal proceedings.
245 Thus defined, the scope of the directive has been confirmed by the
interpretation held by the CJEU in Case C-216/14, Covaci, EU:C:2015:686, para 42.
246 Art 3-2 (7) CCP.
247 Projet de loi n°6758 renforçant les garanties procédurales en matière pénale,
06.10.2016, doc. 6758/03, at 15. Indeed, when the police officer who questions the
suspect considers that there is no need for interpretation, the defendant can request
the annulment of the decision not to provide linguistic assistance and the
questioning report. Second, the defendant can lodge a request for annulment against
the decision taken by the Investigating Judge not to provide linguistic assistance as
well as against the questioning report.
LUXEMBOURG 359
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
immediately in the report of the questioning or subsequently included
in the case file. 248
As regards the scope of review, the competent court verifies
whether the failure to provide the assistance of an interpreted
prevented the suspect or accused from understanding the charges
against him, to prepare and put forward his defense. It is worth noting
that, before the entry into force of the 2017 law, the judicial practice
conformed to the standards of protection enacted by Directive 2010/
64/EU. While case law acknowledged the direct effect of the
Directive, 249 in 2014 the General Public Prosecutor adopted a note
for the purpose of implementing the EU Directive on the right to
interpretation and translation pending the adoption of the national
transposition law. 250
4.4. Decisions finding that there is no need for translation
Likewise, the 2017 law significantly clarified the scope of the right
to translation. 251 The suspected or accused person who does not
understand the language of the criminal proceedings is, within a
reasonable period of time and free of charge, provided with a written
translation of all documents that are served upon them or that they
have the right to access which are essential to ensure that they are
able to exercise their rights of defence and to safeguard the fairness
of the proceedings. 252 More specifically, Article 3-3 distinguishes
between documents that must be automatically translated and those
translated upon request of the defendant. The former category
encompasses the letter of notice of rights provided by the police
248 Art 3-2 (7) CCP.
249 CSJ Ch.c.C. 20 January 2012, n° 37/14.
250 Note du Parquet général du 20 janvier 2014 relative au droit à l’interprétation
et à la traduction dans le cadre des procédures pénales.
251 Despite the judicial practice already implemented the guarantees provided
under the directive, very few provisions in Luxembourg CCP expressly related to
the right to translation before the 2017 reform. See Note du Parquet général du 20
janvier 2014 relative au droit à l’interprétation et à la traduction dans le cadre des
procédures pénales. Legal vacuum was nonetheless filled by Luxembourg case law
that implements the right to translation in the light of the ECtHR case law. For
instance, the pre-trial chamber held that the defendant who does not understand the
language of the proceedings must be provided with a written translation of the
decision referring the case for trial must. CSJ Ch.c.C. 12 February 2011, n° 52/11.
252 Art. 3-3 (1) CCP.
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during preliminary investigations, any warrant depriving the person of
his liberty, the decision ordering or rejecting a request for contrôle
judiciaire, the request of the Public Prosecutor or the civil party to
refer the case for trial, the decision of pre-trial chamber to refer the
case for trial or dismiss the proceedings, the order to appear in trial
courts and any court decision imposing penalties including penal
orders. 253 In addition to the ex-officio translation, the suspect or
accused has the possibility to submit a reasoned request to obtain
written translations of other documents that he has the right to access
provided that such documents are essential to ensure the exercise of
defence right and to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings. 254 This
does not prevent the competent authority to provide proprio motu the
translation of those acts. It must be underlined, however, that the right
to interpretation does not apply to criminal proceedings regarding
minor offences not punished by imprisonment (contraventions). 255 As
for the right to interpretation, this raises concerns as for the proper
implementation of Article 1(3) Directive 2010/64/EU. 256
The distinction between essential documents translated ex-officio
and other essential documents is of relevance to the designation of
the authority competent for granting linguistic assistance. As to the
former category, the authority that is the author of an essential
document within the meaning of Article 3-2 (3) also decides whether
a translation is needed. 257 Depending on the legal act, the decision
might be taken by the Prosecutor, the Investigating Judge or the pre-
trial chamber of the competent court. Exceptions to this rule are
requests submitted by the civil party, the translation of which falls
within the competence of the Public Prosecutor. As for documents
that might be considered essential, the decision granting or rejecting
a request for translation falls within the competence of the Public
Prosecutor during preliminary investigations and the Investigating
Judge during judicial investigations. 258 The law requires the
authority which interrogates the defendant or the court before which
he appears to verify whether the defendant speaks or understands the
language of the proceedings if there are doubts as to his linguistic
253 Art. 3-3 (3) CCP.
254 Art. 3-3 (4) CCP.
255 Art. 3-8 CCP.
256 See supra Section 4.3.
257 Art. 3-3 (5) para1. Exception to the rules are acts whereby the partie civile
request the referral of the case for trial or the appearance of the defendant in court.
258 Art. 3-3 (5) para 2 CCP.
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ability. 259 However, under exceptional circumstances, an oral
translation of essential documents may be provided instead of a
written translation provided that such an oral translation does not
prejudice the fairness of the proceeding. 260
The 2017 law does not introduce new specific remedies enabling
the suspect or the accused to challenge the decision finding that there
is no need for translation. Nonetheless, it enhances the effective
protection of the defendant’s rights, since it specifies what authority
and under which criteria does it orders written translation of essential
documents. 261 The defendant may notably request the adjournment of
a court hearing, precluding the applicability of a time-limit for
instituting a judicial action, where the lack of translation prevents the
applicant from having knowledge of the contested act or makes it
impossible for him to bring a judicial action, 262 submit requests for
nullities under Article 126 CCP where the Investigating Judge fails to
provide a written translation of an essential document, or request for
nullities under Article 48-2 CCP where such a decision is taken by
the Public Prosecutor during preliminary enquiries. Moreover, the
decision whereby the Investigating Judge rejects a request for
translation is subject to appeal before the pre-trial chamber of the
competent court under Article 133 CCP. 263 In a similar way, the
competent court may order the adjournment of the hearings where the
Public Prosecutor has failed to order translation of an essential
document despite the request of the accused. In addition, this reform
granted defendants the possibility to make oral observations regarding
the lack of linguistic assistance that are recorded either immediately in
the report of the questioning or subsequently in the case file. 264
Regarding the scope of judicial review, Luxembourg courts are
called upon to identify documents which are essential to ensure that
the suspect and accused are able to exercise their rights of defence
259 Art. 3-3 (2) CCP.
260 Art. 3-3 (7) CCP.
261 Projet de loi n°6758 renforçant les garanties procédurales en matière pénale,
06.10.2016, doc. 6758/03, 35.
262 The time-limit for lodging a judicial action is suspended (relevé de
déchéance) where the defendant is not provided with a written translation of the
decision referring the case for trial that he intends to challenge. CSJ Ch.c.C. 12
February 2011, n°52/11.
263 Projet de loi n°6758 renforçant les garanties procédurales en matière pénale,
23.12.2004, doc. 6758/00, 35.
264 Art. 3-3 (8) CCP.
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and to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings within the meaning of
Article 3-3 (4). This also encompasses a case-by-case assessment of the
need to translate passages of essential documents, which are not relevant
for the purposes of enabling suspected or accused persons to have
knowledge of the case against them. 265 Finally, the 2017 law codifies
the conditions upon which the suspect or the accused may waive his
right to translation. In this regard, the competent authority must verify
whether the waiver is unequivocal and given voluntarily by the person
who has been informed about the scope of the right to translation and
the consequences of the waiver. 266
4.5. Violations of the right to information about the accusation
In the course of judicial investigations, the indictment of a suspect
(inculpation), irrespective of whether he is under detention, occurs after
the first questioning by the Investigating Judge. 267 Before the
interrogation, the latter must inform the accused (inculpé) about the
facts to which the interrogation relates, the legal characterization of
those facts as well as of the investigative acts previously undertaken
by the police during preliminary enquiries or flagrante delicto
investigations. 268 If the Investigating Judge proceeds by indictment
after having questioned the suspect and heard observation by his
lawyer, he is required to inform the accused about the charges against
him. 269 The information provided encompasses the facts he is
accused of having committed and their legal characterization, unless
these information was already communicated. It is worth noting that
the 2017 law implementing Directive 2012/13/EU further requires the
Investigating Judge to indicate in non-binding summons to appear for
questioning the nature and date of the offence to which the
interrogation relates. 270 In addition, where the Investigating Judge
modifies the legal characterization of the charges communicated to the
accused, the latter must be informed. 271
The 2017 law introduced similar provisions in the case of
265 Art. 3(4) Directive 2010/64/EU.
266 Art. 3-3 (10) CCP
267 Art. 81 (7) CCP.
268 Art. 81(1) CCP.
269 Art. 81(7) CCP.
270 Art. 91 (2) CCP.
271 Art. 86-2 CCP.
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preliminary investigations 272 and investigations of flagrante delicto
offences. 273 Where there is evidence indicating that the person under
police questioning participated in a criminal offence punishable by
imprisonment, 274 he has the right to be informed as to the nature and
date of the offence allegedly committed. 275 Article 46 CCP grants the
same guarantee to witnesses if, during the interrogation, reliable
evidence appears to indicate that he likely took part to the
perpetration of the offence. 276 Where the suspect is summoned to
appear for questioning, information regarding the charges must be
provided beforehand in writing. 277 Information given orally regarding
the charges and rights must be recorded in the minutes of the
interrogation. 278
In any event, the accused is informed about the charges against him
before submission of the merits of the accusation to the competent court.
To this end, Article 184 CCP requires the summoning actor to appear
before the competent trial court to indicate the nature, legal
characterization and date of the offence, as well as the nature of the
participation by the accused person. 279 Nonetheless, where the
decision to refer the case for trial falls within the jurisdiction of the
pre-trial chamber of the District Court, 280 such information is
provided in the decision to refer the case for trial notified to the
accused. Indeed, the pre-trial chamber is called upon to verify after
the closing of the preliminary enquiries or the judicial investigation
whether the evidence collected are sufficiently reliable and accurate to
justify the holding of a trial. 281 The review does not aim to establish
the guilt or innocence of the accused, but merely to identify and refer
the case to the court having jurisdiction to rule on the charges. The
order delivered by the pre-trial chamber to that effect (ordonnance de
renvoi) is notified to the accused 282 and provides him detailed
information about the accusation, including the nature and legal
272 Art. 46 CCP.
273 Art. 39-1 CCP.
274 Art. 46 (2) CCP.
275 Art. 46 (3) CCP.
276 Art. 46 (2) and art. 39-1 (2) CCP.
277 Art. 46 (3) para 2 CCP.
278 Art. 46 (3) para 3 CCP.
279 Art. 184 para 2 CCP.
280 Art. 127 CCP.
281 G Vogel (n 12) 138.
282 Art. 127(9) CCP.
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classification of the criminal offence, as well as the nature of
participation by the accused person. 283
The suspect or accused has the possibility to submit a request for
annulment to the pre-trial chamber of the competent court against the
act of the investigative investigation 284 or the preliminary enquiry 285
adopted in violation of the right to be informed. It should be stressed
that the review undertaken by the Instruction Courts may encompass
the violation of defence rights resulting from an indictment that was
unduly delayed. In particular, Article 73 CCP prevents the competent
magistrate or police officer from questioning a person as a witness
where serious and consistent evidence against him justify the pressing
of charges. In such circumstances, the contested act would be
declared null and void when the delayed indictment irreparably
deprive the accused of the ability to exercise defense rights. 286
Likewise, the failure to notify the order of the pre-trial chamber
which refers the case for trial is sanctioned by nullity. 287 The accused
may file a motion before the competent trial court before any
submission on the merits of the case. 288 Judicial review may also
concern the accuracy of the charges indicated in the summons to
appear for trial. In case of re-characterization of the charges, the court
verifies whether the accused was informed in a detailed manner as to
the nature and reasons of the accusation against him in order to
provide him with sufficient time and facilities to prepare his defense. 289
5. Sanctions against illegal or improperly obtained evidence
As mentioned above, Luxembourg law sanctions evidence gathered
in breach of defense rights by nullities. During judicial investigations,
requests for nullities fall within the jurisdiction of the instruction
courts. 290 Nullities against investigative acts carried out in the course
preliminary enquiries which did not lead to the opening of judicial
investigations shall be raised before the competent trial courts prior to
283 G Vogel (n 12) 140.
284 Art. 126 CCP.
285 Art. 48-2 CCP.
286 CSJ Ch.c.C. 24 October 2012, n° 690/12.
287 Art. 127(9) CCP.
288 G Vogel (n 12) 141.
289 CSJ corr. 13 mars 2007, n° 155/07 V.
290 Art. 126 CCP.
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any review on the merits. 291 One should distinguish two categories of
nullities. On the one hand, formal nullities are explicitly provided by
a statutory provision. On the other, substantial nullities are developed
by case law with the aim of sanctioning violations of substantial
procedural requirements and, in particular, breaches of defence rights.
Since 2012, Luxembourg case law considers that a request for nullity
can be based on alleged violations of the right to fair trial guaranteed
under Article 6 ECHR. 292 Thus, breaches of defense rights that would
hinder the fairness of the proceedings in light of the specific
circumstances of the case lead instruction courts to declare the
contested act null and void. 293 Nonetheless, breaches of defense
rights do not automatically entail substantial nullities. Restrictions
might be justified by legitimate purposes, provided that the fairness of
the criminal proceedings as a whole is ensured. 294
If the defendant fails to submit a request for nullity, or if the
instruction court rejects his request, the competent trial court does not
have the power to apply nullities after the competent instruction court
refers the case for trial (purge des nullités). Nonetheless, trial courts
assess freely the admissibility and probative value of evidence. 295 In
particular, they exclude illegally obtained evidence from being used at
trial in the following situations: violations of formal requirements that
are prescribed by a legal provision under penalty of nullity; the
irregularity vitiates the evidentiary value of an act; the use of
evidence would entail a breach of the right to a fair trial. 296
Luxembourg case law seems to adopt a stringent interpretation of the
latter condition. Even though the Court of Cassation seems to allow
the use of illegally obtained evidence where such use does not
prejudice the fairness of the proceedings, 297 the Luxembourg Court of
Appeal has held that the adversarial discussion of evidence at trial is
not sufficient to repair irregularities in the gathering of evidence. 298
291 Art. 48-2 CCP.
292 CSJ Ch.c.C. 16 May 2012, n° 301/12.
293 CSJ Ch.c.C. 22 October 2012, n° 674/12.
294 CSJ Ch.c.C. 12 February 2014, n° 102/14.
295 V Bolard, Preuve et Vérité (2013) 23 Annales du droit luxembourgeois 39, 77
ff.
296 CSJ cass. 22 November 2007, n° 2474.
297 CSJ cass. 22 November 2007, n° 2474.
298 CSJ corr. 26 February 2008, n°106/08 V; A Elwinger, ‘Le triomphe des droits
fondamentaux. Du contrôle de la légalité des pièces aa contrôle du procès équitable.
La portée juridique des décisions rendues à la suite de l’ « Affaire KB »’ (2011) 48
Bulletin Droit et Banque 29,41 ff.
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5.1. Infringements of the right to access the case file
Trial courts may sanction the lack of access to materials of the case
file as a violation of the right to an adversarial hearing. The latter
prevents the judge from basing a conviction on evidence, which was
not included in the case file and was not subject to an adversarial
debate among the parties to the criminal proceeding. 299 For instance,
an official record providing incriminating evidence that is presented
by a police officer after having testified in front of a court must be
excluded, where the defendant did not have access to it and therefore
was not able to adequately prepare his defence. 300 However, the right
to access the case file can be limited. In 2013, the Constitutional
Court outlined the scope of review that trial court must undertake in
order to guarantee the rights of the defendant. 301 The judgement
recalled that legitimate interests, notably national security and
protection of witnesses, could justify restrictions on access to the case
file, provided that such restrictions are strictly necessary. Where the
trial court is unable to review the proportionality of the lack of
access, the rights of the accused would be violated. For instance,
intelligence services cannot oppose in a discretionary manner, the
disclosure of evidence gathered by foreign intelligence services, where
the reliability of such evidence cannot be assessed by Luxembourg
courts. In any event, if the evidence is not available, it cannot
constitute the basis of the decision to be taken by the trial court.
It should be stressed, however, that Luxembourg law also sanctions
violation of the right to access the case file by nullities. In particular,
when the judicial investigation is closed, access to the case file must
be granted under penalty of nullity, 8 days before the pre-trial
chamber decides whether the case shall be referred for trial. 302 Given
that Luxembourg CCP grants the defendant access to the case file
before he is questioned by the Investigating Judge, 303 the violation of
such right might constitute a ground for nullity of the minutes of the
questioning. In particular, the case law acknowledges that delayed
access to the materials of the case might constitute a ground for
299 CSJ corr. 5 May 2015, n° 165/15 V.
300 CSJ corr. 16 June 2006, n° 308/06 V.
301 Cour const. 25 October 2013, n°104/13. The case in question dealt with the
lack of communication of an informant’s identity and certain documents by
intelligence services.
302 Art. 127 (6) CCP.
303 Art. 85 CCP.
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substantial nullity, where the defendant is able to show an irreparable
breach of his defense rights in the light of the specific circumstances
of the case. 304
5.2. Statements obtained in breach of the right to access a lawyer
The right to access a lawyer constitutes a ground for nullity against
the questioning by the Investigating Judge. 305 By contrast, it does not
guarantee the right to legal assistance during a police questioning
under penalty of nullity. However, the instruction courts has
consistently held that breaches to such procedural safeguard might
constitute a ground for substantial nullity and therefore remove the
record of the police questioning from the case file. This is for
instance the case where the police officers failed to provide the
suspect with adequate information about his right to access a lawyer
and to legal aid. In this circumstance, the resulting waiver of the right
to legal assistance does not fulfill the requirements stemming from
Article 6 ECHR. 306 Likewise, if at the time of the interrogation, there
was sufficient reliable and consistence evidence against a witness, he
must benefit from the right to access a lawyer during the police
questioning. 307
However, the pre-trial chamber of the Luxembourg Court of Appeal
has held that incriminating statements made by the suspect during the
police questioning without the assistance of a lawyer do not
irretrievably prejudice the rights of defence, where such statements do
not constitute the sole or decisive basis for prosecution. 308 Trial
courts apply the same threshold whilst assessing the probative value
of incriminating statements made during police questioning without
access to a lawyer. 309 Finally, communication between the defendant
and his lawyer that relates to the exercise of defence rights are
protected by the legal privilege and therefore cannot be used as
incriminating evidence for the purpose of prosecution. 310
304 CSJ Ch. c. C. 12 February 2014, n° 102/14.
305 Art. 81-10 CCP.
306 CSJ, Ch.c.C. 8 July 2013, n° 396/13, 370/13, 371/13, 372/13 and 374/13.
307 CSJ Ch. c. C. 25 April 2013, n° 229/13.
308 CSJ Ch.c.C. 21 January 2014, n° 44/14.
309 CSJ corr. 23 March 2015, n° 109/15 VI.
310 CSJ Ch.c.C. 23 May 2012, n° 316/12.
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5.3. Breaches of the right to translation and interpretation
In the pre-trial stage of proceedings, the CCP empowers instruction
courts to ascertain whether alleged violation of the right to interpretation
and translation constitutes a substantial nullity and thereby prevents the
admissibility of unlawful collected evidence. At trial, statements made
by the accused during a police questioning without the assistance of
an interpreter must be excluded when it appears during the hearings at
the trial court that he does not understand the language in which his
statements were recorded. 311
5.4. Failure to provide information about rights and about accusation
A set of provisions of the CCP sanction violations of different
aspects of the right to information. Nullities apply to acts of the
Investigative Judge where, before the interrogation, he fails to inform
the accused about the accusation 312, to provide information about the
right to access a lawyer 313 and the right to make statement or to
remain silent during the questioning, 314 to comply with the duty to
record the compliance with the above mentioned procedural
safeguards in the report of questioning. 315 Luxembourg law also
provides formal nullities against breaches of the right to information
about the right to access the case file 8 days before the pre-trial
chamber of the competent court decides whether to refer the case for
trial 316, as well as the date and place of the trial hearing, where the
summons to appear for trial does not comply with the formalities set
forth by the law and the accused does not appear in court. 317
6. Appeals against conviction and sentence
Luxembourg law guarantees the right for the convicted person to
appeal against judgements delivered in first instance by trial court. 318
311 CSJ corr. 13 October 2015, n° 400/15.
312 Art. 81 (1) and 81-10 CCP.
313 Art. 81 (2) and 81 (10) CCP.
314 Art. 81 (3) and 81-10 CCP.
315 Art. 81 (4) and 81-10 CCP.
316 Art. 127(6) CCP.
317 Art. 146 para 4 (1) CCP.
318 Conversely, appeals on questions on law and facts cannot be lodged against
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The time limit for lodging an appeal is 40 days from the pronouncement
of the contested judgement if it was delivered after an adversarial debate
or from the notification of the contested judgement if the latter was
delivered in absentia. 319 While determining the admissibility of the
appeal, the competent court must verify whether the defendant was
informed about the first instance decision. 320 Moreover, where a
public prosecutor challenges a judgement before a court of second
instance, the defendant has the right to cross-appeal within 5 an
additional days. 321 Within the above-mentioned time limits, the
applicant is required to submit a declaration of appeal either in person
or through a mandated lawyer at the registry of the court that has
delivered the contested judgement by either the accused or his legal
counsel. 322 It is worth mentioning that Luxembourg law does not
provide specific requirements related to pleas and arguments that the
defendant should put forward in the declaration of appeal.
The scope of the right to appeal guaranteed under national law is broader
than the one enshrined under Article 2 of Protocol 7 ECHR. On the one hand,
appeal is available against any judgement wherein a first instance court rules on
the merits of the case or orders investigatory and interim measures while ruling
on the substance of the case. 323 This encompasses any decision that determines
whether the accused is innocent or guilty and, in the latter case, imposes
penalties, 324 irrespective of the seriousness of the offence. 325 On the other
hand, the parties to the criminal proceeding can lodge an appeal before a
second instance court against a judgement ruling on procedural objections
and pleas that put an end to the proceedings. 326 For instance, the public
judgement rendered on appeal (appel sur appel ne vaut). See CSJ corr. 8 May 2007, n°
228/07 V.
319 Art. 203 CCP.
320 If there is no proof of notification in the case file or the competent authority
failed to provide the information, the limitation period for lodging an appeal is
suspended. CSJ corr. 11 October 2010, n° 381/10 VI; CSJ crim. 29 April 2012, n°
217/12 VI.
321 Art. 203 para 7 CCP.
322 Art. 203, para 4 CCP.
323 Art. 579 para 1 New Code of Civil Procedures, thereinafter NCCP.
324 CSJ corr. 3 February 2009, n° 64/09 V.
325 Indeed, appeal is available against convictions and sentences pronounced by
criminal courts having jurisdiction over misdemeanors (art. 172 CCP), felonies (art.
199 CCP) and crimes (art. 221 CCP). Likewise, penal orders can also be subject to
appeal (art. 401 c) CCP). By contrast, a decision related to the admissibility of
testimony or a judgement that orders an expertise without ruling on the culpability
of the defendant nor on the penalties to be imposed cannot be directly subject to
appeal. CSJ corr. 7 July 2000, n° 225/ V; CSJ corr. 16 April 2002, n° 99/02 V
326 Art. 579 para 2 NCCP.
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prosecutor has the possibility to appeal the first instance decision that
terminates the prosecution by virtue of the ne bis in idem principle. 327 As
an exception to the above-mentioned conditions, Luxembourg case law
acknowledges the possibility to appeal against a judgement, which did not
rule on the merits of the case nor put an end to the proceedings, where the
first instance court delivering the impugned decision, has committed an
abuse of power. Such derogation refers to specific cases where the lower
tribunal acted ultra vires or infringed a fundamental principle governing the
criminal justice system, such as a first instance decisions that deprive the
defendant the possibility to be heard in person. 328
Luxembourg law empowers appellate courts to review the case both
on questions of law and facts. The scope of review is however limited in
a twofold way. First, it encompasses issues that have been settled by the
first instance court in the impugned judgement (tantum devolutum,
quantum judicatum). 329 Second, the scope of review can also be
limited to selected issues where the appeal lodged by the parties to
the proceeding is limited to the correspondent parts of the first
instance decision only (tantum devolutum quantum appelatum). 330
The review undertaken by second instance courts encompasses the
examination of new evidence and new grounds presented by the parties
in support of their claims. An exception is made for pleadings in law that
must be presented before the competent court, wherein the reviewing
court then would undertake a review on the merits. 331 Appeals on the
merits do not necessarily imply, however, a complete and fresh
examination of the case. 332 In particular, appellate courts are not
required to hear all witnesses called by the defence who have already
testified before the first instance tribunal. 333 If the hearing is
manifestly unnecessary for the sake of establishing the truth, the
appeals court may reject any request of the defendant that would
simply delay the hearings or is not likely to provide relevant
327 CSJ corr. 16 October 2012, 454/12 V.
328 CSJ corr. 26 mai 2015, 215/15 V.
329 An exception to this rule applies as regards decisions rendered by first
instance courts that are quashed on appeal for breach of, or for non-corrected failure
to comply with any formalities prescribed by law under penalty of nullity. In order
to guarantee the right for the defendant to a fair trial, the Court of Appeal is under
the obligation to undertake a review de novo of the case, including matters of facts
and law on which the first instance court did not ruled (évocation). Art. 215 CCP.
330 Ibid, p. 277.
331 G Vogel (n 12) 277.
332 CSJ corr. 18 November 2015, 511/15X.
333 G Vogel (n 12) 397.
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elements. Nonetheless, the decision rejecting the defendant’s submission
must be duly reasoned in order to avoid arbitrary exclusion of
testimonial evidence. 334 Moreover, the court ruling on appeal is not
compelled to review ex officio grounds related to alleged breaches on
defence rights that the defendant failed to raise, unless the sanction
provided for such violations are nullities. 335
Regarding the gathering of new evidence, appellate courts enjoy the
same powers as first instance tribunals. 336 The powers referred to are
particularly extended where the prosecution relates to serious crimes
(crimes). Indeed, the President of the criminal chamber of the first
instance District Court, as well as the President of the Court of
Appeals, has discretionary powers to order any measure necessary for
establish the truth. 337 This entails the power to summon a witness to
appear and order the presentation of new items of the case file that
the judge considers relevant. 338
Appellate courts in criminal proceedings have the power to quash
and reverse all or parts of the lower court decision. Thus, the Court of
Appeals can substitute its own assessment of the case to the first
instance judgement. This encompasses the power of appellate courts
to characterize the facts, provided that the right of the defendant to be
informed of accusation and to defend himself are guaranteed. This
further implies the power to repeal and alter the penalty imposed by
the lower tribunal.
The above-motioned powers of review are nonetheless limited by
the prohibition of reformation in pejus. The latter prevents the
competent court of appeal from putting the defendant, where he is the
sole appellant, in a worse position than before the filing of the
appeal. 339 Accordingly, if the prosecutor does not appeal against the
first instance judgement, the appellate court cannot increase the
penalty pronounced in first instance nor apply a new aggravating
factor. 340 Likewise, the defendant who institutes the appeal
proceedings cannot be convicted of the charges of which he was
acquitted by the first instance court. 341 Conversely, where the appeal
334 CSJ corr 12 March 2012, 141/12 VI.
335 CSJ cass. 19 mars 2015, n°3453.
336 Art. 211 CCP ; Art. 222 CCP.
337 Art. 218 (1) CCP.
338 Art. 218 (2) CCP.
339 CSJ cass. 16 May 2002, n° 1890.
340 CSJ cass. 24 May 2011, n°271/11 V.
341 CSJ corr. 21 June 2011, n° 325/11 V. Thus defined, the prohibition of
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lodged by the public prosecutor refers the case as a whole, including
incriminating and exculpatory aspects, to a second instance court
(devolution complète), 342 the Court of Appeals has the power to
impose a higher sentence 343 and convict the defendant, even though
the prosecutor requested the acquittal in first instance. 344
7. Appeals in cassation
The defendant has the right to appeal final convictions rendered in
last instance before the Court of Cassation (pourvoi en cassation). 345
The time limit for filling an appeal in cassation is two months from
the date of notification of the contested judgement delivered by a trial
court. 346 The law extends the time limit where the applicant does not
reside in Luxembourg. 347 However, appeals in cassation must be
instituted within one month where the contested judgement was
pronounced by a court having jurisdiction over minor offences. 348
Within the time limit prescribed by the law, the applicant must submit
at the registry of the Court a copy of the decision subject to appeal as
well as a memorial signed by a lawyer indicating the contested part of
the judgement, grounds for appeal and arguments thereto. 349 In this
regard, it should be mentioned that Luxembourg law does not allow
the applicant to defend himself in person before the Court of
Cassation. Only qualified lawyers are admitted to plead before the
highest instance court. 350
reformation in pejus also apply to Appellate Courts to which the Court of cassation
remand the case after quashing a judgement on appeal. CSJ cass. 2 February 2012,
n°3029.
342 CSJ corr. 18 February 2009, n° 92/09 X.
343 CSJ cass. 27 January 2011, n° 2817; CSJ corr. 18 February 2009, n° 92/09 X.
344 CSJ corr. 14 June 2010, n° 259/10 X.
345 Art. 407 CCP.
346 Art. 7 Modified Law of 18 February 1885 governing appeals in cassation and
related procedures, Mém. A n°23, 18.04.1885, hereinafter Law governing appeals in
cassation. Luxembourg law does not apply any similar provisions to the conclusions
submitted by the General Public Prosecutor. The case law consistently held that
such a discrepancy does not infringe the principle of equality of arms, since the
prosecutor is not a party to the proceedings but plays an advisory role before the
Court of Cassation. CSJ cass. 3 July 2008, n°2583 ; CSJ cass. 9 June 2011, n°2841;
Ewert v. Luxembourg, App no 49375/07 (ECtHR, 22 July 2010), para 97 – 98.
347 Art. 7 Law governing appeals in cassation.
348 Art. 41 Law governing appeals in cassation.
349 Art. 10 Law governing appeals in cassation.
350 Art. 20 Law governing appeals in cassation.
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Under Luxembourg law, appeals in cassation constitute an
extraordinary remedy that is governed by restrictive procedural rules.
Indeed, the Court of Cassation does not intervene as a third instance
court undertaking a full judicial review of the case. 351 The scope of
review is limited to question of law only 352 and, more specifically,
to the pleas in law put forward by the applicant in support of the
appeal. 353 Thus, the defendant who lodges an appeal must indicate in
a precise errors of law in the impugned decision, 354 including the
way in which a specific legal provision was violated 355 as well as the
correct interpretation that the lower court should have adopted. 356
Nonetheless, the requirement for precision and clarity in the wording
of grounds for cassation should not lead to excessive formalism,
which would constitute a disproportionate restriction on the right to
access the court of higher instance. 357 By contrast, pleas, which call
into question the assessment of the facts and the appraisal of evidence
by the court whose decision is challenged, are inadmissible. 358 In a
similar way, the applicant is not entitled to raise in front of the Court
of Cassation new pleas of law. 359 For instance, nullities against a first
instance decisions are inadmissible if the applicant failed to raise the
grounds for nullity in question before the appellate court, exception
made for pleas advocating the lack of jurisdiction. 360
Cassation proceedings may lead to three different outcomes. If the
Court of Cassation holds that the lower court correctly applied the law, it
would dismiss the appeal (rejet du pourvoi). By contrast, where the
Court of Cassation finds that the lower court made an error of law, it
is empowered to quash the impugned judgement either in its entirety
or partially (casse et annule). 361 In such a case, the Court of
351 CSJ cass. 6 June 2013, n° 3227.
352 Art. 407 CCP.
353 CSJ cass. 11 March 2010, n°2747.
354 CSJ cass. 18 January 2007, n°2334.
355 CSJ cass. 7 February 2008, n°2538.
356 CSJ cass. 12 February 2009, n°2623.
357 Petrovic v. Luxembourg, App no 32956/08 (ECtHR, 17 February 2011), para
27. In this regard, the ECtHR fond that Luxembourg violated Art. 6 of the Convention
where the expected higher accuracy was not essential for the Court of Cassation to
review the case. Ewert v. Luxembourg, App no 49375/07 (ECtHR, 22 July 2010),
para 93.
358 CSJ cass. 19 October 2006, n° 2325.
359 CSJ cass. 8 March 2007, n° 2388.
360 Art. 410 CCP.
361 Art. 28 Law governing appeals in cassation.
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Cassation may refer the case back to a court (renvoi) of the same level as
the one whose decision has been overturned or to the same court
composed by different judges. 362 The lower court having jurisdiction
to review the merits of the case is not bound by the assessment of the
facts in the quashed judgement, but must comply with the ruling
delivered by the Court of Cassation. 363 The latter may however annul
a judgement without remanding the case to a lower instance court
where the action of quashing the judgment does not imply any further
ruling on the merits. 364
8. Access to the Constitutional Court
The parties to criminal proceedings do not have direct access to the
Luxembourg Constitutional Court. However, if the defendant challenges
the conformity of applicable laws with the national Constitution, the
competent court must refer the question to the Constitutional Court
for a preliminary ruling. 365 The court before which exception of
unconstitutionality is raised is not under the obligation to refer the
case to the Constitutional Court where one of the following conditions
is met: the decision on the constitutionality question is not necessary
to solve the dispute, the claim is manifestly unfounded, or the
Constitutional Court has already ruled on the same matter. 366 The
public nature of hearings before the Constitutional Court entail the
possibility for the parties to the main proceeding to present their case
and submit written conclusions. 367 The decision taken by the lower
court in the main proceedings must comply with the legally binding
judgement delivered by the Constitutional Court. 368
362 Art. 27 Law governing appeals in cassation.
363 Art. 29 Law governing appeals in cassation.
364 Only under exceptional circumstances, the Court of cassation may substitute
its own decision without exerting its power to remand if the facts as ascertained and
assessed by the trial court enable it to apply the appropriate rule of law. Art. 27 and
29 Law governing appeals in cassation.
365 Law of 27 July 1997 on the organization of the Constitutional Court, Mém. A
n°58, 13.08.1997.
366 Art. 6 Law on the organization of the Constitutional Court.
367 Art. 11 Law on the organization of the Constitutional Court.
368 Art. 15 Law on the organization of the Constitutional Court.
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9. Judicial review and the EAW
9.1. Competent judicial authorities
The Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA was implemented in
Luxembourg by the 2004 Act governing the EAW 369. Pursuant
Article 26 of the law, the designation of the issuing authorities reflects
the jurisdiction conferred to judicial bodies within the Luxembourg
criminal justice system. 370 On the one hand, the competence for
issuing a national arrest warrant, which is conferred to investigating
judge, instruction courts and trial courts, is extended to EAW issued
for the purpose of prosecution. 371 On the other hand, the Chief Public
Prosecutor (Procureur général d’Etat) has the power to issue a EAW
for the purpose of executing a sentence. 372 Likewise, the competence
for executing a EAW falls within the jurisdiction of different
authorities. In particular, the decision to surrender the requested
person is taken by the pre-trial chamber the District Court having
jurisdiction over the place of arrest (chamber du conseil du tribunal
d’arrondissement) upon request of the prosecutor. 373 However, if the
arrested person consents to surrender, his consent amounts to a
decision executing the EAW. 374
9.2. Defence rights in the execution of a EAW
The person subject to a EAW has the right to challenge alleged
369 Law of 17 March 2004 on the European Arrest Warrant and surrender
procedures among Member States of the European Union, Mém. 2004, p. 588, as
modified by the Law of 17 October 2010, Mém. 2010, p. 3172, the Law of 3
August 2011, Mém. 2011, p. 2962 and the Law of 8 March 2017, Mém. n° 346, 30
March 2017. Hereinafter Law implementing the EAW.
370 The current wording of the provision referred to was modified in 2011 with
the aim to clarify what is the authority having competence for issuing a EAW
where preliminary investigations have been completed.
371 Art. 26(1) Law implementing the EAW.
372 Art. 26(2) Law implementing the EAW. Luxembourg legislator excluded the
power of the prosecuting authorities to issue a EAW for the purpose of prosecution
given that the Prosecutor does not have competence under national law for ordering
an arrest except in cases of flagrante delicto. Avis du Conseil d’Etat, 8 April 2011,
Projet de loi n°6178 portant modification de la loi du 17 mars 2004 relative au
mandat d’arrêt européen at aux procédures de remise entre Etats membres de
l’Union européenne.
373 Art. 12 Law implementing the EAW.
374 Art. 10 Law implementing the EAW.
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violations of defence rights committed by the Luxembourg executing
authorities in front of national judicial bodies. In this regard, it should
first be stressed that the 2017 law grants the person subject to the
EAW the right to be provided at the time of arrest with a written
notice of rights in a language that he understands. 375 The information
provided encompasses the right of access to a lawyer in Luxembourg
and in the issuing State, the right to interpretation and translation
services, the right to consent to surrender and the right to renounce
entitlement of the ‘speciality rule’ and the right to be heard by a
judicial authority. 376
The arrested person who does not understand the language of the
proceedings has the right to obtain a written translation of the notice
of rights. 377 The EAW, or the alert in the SIS, shall also be notified
to him in a language that he understands. 378 Moreover, the 2017 law
implementing Directive 2010/64/EU extends the right to interpretation
to the entire surrender procedure, namely from the arrest until the
surrender or the refusal to surrender. 379 Linguistic assistance is
granted, ex-officio or upon request of the person or his lawyer, by the
authority competent to question the person or the authority called
upon to rule on the request or other application brought before it. 380
Regarding the implementation of Article 2(5) of the Directive 2010/
64/EU, the person subject to a EAW may challenge the absence or the
decision finding that there is no need for interpretation or translation, as
375 Art. 7 para 2 Law implementing the EAW.
376 Art. 7 para 2 Law implementing the EAW.
377 Art. 7 para 2 Law implementing the EAW.
378 Art. 7 para 1 Law implementing the EAW. As for national arrest warrants, if
the information cannot be provided in writing, an oral communication shall be
guaranteed, if necessary with the assistance of an interpreter. A written copy shall
be in any event provided without undue delay.
379 Art. 7-1 (5) Law implementing the EAW. Before the entry into force of the
2017 reform, Luxembourg law expressly guaranteed a person, who does not
understand French or German, the right to interpretation at two stages of the
surrender procedure. At the time of his arrest, an interpreter assists the arrested
person, who is informed of his rights by the police authorities. The presence of an
interpreted is further required where the person consents to surrender and renounces
his entitlement of the ‘speciality rule’ before the competent magistrate of the
Prosecution Office. As for the recording procedure, the interpreter shall sign the
arrest report and the minutes of the hearing above-mentioned.
380 Luxembourg law also provides appropriate assistance for persons with
hearing or speech impediments as well as the possibility to use communication
technology such as videoconferencing, telephone or the Internet, unless the presence
of the interpreter is required in order to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings.
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well as to complain about the quality of the interpretation or translation
provided. 381 A surrendered person can formulate observations with
respect to the alleged violation, which are recorded immediately in the
transcripts (procès-verbaux) of the surrender procedure or in the case
file if the comments are raised subsequently. This is without prejudice
to legal remedies available to the arrested person throughout the
surrender procedure. In particular, the compliance with procedural
safeguards fall within the jurisdiction of the pre-trial chamber of the
competent district court, when it is call upon to rule on a request for
interim release 382 or the decision to execute a EAW where the person
does not consent to his surrender. 383 Likewise, violations of the right
to interpretation can be raised before the pre-trial chamber of the
court of appeal, notably where the arrested person challenges the
decision to execute the EAW. 384 No further appeal before the Court
of Cassation (recours en cassation) can be filled.
Finally, the 2017 reform enhanced the right of access to a lawyer in
proceedings executing a EAW in order to fully comply with Article 10
of the Directive 2013/48/EU. 385 The scope of the procedural guarantee
and related remedies reflects the right to legal assistance of persons
subject to a national arrest warrant. 386 Moreover, Luxembourg law
also guarantees the right for the arrested person to retain a lawyer in
the requesting State. 387 The role of that counsel is to assist the lawyer
in the executing Member State by providing that him with
information and advice with a view towards the effective exercise of
the rights of requested persons. Where requested persons wish to
381 Art. 7-1 (5) para 7 Law implementing the EAW.
382 Art. 9 Law implementing the EAW.
383 Art. 12 Law implementing the EAW.
384 Art. 13 Law implementing the EAW.
385 Before the legislative reform, Luxembourg law implementing the EAW
granted the requested person the right of access to a lawyer where he/she is heard
by the Luxembourg executing authorities and in connection with remedies related to
the execution of a EAW. In particular, the presence of a lawyer was mentioned in
relation to the hearing before the examining magistrate to establish the arrested
person’s identity (intérrogatoire d’identité), where the arrested person indicates that
he consents to surrender or renounces his entitlement to the “speciality rule” , the
hearing before the pre-trial chamber competent to rule upon the execution of the
EAW and the appeal against the latter’s decision, as well as in the procedure
executing a EAW for the purpose of prosecuting other than for which the surrender
was requested.
386 Opinion of the Conseil d’Etat, Projet de loi n°6758, 3.6.2015, 22.
387 Art. 7-1 Law implementing the EAW. In this regard, the reform foresees a
literal implementation of article 10(4) of Directive 2013/48/EU.
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exercise this right, the Luxembourg prosecutor acting as an executing
authority must promptly inform the competent authority in the issuing
Member State. In a similar way, the person subject to a EAW issued
by Luxembourg authorities would have the right to appoint a lawyer
in Luxembourg. 388
9.3. Judicial review and grounds for refusal
Luxembourg law does not provide for additional grounds for refusal
than those set forth under the Framework Decision. In this regard, the
case law has held that violations of Article 6 ECHR do not constitute
a ground of non-execution of the EAW. 389 Likewise, neither the
minor character of the offence, nor the lack of serious damage caused
by the offence, can be seen a grounds for refusal the execution of a
EAW. 390 Conversely, Luxembourg courts have accepted review of a
motion against the execution of a EAW on the grounds that detention
conditions in the issuing State would expose the surrendered person to
actual and real inhuman and degrading treatment. 391
Regarding the grounds for refusal listed in the framework decision,
Luxembourg law introduced specific provisions governing the EAW
issued for the purpose of executing a decision rendered in
absentia. 392 Indeed, Article 5 (9) of the 2004 law opposes the
surrender of a person who did not appear in person at the trial
resulting in the decision referred to in the EAW, unless the EAW
indicates that one of following conditions are met. First, the requested
person must have received in due time, official information regarding
the scheduled date and place of that trial in the issuing Member State
and was informed that a decision may be handed down if he does not
appear for the trial. Second, he or she gave a mandate to a legal
counselor and was indeed defended by that counselor at the trial.
Third, after being served with the decision and being expressly
informed about the right to a retrial or an appeal, the requested person
expressly stated that he or she does not contest the decision or did not
388 Art. 27-1 Law implementing the EAW.
389 CSJ Ch. C. C. 24 janvier 2012, n° 47/14.
390 CSJ Ch. C. C. 4 September 2012, n° 565/12. The decision seems to exclude
the principle of proportionality from the scope of review undertaken by the Pre-trial
chamber.
391 CSJ Ch. C. C., 4 Septembre 2012, n° 565/12.
392 Law of 12 April 2015, Mém. A n°74, 17.04.2015.
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request a retrial or appeal within the applicable time frame. 393 In
addition, Luxembourg law allows the surrender of a person sentenced
in absentia provided that the issuing Member States guarantees his
right to retrial or appeal against the judgement delivered in his
absence. In particular, Article 19 of the 2004 law implementing the
EAW requires the issuing judicial authority to give an assurance
deemed adequate to guarantee the person who is the subject of the
EAW that he or she will have an opportunity to apply for a retrial of
the case in the issuing Member State (droit d’opposition) and to be
present at the Court hearing. 394
393 Art. 5 (9) Law implementing the EAW.
394 Art. 19 Law implementing the EAW.
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CHAPTER V
POLAND
Maciej Fingas, Sławomir Steinborn, Krzysztof Woźniewski
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1. Constitutional guarantees
There are few provisions in the Polish Constitution which regulate the
right to an effective remedy in criminal process. The right to a court is
guaranteed by Article 45 of the Polish Constitution. In the jurisprudence
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
of the Constitutional Court, 1 it is assumed that the scope of the
generally formulated right to court includes two rights: the right to a
court as a right to a judicial system of justice, ie a substantive
settlement of the rights of an individual, and the right to judicial review
of acts prejudicial to the constitutionally guaranteed rights and
freedoms of the individual.
According to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, 2 such
constitutional right to a court consists in particular of the following
elements: the right of access to a court, ie the right to start
proceedings before a court; the right to a proper judicial process
meeting the requirements of fair and public proceedings; the right to a
court judgment, ie the right to obtain a legally binding resolution of
the case by a court; the right to ‘proper shape’ of institutional
requirements and judicial position of the reviewing authority over the
case (the right to an impartial, independent and competent court).
Article 78 of the Constitution provides the right of parties to contest
judgments and decisions issued at first instance. Undoubtedly, it also
coveres judgments issued in criminal proceedings. It must be kept in
mind, however, that Article 78 of the Constitution does not require
that any judgment or other decision issued in proceedings can be
challenged. In respect to this constitutional rule, it is also accepted
that some incidental decisions issued during criminal proceedings can
be contested only in the appeal brought to the court against the
judgment (eg challenging in the appeal against the judgment the
rejection of an evidence request).
The Constitutional Court in its jurisprudence indicates that
exceptions to the principle of suability of decisions and judgments
made at first instance cannot, however, be introduced by the
legislature in an unrestricted way. They should be rational and
justified in the light of the constitutional principle of proportionality. 3
An appeal should be available and effective to the parties.
Article 78 of the Constitution is connected with Article 176 Section
1 of the Constitution, which lays down the principle of two-instances
judicial proceedings. This provision refers to proceedings before a
court (judge). It concerns the cases in which the courts exercise
1 Constitutional Court 12 May 2003, SK 38/02, OTK-A 2003 No. 5 pos. 38.
2 Constitutional Court 9 June 1998, K 28/97, OTK 1998 No. 4 pos. 50;
Constitutional Court 16 March 1999, SK 19/98, OTK 1999 No. 3 pos. 36;
Constitutional Court 24 October 2007, SK 7/06, OTK-A 2007 No. 9 pos. 108.
3 Constitutional Court 18 October 2004, P 8/04, OTK-A 2004 No. 9 pos. 92.
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justice, thus deciding on the merits from the beginning to the end.
Outside the scope of this provision are cases in which the courts
operate as an examining body of other public authorities’ acts which
resolve the cases of individuals. 4 The principle of two instances
requires: providing an access to the second instance court; referring
the case at second instance, in principle, to a higher court; the
appropriate structuring of a procedure before a court of second
instance, so that it can thoroughly investigate the matter and issue a
substantive decision.
Also, the right to review the lawfulness of detention in criminal
proceedings is enshrined in the constitutional framework. Article 41
Section 2 of the Polish Constitution provides that anyone deprived of
liberty, except by sentence of a court, shall have the right to appeal to
a court for an immediate decision on the lawfulness of such
deprivation. This provision refers to all cases of deprivation of liberty
on a non-judicial basis, and therefore includes the use of detention on
remand. This provision does not require the imposition of a specific
measure allowing for this control, but the legislature is required to
create such a guarantee mechanism that would provide effective
judicial review. However, the combined reading of the guarantees
expressed in Article 41 Section 2, Article 45 and Article 78 of the
Constitution justify the conclusion that every decision of a court on
detention on remand, substantially affecting the liberty of an
individual, gives rise to the right of the suspect (accused) to appeal to
a higher court or at least to another composition of the same court. 5
The Constitutional Court points out that the control of the legality
of deprivation of liberty should not only cover the legality of the
decision on the deprivation of liberty itself, its conditions and mode
of execution, but also the way in which it is carried out, in particular,
the duration of imprisonment. 6 The Court underlines the relationship
between the guarantee mentioned in Article 41 Section 2 of the
Constitution with the right to access a court. The appeal should
therefore be dealt with in a judicial procedure, formulated in
accordance with the requirements of transparency and fairness. 7
It should be also mentioned that Poland has ratified Article 2 of
4 Constitutional Court 12 May 2003, SK 38/02, OTK-A 2003 No. 5 pos. 38
5 Constitutional Court 13 July 2009, SK 46/08, OTK-A 2009 No. 7 pos. 109.
6 Constitutional Court 11 June 2002, SK 5/02, OTK-A 2002 No. 4 pos. 41.
7 Constitutional Court 6 December 2004, SK 29/04, OTK-A 2004 No 11 pos.
114.
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Protocol No 7 to the ECHR without reservation. The European
Convention on Human Rights is a ratified international agreement,
which is a part of the domestic legal system and is directly applicable
by the courts. 8 It belongs to a group of agreements that have priority
over national law, if the law cannot be reconciled with the
agreement. 9 Courts (including the Constitutional Court) use ECHR
jurisprudence primarily as an interpreting tool of national law in order
to ensure its compliance with the Strasbourg standards. Accordingly,
the national courts in their rulings invoke both the provisions of the
ECHR and the specific judgments of the ECHR.
2. Investigative measures subject to prior judicial authorization
2.1. Investigative acts authorized by a court
In pre-trial proceedings, the possibility of carrying out the following
investigative measures is subject to a prior decision of the court. First,
the competence to order surveillance of telecommunication and other
communications 10 belongs to the court competent to hear the case,
but the order of tapping can only occur to detect and obtain evidence
for the pending proceedings or to prevent a new offence from being
committed, if the proceeding or new offence belongs to the catalogue
of the offences referred to in Article 237 § 3 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (CCP).
Second, police and some other authorities designated to combat
specific types of crime are entitled (before the criminal proceedings
are instituted, under the so-called undercover operations) to apply to
the regional court, having previously obtained the prior consent of the
district prosecutor, in order to request operational control. One of the
methods of operational control is to obtain and retain the content of
conversations conducted using technical means.
Third, the competent court may issue a permit to hear a witness
obliged to observe certain types of professional secrets, 11 when in the
pre-trial proceedings, in the prosecutor’s opinion it is necessary to
question a notary, defence lawyer, legal adviser, tax adviser, doctor,
journalist, or a person required to preserve confidentiality. In this case,
8 Art. 91 section 1 of the Constitution.
9 Art. 91 section 2 of the Constitution.
10 Art. 237§ 1 CCP.
11 Art. 180§ 2 CCP.
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the prosecutor must request the court to release them from the obligation
of professional secrecy. The court, at a session without the participation
of the parties, shall decide to allow the prosecutor, or other authority
conducting the investigation, to question a witness in the
circumstances covered by the secrets if it finds that two conditions are
met: the necessity in the interest of justice and at the same time, if the
circumstances of the crime cannot be established on the basis of the
other evidence.
Forth, prior judicial authorization is required for obtaining
information constituting a bank secret. 12 The prosecutor may only
request information about a natural person who is a party to an
agreement with the bank and against such person criminal
proceedings are under way. Obtaining other data subject to banking
secrecy (eg on a person other than the person against whom criminal
proceedings are pending) is subject to the prior approval of the
District Court. The law does not specify the conditions for that
decision. It is required that the prosecutor proves that there is a
special situation justifying the waiver of bank secrecy. The court
consent at this stage of proceedings is necessary to achieve the
purpose of criminal proceedings: the role of the court is to examine
whether it is suitable to apply this exceptional provision in the case in
question or whether the prosecutor can collect the necessary evidence
without the need to waive bank secrecy. 13
Fifth, the court, at the request of the public prosecutor, is entitled to
issue a decision to subject the defendant to a psychiatric examination
combined with observation in a closed establishment 14 if at the stage
of the pre-trial proceedings an expert psychiatrist’s request is made to
observe the defendant in isolation, if necessary to deliver an opinion
on the state of mental health of the accused. The premise is that the
evidence gathered indicates on the probability of committing the
offence by the defendant. The court also examines whether, on the
basis of the circumstances of the case, it can be predicted that the
court will sentence the defendant with the penalty of deprivation of
liberty exceeding the period of isolation.
12 Pursuant Art. 105 section 1 point 2b of the Banking Law.
13 Court of Appeal Lublin 22 October 2008, II AKz 508/08, LEX no. 477843.
14 Art. 203 CCP.
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2.2. Scope of review
Each of the above-mentioned actions of the court in the pre-trial
proceedings may be taken only if the appropriate conditions for its
issuance are fulfilled. Proportionality as a constitutional requirement
should be examined each time a decision can reduce the constitutional
rights and freedoms of an individual. In addition, in the case of
operational control in the sphere of undercover operations, a
subsidiarity clause is required, namely the use of operational control
is permitted only if other means proved to be unsuccessful or useless.
2.3. Exceptions for urgent cases
Surveillance of telecommunication and other conversations may, in
urgent cases, be ordered by the prosecutor. He is obliged to apply to the
court within 3 days with a request of approval of his decision. If the time
limit is exceeded or if the court’s decision is not approved, all recordings
must be destroyed.
In exceptional cases, operational control may also be ordered
without a district court order being issued, but it is still necessary to
obtain prior consent from the district prosecutor. This applies to cases
of urgency if this could result in loss of information or blurring or
destruction of evidence of crime. However, the police must at the
same time request the court to issue a decision on the matter. If the
court does not agree within 5 days of the inspection order, the
operational control must be suspended and the collected materials
must be destroyed.
2.4. Remedies available to the defendant
The suspect as a party to the pre-trial proceedings has the right to
lodge an interlocutory appeal against the following decisions of the
public prosecutor or the authority conducting the proceedings
concerning the investigative measures: the prosecutor’s order on the
confidentiality of personal data of an anonymous witness. The appeal
is examined by the court competent to hear the case; 15 decisions and
other acts on search and seizure and on material evidences made in
pre-trial proceedings. The appeal is made to the district court in which
15 Art. 184§ 5 CCP.
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jurisdiction the proceedings are conducted; 16 the prosecutor’s decision
on surveillance of telecommunication and other conversations issued
in urgent case. The appeal is made to the court having jurisdiction. 17
The rule is that the review of the prosecutor’s decision is handled by
a single-judge court. 18 The court has the power to review the contested
decision to the full extent, and therefore primarily examines whether it
complies the statutory conditions for its issuance.
3. Deprivation of liberty: Arrest and pre-trial custodial measures
3.1. Information about available remedies
According to Article 244 §2 CCP, an arrested person is
compulsorily and immediately informed of his rights, including the
right to bring an interlocutory appeal to the court, in which he may
demand the judicialreview of the legitimacy, lawfulness and
correctness of his or her arrest. This information is provided in
writing, in accordance with the formula set out in the Regulation of
the Minister of Justice.
In turn, a person who is in detention on remand receives a written
notice of his or her rights, in accordance with the formula set out in the
Regulation of the Minister of Justice. The instruction contains
information about the right to lodge an interlocutory appeal against
the detention order and the right to file an application for revocation
of a temporary detention or change to non-custodial measures at any
time. According to Article 250 §3 CCP, in the pre-trial proceedings,
the information to the suspect as to his rights, in the event of the use
of detention on remand, should be given by the prosecutor before
sending a request to the court for the issuance of a detention order.
The content of the notice generally complies with the requirements of
Directive 2012/13/EU. It lacks only the detailed definition of the
scope of judicial review.
3.2. Arrest, habeas corpus and judicial review
An individual may be arrested when there is a reasonable suspicion
16 Art. 236 CCP.
17 Art. 241 CCP.
18 Art. 329 CCP.
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that he or she has committed a crime, and, at the same time, if there is a
fear of escaping or go into hiding, or of concealing the traces of the
offence, or if his identity cannot be established, or if there are legal
grounds for carrying out an accelerated proceedings. 19 A suspected
person may also be arrested if he is alleged to have committed an
offence with the use of violence against a member of his household
and it is feared that such an offence may be repeated, especially if the
suspected person is threatening to do so. 20 Arrest is mandatory if the
crime in question has been committed using firearms, knives or other
dangerous objects, and there is a fear that the offender is committing
a crime of violence. 21
The maximum lenght of the arrest is 48 hours. During those 48
hours the ‘arrested person’ should be sent to the court with the
request for detention on remand. The arrested person must be released
immediately if he or she has not been presented to the court with a
motion to order detention on remand, or if this motion has not been
granted within 24 hours of being surrendered to the jurisdiction of the
court.
The right to arrest the suspected person is vested in the Police and
the authorities which have similar procedural rights of the Police, ie the
Border Guard (Straż Graniczna), the Internal Security Agency (Agencja
Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego), the National Administration of the
National Treasury (Krajowa Administracja Skarbowa), the Central
Anticorruption Bureau (Centralne Biuro Antykorupcyjne) and the
Military Police (Żandarmeria Wojskowa), and also to other
administrative bodies in cases provided in other regulations.
An arrested person in criminal proceedings has the following rights:
• The right to information about the reason of the arrest and to be
heard; 22
• The right to make or to refuse to make a statement in his or her
case; 23
• The right to contact the lawyer immediately and to speak directly
with him; 24
• The right to make use, free of charge, of the assistance of an inter-
19 Art. 244 §1 CCP.
20 Art. 244 §1a CCP.
21 Art. 244 §1b CCP.
22 Art. 244 §2 CCP.
23 Art. 244 §3 CCP.
24 Art. 245 §1 CCP.
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preter if the arrested person does not command the Polish langua-
ge sufficiently; 25
• The right to receive a copy of the arrest record; 26
• The right to give notice about the arrest to the closest or other de-
signated person, as well as employers, heads of schools, universi-
ties, the commander and the person managing the arrested per-
son’s company or the company for which he is responsible. 27 Re-
garding the arrest, police are obliged to notify the authority con-
ducting the proceedings against the arrested person in another ca-
se, as far as they know about it;
• If the arrested person is not a Polish citizen - the right to contact
the consular office or the diplomatic representation of the country
of which he or she is a national. If he or she does not have any
nationality - the right to contact the representative of the state
where the arrested person lives permanently. 28 If there is a consu-
lar agreement between Poland and the State of whose nationality
the arrested is, the competent consular or diplomatic representa-
tion must be informed of the arrest, even without his or her re-
quest;
• The right to lodge an interlocutory appeal against the arrest to the
court within 7 days from the day of arrest; 29
• The right to immediate release if the reasons for the arrest have
ceased to exist or the maximum length of detention has expired; 30
• The right to access to medical aid.
Lastly, the arrested person is entitled to an interlocutory appeal to
the court in which he or she may demand the examination of the
validity, legality and correctness (indefectibility) of the arrest. 31
Judicial review takes place only upon request. The judicial review of
arrest covers: the legitimacy of the arrest, which must be understood
as the factual justification, necessity and proportionality of its use; the
legality of the arrest, which should be understood as compliance of
the arrest with the law in force; 32 the correctness of the arrest, which
25 Art. 72 §1 CCP.
26 Art. 244 §3 CCP.
27 Art. 245 §2 CCP in conjunction with Art. 261 CCP.
28 Art. 612 §2 CCP.
29 Art. 246 §1 CCP.
30 Art. 248 §1 and §2 CCP.
31 Art. 246 §1 CCP.
32 The review of the legality of deprivation of liberty covers not only the legality
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should be understood as the means of depriving a person of his liberty
and the circumstances in which an arrest took place.
An appeal submitted by the arrested person must be immediately
serviced to the County Court of the place of arrests or of the
procedure, which must immediately examine it. The court is
composed of one judge, and the term ‘immediately’ means without
delay as soon as it is in this case possible to examine the appeal but
not later than the termination of the arrest period. The court examines
the appeal at a session in which the arrested person may take part. 33
If the person is imprisoned, the court at his or her request will bring
him or her to the hearing unless it considers the presence of a defence
lawyer to be sufficient. Regarding the right to submit such an appeal,
arrested person must be instructed as to his or right to do so. If the
court does not order him or her to be brought to the hearing, and he
or she does not have a defence lawyer, a defence lawyer is granted to
this person by the court. 34 The court must order the immediate
release of the arrested person if, after the appeal has been heard, the
court finds that the arrest was unlawful (ie was illegal) or was not
justified by the circumstances of the case or constituted a
disproportionate interference with the right to liberty (ie was
unreasonable).
3.3. Detention pending trial
3.3.1. Competent authorities and procedural requirements
According to Article 250 § 2 CCP, the detention on remand is
ordered, in the pre-trial proceedings, at the request of the prosecutor
by the County Court in whose jurisdiction the proceedings are
conducted, or, in urgent cases, another County Court. Detention on
remand may be imposed by this court for a period not exceeding 3
months. 35 If, due to the extraordinary circumstances of the case, it
proves impossible to conclude pre-trial proceedings within the time
limit of 3 months, upon the request of public prosecutor, the court of
first instance competent to hear the case may, if necessary, extend
detention on remand for a period, whose total duration may not
of the decision on deprivation of liberty, but its duration, conditions and mode of
carrying out the arrest as well.
33 Art. 464 §1 CCP.
34 Art. 96 §1 CCP in conjunction with Art. 451 CCP.
35 Art. 263 §1 CCP.
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exceed 12 months. 36 Theoretically, this is the maximum time for pre-
trial detention on remand, and the total period of detention until the
judgment of the first instance court can not exceed two years, which
represents the maximum total detention time in the entire pre-trial and
judicial proceedings until the first judgment issued by the Court of
first instance. 37 For a period longer than 12 months in pre-trial
proceedings, the detention on remand may be extended by a Court of
Appeal at the request of the public prosecutor, if such a request arises
in connection with the suspension of criminal proceedings, the
activities aimed at establishing or confirming the identity of the
suspect, taking of evidence of special complexity or beyond the
borders of the country, as well as intentional protraction of
proceedings by the accused. 38 Extension of this period is not
permissible, however, if the court finds that the penalty for which the
accused is exposed to, in light of the offense, does not exceed 3 years
of imprisonment. 39
In addition to the above mentioned requirement, further conditions
for the correct application of detention on remand must be fulfilled. As a
general requirement, the evidence gathered must indicate a high
probability that the suspect has committed a crime. Second, the law
reauires the fulfillment of at least one of the so-called special
conditions, namely:
• there is a justified concern of escape or that the suspect will ab-
scond, especially if his or her identity cannot be established or
he or she has no permanent place of residence in the country of
residence,
• there is a justified concern that the suspect will persuade others to
give false testimony or explanations or obstruct the proceedings in
any other unlawful way,
• there is the need to apply the detention on remand in order to se-
cure the proper course of proceedings, justified by the severe pe-
nalty that the suspect is exposed to when he or she has been char-
ged with a crime or with a misdemeanour that carries the statutory
maximum penalty of imprisonment of a minimum of 8 years, or if
the court of the first instance sentenced him to a penalty of impri-
sonment of not less than 3 years;
36 Art. 263 §2 CCP.
37 Art. 263 §3 CCP.
38 Art. 263§4 CCP.
39 Art. 263 §4b CCP.
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Exceptionally, detention pending trial is authorized when there is a
justified concern that a suspect who has been charged with a crime or
intentional offence will commit a offence against life, health or public
safety, especially when he or she threatened to commit such a crime.
The basis for the decision to apply or extend detention on remand
may be based on the findings of evidence accessible to the suspect
and his defence lawyer, and also evidence from witnesses at risk,
even if the defence has no access to such evidence. Finally, it is
mandatory that the suspect must be heard before issuing the order of
detention on remand.
3.3.2. Judicial scrutiny upon request and ex officio
The court’s decision on detention on remand may be appealed
according to the general principles, which means that an appeal may
be lodged before the court of second instance. If a decision on
detention was issued by a court of second instance, the interlocutory
appeal shall be examined by another equivalent composition of this
court. 40 There is no doubt that the standard referred to in Article 5 §
3 of the ECHR is fulfilled. The appeal against detention on remand in
pre-trial proceedings is examined by an independent and impartial
professional single judge (with no lay-judges). Appeal on extended
use of detention on remand of over a period of 12 months is
examined by the court of appeal, in a panel consisting of three
professional judges.
The court must decide the appeal against the decision on the
detention on remand immediately, not later than 7 days from the day
of the referral to the court of appeal. 41 Interlocutory appeals have no
suspensive effect, and therefore do not stop the execution of the order
for detention on remand, unless the court decides otherwise, namely
to suspend the execution of the order. 42
In addition, the detainee may at any time request to quash or change
a preventive measure. 43 On that request, the prosecutor decides in the
pre-trial proceedings within three days. Prosecutor’s decision may be
appealed before the district court if the request was made after at least
40 Art. 426 §2 CCP.
41 Art. 252 §2 CCP.
42 Art. 462 §1 CCP.
43 Art. 254 CCP.
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3 months from the date of the previous order concerning preventive
measure.
Review of the use of detention on remand is of permanent nature.
According to Article 253 § 1 CCP, preventive measures, and therefore
detention on remand, should be immediately quashed or changed if
the reasons for which it has been previously applied have terminated
or cease to exist or if reasons for such a change have arisen. Pre-trial
preventive measures applied by the court can be quashed or changed
into milder provisions (eg bail) by the prosecutor as well. The law
does not provide any deadlines for such a review. The directive on
adaptation of a preventive measures to the defendant’s situation means
that the public prosecutor and the court sua sponte (without waiting
for any request) should re-assess the need and purpose of the
preventive measure, and in particular the detention on remand and,
consequently, quash or change the measure, at the moment when the
reasons for which it was applied have ceased. It is assumed that such
a review may be carried out also by the court by adjudicating
incidental questions. 44 The scope of review is full, ie the fulfillment
of factual and legal grounds for the use of detention on remand, as
well as the existence of obstacles resulting in the quashing of the
order (eg health).
Carrying out the review on the legitimacy and the need for the
continued use of detention on remand is also underlined by the fact
that, in the Polish criminal trial, the detention on remand is always
used for a definite period of time. The court’s decision on the
application for detention must specify the period for which this
measure is applied, 45 and therefore its continuation depends on the
issuing, before its expiry, of another decision to extend the detention
for a further period of time. In practice, detention on remand is
applied once for a period of 2-4 months, and within this time the
courts may examine whether there are grounds for extending further
detention of the suspect. In the event of prolongation of the detention
on remand, all the above-mentioned criteria shall be examined as well
as the fulfillment of conditions justifying the extension of the detention.
44 Supreme Court 28 February 2001, IV KO 11/01, OSNKW 2001 No. 5-6 pos.
46.
45 Art. 251 §2 CCP.
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3.3.3. Defence rights and effective judicial review
From Article 248 § 2 CCP follows the rule that a suspect must be
served with a copy of the order for detention on remand. This order
contains a justification, comprised of an analysis of the evidence
indicating that the suspect committed the crime and the circumstances
indicating the existence of reasons justifying the use of detention (eg
threats to the proper conduct of the proceedings). In addition, the
justification should explain why it was not considered sufficient to
apply different preventive measures. If a detainee does not participate
in the session at which the court made a decision to extend the
detention, a copy of such an order is also served him.
On the other hand, information regarding the alleged act of the
suspect must be provided to him before the prosecutor goes to court
in order to apply for detention on remand. For this purpose, the
prosecutor issues a decision on presenting the charges and announces
them to the suspect who may also request to be served with a copy of
that order.
In the pre-trial proceedings the conducting authority determines in
practice the range of available materials (case file), because at this stage
of the process the so-called internal confidentiality of pre-trial case files
applies. 46 The Polish CCP provides separate rules on the access of the
suspect and his defence lawyer to the file in relation to the use of
detention on remand.
Taking into account the existing Strasbourg standards and the
content of Article 7 of Directive 2012/13/EU, the Polish legislature
did not fully and satisfactorily manage to address the problem of how
to provide to the suspect in detention on remand during pre-trial
phase proper access to all material evidence. The ECHR rulings on
the Polish cases have always emphasized that the goal of witholding
from the defence certain information and evidence gathered in the
pre-trial proceedings cannot be achieved at the cost of significant
restrictions on the right to defence. 47 Against this background, the
46 See infra Section 4.1. Restrictions on the right to access the case file.
47 See M Wąsek-Wiaderek, ‘Dostęp do akt sprawy oskarżonego tymczasowo
aresztowanego i jego obrońcy w postępowaniu przygotowawczym – standard
europejski a prawo polskie’ [Access to the case file of the accused detainee and his
lawyer during the pre-trial proceedings – European standard and Polish law],
[2003] Palestra No. 3-4, 56; P Kardas, ‘Standard rzetelnego procesu a prawo
wglądu do akt sprawy w przedmiocie tymczasowego aresztowania, czyli historia
jednej nowelizacji’ [Standard of a fair trial and the right of access to the file
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Polish Constitutional Tribunal in its judgment of 03/06/2008 48 has
concluded that the regulation, which allows the arbitrary exclusion of
free access to the pre-trial proceedings’ materials on which the request
of the public prosecutor for detention on remand in based, is
unconstitutional. In the Tribunal’s view, these materials, because of
the need to ensure the viability of the detainee’s defence, should be
open to the suspect or his or her lawyer.
An implicit standard was introduced to the procedure act by the
amendment of 09/27/2013 CCP, but recently the legislature has
decided to restore certain restrictions in this respect. The amending
act of 11/3/2016 implemented a new wording of article 156 § 5a
CCP, which indeed maintains the principle that in the event of
submitting a request, during the pre-trial proceedings, for an order or
extension of detention on remand, the suspect and his or her lawyer
shall gain access to the case file in the section containing the
evidential material attached to the request. However, Article 250 § 2b
CCP introduced an exception according to which, if there is a
reasonable risk to life, health or freedom of the witness or the person
closest to him or her, the statements of these witnesses may be placed
in a separate set of documents that cannot be made available to the
suspect and his lawyer. It is widely accepted that the court has no
authority to decide on its own on pre-trial proceedings’ case file
access and cannot provide access to them to the suspect and his
lawyer, without the consent of the public prosecutor. 49 Without any
restrictions the suspect and his lawyer have free access to the
prosecutor’s written request for the order or extension of detention on
remand. There is no doubt that the return to the possibility to conceal
part of the evidence by the prosecutor from the suspect and his
lawyer is a ‘step backwards’ and can make the defence in the
detention proceedings illusory, which is in clear opposition to the
existing constitutional and international standards. 50 The possibility of
secrecy regarding the evidence, referred to in Article 250 § 2b CCP is
not well justified in terms of Article 7 of Directive 2012/13/EU,
concerning detention – the story of one amendment], [2010] Prokuratura i Prawo No.
1-2, 89.
48 Constitutional Court 3 June 2008, K 42/07, OTK-A 2008 No. 5 pos. 77.
49 See Supreme Court 11 March 2008, WZ 9/08, OSNKW 2008 No. 7 pos. 55; Z
Pachowicz in J Skorupka (ed), Kodeks postępowania karnego. Komentarz [Code of
Criminal Proceedings. Commentary] (C.H. Beck 2016) 321; M Kurowski in D
Świecki (ed), Kodeks postępowania karnego. Komentarz [Code of Criminal
Proceedings. Commentary] (Wolters Kluwer 2017, vol. 1) 596.
50 See Zd Pachowicz (n 49) 321.
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which does not provide for the possibility of introducing restrictions in
regard to the rule laid down in paragraph 1.
There is also a specific mechanism reinforcing the right of the
suspect to obtain access to the file in the section containing the
evidence attached to the request for an order or extension of detention
on remand. Namely, in accordance with Article 249a § 1 CCP, the
decision to order or extend the detention may be based on explicit
evidence accessible to the suspect and his lawyer and the evidence of
witnesses, for which there is concern mentioned in the earlier quoted
Article 250b CCP. In addition, in accordance with § 2 of quoted
provision, the court, by giving notice to the prosecutor, may take into
account ex officio, the files which the prosecutor did not disclose,
after their disclosure, if they are favourable to the suspect. The
doctrine suggests that the court may, therefore, come to a conclusion
that part of the materials of pre-trial proceedings were unjustifiably
undisclosed, and - although it may not take independently the decision
on disclosure of these materials, it should not rely on these materials
when deciding on detention on remand, unless they are beneficial for
the suspect. 51
Without prior questioning of a suspect by the court, it is not possible
to use detention on remand, unless the accused is believed to be likely to
go into hiding in the country or is absent. 52 However, when a suspect is
captured, he should be immediately heard by the court and it should then
to be decided whether further use of detention is warranted, even if the
suspect does not demand it. The standard arising from Article 5 Section
3 of the ECHR is implemented in Article 279 § 3 CCP, according to
which, a suspect, who absconded and was captured on the basis of an
arrest warrant, should immediately be brought to the court which
earlier issued the detention order as that court is entitled to adjudicate,
maintain, change or quash the measure.
The legislation does not provide for separate rules on the detainee’s
the right to translation and interpretation. In this case, general rules
concerning the suspect rights shall apply. 53 Likewise, Polish law does
not provide for separate rules on the detainee’s right to legal aid. In
this matter, general rules concerning the suspect shall apply. 54 In such
51 See M Kurowski (n 49) 154.
52 Art. 249 §3 CCP, Article 279 § 2 CCP.
53 See infra Sections 4.3. Decisions finding that there is no need for
interpretation and 4.4. Decisions finding that there is no need for translation.
54 See infra Section 4.2. Derogations on the right to access a lawyer.
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a case, if a defence lawyer is chosen by the suspect, the court is obliged
to allow him to participate in the questioning of the suspect while
examining the prosecutor’s request for detention on remand. 55 The
court is not obliged to notify the defence of the date of the hearing,
unless the defendant requests it, and his absence does not hinder the
hearing. It is understood that the notice to the defence may be done in
any accessible manner, even some hours before the hearing. 56
However, it is the court’s obligation to notify the prosecutor. In the
doctrine it is correctly pointed out that in this respect there is a breach
of the principle of equality of arms. 57
The defence lawyer has the right to take part in the court session
concerning the extension of detention on remand and examination of
an interlocutory appeal against the order applying this preventive
measure or the extension of it. At the request of the suspect, who has
not chosen a defence lawyer himself, the court must appoint him
defence lawyer ex officio for this action. The court is therefore
obligated to notify such an appointed defence lawyer about the date
of this session, however the failure to appear of the defence lawyer
properly notified about the date is not obstacle to the examination on
the matter. 58
There are three possibilities available at the detention hearing:
withdrawal, ordering less restrictive or alternative measures or to
imprisonment (ie bail, personal or social guarantee, police
surveillance, the ban on leaving the country, injunctions or
prohibitions of determined behaviour).
3.4. Arrest and detention order for questioning
According to Article 247 §1 point 1 CCP, the prosecutor may order
the arrest of a suspect or suspected person if there is a justified fear, for
example, that he or she will not appear on summon in order to present
him the charges and questioning him or her as a suspect. There should
55 Art. 249 §3 CCP.
56 Court of Appeal Katowice 29 March 2000, II AKz 84/00, OSA 2001 No. 2
pos. 12.
57 See P Hofmański, E Sadzik, Kazimierz Zgryzek, Kodeks postępowania
karnego. Komentarz [Code of Criminal Proceedings. Commentary] (CH Beck 2011,
vol. 1) 1386.
58 Art. 249 §5 CCP.
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be some facts indicating that the suspected person will intentionally fail
to appear at the request of the trial authority. 59
Such an arrest in pre-trial proceedings may be ordered only by the
prosecutor. Immediately after bringing the suspect to the police,
prosecutor or court, the above-mentioned actions must be carried out,
and after completion, the suspect must be released, unless detention
on remand is required. 60 Such an arrest cannot last longer than the
time required to complete the proceedings and never longer than 48
hours, unless the prosecutor submits a request to the court to apply
for an order of detention on remand.
In accordance with Article 247 § 6 CCP the person detained upon
the prosecutor’s order has the right to lodge an interlocutory appeal,
according to the rules governing the appeal for ordinary arrest
pursuant to Article 244 CCP. 61
Immediately after the arrest, the arrested person must be informed
of the reasons of the arrest and informed of his or her rights. The
legislation does not impose the obligation of personal service of the
prosecutor’s arrest order. The rule is that arrested person should be
immediately brought to the prosecutor where he or she should be
heard. Otherwise, the hearing by the court will only occur when the
prosecutor submits to the court a request for detention on remand. In
addition, the arrested person has his own right to lodge an
interlocutory appeal to the court on the arrest. 62
Article 156 § 5a CCP connects the defence’s access to the files of
pre-trial proceedings with the request for an order or extension of
detention on remand, 63 but ignores the issue of access to the case
files in connection with the appeal to the court by the arrested
suspect. Meanwhile, there is no doubt that the regulation of Article 5
paragraph 4 ECHR, and therefore also the standard developed in the
Strasbourg jurisprudence, is not only concerned with judicial review
of the detention on remand, but also a review of the arrest. This
provision grants the right to judicial review of deprivation of liberty
only to the person who is deprived of liberty at the time of lodging
the appeal. It is extremely important that the review of arrest must be
scrutinized even when person deprived of liberty is released before
59 See Supreme Court 23 May 2006, I KZP 5/06, OSNKW 2006 No. 6 pos. 55.
60 Art. 247 § 5 CCP.
61 See supra Section 3.2. Arrest, habeas corpus and judicial review.
62 Ibid.
63 See supra Section 3.3.3. Defence rights and effective judicial review
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the decision is taken by a court 64. There is therefore a problem of access
to files of pre-trial proceedings when the prosecutor has ordered the
arrest and compulsory bringing of a suspect on the basis of Article
247 § 1 CCP. In order toguarantee that, under Article 156 § 5a CCP
the file is made available to the defence in connection with the
interlocutory appeal lodged against the arrest, it is necessary to
interpret this provision of the Polish CCP in pro-convention mode.
General rules apply to the person arrested for questioning. These are
the same rules that govern the access to the defence lawyer for the
person arrested by the police. 65 Pursuant to Article 247 § 6 CCP,
rules governing interlocutory appeals against an arrest by police shall
apply accordingly to the arrest and compulsory bringing for the
purposes of the hearing. 66
The person arrested for the purpose of a hearing is entitled to appeal
to the court. The court examining the appeal, depending on the
circumstances, may: a) order his or her immediate release if the court
considers that the arrest was unjustified, illegal and the arrested
person is still deprived of his or her liberty; 67 b) if the arrested
person is not in custody, the court finds the arrest groundless, illegal
or defective. Such finding is then notified to the authority superior to
the one who made the arrest. 68
4. Specific remedies for alleged breach of defence rights in the pre-
trial stage of criminal proceedings
4.1. Restrictions on the right to access the case file
Access to the file is granted to the accused and his or her lawyer. It
should be added that the fact that the accused is in detention on remand
64 See more widely S Steinborn, ‘Dostęp obrony do akt postępowania
przygotowawczego w związku z procedurą habeas corpus – standard strasburski i
jego realizacja w polskim procesie karnym’ [Access of defense to file pre-trial
proceedings in connection with the habeas corpus procedure – the Strasbourg
standard and its implementation in the Polish criminal process] in A Błachnio-
Parzych and others (eds), Problemy wymiaru sprawiedliwości karnej. Księga
jubileuszowa Profesora Jana Skupińskiego [The problems of criminal justice. The
jubilee book in honour of Professor Jan Skupiński] (Wolters Kluwer 2013) 540-542.
65 See supra 3.2. Arrest, habeas corpus and judicial review.
66 Ibid.
67 Art. 246 § 3 in connection with Art. 247 §6 CCP.
68 Art. 246 § 4 in conjunction with Art. 247 §6 CCP.
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or deprived of liberty does not exclude the possibility of acquaintance of
such person with the case files. It can be ordered at the request of such a
person to send the case files to a prison or detention center, where he
may familiarize himself with the materials in a designated room under
the supervision of the Prison Service. The case law emphasizes the
importance of the possibility for the accused under detention to
defend himself in person where he claims the need to read the case
file. The files should be sent to the accused in the first instance,
whenever possible, regardless of whether he or she is using the help
of defence lawyer 69.
The law does not foresee any fees for accessing the case files. The
provision of Article 156 § 2 CCP stipulates, however, that copies of
documents from the case file are payable. However, no fee is charged
for self-made copies, which in practice allows defendants and their
defence lawyers to make photocopies themselves without paying for
this. The fee is based on the provisions of the Regulation of the
Minister of Justice of 25/09/2015. 70 A fee of 1 PLN is charged for
each page of a copy, and a fee of 6 PLN is charged for each page for
printing a certified copy of the file. In the case of a copy of electronic
documents on the data carrier, a fee of PLN 6 is charged for each
used data carrier.
The suspect acquires the right to access the file, in principle from
the moment he or she receives the suspect’s status as charged, ie
when he or she is presented with charges. From that moment on, he
or she is entitled to lodge a request for access to the file. During pre-
trial proceedings, some limitations may apply due to the internal
secrecy of the case file. These restrictions cease at the moment of the
review of the suspect of the materials in the final stage of the pre-trial
proceedings. This operation is carried out based on the prior request
of the suspect or his defence lawyer if there are grounds for closing
the investigation. In this case, the suspect and his or her defence
lawyer are entitled to review the entire files and then familiarize
themselves with the material collected by the investigator. In addition,
a suspect’s right to read the case file is absolute if the pre-trial
proceedings have been discontinued. The provision of Article 306 §
1b CCP stipulates that persons entitled to submit an interlocutory
appeal (and even the suspect may question the legal ground of
discontinuation adopted in the order) are entitled to review the file.
69 Supreme Court 20 November 2008, II KK 175/08, LEX no 468655.
70 Journal of Laws, pos. 1566.
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At the pre-trial stage of the criminal proceedings, the authority in
charge of the investigation decides in practice whether the suspect
must be denied access to the case file or on the scope of materials
available to the suspect because of the need to secure the so-called
‘internal secrecy of the case file’. The authority conducting the pre-
trial proceedings may refuse access to the case file, taking into
consideration the need to secure the proper conduct of the
proceedings or the necessity to protect an important state interest. The
refusal of the access to the file of the pre-trial proceedings may
concern all of the related case files, their specific parts and specific
documents. 71 The Court emphasized that the limitation on the full
disclosure of the pre-trial proceedings’ case file is also in a functional
relation to the constitutional value of public order. Keeping, at the
pre-trial stage, specified categories of information to the authority
conducting the proceedings only, can effectively prevent the suspect
from taking measures to distort the evidence gathered. Thus, the lack
of full access to the file of pre-trial proceedings makes it difficult for
the suspect to find out how to undermine – even using unlawful
actions - the value of evidence already collected. The purpose of the
provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, and therefore
also in Article 156 § 5 CCP, is to develop the criminal proceedings in
a way which enables the detection of the criminal perpetrator and for
him to be brought to criminal responsibility. 72 The detection of the
offender and the bringing of him or her to criminal responsibility may
contribute to restoration of the public order, violated by the offence.
It is, however, pointed out in the literature that a fairly general view
of the conditions for refusing access to the case file increase the danger
of total arbitrariness in the decision. It should therefore be assumed that
the circumstances justifying the refusal of access to the file should
include, in particular, the risk of premature disclosure, distortion, loss,
intimidation of witnesses or other suspects, the destruction of
evidence, or the absconding of a suspect. 73 The refusal of access to
the file cannot, however, relate to the documents referred to in Article
157 §3 CCP, ie the protocol of the activity in which the party
71 S Steinborn in L K Paprzycki (ed), Kodeks postępowania karnego. Komentarz
[Code of Criminal Proceedings. Commentary] (Wolters Kluwer 2013, vol. 1) 536. The
admissibility of the above mentioned limitations was the subject of a Constitutional
Court’s review in the judgment of 3 June 2008, K 42/07, OTK-A 2008 No. 5 pos. 77.
72 Art. 2 §1 point 1 CCP.
73 P Wiliński, Odmowa dostępu do akt sprawy w postępowaniu przygotowawczym
[Refusal to access the case file in pre-trial proceedings], [2006] Prok. i Pr. No. 11, 81.
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participated or was entitled to participate, as well as the document
originating from it or drawn up with it.
In the pre-trial proceedings, the order of access to the case file shall
be issued by the authority conducting the proceedings (eg the prosecutor
or the police officer). Polish legislation provides the defendant with the
possibility to challenge a decision to refuse access to certain materials.
According to the provisions of Article 159 CCP, the parties are entitled
to submit an interlocutory appeal on the refusal on their access to the file
of pre-trial proceedings. If the order has been issued by a non-
prosecuting authority in the pre-trial proceedings, the interlocutory
appeal shall be examined by the prosecutor supervising the
proceedings. If the order was issued by a public prosecutor, the
suspect is entitled to appeal to the court competent to hear the case,
which decides in a composition of a single judge.
Judicial review of the prosecutor’s decision to refuse access was
introduced by the law of 27/09/2013 amending the CCP, which was
the result of several years of work on a comprehensive reform of the
criminal procedure prepared by the Criminal Law Codification
Commission. The change in the content of Article 159 CPP was, in
turn, a response to the voices of the practitioners, who indicated that
the earlier solution, which sought examination of an appeal by the
direct supervising prosecutor, made the review of orders illusory.
4.2. Derogations on the right to access a lawyer
The governing principle here is the free, contact, in person and by
correspondence, of the arrested defendant with his lawyer in both the
pre-trial and the jurisdictional proceedings. The current rules do not
provide the possibility of refusal of contact of the accused in
detention on remand with his lawyer. 74 Only in pre-trial proceedings
it is possible to introduce certain restrictions in this area, during the
first 14 days of detention on remand. 75
Some additional problems are encountered in relation to the
participation of the suspect’s lawyer during the first hearing in the
pre-trial stage. Article 301 CCP stipulates that, at the request of the
suspect, he or she should be interviewed in presence of a briefed
defence lawyer. Before the first hearing, the suspect is informed of
74 J Grajewski, S Steinborn, in L K Paprzycki (n 71) 291-292.
75 See supra 3.3. Detention pending trial.
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the right to access a defence lawyer. However, as it follows, according to
the standard set forth in the case of Płonka v. Poland, 76 national
authorities should take proactive steps to inform the defendant with
his right to a lawyer, also on the possibility that one could be
appointed by the court, and that the effectiveness of the waiver of that
right depends on whether it has taken place in a clear, irrevocable
manner and accompanied by the provision of minimum guarantees
appropriate to the severity of the waiver. Against this background, the
Supreme Court, in a recent case, held that the lack of the defence
lawyer during the first hearing of the suspect in the pre-trial
proceedings did not prevent the use of the statements given at the
hearing, if there was no objectively present vulnerability to the
suspect. 77 In the literature, it is indicated that this provision applies
only to ‘briefed’ defence lawyers. Therefore, the provision of Article
301 CCP should be amended to make possible the briefing of a
defence lawyer before the first interrogation of the suspect. This is
fundamental for the selection of the strategies and lines of defence in
the course of further proceedings. 78 The doctrine rightly assumes that
when a suspect makes a statement about his or her willingness to
excercise the right to silence until the defence lawyer is consulted, the
authority should allow him to contact the lawyer and stop the further
hearing without the support of his or her lawyer. 79 It is underlined as
well the fact that in view of the extension of the so-called Salduz
doctrine in the ECHR’s jurisdiction, the Supreme Court’s position, as
set out in the above cited order of 5/04/2013, is not sufficient and the
authority should aim for an express waiver by the suspect of the right
to defence lawyer. 80
There is no exception to the rule that a defence lawyer is entitled to
take part in a suspect’s hearing. Of course, the possibility of taking part
76 Płonka v Poland App no. 20310/02 (ECtHR, 31 March 2009).
77 Supreme Court 5 April 2013, III KK 327/12, OSNKW 2013 No. 7 pos. 60.
78 See more: W Posnow, ‘Udział obrońcy w przygotowawczym stadium procesu –
aspekty realizacji niektórych uprawnień’ [Attendance of the defence lawyer in the pre-
trial stage of the process – aspects of implementation of certain powers], in J Skorupka
(ed), Rzetelny proces karny. Księga jubileuszowa Profesor Zofii Świdy [Fair Criminal
Process. Jubilee Book in Honour of Professor Zofia Świda] (Wolters Kluwer 2009)
416.
79 J Grajewski, S Steinborn in L K Paprzycki (n 71) 902; Z Brodzisz, in J
Skorupka (n 49) 702.
80 See: S Steinborn, in S Steinborn (ed), Kodeks postępowania karnego.
Komentarz do wybranych przepisów [Code of Criminal Proceedings. Commentary
to the Selected Regulations] (LEX/el. 2016) commentary to Art. 301.
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in a legal proceeding depends upon the prior notification of the entitled
person. As a rule, according to Article 117 § 1 CCP the defence lawyer
should be notified about the time and place of the hearing. In this regard,
the legislature, however, introduced in Article 249 § 3 CCP quite an
important exception, as the defendant’s notification of the date of the
suspect’s hearing before the application of a preventive measure is not
obligatory unless the defendant requests it, and this does not hinder
the conduct of the action. 81
According to Article 301 CCP, the lawyer’s absence does not stop
the hearing of the accused. It dominates a view that it is irrelevant
whether the defence lawyer justifies his failure to appear. 82 If the
defence lawyer takes part in the hearing, he or she is entitled to ask
questions to the suspect, submit motions, statements and to report any
objections to the content of the report.
Article 73 CCP provides, in this regard, for two types of
restrictions. First, the prosecutor granting authorization for the lawyer
to communicate with the suspect in detention on remand, may
stipulate in particularly justified cases, taking under consideration the
need to protect the best interest of the pre-trial proceedings, that the
lawyer or a person authorized by him also participate in the meeting.
Second, for the same reason, it is acceptable to check the
correspondence of the suspect with the defence lawyer. However, it
should be noted that according to Article 73 §4 CCP the above
reservations cannot be maintained or made after 14 days of detention
on remand. In literature it is emphasized that the particularly justified
cases referred to in Article 73 §2 and 3 CCP should be considered as
extremely rare situations and they should not become the rule. The
cases should primarily concern a real possibility of obstruction during
the case or the need to verify the suspect’s alibi. 83 In addition,
restrictions should be applied with regard to the principle of
proportionality. They can only take place if it is possible to achieve,
in this manner, the intended purpose and also only when it is
necessary. It means that preventing the abuse of the contacts between
the suspect and his lawyer in a manner not compliant with the law, is
not possible in any other way, e.g. by personal control of a suspect
81 See supra Section 3.3.3. Defence rights and effective judicial review.
82 See for example A Sakowicz, in A Sakowicz (ed), Kodeks postępowania
karnego. Komentarz [Code of Criminal Proceedings, Commentary] (CH Beck 2016)
661; critically about this solution: W Posnow (n 77) 420.
83 K Eichstaedt, in D Świecki (n 49) 371.
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before and after the meeting with his lawyer in order to prevent the
transfer of certain items and information. 84 The prosecutor’s decision
in both cases is not subject to appeal.
The involvement of the suspect and his or her lawyer in the pre-trial
proceedings is limited by procedural law, due to the significant
limitation of the principle of audi alteram partem at this stage of the
process and the putting forward (prioritizing) of the interests of the
investigation. The basic formal condition for participation in these
activities is the submission of a request for admission to participation
in the various actions of the pre-trial proceedings by the suspect or
his lawyer. If the request for admission to participate in procedural
actions does not specify what action is to be taken, the public
prosecutor shall ask the applicant to indicate in what pre-trial
proceedings he or she wants to participate.
The suspect and his or her lawyer have the right to take part in the
following actions. The first category are actions that will not be repeated
at trial (eg examining a place, object or body, examining and opening a
corpse, collecting blood and secretions of the body, searching,
exhuming, procedural experiment, recognition, confrontation, witness
testimony, who will probably not be heard in court). 85 However,
according to Article 316 §1 and 2 CCP, there is a possibility of not
allowing the party to take part in unique activities. A person who is
deprived of liberty is also not allowed to participate if there is a risk
of loss or distortion of the evidence.The second types of actions are
activities that are carried out at the request of the suspect or his
lawyer, if they demand participation in this action. However, a suspect
who is deprived of liberty is not brought over if it would cause
serious difficulties. 86 Thirdly, in the hearing of an expert, a suspect
deprived of liberty is not brought over if this would cause serious
difficulties. 87
For other activities, the rule is that a party (and therefore the suspect
and his or her lawyer) should be allowed to participate upon request.
However, the prosecutor may, in particularly justified cases, refuse to
allow the parties to take part in the activity on the basis of an
84 S Steinborn, in S Steinborn (n 80) commentary to Art. 73.
85 See J Grajewski, Przebieg procesu karnego [Course of Criminal Process] (CH
Beck 2012) 69.
86 Art. 315 §2 CCP.
87 Art. 318 CCP.
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important interest of the investigation or if bringing the accused person,
deprived of his liberty would cause serious difficulties. 88
As regards available remedies, it is not possible to challenge the
prosecutor’s decisions restricting the personal and correspondence
contact of the suspect with the defence lawyer. Similarly, in the case
of other violations of the right to contact the defence lawyer,
violations that may occur can be subject to appeal proceedings in the
course of appeals against the first instance judgment. It is necessary,
however, to demonstrate that such a violation of procedural rules
could have affected the content of the ruling.
The described rules are in force in Polish criminal proceedings, in
principle, since 1998. Legislative work on the further implementation
of Directive 2013/48/EU was carried out in 2014-2015 by the
Criminal Law Codification Commission, but the draft was not
addressed by the Ministry of Justice for further work. Finally the
Polish CCP has not been amended in order to implement the
Directive 2013/48/EU (except adding the sole implementation note
stating that the CCP implements the Directive 2013/48/EU 89). The
Ministry of Justice holds the position that the Directive 2013/48/EU
has been fully implemented into the Polish law and there is no need
of any further legislative steps. However, the Polish Ombudsman, the
Polish Bar Council, NGO’s and many experts are of the opinion that
domestic regulations fail to reasonably comply with the EU standard.
4.3. Decisions finding that there is no need for interpretation
In accordance with Article 72§ 1 CCP, the suspect has the right to
use the free help of an interpreter if he does not speak Polish sufficiently.
An interpreter is appointed by the authority conducting the pre-trial
proceedings for acts of the proceedings. In addition, at the request of
the suspect or his lawyer, the interpreter should also be appointed for
the suspect to communicate with suspect’s lawyer in connection with
acts, in which the accused is entitled to participate.
The case law indicates that the concept of lack of sufficient
command of the Polish language justifies the need for the
participation of an interpreter, and cannot be narrowed to a total
88 Art. 317 §1 and 2 CCP.
89 Law of 10 January 2018 on the amendment of CCP and some other laws
(Journal of Laws pos. 201).
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ignorance of the language by the questioned person. The condition
justifying the need to appoint an interpreter is the statement that the
person interviewed either does not understand sufficiently the
questions asked, or against the background of poor knowledge of the
Polish language may not formulate thoughts recreating the course of
events, which are the subject of the hearing. 90 The defendant is
therefore entitled to the assistance of an interpreter if he or she knows
the Polish language to a certain extent, but such knowledge is not
sufficient for self-defense. 91
Article 72 does not specify the language in which translation is to
be provided. It is obvious, however, that it must be the language in
which the accused is able to understand the content of the procedural
actions and can speak freely. It seems, however, that this does not
have to be the mother tongue of the accused, which is of particular
importance in cases of less popular foreign languages. Therefore, if
the accused speaks another foreign language other than his or her
mother tongue (eg English), it is possible to provide an interpreter of
such language. Undoubtedly, however, the knowledge of this language
should be similar to that of the mother tongue, so that there is no
limit to the possibilities of defence. The position of the suspect in this
matter is also important, although it cannot be considered as decisive. 92
As regards the abovementioned right of the suspect to have the
assistance of an interpreter in connection with the activity in which
the defendant is entitled to participate, the provision of Article 72 §2
CCP seems, however, to skip the need for the defendant to
communicate with the lawyer in connection with the preparation of
pleadings, especially appeals, which is subject to explicit regulation of
Directive 2010/64/EU. Therefore, it is emphasized in the literature
that the provision should be interpreted in a manner consistent with
the directive, and that it also involves communication necessary to
commence actions in which the accused may be involved. Such an
interpretation leads to the conclusion that the accused is also entitled
to the assistance of an interpreter in consultation with the lawyer in
connection with an application, and in connection with the filing of
another pleading, if required by the standard of fair trial. 93
Polish law does not provide any remedies in the event of refusal to
90 Supreme Court 22 April 1970, III KR 45/70, OSNKW 1970 No. 11 pos. 150.
91 S Steinborn, in S Steinborn (n 80) commentary to Art. 72.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
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grant interpretation assistance. Possible omissions in this case may be
the subject of an appeal if the first instance judgment is challenged. In
practice, there are also rulings in which the court of appeal also ex
officio has taken into account defects observed in this regard, even if
the party itself did not raise any objections as to the scope and quality
of the translation. 94
4.4. Decisions finding that there is no need for translation
Article 72 §3 CCP requires that the defendant be provided with the
decision of presentation, addition or amendment of the charges, the
indictment and the judgment which is subject to appeal or termination
along with its translations. In addition, the accused may submit a
request for translation of other documents from the case file not
mentioned in the aforementioned provision. The case law indicates,
however, that there is no obligation to translate the entire case, but
only to the extent which is necessary for the accused to understand
the meaning of the main proceedings against him. 95 This position is
endorsed in the literature as it is argued it does not seem necessary to
translate for the suspect, for example, the summons, the proof of
documents’ service, official notes and documents not related to the
charge. 96 Quite surprising it may seem, however, that it is not
required to deliver the translated appeal. It is difficult to effectively
defend in the appeal proceedings without knowledge of the content of
this pleading. Therefore, in the case-law, it is assumed that the
principle of procedural loyalty and the need to provide the accused
with a fair trial obliges the court to serve the accused the translated
remedy. Otherwise, it would violate the accused’s right to material
defense, which is expressed in the possibility to determine his own
position in the matter, submitting personal pleadings in his or her
defense, or of evidence on appeal. 97
In addition, the translator should be called upon to translate the
official documents written in a foreign language. 98 The defendant is
94 See Maciej Fingas, Glosa do wyroku Sądu Apelacyjnego w Gdańnsku z
30.11.2011 r., II AKa 349/11 [Commentary to the judgment of the Court of Appeal
Gdańsk of 30 November 2011, II AKa 349/11], [2013] Palestra No. 1-2, 140.
95 Supreme Court 4 April 2012, III KK 133/11, OSNKW 2012 No. 8 pos. 81.
96 K Eichstaedt, in D Świecki (n 49) 368.
97 Supreme Court 24 July 2008, V KK 28/08, LEX No. 438505.
98 Art. 204 §2 CCP.
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therefore entitled to make his own written pleadings, which must then be
translated by the authority. This provision also requires calling for an
interpreter to familiarize the party with the content of the evidence.
This also means the possibility of active participation by a person
who does not speak Polish in procedural activities on a general basis.
The decision concerning the need to translate the particular
document is taken by the authority conducting the proceedings. This
authority is also competent to settle the accused motion in this respect.
Polish national law does not provide any remedies in the case of
refusal of an interpreter’s assistance. This may be the subject of
appeal in the case of appeal against a judgment of the court of first
instance.
4.5. Violations of the right to information
The CCP does not provide any specific remedy in the absence of
proper notification of the suspect’s rights in the pre-trial proceedings.
The procedural consequences of this type of misconduct vary
depending on the nature of the defiance. Article 16 §1 CCP provides
an information rule called ‘procedural loyalty rule’. It provides that if
the authority conducting the proceedings is obliged to instruct the
participants about their obligations and their rights, the absence of
such instruction or a misleading one shall not have negative
procedural consequences for the participant or other person concerned.
It is mandatory to instruct the suspect before his or her hearing
regarding most of the procedural rights, including the right to
information about the contents of the charges, the right to the
assistance of a lawyer and the free assistance of an interpreter, and
the possibility for the suspected person to gain the access to the
proceedings’ file, The suspect is instructed of these before the first
hearing. 99 However, it is noted that Article 300 §1 CCP unjustifiably
omits instruction relating to the rights to initiate and participate in
activities of pre-trial proceedings provided for in Article 315-318
CCP. 100 The instruction of a suspect and a crime victim who do not
speak Polish sufficiently should be done in a language that is
understandable to them. Although the provision of Article 72 §3 CCP
99 Art. 300 CCP.
100 See S Steinborn, in S Steinborn (n 80) commentary to Art. 300 and quoted
literature.
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does not provide for the obligation to give the written instruction
referred to in Article 300 §1, with the translation, but nevertheless it
should be translated at least orally. 101
Polish criminal procedure provides a rule whereby a statement of
charges is given when existing information justifies the suspicion that
the offense was committed by a particular person. 102 This action
initiates the stage of proceedings against the identified person, who
formally becomes a suspect and acquires certain procedural rights.
The institution of presenting the charges is guaranteed, since it allows
the suspect to take an active defence. For these reasons, it is
unacceptable to delay the moment of presenting the charges by the
person conducting the proceedings. Even more serious misconduct is
the hearing as a witness of a person against whom there are grounds
for presenting the charges and for questioning him or her as a suspect.
This requires, for example, the assistance of a lawyer and the
privileges of nemo se ipsum accusare tenetur. The Supreme Court
indeed acknowledged the need to guarantee the effectiveness of the
defence while countering abusive practices. It thus held that a person
who was heard as a witness does not bear penal liability for giving
false testimony, because inter alia it would violate Article 313 §1
CCP which orders him or her to be considered as a suspect. 103
In light of the above, it can be said that Polish procedural law
adopts a formal criterion for acquiring the status of suspect. It should
be added that, in the event of an action against the accused, in
particular an arrest, he or she also has the right to information.
Namely, according to Article 244 §2 CCP, the arrested person must
immediately be informed of the particular reasons for the arrest and
of his or her rights, including the right to a lawyer, the use of free
interpreter services, and to refuse giving any statements.
The defendant does not have the opportunity to appeal separately on
errors resulting from incorrect instructions or lack of adequate
information about the charges. He or she may, however, challenge it
indirectly referring to Article 16 §1 CCP and appeal against
procedural decisions issued in connection with such a breach of the
right to information.
101 Ibid.
102 Art. 313 §1 CCP.
103 Supreme Court of 26 April 2007, I KZP 4/07, OSNKW 2007 No. 10 pos. 71.
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5. Sanctions against illegal or improperly obtained evidence
The exclusionary rules are crucial mechanisms in the Polish
criminal procedure, which aim is to prevent the infringements of the
most important evidentiary rules and eliminate evidence obtained in
such way. Nullities are unknown in the Polish criminal procedure.
The sources of these rules are both regulations of the code of criminal
procedure and case-law. There is no general rule regarding the illegal
or improperly obtained evidence, but specific rules apply to the
different situations. The exclusionary rules provided by the law are
for example, the inadmissibility of using the earlier testimony of the
witness (eg close relative of accused), who refused to give evidence
to the court 104 or the inadmissibility of using objects found during the
search, when the search and seizure had been performed without the
consent of the prosecutor or judge and have not been ex post
authorized by one of them. 105 An example of this exclusionary rule
that has been developed in the case law is the inadmissibility of using
the statements of a suspected person, which had been given without
proper information about the right to remain silent. 106
The general exclusionary rule regarding illegal evidence has existed
in Polish law for only a very short time. In the period from 1 July 2015
to 15 April 2016, the use of evidence obtained by a crime for the
purposes of criminal proceedings was prohibited. Recently, the general
approach of the legislature regarding illegal evidence has changed.
Currently, according to Article 168a CCP this evidence is not to be
regarded as inadmissible solely on the grounds that it was obtained in
breach of the rules of proceedings or by means of a crime (with few
exceptions). Also the theory of the fruits of the poisonous tree is not
widely accepted in Polish criminal procedure and especially in the
case law.
In the situation of the lack of general and also specific exclusionary
rule, the only way for the accused person and his or her defence lawyer
to eliminate the illegal or improperly obtained evidence is to prove that
there has been a breach of the rules of procedure which may affect or
have affected the content of the judgment. The defence may try to
convince the court of first instance, that using such an evidence may
negatively affect the proceedings and, as a consequence, also the
104 Art. 186 §1 CCP.
105 Art. 230 §1 CCP.
106 Supreme Court 28 June 2001, II KKN 412/98, LEX No. 51377.
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judgment. The court may then undertake preventive actions (eg
repetition of evidentiary activities) or just eliminate this evidence,
with the aim of avoiding a failure. Violations of the rights of the
defence can be raised as allegations in the appeal. 107 The defence
may raise the issue in the appeal that specific evidence is
inadmissible. This may result in the change or revocation of the
contested judgment. The assessment of the possibility of an impact of
the breach of procedure on the judgment’s content is made in concreto.
5.1. Infringements of the right to access the case file
In the case law, the consequences of a denial of access to the case
file are only considered in the context of the possible impact of such a
failure on the content of the contested decision. One of the rulings
indicated that the refuse to access to the case file may be treated as
an infringement of the right to defence, as it may be exercised by
using procedural rights, including access to the case files. 108 This
means that if a particular document from the case files was not made
available for the defence (eg the evidential record, which could not be
taken into account by the defence in further evidential proceedings),
this can be considered in concreto as a failure that could affect the
content of the decision and result in the decision being quashed and
the case reconsidered. In principle, this will not result in the
elimination of a particular evidentiary activity, but only in re-
conducting it. If the court of first instance determines that the defence
has not been given the opportunity to review the files, in order to
avoid the above mentioned consequences, the hearing should be
postponed in order to give the defence adequate time to review the files.
Similarly, if the right of defendant and his lawyer to access the
materials essential to challenging the detention on remand is violated,
this may result - if the defence lawyer raises an allegation in the
interlocutory appeal against the decision regarding detention on
remand - in the quashing of the decision and re-hearing of the issue
of ordering detention on remand.
If the defence lawyer has not been given the access to the case files
for the full period of time which is scheduled to draw up and lodge an
appeal, then it may be considered to be serious misconduct resulting in
107 Art. 438 point 2 CCP.
108 Court of Appeal Katowice 6 May 2009, II AKa 394/08, LEX No. 519646.
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quashing the decision and referring the case back to the court of first
instance, especially when the defence lawyer objectively was not able
at the time to read the file, make the necessary copies or photocopies
and develop an appeal and submit it within a set time to the
competent court. 109
5.2. Statements obtained in breach of the right to access a lawyer
The case law indicates that the absence of the defence lawyer at the
first hearing of the suspect in the pre-trial proceedings 110 does not in
itself constitute an obstacle to the use at trial of the statements
submitted under such conditions – because of the content of Article 6
Section 1 in conjunction with Article 6 paragraph 3 point c) ECHR –
unless the suspect is objectively vulnerable to harm. 111 On this basis,
it can be held that if there is a violation of the right of the accused to
a lawyer and he or she would be questioned without the assistance of
a lawyer, or if any evidentiary activity would be in violation of the
right to a lawyer, the use of such statements or evidence in court
would be unacceptable.
Practitioners, especially defence lawyers, indicate that an explicit
exclusionary rule in the CCP, which would eliminate hearings in
violation of the right of access to a lawyer, is necessary. Instruction
on the right to refuse to give statements and the correlated standard
set forth in Article 16 CCP are not a sufficient safeguard mechanism
for the lack of proper instructions on the right of access to a lawyer.
5.3. Breaches of the right to translation and interpretation
There are no exclusionary rules regarding breaches of the right to
translation and interpretation. In practice, if the evidentiary
proceedings were carried out (eg witness testimony), and the suspect
(accused) was not assisted by an interpreter, the court is obliged to
repeat the action with the interpreter in order to give the accused an
109 Supreme Court 4 December 2013, II KK 230/13, LEX No. 1400584.
110 Art. 300 and 301 CCP.
111 Supreme Court 5 April 2013, III KK 327/12, OSNKW 2013 No. 7 pos. 60;
similarly Court of Appeal Gdansk 22 January 2014, II AKa 447/13, LEX No.
1430707; Court of Appeal Wroclaw 19 September 2013, II AKa 292/13, LEX No.
1375926.
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opportunity to ask questions and refer to its results (eg witness
statements). This will not, however, result in the inadmissibility of the
results of the previous activity.
5.4. Failure to provide information about rights and about accusation
From Article 16 §1 CCP, a rule may be derived that, if the authority
conducting the proceedings is obliged to instruct the accused of his or
her obligations and rights, the lack of such instruction or a misleading
instruction must not adversely affect the suspect (accused). The same
applies to the situation where the law does not explicitly provide the
obligation to instruct, but in the light of the circumstances, such
instruction should be deemed necessary.
Under Article 175 §1 CCP, which provides the right of the accused
to provide explanations and the right to remain silent, it is clear that the
accused must be instructed that he or she may do so. In the literature,
however, there is no common view on what are the procedural
consequences for a violation of this rule. Some of the literature tends
to the view according to which, if the accused is not instructed as to
his right to refuse to give explanations, plead guilty or give
information about the circumstances unfavourable to his or her
procedural interests, then the statements cannot be used as
evidence. 112 A different view presupposes that due to the evidentiary
rules, the statements submitted in a situation of lack of instructions on
the right to remain silent are not in themselves deprived from the
evidentiary force, because the legislature intended to eliminate the
evidence at trial due to certain infringements, such as these. 113
The lack of information regarding the charges during the pre-trial
proceedings does not directly affect the admissibility of the evidence
gathered during this stage of criminal proceedings. The case law and
literature point out that the authority conducting the investigation
should not postpone the presentation of the charges if it has sufficient
112 In particular L K Paprzycki, in L K Paprzycki (n 71) 595; M Jeż-
Ludwichowska, ‘Wyjaśnienia oskarżonego a prawo do informacji’ [Explanations of
the accused and the right to information], [2003] Palestra No. 3-4, 50; R Kmiecik,
in R Kmiecik (ed), Prawo dowodowe. Zarys wykładu [The law of evidence. Basic
principles] (Wolters Kluwer 2008) 95.
113 See T Grzegorczyk, Kodeks postępowania karnego. Komentarz [Code of
Criminal Proceedings, Commentary] (Wolters Kluwer 2008) 637; K Boratyńska, in
Sakowicz (n 82) 464; M Kurowski (n 49) 673.
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evidence justifying the suspicion that the offence was committed by the
specific person. On the other hand, there is no direct consequence of the
violation of the right to information about the charges to the evidence
gathered. When a specific charge was not presented to the suspect in
a formal way and the accusation was brought to the court, it could
lead to the return of the case to the pre-trial proceedings. 114 The main
aim of this is to enable the suspect to defend himself, but it does not
directly affect the evidence. Specific evidence can be eliminated only
when the court of first or second instance finds that this failure may
affect (or has affected) the content of the judgment.
6. Appeals against conviction and sentence
According to the provisions of Article 444 CCP the judgment of the
court of first instance may be challenged in an appeal by the parties,
inter alia by the accused. The law does not provide for any exceptions
to the right of the parties to challenge a judgment delivered by a court
of first instance. The deadline for appeals is 14 days that counts and
runs for each eligible person separately from the date of service of the
judgment together with the justification. It should be noted, however,
that the justification of the judgment of the court of first instance is
drawn up at the request of a party, filed within 7 days from the
issuance of the judgment.
The Polish model of appeal proceedings is of mixed character. With
the recent reforms of the CCP from 2013 to 2016, second instance
proceedings got more a character of the ‘appeal-model’ (in contrast to
the previous ‘revision-model’), as the elements of the typical revision
were weakened. 115 The appellate court carries out the substantive and
legal review of the contested judgment within the appeal and raised
objections. The applicant can therefore challenge both the facts
underlying the contested judgment and raise objections relating to
infringements of substantive and procedural law. As a rule, the
content of the appeal determines the extent of the review of the case
conducted by the second instance court.
There are, however, several exceptions to this rule, which allow the
114 Art. 344a CCP.
115 See more: M Fingas Orzekanie reformatoryjne w instancji odwoławczej w
polskim procesie karnym [Reformatory Adjudication in Appellate Proceedings in
Polish Criminal Process] (Wolters Kluwer 2016) 59-60.
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Court of Appeal to rule regardless of the appeal’s boundaries and
objections raised. The first exception is the so-called benefit of
another remedy. 116 The court of second instance may quash or
change the ruling in favour of the co-defendants, even if they did not
bring an appeal, in the situation when considerations supporting
quashing or changing the rule in favour of them are similar to all
defendants in question. Second, absolute reasons for appeal 117 consist
in the most serious procedural defects which, if they arise, result in
the quashing or sending for the re-examination by the court of first
instance, irrespective of the defects on the content of the contested
decision.Third, the serious injustice of a judgment 118 allows the
appellate court to modify a judgment in favor of the accused (and in
cases enumerated in the CCP, set aside the judgment) when
maintenance of the contested decision would be grossly unfair.
The appellate court is also entitled to conduct evidentiary
proceedings, apart from the situation in which it would be necessary
to retry the trial as a whole. 119 As a rule, the appellate proceedings
do not entail, therefore, the re-taking of evidence. The extent of the
evidence proceedings in the hearing before the second instance court
stems primarily from the grounds of appeal and evidence submitted
by the parties. The legislation, in this respect, provides restrictions
according to which the appellant may only indicate new facts or
evidence if he or she could not refer them to the court of first
instance. 120 However, this rule is weakened by the appellate court’s
obligation to examine, ex officio, all available evidence, important for
the resolution of the case. 121 It should be noted, however, that in
appeal proceedings it is of relevance for the judgment only the
evidence which are related to the objections indicated in appeal and
are examined by a Court of Appeal, or which deal with matters that
are subject to the issues of Court’s own motion. 122 Consequently,
nothing stops the Court of Appeal from making new findings and to
116 Art. 435 CCP.
117 Art. 439 §1 CCP.
118 Art. 440 CCP.
119 Art. 452 §2 CCP.
120 Art. 427 §3 CCP.
121 Ibid 182.
122 S Steinborn, Postępowanie dowodowe w instancji apelacyjnej w świetle
nowelizacji kodeksu postępowania [Evidence Proceedings in the Appellate Instance
in the Light of the Amendment to the Code of Crminal Proceedings], [2015] Prok. i
Pr. No. 1-2, 154.
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rule differently on the substance of the case, except the three exemptions
described in Article 437 §2 CCP.
The disputes resolved in the appeal are governed by Article 437
CCP. The Court of Appeal may uphold the challenged judgment,
change the contested decision, ruling differently on the merits, quash
the challenged judgment and discontinue the procedure, quash the
challenged judgment and refer the case back to the first instance. This
last scenario arises in the following situations:
• The Court of Appeal finds that an absolute cause of appeal listed
in Article 439 §1 CCP (eg improper court composition, res iudica-
ta process obstacle) has been established;
• The occurrence of one of the ne peius rules; 123
• The Court of Appeal cannot convict the accused, who was acquit-
ted at first in-stance or for whom at first instance the proceedings
were discontinued or conditionally discontinued;
• The Court of Appeal cannot aggravate the punishment by impo-
sing a life imprisonment sentence. If, therefore, the court of appeal
find the grounds for issuing such a decision, it is obliged to give a
ruling of a cassation nature;
• The need arises to re-try the case. However, this is permissible on-
ly in the situation where all of the activities of the first instance
court proceedings require a retrial due to the nature of the infrin-
gement of established law (eg proceeded without the participation
of the party who was not duly notified of the hearing).
In the Polish penal process there is a direct and indirect ban of
reformatio in peius. Direct prohibition on reformatio in peius is
addressed to the appellate court. According to Article 434 §1 CCP,
the court of appeal may rule against the accused only if the following
conditions are met: when the appeal was brought against the accused;
within the limits of an appeal, unless the law requires judgment
regardless of the limits of the appeal; in the event of objections
indicated in the appeal, unless the appeal comes not from the public
prosecutor or attorney and has not raised any objections (allegations),
or the law requires the judgment, regardless of objections indicated in
the appeal.
The key issue in practice is to determine what the term ‘decision
against the accused’ means and what the scope of this ban is. In the
case law, it is assumed that in the absence of an appeal against the
123 Art. 454 CCP.
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accused, his situation in the appeal procedure cannot deteriorate at any
point. This imposes on the court of appeal the obligation to refrain from
taking actions- including in the sphere of factual findings - causing, or
even possibly having, a negative effect on the legal position of the
accused. 124 Therefore, this prohibition refers broadly to the issue of
criminal responsibility of the accused for his alleged offense, in
particular its legal qualification, factual findings on the subject matter,
the sentence terms, the penalties and other judgments.
The Code of Criminal Procedure currently provides only one
exception. This applies to the use of the so-called ‘small’ crown
witness institution, which involves an extraordinary reduction of the
sentence against the accused, who has opted to cooperate with the law
enforcement authorities in which he or she discloses to them
information about persons involved in the offense and the relevant
circumstances of this offense. 125 The prohibition of reformatio in
peius is excluded if, after the judgment has been delivered, the
accused appeals and at the same time cancels or substantially changes
his explanations or testimony. In such a case, the appellate court may
rule against him or her despite the fact that the only appeal which
was brought was in favour of the accused. However, this does not
apply if the accused does not ‘withdraw from the agreement’ with the
prosecutor, but rightly pleads on an infringement of substantive law.
The exception does not occur also when the court of appeal
establishes one or more absolute grounds for appeal set out in Article
439 §1 CCP.
The indirect prohibition of reformationis in peius is addressed to the
court of first instance, which has been referred the case for re-
examination. Pursuant to Article 443 CCP, in further proceedings it
may be given a more severe judgment than the quashed one, only if
the judgment has been challenged against the accused or there were
grounds of the reformatio in peius exclusion. It is important to note
that in a re-trial, the court of first instance is not constrained in any
way with regard to rule against the defendant regarding preventive
measures (eg placement in a psychiatric hospital), if it is found
necessary and justified.
124 See inter alia: Supreme Court 2 April 1996, V KKN 4/96, OSN Prok. i Pr.
1996 No. 10 pos. 14; Supreme Court 4 February 2000, V KKN 137/99, OSNKW
2000 No. 3-4 pos. 31; Supreme Court 5 August 2009, II KK 36/09, OSNKW 2009
No. 9 pos. 80.
125 Art. 60 § 3 Penal Code.
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7. Judicial review by Courts of Higher instance
As already mentioned, Polish criminal procedure consists of two
instances. The judgment given by the Court of Appeal is therefore
final and enforceable. The quashing or changing of the final judgment
is possible within the framework of the system of extraordinary
remedies, which include: cassation, complaint against the quashing
judgment of the Court of Appeal and reopening of proceedings.
Complaint against the judgment of the Court of Appeal is an
extraordinary remedy, and in fact, unlike in the known systems of
procedural penal law, it was introduced by the amended law of 11/03/
2016. The complaint serves only one purpose: to stop courts of appeal
from quashing the judgments hastily and sending the cases back for
reconsideration. 126 As it has already been pointed out, currently
Article 437 §2 CPP provides a closed catalogue of prerequisites for
issuing a cassation judgment. Where the Court of Appeal cancels the
judgment of the court of first instance and hands it back for
reconsideration in breach of the above-mentioned provision, ie for
reasons not provided for therein, or where the cassation decision of
the appeals court is affected by an absolute ground for appeal under
Article 439 §1 CPP, then a party has the possibility of lodging a
complaint to the Supreme Court within 7 days. If the complaint is
upheld, the contested judgment is annulled and the case forwarded to
the appropriate court of appeal for re-examination.
Cassation is available to the parties against final judgments of the
appeal court closing the proceedings and a lawful decision of the
court of appeal to discontinue the proceedings and to apply a
protective measure. It must be emphasized, however, that a party who
has not challenged the judgment of a court of first instance can only
file for cassation if the decision of the court of first instance has been
altered to their detriment. Additionally, there is an absolute cause for
appeal contained in Article 439 § 1 CPP. The Code in Article 523,
however, provides limits to the type of cases which can be subject to
appeal under cassation proceedings. On the one hand, cassation in
126 See: S Steinborn, ‘Skarga na wyrok kasatoryjny sądu odwoławczego na tle
systemu środków zaskarżenia w polskim procesie karnym’ [Complaint against the
Cassation Judgment of the Appellate Court in the Perspective of the System of
appeals in the Polish criminal process], in T Grzegorczyk, R Olszewski (eds),
Verba volant, scripta manent. Ksiega pamiątkowa poświęcona Profesor Monice
Zbrojewskiej [Verba volant, scripta manent. The Jubilee Book in Honour of
Professor Monika Zbroejwska] (Wolters Kluwer 2017) 415-416.
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favour of a convicted person can be made only if the defendant is
convicted for a crime or a fiscal offense, facing imprisonment without
conditional suspension of the sentence. On the other, cassation to the
disadvantage of the accused can only be made if the accused is
acquitted or the proceedings are discontinued.
The above limitations do not apply if the judgment is affected by an
absolute grounds for appeal under Article 439 §1 CPP. The literature
indicates pragmatic reasons for restricting the access of parties to
cassation proceedings, ie the need to reduce the influx of cassations to
the Supreme Court 127.
The deadline for the cassation appeal for parties is 30 days from the
date of delivering the ruling with justification. A request for delivering a
ruling with justification should be lodged to the court that issued the
judgment, within 7 days from the date of the judgment’s publication,
and if the law provides the service of the judgment, from the date of
the service.
A special type of cassation is the extraordinary cassation which is
reserved for the Minister of Justice - the General Attorney, the
Ombudsman and the Ombudsman for Children’s Rights if the
judgment violates the rights of a child. The above-mentioned
authorities are entitled to lodge a cassation appeal against each lawful
judgment of the court terminating the proceedings, and therefore there
are no limitations on the scope of the subject matter subject to appeal
proceedings. Furthermore, these authorities are not bound by any
deadlines to file a cassation, with a stipulation that in accordance with
Article 524 §3 CPP it is impermissible to file a cassation appeal
against a defendant which is brought one year after the date of the
judgment becoming final.
The third of the remedies is the reopening of judicial proceedings
concluded by final legal binding judicial decision. This institution is
based on the principle that in particularly offensive situations, the
legitimacy and stability of a judicial decision cannot be seen as proper
and just 128.
The CPP lists in Articles 540 CPP, Article 540a CPP and Article
540b the following conditions for the resumption of court
proceedings. First, the so-called propter crimen arises where there has
been a crime connected with the proceedings and there is a justified
127 See Grajewski (n 85) 364.
128 K Marszał, in K Marszał (ed), Proces karny. Przebieg postępowania [Crminal
Process. The Course of Proceedings] (Volumen 2012) 281.
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reason to believe that this may affect the content of the judgment.
Second, the so-called propter nova applies where new facts or
evidence is revealed after the ruling has been delivered indicating
that: a convicted person did not commit the offense or the offense
was not a criminal offense or it is not punishable; a person was
convicted of an offense punishable by a more severe punishment, or
did not take into account circumstances requiring extraordinary
mitigation of the penalty, or misrepresentation of circumstances
affecting the extraordinary aggravation of the penalty; or the court has
discontinued or conditionally discontinued criminal proceedings and
mistakenly found that the accused committed the offence although he
should be acquitted. As a third condition, a ruling of the
Constitutional Tribunal has declared the law on the basis of which a
judgment has been issued incompatible with the Constitution, ratified
international agreements or a legal provision and, as a result,
resumption may not adversely affect the accused. A forth condition
lies in the decision of an international authority (in particular the
ECHR), from which it is necessary to reopen the proceedings in
favour of the accused (e.g. the judgment of the European Court of
Human Rights). Resumption of court proceedings may also result
where the so-called ‘small’ crown witness did not confirm the
information disclosed in criminal proceedings, there is a need to
resume proceedings for an action covered by the so-called absorption
cancellation, or the case was considered and conducted in the absence
of the accused.
The higher instance court is competent to hear the request for the
resumption of proceedings, but in the case of proceedings leading to a
judgment by the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court, the latter is
competent to hear the application. It should be noted that it is not
permissible to reopen the proceedings to the detriment of the
defendant after one year from the date of validation of the decision. 129
As regards the scope of review, a complaint against a judgment of
the Appeal Court initiates a review only of the legal side of the
judgment. The Supreme Court examines the complaint within the
limits of the objections raised, as previously stated, to show only that
the Court of Appeal has inadequately dismissed the contested decision
and forwarded it for reconsideration, or that the judgment of the Court
of Appeal is affected by the absolute reason for appeal.
129 Art. 542 §5 CCP.
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Cassation has autonomous cassation reasons formulated in Article
523 § 1 CCP, in line with the model of this appeal as a purely legal
review. Namely, cassation may be brought only because of the
absolute reason for appeal under Article 439 §1 CCP or other serious
violation of the law, if it could have a significant impact on the
content of the judgment. It is unacceptable to base the cassation solely
on the allegation of disproportionate punishment, but this restriction
does not apply to the Minister of Justice - General Attorney in cases
of crimes (acts punishable by at least 3 years of imprisonment). In
cassation proceedings, as a rule, factual findings underpinning the
contested judgment are not examined. It is not permissible to raise an
allegation of erroneous facts, unless they are the result of a gross
violation of procedural law. 130 However, the complainant may raise
objections to the judgment of the court of first instance, but they must
be related to the objections against the ruling of the Court of Appeal.
It is not a function of the Supreme Court to ‘duplicate’ the appellate
control. 131
According to Article 536 CCP the Supreme Court examines the
cassation within the limits of the appeal and objections raised, and to
a greater extent only if there is a need for the institution of the
beneficiary of the appeal, 132 the occurrence of absolute reason for
appeal 133 and the need to correct the legal qualification of the
offence. 134 In practice, there are situations in which the Supreme
Court goes beyond the normative framework of examining a case in
cassation proceedings, mainly for reasons of justice. The admissibility
of such an action by the Supreme Court was in particular referred to
in the judgment, which stated that a ruling in favour of the defendant
was also permitted when in the course of cassation proceedings
blatant breaches of law causing the contested judgment to be openly
contrary to the principles of a lawful and fair criminal procedure are
found unraised in the cassation and not mentioned in Article 439 § 1
CCP. 135 In addition, the analysis of the case law makes it clear that
the Supreme Court also occasionally interferes in factual arrangements
to benefit from the provisions of Article 537 § 2 CCP allowing the
130 J Grajewski, Steinborn, in L K Paprzycki (n 71) vol. 2, 318.
131 J Grajewski (n 85) 358.
132 Art. 435 CCP.
133 Art. 439 CCP.
134 Art. 455 CCP.
135 Supreme Court 21 May 1995, III KKN 2/96, OSNKW 1996 No. 9-10 pos. 52.
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exceptional right to acquit the defendant whose conviction was clearly
wrong. 136
In the cassation proceedings, the evidence may be examined only to
confirm or exclude the objection raised in the cassation of alleged
egregious infringement of law, rather than supplementing the evidence
procedure aimed at examining the validity of the assessment of the
evidence and the accuracy of factual findings. 137
The court hearing the request for the reopening of proceedings must
rule within the limits of the application, and will exceed those limits
only if there is an absolute reason for appeal under Article 439 § 1
CCP and if there is the need to use the institution of the beneficiary
of the appeal. 138 In proceedings initiated by filing a request for
resumption of the proceedings, there is no evidence processing in
principle. Article 546 CCP provides, however, for the opportunity to
review the circumstances relevant to the decision on the application,
eg verifying whether the evidence offered in the application for a
renewal exists. The parties have the right to take part in such activities.
Once a complaint against the judgment of the Court of Appeal has
been examined, the Supreme Court dismisses the complaint if it is
unfounded, or considers it necessary to quash the contested judgment
and refer the case to the competent Court of Appeal. After the
cassation review, the Supreme Court is entitled to issue the following
resolutions: dismiss the cassation if it is unfounded or, if the cassation
is upheld, the contested judgment is quashed and the case is referred
to the competent court for reconsideration or the proceedings are
discontinued. Exceptionally, if the conviction is manifestly groundless,
the Supreme Court would acquit the accused.
As a result of consideration of the application for resumption of
proceedings, the following resolutions may in principle be settled. On
the one hand, unfounded requests are dismissed. On the other, where
the application is considered, the court quashes the challenged
decision and refers the matter to the competent court for
reconsideration. Exceptionally, by quashing the challenged judgment
136 See, for example, M Fingas, ‘Kilka uwag o orzekaniu reformatoryjnym w
postępowaniu kasacyjnym’ [Several Comments on Reformatory Adjudication in
Cassation Proceedings], in S Steinborn (ed), Postępowanie odwoławcze w procesie
karnym – u progu nowych wyzwań [Appeal proceedings in criminal process – on
the threshold of new challenges] (Wolters Kluwer 2016) 370.
137 Supreme Court 3 April 1997, III KKN 170/96, OSNKW 1997 No. 7-8 pos.
69.
138 J Grajewski, S Steinborn, in L K Paprzycki (n 71) vol. 2, 401.
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the court may acquit the accused if new facts or evidence indicate that
the judgment is manifestly groundless or the proceedings are
discontinued. However, this applies only to situations in which the
assessment of all evidence gathered in the case, taking into account
the new circumstances set out in the request, leads to the undoubted
finding that an innocent person was convicted. 139
8. Access to the Constitutional Court
The Polish legal system provides for a specific legal measure in the
form of a constitutional complaint. According to Article 79 of the
Constitution, anyone whose constitutional freedoms or rights have
been infringed has the right, in accordance with the provisions of the
law, to file a complaint with the Constitutional Tribunal on the
conformity with the Constitution or other normative act on the basis
of which the court or a public administration’s authority has finally
ruled on their freedoms or their rights and obligations defined in the
Constitution. A constitutional complaint can only be lodged by an
individual complainant after a final, fully valid closing of criminal
proceedings, because a constitutional review of the legal provisions
commenced by the constitutional complaint may concern the legal act
(law) being the basis of the final judgment given in the complainant’s
case. There must therefore be a link between the provision indicated
as the subject of the review and the basis of the final judgment. 140
The deadline for filing the complaint is 3 months after the final
judgment, final decision or other final resolution has been served on
the applicant. 141 A party may, however, challenge in the complaint
only the laws, on the basis of which the case was adjudicated, as
incompatible with the Constitution. On the other hand, it is not
permissible to question how the law was applied in the issuing of a
judgment. As already mentioned earlier, the Constitutional Tribunal’s
judgment may also serve as a basis for resuming judicial proceedings
in favour of the accused.
139 Supreme Court 10 October 1995, II KO 76/94, OSNKW 1996 No. 1-2 pos. 9.
140 Constitutional Court 18 October 2011, SK 39/09, OTK-A 2011 No. 8 pos. 84.
141 Art. 46 section 1 of the Constitutional Tribunal Act.
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9. Judicial review and the EAW
9.1. Competent judicial authorities
Both the issue of the EAW and the execution of the EAW belong
primarily to the jurisdiction of the district court (sąd okręgowy),
which is a mid-level court of the judiciary in Poland. 142 This is in
line with the traditionally accepted principle of the Polish law that, in
the area of international judicial cooperation in criminal matters,
instruments involving deprivation of liberty belong to the jurisdiction
of district courts. A decision on the execution of the EAW may be
appealed to the Court of Appeal.
9.2. Defence rights in the execution of a EAW
In the proceedings concerning the execution of the EAW, defence
rights such as right to an interpreter and translation, right to
information and right to access to the defence lawyer are guaranteed.
There is no separate regulation on the right of the requested person
to an interpreter. In this regard, the rules concerning the right of the
accused (suspect) are accordingly applied to the requested person. 143
This means that if the requested person does not have sufficient
command of the Polish language, he or she has the right to use the
free-of-charge interpreter service. 144 According to Article 607l § 1a
CCP, the court delivers to the requested person information about the
date of the court sitting, along with the EAW accompanied by a
translation into the language that this person commands. This
provision also allows the giving of information to the requested
person, if it does not impede the exercise of their rights, regarding the
content of the EAW, including the right to consent to be surrendered
and to renounce to the entitlement to the speciality rule. Polish
legislation does not provide any separate measure by which the
requested person could challenge the court’s decision not to translate
the EAW and other documents and to question the quality of the
translation. This person can only raise this issue in the course of the
142 Judiciary in Poland consists of county courts (sądy rejonowe), district courts
(sądy okręgowe) and courts of appeal (sądy apelacyjne).
143 See supra Section 4. Specific remedies for alleged breach of defence rights in
the pre-trial stage of criminal proceedings.
144 Art. 72 §1 CCP.
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proceedings in the form of motions for translating specific documents or
requesting a change of interpreter, and also as an argument in an appeal
against a court’s decision to execute the EAW and surrender him or her
to another Member State.
The person who is in detention in connection with the EAW issued
in another Member State is given a written notice. A model of this
instruction is set out in the regulation of the Minister of Justice of 11
June 2015. 145 The notice includes information on the following rights
of the requested person:
• to obtain the cause of arrest,
• to give explanations, the right to remain silent or refuse to answer
questions,
• to the assistance of a lawyer, including a court-appointed defence
lawyer,
• to the assistance of a free interpreter,
• to review the file as to the grounds of arrest,
• to notify their closest person and consular services of their coun-
try,
• to lodge an interlocutory appeal against the arrest,
• to immediate release if, within 48 hours of arrest, there is no tran-
sfer of that person to the court for the purpose of detention on re-
mand, or if there is no detention order issued by the court within
24 hours after the transfer,
• to information on the content of the EAW and to receive a copy of
it with translation,
• to lodge an interlocutory appeal against the decision on the execu-
tion of the EAW,
• to consent to be surrendered and to renounce to the entitlement to
the speciality rule,
• to access to medical aid.
There is no explicit information about the right to be heard by a
judicial authority, but only the general information about the right to
be heard and to the refusal to submit any explanation (right to remain
silent).
The person arrested in order to execute the EAW has access to a
defence lawyer on the same conditions as a detained suspect in
criminal proceedings. The Polish CCP does not provide any separate
145 Ordinance of Ministry of Justice of 11 June 2015 on specifying a model of
instruction about the powers of person arrested upon the European Arrest Warrant
(Journal of Laws pos. 874).
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regulation in this area. This means that the detained person in connection
with the EAW should be able to contact the lawyer, while in justified
cases, a prosecutor or a police officer may be present during the
meeting. The requested person also has the right to be heard with a
defence lawyer if he or she has already appointed him, but the
absence of the lawyer does not prevent the hearing. However, Article
73 §2 and 3 CCP allow limitations of contact with the defence lawyer
by introducing for a period of 14 days from the date of the detention
on remand, as well as the control of correspondence, and the above-
mentioned presence of an indicated person at a direct meeting
between the suspect and the defence lawyer. These restrictions,
however, can only be used in preparatory proceedings, not during the
proceedings regarding execution of the EAW.
It is not possible for a requested person to immediately challenge
decisions restricting their right of access to a lawyer. Allegations of
such restrictions can only be raised in an appeal against a decision on
the execution of the EAW and on the surrender of the requested person.
The most serious difficulty with regards to the right to defence of
the person, against whom the EAW was issued, is caused by the
Polish legislation implementing Framework Decision 2002/584,
limiting effective access of this person to a defence lawyer. Among
other difficulties, there is a lack of an absolute obligation to bring a
requested person to a court hearing during which the execution of the
EAW is considered, even if the person is in custody and expresses the
will to attend the hearing. The decision to bring in the requested
person is made by the court. The provisions also do not provide the
obligation to inform that person that they have the right to request to
attend the court proceedings.
9.3. Judicial review and grounds for refusal
Polish law foresees grounds for refusal of the execution of a EAW
closely linked to the defence rights of the requested person. According
to Article 607r §3 CCP the execution of the EAW issued for the purpose
of executing a custodial sentence may be refused if it has been rendered
in the absence of a requested person. The indicated grounds for refusal
to execute the EAW do not occur in the following cases:
• the requested person was summoned to participate in the procee-
dings or otherwise notified of the date and place of the hearing,
informing him/her that the failure to appear does not constitute
POLAND 427
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
a hindrance to the issuance of a decision, or if this person had a
lawyer present at the hearing;
• after delivering to the requested person a copy of the decision
along with the notice of their rights, the term and manner of sub-
mitting a request for new court proceedings in the same case in the
country issuing the EAW, the requested person failed to submit
such a request within the statutory deadline or stated that he or
she does not challenge the decision,
• the issuing authority ensures that after the surrender of the reque-
sted person to the country issuing the EAW, he or she will receive
a copy of the judgment together with a notice of his or her right,
the term and manner of submitting for new judicial proceedings in
the same case.
The Polish legislation concerning this ground for refusal to execute
the EAW is therefore almost an exact reproduction of the content of
Article 4a Section 1 b) of Framework Decision 2002/584. The
differences concern specific issues. For example, in point (a), contrary
to the Framework Decision 2002/584, it is not explicitly reserved that
the defence lawyer’s participation in the hearing excludes the grounds
for refusal only when the requested person was aware of the hearing.
In turn, point (b) does not distinguish clearly, unlike in art. 4a Section
1 c) of the Framework Decision 2002/584, the right to reconsider a
case and the right to appeal. In Article 607r § 3 CCP only the right to
apply for new court proceedings is mentioned. However, a broad
understanding of this term is proposed, consistent with the wording of
Article 4a Section 1 of the Framework Decision 2002/584.
Polish law requires that the requested person shall receive a copy of
the judgment before being surrendered, when this person was not
personally served with the decision rendered in absentia in the issuing
Member State, as required in Article 4a Section 2 of the Framework
Decision 2002/584. According to Article 607u CCP, if the EAW has
been issued for the purpose of executing a custodial sentence imposed
under the conditions set out in Article 607r §3 point c) CCP, the
requested person must be informed about the right to demand a copy
of the judgment. The information on filing a claim for a copy of a
judgment is forwarded to the country issuing the EAW without delay,
and upon receipt of the judgment it is delivered to the requested
person. Submission of the request does not suspend the execution of
the EAW.
The ground for non-execution of EAW issued for purpose of
enforcing decisions rendered in absentia, as defined in Article 607r §
3 CCP, does not cause difficulties in practice and it is rather rarely
discussed. One of the rulings stated that this ground for refusal to
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execute the EAW occurs if the requested person was not present at the
hearing, unless one of the conditions provided for in the further part of
Article 607r § 3 CCP occurs. 146
According to Article 607p §1 point 5 CCP it is an obligatory ground
for non-execution of EAW, if execution would violate the freedoms and
rights of individual. This is a consequence of Article 55 Section 4 of the
Polish Constitution banning extradition if it would violate the freedoms
and rights of individual.
This ground is quite general, which makes it possible to cover
different situations. It encompasses freedom and rights guaranteed in
the Polish Constitution and in acts of international law, especially in
the ECHR. With regards to the content of Article 607p §1 point 5
CCP, it appears that this is a violation of fundamental rights as a
result of execution of the EAW, and not only in the national
proceedings on the implementation of the EAW. The risk of violation
of the freedom and rights of an individual through the execution of
the EAW may be due to an infringement of the right to defence in the
country issuing the EAW (eg in criminal proceedings in connection
with which the EAW was issued).
The Constitutional Court has held that Article 607p §1 point 5 CCP
is compliant with Article 45 Section 1 and Article 42 Section 2
connected with Article 55 Section 4 of the Polish Constitution which
allows refusing to execute the EAW issued against a Polish citizen for
the purpose of conducting criminal proceedings in cases where it is
obvious for the court adjudicating on its execution that the requested
person has not committed the offence in respect of which the EAW
has been issued and where the description of the offence in the EAW
prevents its legal qualification. 147 The Court ruled that the possibility
of refusing to execute the EAW should be allowed where it is
apparent to the court adjudicating on its implementation that the
requested person is not guilty of the offence in respect of which the
EAW was issued and where the description of the offence the EAW
refers to is imprecise to the extent that it is impossible to decide on
the admissibility of the surrender, ie to the extent that it is impossible
to determine whether there are grounds for mandatory or optional
refusal to execute the EAW. The inclusion of these circumstances is,
in the Court’s view, possible in the context of the condition for refusal
set out in Article 607p §1 point 5 CCP. This provision, interpreted in
146 Court of Appeal Katowice 4 January 2013, II AKZ 776/12, KZS 2013 No. 5
pos. 87.
147 Constitutional Court 5 October 2010, SK 26/08, OTK-A 2010 No. 8 pos. 73.
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this way, conforms to the constitutional standards of the right of defence
and the right to a fair trial.
Polish regulations do not explicitly provide for the possibility of
examining the proportionality of the EAW during the procedure of
executing the EAW. However, this can be considered admissible in
the context of the verification as to whether there is no ground for
refusal to execute the EAW as defined in Article 607r §1 point 5
CCP, so that the execution of the EAW would violate the freedoms
and rights of the individual. Within this basis, the court could assume
that the execution of the EAW would result in a disproportionate
limitation of the requested person’s freedom.
The Supreme Court has examined whether examining the reasons
for issuing the EAW is permissible in the course of proceedings. It
accepted that the judicial authority of the executing state may refuse
to surrender the requested person only if it finds that the EAW was
issued contrary to the admissibility of its issuing. A review of these
conditions must precede the assessment of whether there are grounds
for non-execution of EAW (both mandatory and optional). The
admissibility of the negative verification of the conditions of the EAW
in the executing country is limited to completely exceptional cases, as
it is enshrined in the principle of mutual trust, which is the
cornerstone of judicial cooperation between EU Member States. It is,
therefore, not permissible to verify the validity of a decision of an
issuing judicial authority in regard to the conditions which are of an
evaluative nature. The competence of a specific authority issuing the
EAW and the purpose for which the EAW has been issued are subject
to review by the executing judicial authority. There is no doubt that
the EAW cannot be issued to prosecute a person for any other
conduct than the one object of the criminal proceedings. In such
situations, the refusal to surrender a requested person is not due to the
grounds for non-execution of the EAW, but because the EAW was
issued despite the fact that it did not meet the conditions of its issue
in the country requesting the surrender of the requested person (and
hence the finding that the decision given to the executing judicial
authority in essence is not a EAW). The assessment of the fulfilment
or non-fulfilment of the prerequisites for the issue of a EAW must, in
any event, be made in the context of the national law of the country
in which the EAW was issued, but always taking into account the
content of the EAW Framework Decision. 148
148 Supreme Court 20 July 2006, I KZP 21/06, OSNKW 2006 No. 9 pos. 77.
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1. Constitutional guarantees
The Spanish Constitution guarantees the right of access to court,
granted through effective judicial action whenever there is a
legitimate claim in the exercise of a right or interest. In this way,
the Spanish Constitution pays special attention to the respect and
enforcement of fundamental rights provided by constitutional
provisions. This preferential treatment is reflected upon the specific
content of Article 24, which contains provisions guaranteeing what
has been referred to in the national doctrine as ‘procedural
fundamental rights’. If a breach of fundamental rights occurs
during criminal proceedings, the right of the accused to access a
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court is guaranteed by the said article, 1 whose wording reflects
Article 13 ECHR. By referring to the establishment of an impartial
tribunal, right of legal assistance, presumption of innocence and
due process, Article 24 of the Spanish Constitution further
enhances the guarantee of effective judicial protection and
incorporates the content of Article 6 ECHR in the constitutional
text. In this regard, it is worth recalling that Article 10 (2) of the
Spanish Consti tut ion requires nat ional courts to construe
fundamental rights and liberties recognised by the Constitution in
conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
international treaties ratified by Spain, including the ECHR.
Further rights and guarantees provided by the Constitution apply at
different stages of criminal proceedings. For instance, the right to appeal
is provided in line with Article 2 Protocol 7 ECHR. 2 Even if it is not
explicitly stated in the Constitution, the Spanish Constitutional Court
(Tribunal Constitucional) has acknowledged its existence within the
formula of the ‘fair trial principle’ under Article 24 of the
Constitution. The right to appeal is further developed by the Spanish
Code of Criminal Procedure (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal,
hereinafter CCP), 3 which sets forth the procedural rules and limits on
the exercise of this right. Also the constitutional remedy of amparo
provides ample opportunities to seek judicial review over the actions
taken by the authorities in connection to criminal trials, from arrest
and detention to sentencing, whenever there is a claim for the
violation of a fundamental right. 4
By contrast, the Spanish Constitution does not expressly provide the
right to review the lawfulness of detention. However, it guarantees the
right to be informed of the rights and grounds for arrest, 5 as well as
the requirement of a habeas corpus procedure provided by law to
ensure the immediate release of an illegally arrested individual. 6
1 Art. 24 (1) Spanish Constitution reads ‘All persons have the right to obtain
effective protection from the judges and the courts when exercising their Rights and
legitimate interests, and in no case may there be a lack of defence’.
2 Ratified by the Spanish government on October 15, 2009.
3 Art. 220 – 224 CCP.
4 Art. 53 (2) Spanish Constitution.
5 Art. 17 (3) and (4) Spanish Constitution.
6 Art. 17 (4) Spanish Constitution, as well as Ley Orgánica no 6/1984 reguladora
del procedimiento de Habeas Corpus, BOE 26 May 1984.
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2. Investigative measures subject to prior judicial authorization
2.1. Competent judicial authorities
In Spain, criminal investigations are assigned to the investigating
judge (Juez de Instrucción). Thus, the investigative measures taken
during the pre-trial stage of criminal proceedings are mostly carried
out under judicial authorization. There are some intrusive measures
which can be carried out by the police, such as following suspects,
recording them in public places or asking telephone companies to
identify who owns a telephone number. However, when these
measures may somehow affect fundamental rights judicial
authorisation is necessary. In this sense, the Spanish Supreme Court
(Tribunal Supremo) recently held that evidence resulting from house
surveillance by police officers with binoculars without prior judicial
authorization is null and may not be taken into account. 7
2.2. Scope of review
The review focuses on the compliance of the judicial decision
authorizing an investigative measure with the principle of
proportionality. 8 The latter covers three aspects: suitability, necessity
and proportionality stricto sensu, requirements that apply to all
measures restricting fundamental rights. Suitability refers objectively
and subjectively to the causality of the measures in relation to their
purposes, both qualitatively (eg entering and searching to obtain
evidence) and quantitatively (eg duration of telephone tapping). The
necessity requirement, also referred to as a ‘less burdensome
alternative’, compares the restrictive measure intended to be used with
other possible measures and these should be the least harmful to the
rights of citizens (ie provisional release, provisional custody, home
surveillance, and the order to not leave the country). To sum up,
proportionality in its strictest sense, is applied after examining the
concurrence of the two precedents and assesses the weight of the
competing interests according to the circumstances of each concrete
case, determining whether the sacrifice of individual rights that such
restriction entails maintains a proportional relation to the extent of the
State interest that it seeks to safeguard (eg right to honour versus
7 Spanish Supreme Court, 20 April 20 2016, no 329/2016.
8 Art. 220 and 766 CCP.
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freedom of expression, right to information versus interest in criminal
prosecution).
Against this background, further observations should be made with
regard to new ways of using technology for investigative purposes. 9
Judicial authorization shall be adopted in line with the principle of
speciality and proportionality. According to the former, the measure
must be related to the investigation of a specific crime, thus
precluding the use of technological means aimed at preventing and
discovering crimes or removing suspicions without an objective basis.
Proportionality implies, on the other hand, that the judicial
authorization takes into account all the circumstances of the case, so
that the encroachment on the individual rights and interests involved
does not exceed the benefits that the authorized measure would bring
for the public interest and third parties. This balancing test shall take
into consideration: a) the seriousness of the event; b) its social
importance or the technological field of production; c) the intensity of
the existing evidence, and d) the relevance of the results sought with
the restriction of the right. Further requirements of suitability,
exceptionality and necessity are manifestations of the exceptional
character of these investigative measures, which can only been carried
out for serious or specific crimes, or over a limited time period even
in exceptional cases. This last aspect has raised a number of issues
with regard to the compatibility of the measure and its successive
extensions. 10
2.3. Exceptions for urgent cases
Exceptions to the above-mentioned procedural rules may apply in
the event of terrorism and of in flagrante offences. Furthermore, in
cases of urgent need, certain measures may be carried out without
prior judicial authorisation, but in these circumstances they must be
immediately notified to the judge who may decide to confirm or
revoke the measure. An illustration thereof is the tapping and
monitoring of communications, which in some cases may be
authorized by the Minister of Interior or the State’s Security Secretary
9 For instance, tapping phones and electronic messages, tapping and recording
conversations with the use of electronic devices and the use of technical devices to
capture images, following and locating, remote searches on computer devices and
searching large storage data devices.
10 Art. 588 bis CCP.
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provided that such investigative act is notified to the judge within 24
hours. Likewise, the police may use tracking devices without prior
judicial authorization when it is absolutely necessary and urgent. In
this case, the judge must also be notified within a maximum period of
24 hours.
2.4. Remedies available to the defendant
As mentioned above, in Spain criminal investigations are not
assigned to the public prosecutors but to the investigating judge, a
judge who is responsible for authorizing any investigative measure,
including those which affect the fundamental rights of the defendant.
As a consequence, although Spanish law establishes as a general rule
the possibility of reviewing a decision, the first reviewing authority is
usually the judge who has adopted the measure. 11
The defendant has indeed the possibility to challenge resolutions
taken by the investigating judge before the same judge (recurso de
reforma). 12 However, such possibility encounters limitations. In
particular, where the investigations are declared confidential, all
parties, except the public prosecutor, are unaware of any information
gathered in the proceedings. Therefore, the defendant cannot challenge
the act until the judicial declaration of confidentiality is lifted. This
limitation is regarded as fully justified in view of the needs of
investigation, even though it is intended to last for the shortest
possible time.
Under certain circumstances, the defendant has also the possibility
to further appeal against acts taken by the investigating judge with the
Court of Appeal (Audiencia Provincial), 13 which is composed of
three judges. Appeals (recurso de apelación) are of particular
importance where they are directed against evidentiary sources that
could later be declared illegally obtained. Again, the possibility to
appeal against warrants authorising investigative measures is restricted
when it has been declared the confidentiality of all or part of the
proceedings– in case, for instance, of interception and monitoring of
communications–, because the defendant will have no notice of the
investigative measures before the confidentiality is lifted. Appeals in
11 For this reason, it is uncommon that the decision is overruled.
12 Art. 216 CCP.
13 Art. 220 and 766 CCP.
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the investigation phase are not subject to any payment or fee, but to
relatively short terms (five days), that are sufficient in the opinion of
judges and prosecutors, not so much in the view of defence lawyers
because of the limitation that such short term may entail for the
exercise of the right of defence. Lawyers also value negatively the
limitation on the grounds of appeal enacted following the legal reform
of 5 October 2015. 14
3. Deprivation of liberty: Arrest and pre-trial custodial measures
3.1. Information about rights and reasons for arrest
Article 520 CCP implements into Spanish law the content of Article
4, paragraph 3 Directive 2012/13/EU. Detailed information on the
reasons for arrest must be provided in written form as soon as the
person is deprived of his liberty. This information also encompasses a
list of rights, which correspond to those mentioned in Article 3
Directive 2012/13/EU. If the person does not understand the language
in which the information is given to him, an interpreter shall be
provided. 15
3.2. Arrest, habeas corpus and judicial review
In the pre-trial stage of criminal proceedings, arrest and detention
warrants are issued by the Investigating Judge. The maximum length
of detention is 72 hours, 16 after which the arrested person must be set
free or presented before a judge in order to determine his legal
standing and to be informed of all the rights granted to him in case of
detention. 17 Police officers and members of other enforcement
agencies have competence to execute an arrest. Under exceptional
circumstances, in cases of extreme urgency and in flagrante delicto,
private citizens are also authorized to arrest a suspect without prior
judicial authorization. 18
The lawfulness of the arrest may be examined through the habeas
14 See below.
15 Art. 520 (2) CCP.
16 Art. 17.2 Spanish Constitution.
17 Art. 17.3 Spanish Constitution.
18 Art. 490 – 492 CCP.
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corpus procedure at any time, where there are reasons to suspect a
breach of defence rights related to the arrest or detention. 19 The
habeas corpus procedure enables the defendant to exercise his right to
be brought in front of a judge who determines the lawfulness of
detention. The review thus undertaken leads to the release of the
individual who has been either taken into custody in an illegal manner
or is retained in an unlawful way. Detention is declared in any event
illegal when the detainee was put into custody in breach of the
formalities and requirements set forth by law. More specifically,
persons considered to be illegally detained are: those detained by a
member of the public or non-judicial authority without a legal basis
or without observing the formalities and requirements demanded in
that respect by the law; those detained for a longer period than
allowed by law if, after this period, they are not released or are not
handed over to the Judge closest to the place of detention.
After the arrest and during detention, Spanish Constitution and
procedural law grants to the individual a comprehensive set of
safeguards, designed to sustain the ability of the accused to actively
participate in the pre-trial phase, to assert his innocence and exercise
his defence. Such guarantees encompass different safeguards
contained in EU Directives, such as, among others, the right to legal
assistance, 20 the right to be informed of the contents of the
accusation, 21 the right to access the materials of the case file. 22 In
particular, after the entry into force of the new CCP, Articles 118 and
520 referring to the participation of the lawyer in criminal
proceedings strengthened the rights of suspects and accused persons.
In particular, Spanish law guarantees the right of the accused persons
and their lawyers to be informed in writing, immediately and in a
language they understand of the reasons and facts related to the
detention. They must also be informed of the maximum length of
detention. The accused person has the right to appoint a lawyer of his
choosing, with whom he can communicate in private - even via
telephone or videoconference in the event they are distant from the
place of detention – before the police questioning. 23 In order to be
able to examine and discuss the legality of the detention, the defence
19 Organic Law no 6/1984 of May 24.
20 Art. 527 CCP in accordance with Art. 6 ECHR.
21 Art. 24.2 Spanish Constitution in accordance with Art. 6 Directive 2012/13/EU.
22 Art. XXX CCP in accordance with Art. 7 Directive 2012/13/EU.
23 Art. 527 CCP.
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lawyer has access to the police statements before the questioning of the
accused person. Furthermore, he has the rights to obtain a copy and
verify, after the conclusion of the questioning, the accuracy of the
transcription of statements made by the accused in the report he is
given to sign. The accused person may renounce to the mandatory
assistance of a lawyer if he has been detained for facts that can be
classified exclusively as road safety offences. The accused has the
right to communicate in private with his lawyer at the end of the
procedure in which they have participated.
3.3. Detention pending trial
Detention on remand can only be ordered by a judicial decision. 24
In the pre-trial stage of criminal proceedings, the power to order
detention falls within the competence of the investigating judge. He
has competence to order pre-trial detention in case of serious
crimes, 25 some less serious offences 26 and, irrespective of the
penalty, whenever the special circumstances of the case justify the
need to protect the victims. Furthermore, remand for custody must
fulfil one of the following legitimate aims: prevent a danger of
absconding; avoid, where necessary, disappearance of evidence;
prevent the risk of re-offending; prevent serious risks that the accused
will act against the victim. 27 Detention pending trial may only be
used in cases when it is objectively necessary and whenever no other
less intrusive means restricting the right to liberty could be taken. The
warrant 28 ordering pre-trial detention or its continuation must be
reasoned, providing indication of the grounds justifying detention and
its legal basis. 29
As mentioned above, the person deprived of his liberty must be
brought in front of a judicial authority within 72 hours. 30 The
judicial authority will then determine, having regard to the offence,
whether to order provisional release (without bail) or, hold a hearing
24 Art. 502 CCP.
25 Crimes punished of at least 3 years of imprisonment.
26 Criminal offences punished of at least 2 years, but less than 3 years of
imprisonment.
27 Art. 503 CCP.
28 Auto in Spanish.
29 Art. 506 CCP.
30 Art. 17 Spanish Constitution.
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to order provisional detention pending trial. 31 The hearing must take
place as soon as possible, within 72 hours of the detainee been
presented to the judge. In order to be able to participate in this
hearing, the defendant has the right to legal assistance. Defence must
be granted full access to the case file as far as it contains materials
that are essential to challenge the pre-trial detention order. 32
Judicial review ex-officio and upon request. The review of the
lawfulness of continued detention may be carried out by a judicial
authority at reasonable intervals or at any time the judge considers it
necessary to take into account information on the situation of the
detainee. 33 It may also be carried out whenever a habeas corpus
procedure is requested. In addition, the person placed under detention
on remand can appeal against the decision ordering detention pending
trial to the Court of Appeal (Audiencia Provincial). 34 Continued
detention may be justified only in cases where there are indications
justifying the need to protect a public interest, which outweighs the
presumption of innocence and thereby justifies a restriction to the
individual liberty. In such cases, a person may be released whenever
the reasons for his retention no longer exist.
Defence rights and effective judicial review. In any event, the scope
of judicial review over detention orders encompasses both the merits
and the compliance with the procedural safeguards. In this regard, it
is worth mentioning that the rights recognized in Directive 2012/13/
EU have all been implemented into the CCP. This includes the right
to legal assistance, 35 the right to be informed of the reasons of the
detention 36 and the right to access documents essential to challenge
the lawfulness of arrest and detention, 37 the right to be heard in
person 38 and the right to translation and interpretation. 39
31 Art. 505 CCP.
32 Art. 505 CCP.
33 Art. 520 bis (2) CCP.
34 Art. 507 CCP.
35 Art. 118 and 520 CCP.
36 Art. 302 CCP.
37 Art. 505 (3) CCP.
38 Art. 24 Spanish Constitution and Art. 775 CCP.
39 Art. 123 CCP, in the light of Art. 6 (3) c ECHR and Directive 2010/64/EU.
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3.4. Arrest and detention order for questioning
Spanish law allows arrest and detention for the purpose of
questioning when a person fails to present himself voluntarily after
having been summoned to appear before the Investigating Judge. 40
The lawfulness of such measure is assessed by the Investigating Judge
or by the Court of Appeal upon request of the parties at any time.
The order of arrest for questioning can be challenged through a
request for reconsideration (reforma) 41 addressed to the same judge
that issued the order. The defence can challenge the lack of reasoning
of the order, or the failure to recur to other means to force the
defendant to appear before the judge. The time limit to request
reconsideration is 3 days from the order being issued. Whenever this
request for reconsideration is rejected, the defence can challenge the
order in a subsidiary manner through appeal. 42
Even though procedural safeguards enacted by the EU Directives
are set forth in order to ensure the legality of the questioning, national
legislation still holds room for improvement in matters concerning the
participation of the defence to such questioning. Procedural legislation
foresees that the intervention of the defence attorney must occur after
the questioning of the accused, thus contradicting Directive 2013/48/
EU that requires the lawyer not only to be present, but also be able to
‘participate effectively’ during the questioning. 43
4. Specific remedies for alleged breaches of defence rights in the
pre-trial stage of criminal proceedings
4.1. Restrictions on the right to access the case file
Directive 2012/13/EU on the right to information in criminal
proceedings has been transposed in Spain by the Organic Law no 5/
2015 of April 27 44 amending the CCP and the Organic Law on the
Spanish Judicial Body. The said organic law amends several
provisions of the Spanish Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP), among
others Articles 302 and 505.3 CCP that govern the right to
40 Art. 487 CCP.
41 Arts. 217 and 384 CCP.
42 Arts. 217, 219 and 766 CCP.
43 Art. 3 (3) Directive 2013/48/EU
44 BOE 28 April 2015.
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information in criminal proceedings. The former establishes that ‘the
parties are informed about the proceedings and intervene in all stages
of the proceedings’. 45 Moreover, ‘the counsel of the investigated or
prosecuted party shall, in any case, have access to the elements of the
proceedings that are essential to challenge the deprivation of liberty of
the investigated or prosecuted party’. 46
The authority competent for granting or refusing access to the case
file is the judge responsible for investigating the case. No fees are
charged for accessing the case file. Pursuant to Article 118 of the
Spanish CCP, any person who is accused of a criminal offence may
exercise the right of defence and intervene in the proceedings from
the moment the existence of such punishable act is reported, if he has
been detained or faces any other preventive measure, or when
prosecution has been started against him.
The right to access materials of the case file has raised specific
questions with regard to right of the lawyer to access documents that
are essential to challenge the deprivation of liberty. 47 In this respect,
it is worth noting that Article 527 CCP establishes that in cases of
solitary confinement, the detainee may be deprived of the following
rights: a) appoint a lawyer of his trust; b) communicate with all or
any of the persons with whom he is entitled to do so, except with the
judicial authority, the Public Prosecutor and the Medical Examiner; c)
private interviews with his lawyer, and d) access for him or his
lawyer to proceedings, except for the essential elements necessary to
challenge the legality of detention. The conclusion to be drawn from
the above rules (reformed in 2015) is that in no case may the detainee
or his lawyer be deprived of the information necessary to challenge
the legality of detention or deprivation of liberty. One of the problems
that arises from this issue is that is it not predetermined what are the
documents that may be considered essential to challenge the legality
of arrest or deprivation of liberty, 48 such as for instance the police
statement. The Resolution no 2 issued by the Investigating of
Pamplona, dated November 9, 2016, provides a clear answer to this
problem:
`Of course, the essential supposition necessary for any detention to
45 Art. 302 CCP.
46 Art. 505.3 CCP.
47 Art. 520 CCP.
48 As noted by one of the pratictioners interviewed.
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be lawful is that there is reasonable evidence that the detainee has
committed or participated in an act constituting an offence.
Therefore, the first thing to which the detainee and his lawyer
must have access is to the facts that constitute the offense by
which that person is detained and to those signs that allow an
indication of the existence of an offence. It is therefore necessary
that regarding the part of the report to which the detainee and his
lawyer are to have access, in writing, be told what specific
charges are attributed to the detainee (...). Regarding the proof
(...), it is necessary to reflect a minimum summary of what has
allowed the police to attribute the commission of such a crime to
the detainee in the proceedings so that the lawyer can verify that
the police action was not due to pure whim or the will of the
police officer practising detention (...). It will also be necessary to
provide, for the detainee and his lawyer to have access to these
reports, where the reasons that led to, in each specific case,
deprivation of liberty of the detainee (...). And, finally, it will be
necessary for the detainee and his lawyer to have access to the
items of the proceedings in which all the specific circumstances
of the detention are documented (place, date and time in which
this was done; and effective enforcement by the police of these
rights (...)’. 49
Recently, the judgment of the Spanish Constitutional Court of
January 30, 2017 granted protection to a citizen whose lawyer was
denied access to the police file opened after his arrest by the Civil
Guard, whose situation was not subsequently corrected by the
Investigating Judge who dismissed the habeas corpus petition. 50 The
application for constitutional protection alleges that access to the
police file is a claimable right under Directive 2012/13/EU, although
it had not yet been incorporated into Spanish law at the time of the
events. The Directive set the deadline for transposition in June 2014
and Spain failed to comply with this obligation until 2015. The
Constitutional Court ruled that EU Directives are binding before
transposition when the State fails to meet the deadline set for such
and considers that the rights to individual liberty and legal assistance
during the detention have been violated.
49 Regarding the digitization of materials, the national legislator strongly
supports the use of new technologies in the administration of Justice.
50 TC (Spanish Constitutional Court) no 13/2017.
442 PART III, CHAPTER VI
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
Besides the above-mentioned restrictions on defence rights in case
of solitary confinement, 51 further restrictions of the right of access to the
case file are provided under Article 302 and 505 CCP in case of
‘confidential proceedings’, when an individual is held in pre-trial
detention. The wording of these provisions is far from clear. Article
302 establishes that if the offence is public, the Investigating Judge
may, at the request of the Public Prosecutor, of the parties or ex
officio declare the proceedings, by order, totally or partially
confidential to all parties involved, for a period not exceeding one
month when it is necessary so as to: a) avoid a serious risk to the life,
liberty or physical integrity of another person; or b) prevent a
situation that could seriously compromise the outcome of the
investigation or trial. Confidentiality must necessarily be lifted at least
ten days prior to indictment. Article 302 CCP merely refers to the
fact that such confidentiality must be nevertheless be compliant with
Article 505 paragraph 3 CCP, guaranteeing the right of the defence
counsel to access items of the case file that are essential to challenge
the detention.
Spanish law does not provide specific remedies available to the
defendant against breaches of the right of access to the case file.
Nonetheless, he may use the general remedies of consideration, appeal
and complaint against the decisions of the Investigating Judge. In
particular, remedies for consideration are available against all
decisions of the investigating judge, whilst appeals may be lodged
only in those cases defined by law. The complaint may also be filed
against all non-appealable decisions of the Judge, and against
decisions that deny the acceptance of an appeal. The remedies of
consideration and appellate procedure must be filed before the same
Judge who issued the order. The complaint remedy will be made
before the competent High Court.
4.2. Derogations on the right to access a lawyer
Among the range of rights granted to suspects and accused persons,
the right to access a lawyer is of particular importance since the lack of
legal assistance risks to hamper the effective exercise of other
procedural safeguards. In this regard, Spanish legislation clearly
guarantees the right to access a lawyer in line with the requirements
51 Art. 527 CCP.
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stemming from the ECHR and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 52
The Organic Law 13/2015 53 amending the Spanish CCP to strengthen
procedural safeguards and regulate technological investigative
measures transposed Directive 2013/48/EU on the right to legal
assistance in criminal proceedings into national law.
The resulting reforms implementing the Directive may be
summarized as follows. First, any person accused of a crime may
exercise the right of defence by intervening in the proceedings
from the moment he is charged, irrespective of whether he has
been arrested or not, he is the subject of other preventive measures
or has agreed to be tried. 54 The right to defend oneself is clearly
and precisely recognized. 55 Indeed, Spanish law provides that the
suspect may exercise his right of defence without any restrictions
other than those provided for in the law, from the moment he is
accused of the investigated offence until the termination of the
proceedings.
Second, the right of defence includes the right to appoint a legal
counsel or, failing that, to a court-appointed lawyer. The suspect has
the right to communicate and meet in private with his lawyer at any
time after being accused of a criminal offence. Moreover, the
presence of the lawyer is guaranteed during the questioning of the
suspect or accused person, all identity parades and reconstructions of
the crime scene. In case of detention, the right to appoint a counsel
arises from the time of arrest or provisional detention.
Third, communications between the suspect and his lawyer are
confidential unless there is objective evidence of the lawyer’s
participation in the investigated crime or his involvement in
committing another criminal offence with the defendant. In the same
vein, it is important to emphasize that if these conversations or
communications have been tapped or recorded, the judge orders the
destruction of the recordings and hands over to the recipient any
secret correspondence intercepted.
Where the suspect or accused person is deprived of his liberty, the
right to access a lawyer under Spanish law is in line with the
requirements set forth by the EU Directive. This includes the
52 C Arangüena Fanego, ‘El derecho a la asistencia letrada en la Directiva 2013/
48/UÈ (2014) 32 Revista General de Derecho Europeo.
53 Organic Law 13/2015 of October 5
54 Art. 118 CCP.
55 It should be noted that legal assistance is not mandatory for minor offences.
444 PART III, CHAPTER VI
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
detainee’s right to appoint a lawyer with whom he can meet privately, 56
even before being questioned by the police, the prosecutor or the
competent judicial authority. 57 However, detainees may waive the
right to the mandatory presence of a lawyer when arrested for acts
that might be exclusively characterized as crimes against traffic safety,
as long as they have been given clear and adequate information in a
simple and comprehensible language on the content of that right and
the consequences of the waiver. The lawyer takes part in the
detainee’s interrogations and in the reconstruction of the facts in
which the detainee is involved. He can request, where appropriate,
that the detainee is informed of the rights included in Article 520
CCP and, if necessary, undergoes a medical examination.
Furthermore, the lawyer must inform the detainee of the consequences
of providing or refusing to provide consent to certain acts, such as for
instance DNA samples.
Grounds for temporary derogations apply in case of solitary
confinement or isolation for serious offences only in the pre-trial
stage. 58 This complies with Article 3(6) Directive 2013/48/EU, which
refers to the urgent need to avert serious adverse consequences for the
life, liberty or physical integrity of a person or to prevent substantial
56 Technological means such as video made be used to ensure immediate access
to a lawyer.
57 According to the Resolution issued on 9 November 2016 by the Investigating
Judge of Pamplona, ‘the lawyer appointed for the legal defence of a detainee may not
delay his appearance in the police station where the detainee is held beyond three hours
provided in Article 520.5, last paragraph of the Spanish CCP and that regardless of
whether or not the detainee is going to make a declaration within the said period,
since legal assistance for the detainee goes much further than the mere presence of
the lawyer in his Declaration, as indicated in article 520.6 of the Spanish Criminal
Procedure Law (...) The guiding role of the detainee’s lawyer has been reiterated in
numerous judgments of the Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human
Rights, and first of all verifies the physical and legal situation of a person deprived
of liberty, Which is the principal function of the detainee’s lawyer, which may only
be carried out in the presence of the lawyer in police stations in order to check the
physical condition of the detainee and that all legal provisions are respected
regarding that person. Specifically the rights provided for in Article 520 of the
Spanish Criminal Procedure Law’.
58 In case of solitary confinement, a person may be deprived of the following
rights if it is justified in the light of the specific circumstances of the case: a) right
to appoint a lawyer of his choosing; b) right to communicate with all or some of
the people he is entitled to, except with the judiciary, the prosecution and the
coroner; c) right to meet his lawyer in private; d) access by his lawyer to the case
file, exception made for those documents essential to challenge the lawfulness of
detention.
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jeopardy to criminal proceedings. 59 In particular, according to Article
527 CCP, the detainee or prisoner may be deprived of the possibility
to appoint a lawyer of his choosing, although a lawyer may be
appointed ex officio. It should be pointed out that this is not a
‘derogation’ of the right, but a restriction on exercising the right of
defence in the broad sense since it limits free designation.
Spanish law provides the defendant with the possibility to challenge
a decision applying derogations to the right of access to a lawyer during
the pre-trial stage of proceedings. Available remedies are appeals against
interlocutory resolutions 60 and applications for ‘amparo' with the
Spanish Constitutional Court for violation of fundamental rights.
With regards to the appeals against interlocutory resolutions, these
are lodged with the Court of Appeal that has far-reaching powers of
review. Once the Court ascertains a violation of a defence right, it
declares the impugned procedural act null and void in the following
cases: 1) when the challenged act was adopted by a court with no
jurisdiction or lack of objective or functional jurisdiction; 2) when the
act is carried out under violence or intimidation; (3) when essential
procedural rules are disregarded, provided that such irregularity
hinders the right of defence; 4) when the acts are performed without
the intervention of a lawyer, in cases in which the law provides his
mandatory presence; 5) when hearings are held without the mandatory
intervention of the court-appointed lawyer; 6) in other cases in which
the procedural law provides for a ground for nullity. 61
4.3. Decisions finding that there is no need for interpretation
Directive 2010/64/EU on the right to interpretation and translation
in criminal proceedings has been implemented in Spain by the Organic
Law no 5/2015, of April 27, which amended the CCP and the Organic
Law on Judicial Power. 62 The resulting amendments enhance the
59 J Obach, ‘El derecho de defensa en la detención y prisión incomunicada tras la
reforma de la LO 13/2015 de la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal’, in J Alonso-
Cuevillas Sayrol (ed), El nuevo proceso penal tras las reformas de 2015 (España,
Atelier, 2016) 153 ff.
60 See supra.
61 Art. 238 Judiciary Organic Act.
62 C Arangüena, ‘El derecho a la interpretación y a la traducción en los procesos
penales’ (2011), Revista General de derecho Europeo, 24; C Fernández Carrón,
Derceho a interpretación y a traducción en los procesos penales (Valencia, Tirant
lo Blanch, 2017).
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application of the right to interpretation, thus strengthening the right of
defendants and the guarantee of a fair trial.
A new article has been introduced to guarantee a set of rights for
suspects or accused who do not speak Spanish or the official language
in which the investigation and the proceeding takes place, i.e. the
official languages of certain regions such as Catalan or Basque. 63
Article 123 CCP provides the following guarantees. First, the right to
be assisted by an interpreter extends to all procedural steps in which
the presence of the suspect or accused is required, including
questioning by the police or the prosecutor, and in all court hearings.
The provision also guarantees the right to be assisted by an interpreter
in conversations held with one’s lawyer to prepare the defence,
covering any action directly related to any questioning or hearing
during the proceedings, or when lodging an appeal or other
procedural actions. The defendant has the right to interpretation in the
trial stage of the criminal proceedings, which in principle must be
simultaneous. However, if such a service is not available, consecutive
interpretation is allowed provided that it ensures sufficiently the
defence of the accused.
Furthermore, as a direct result of Article 4 Directive 2010/64/EU,
the administration is expected to bear the costs of interpretation,
regardless of the outcome of the trial. Spanish law allows the
possibility of providing assistance by videoconference or any other
means of telecommunication, unless the Judge or Prosecutor, ex
officio or at the request of the interested parties or the defence,
considers that the physical presence of the interpreter is necessary to
safeguard the right of defence. This is certainly a change, since so far
it has been common in Spain to have an interpreter assisting the
accused or defendant in person. 64 Regarding oral interpretations or by
sign language, these may be documented with an audio-visual
recording of the original statement and interpretation, unless recording
equipment is not available, or if the translation or interpretation is not
deemed appropriate or necessary.
As for the role of interpreters and translators, it is important to note
that they are not obliged to testify, 65 thus ensuring the confidentiality of
interpretations and translations as required by the Directive. Moreover,
63 Art. 123 CCP.
64 Art. 123.5 CCP.
65 Art. 416.3 CCP.
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interpreters and translators must respect the confidentiality of the service
provided. 66
Court interpreters or translators are appointed from the lists drawn
up by the administration. According to the Organic Law no 5/2015, the
Government shall present, within a maximum period of one year from
the publication of this Law, a draft law establishing an official register
of translators and court interpreters for the registration of all
professionals who have the proper licensing and qualification. This
measure is aimed to enhance the quality of the linguistic assistance
provided. In case of urgency, however, other persons familiar with the
language may be appointed as temporary interpreters or translators if
deemed qualified for this task. 67 The entire system is strengthened by
enabling the judge or prosecutor to conduct any necessary checks in
cases where they consider that the translation or interpretation has not
provided sufficient guarantees and, if necessary, they may appoint a
new translator or interpreter.
Finally, it is possible to waive the right to interpretation and/or
translation provided that this is done expressly and freely. The waiver
is valid only if it occurs after the accused or defendant has received
adequate legal advice that allows him to be aware of the consequences
of such waiver. Lastly, the right to be assisted by an interpreter in
court hearings and proceedings before the trial court is inalienable. 68
In the pre-trial stage of criminal proceedings, the defendant has the
possibility to challenge the decision finding that there is no need for
interpretation. 69 The remedy provided under Article 125 (2) CCP
refers to decisions of the Judge or Court both in the pre-trial or trial
stage of the proceedings. Such a decision denying the assistance of an
interpreter must be recorded in writing. In the pre-trial stage, if the
impugned judicial decision is a ruling, an appeal may be filed with
the same investigating judge, who will have jurisdiction to review the
challenged act. 70 Although the law does not provide any specific
remedy against the decisions of the investigating judge on such
appeal, the issue may nevertheless be raised in the appeal against the
final judgment with the competent higher court. 71 In case of arrest or
66 Art. 124.2 CCP.
67 Art. 124 CCP.
68 Art. 126 CCP.
69 Art. 125.2 CCP.
70 Art. 216, 217, 219 and 220 CCP.
71 Art. 218, 219, 221, 233-236 CCP.
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detention, the violation of the right to interpretation may be raised
during the habeas corpus procedure provided by the Law no 6/1984. 72
Likewise, when the Court, the Judge or Public Prosecutor, ex officio
or at the request of a party, finds that interpretation does not offer
sufficient guarantees of accuracy, they may order the necessary checks
and, if necessary, the appointment of a new interpreter. In a similar
way, persons with hearing or speech impediments contending that the
interpretation provided does not offer sufficient guarantees of
accuracy, may request the appointment of a new interpreter. 73
It is worth mentioning that the existing remedies are in line with
Directive 2010/64/EU since they enable the defendant to challenge
both unfounded denials as well as the quality of the interpretation
provided, in so far as these procedural defects impair the effective
exercise of defence. In such cases, the violation of the right to
interpretation entails the nullity of the impugned decision.
A breach of the right to interpretation may also be raised as a
preliminary objection at the beginning of the court hearing. 74 If the
failure to provide adequate interpretation persist, the defence lawyer
shall raise a formal objection that must be recorded, thus allowing
him to raise the alleged violation of the right in the appeal against the
final judgement. 75 If the alleged violations of the right to
interpretation are dismissed on appeal, the defendant may lodge an
appeal for breach of procedural requirements before the Criminal
Chamber of the Supreme Court, alleging a violation of Article 24 (2)
of the Spanish Constitution, which guarantees the right to a fair
trial. 76 According to the case law, the defendant shall demonstrate
that the violation of the right to interpretation deprived him of the
possibility to defend himself. 77 Lastly, the ‘recurso de amparo’ in
72 See among other TC (Constitutional Court) 95/2012, of 7 of May.
73 Art. 124.3 and Art.846 bis c) CCP.
74 Article 666 CCP or Art. 36.1 b) of the Organic Law of the Court of Jury.
75 Art. 125.2 CCP.
76 According to Art. 852 CCP.
77 Supreme Court judgment of 26 January 2016 (STS 213/2016 - ES: TS: 2016:
213): ‘The appellant highlights what he considers to be translation defects, but does not
specifically mention any that has caused material loss to the appellant on the grounds
that he has misled the sentencing court. The purpose of this plea cannot be for the
Court of Cassation to analyse in detail all the answers given by the appellant and
the technical correction of each of the translations carried out by the official
interpreter, but to indicate some specific translation error that may have affected the
appellant’s defence. And the truth is that having examined the set of questions,
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front of the Constitutional Court is also available to the defendant after
exhaustion of all ordinary remedies.
4.4. Decisions finding that there is no need for translation
The Organic Law no 5/2015 implementing Directive 2010/64/EU
has also introduced legislative modifications as regards the right to
translation in criminal proceedings. The suspects or defendants who
do not speak Spanish or the official language in which the
investigation and the process takes place, have first the right to a
written translation of documents that are essential to guarantee the
right to defence. 78 Decisions ordering detention, the indictment and
sentencing of the defendants must be translated ex officio, as required
under Article 3 (2) Directive 2010/64/EU. Among the essential
documents needed to guarantee the exercise of the right of defence
are also certain parts of the police report recording actions that may
have evidentiary value in the oral trial. The accused can always
submit a reasoned request for the translation of other documents that
he considers essential.
Furthermore, as a direct result of Article 4 Directive 2010/64/
EU, the administration is expected to bear the costs of translation,
regardless of the outcome of the trial. The translation must be
provided in a reasonable time and, upon agreement of the Court
or Prosecutor, all procedural deadlines are suspended for that
period. 79
Spanish law provides, however, for the possibility not to translate
certain parts of essential documents that are not deemed necessary for
the accused or defendant to understand the facts against him. The
judge, court or other competent official enjoy discretion in
determining whether passages of documents and materials are
essential. Moreover, in exceptional circumstances, such written
translations may be replaced by an oral summary of their content in a
language that the suspect or accused person understands, provided that
the right of defence is sufficiently guaranteed. 80
The remedies against decisions finding that there is no need for
translation are the same as those applied to decisions finding that
answers and translations related by the appellant we fail to appreciate that there are any
that may have caused some impairment to the appellant’s defence’.
78 Art. 123 CCP.
79 Art. 123.4 CCP.
80 Art. 123.3 CCP.
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there is no need for interpretation. 81. Indeed, Article 125 (2) CCP
provides that ‘the decision of the Judge or Court which denies the
right to the interpretation or translation of any document or passage
thereof that the defence considers essential, or which rejects the
defence’s complaints regarding the lack of quality of the interpretation
or the translation provided, will be documented in writing (...) Against
these judicial decisions an appeal may be lodged’.
4.5. Violations of the right to information
Directive 2012/13/EU on the right to information in criminal
proceedings has been implemented in Spain by the Organic Law no
5/2015, of April 27, which amended the CCP and the Organic Law
on Judicial Power. The need for an adequate guarantee of the right to
information in criminal proceedings has also led to a subsequent
amendment of the CCP by the Organic Law no 13/2015, of October
5, to strengthen procedural guarantees and regulate measures of
technological investigations. The above-mentioned implementing
statutes amended the rules guaranteeing the right to information in
criminal proceedings by providing detailed legal requirements that
ensure the effective exercice of defence rights guaranteed in Article
24 of the Spanish Constitution.
Under Spanish law, any person accused of a crime must be
informed of the charges against him, as well as of any relevant
change leading to a new characterization of the investigated offence.
He has the right to access materials of the case file in timely manner
as to safeguard the right of defence, the right to appoint a lawyer of
his choosing, the right to seek legal aid, the conditions to do so and
the procedures to obtain it, the right to free interpretation and
translation, the right to remain silent and not give evidence if one
does not want to and the right not to testify against oneself or confess
his guilt. 82 The suspect or accused must be informed about all these
rights in a language he understands, adapted to the age, level of
maturity, disability or any other personal circumstances of the
defendant or detained. In addition, in cases of detainees or prisoners,
information of rights must always be provided in writing, and this is
the main novelty introduced in the Spanish system.
81 See supra.
82 Art. 118 CCP.
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With respect to the right to information of detainees or prisoners, it
was necessary to complete the list of rights referred to in Directive 2012/
13/EU, among others, with the right of access to the materials of the
proceedings that are essential to challenge the legality of detention or
deprivation of liberty. Also worthy of mention is the right to
information regarding the maximum period of detention before being
brought in front of the competent judicial authority and the procedure
for challenging the lawfulness of detention. All this information must
be provided in writing. 83 Moreover, Spanish law provides that the
assistance of a counsel for detainees or prisoners includes the
possibility to request, if not done previously, that the detainee or
prisoner is informed of their rights and undergoes a medical
examination 84.
In case of relevant changes in the subject of the investigation and
the charges, defendants must be informed ‘promptly’, as required
under Article 6 Directive 2012/13/EU. On the other hand, this
information can be succinct, provided that it allows first the exercise
of the right of defence, and secondly, is communicated in writing to
the defence lawyer. 85 Also, time requirements further strenghthen the
right to information. Thus, the defendant must receive such
information without undue delay and, in the cases of detainees or
prisoners, it must be provided immediately.
In case of arrest or detention, the person deprived of his liberty can
claim a breach of the right to be informed about his rights guaranteed
under Articles 118 and 520 CCP by requesting an Habeas Corpus
procedure, which aims to ensure the immediate handing over to the
judicial authority of the detainee. 86 The request is submitted before
the competent Court having jurisdiction to hear the request according
to the Organic Law no 6/1984. 87 The governmental authority, agent
or other public official, shall be obliged to immediately notify the
competent judge of the Habeas Corpus request made by the person
deprived of freedom in their custody.
The implementation of the abovementioned rules does not raise
significant problems in the judicial practice. When the investigation is
declared confidential, restrictions on the right to access information
83 Art. 520 CCP.
84 Art. 520.6 a) CCP.
85 Art. 775 CCP.
86 TC (Constitutional Court) 95/2012, of May 7.
87 Art. 2 Organic Law 6/1984, of May 24.
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apply vis-à-vis suspects and accused person. This is however without
prejudice to their right to be informed about the facts and charges on
which they are accused.
5. Sanctions against illegal or improperly obtained evidence
As a general rule, evidence obtained, directly or indirectly, in
violation of fundamental rights or freedoms shall not be effective. 88
Claims alleging violations of a fundamental right against any illegal
or improperly collected evidence may be raised as preliminary issues
before trial courts at the beginning of the oral hearing. 89 Faced with
this claim, the judge may consider that such evidence should be
withdrawn or declared void. If no remedy against the alleged
irregularity is provided during trial, the defence lawyer must lodge an
objection in order to be able to raise the plea in the appeal against the
final judgement. 90 In such circumstances, the ground for appeal
consists in the breach of procedural guarantees that undermined the
right of the accused to defend himself. 91
According to the abundant jurisprudence of the Spanish
Constitutional Court, Spanish law prevents the use of unlawful
evidence obtained directly in violation of fundamental rights and
freedoms. Only such violations entail the indirect or reflexive ‘non-
usability’ of evidence derived from the one that was illegally obtained
(so-called ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine).
Breaches of other rules amount to a procedural irregularity, which is
sanctioned with nullity according to Article 238 and following of the
Organic Law of the Spanish Judicial Body. More specifically,
procedural acts will be deemed null and void in the following cases:
1) when they are adopted by a court lacking jurisdiction or objective
functional jurisdiction; 2) when they are carried out under violence or
intimidation; 3) when essential procedural rules are disregarded,
provided that this undermined the right of defence; 4) when these are
performed without the intervention of a lawyer, in cases in which the
law requires his mandatory presence; 5) when hearings are held
without the mandatory intervention of the Court-appointed lawyer; 6)
88 Article 11.1 Judiciary Organic Act.
89 Article 666 CCP or Art. 36.1 b) of the Organic Law of the Court of Jury.
90 Art. 125.2 CCP.
91 Art. 846 bis CCP.
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in other cases in which the procedural law establishes a ground for
nullity. 92
Examples of the above-mentioned rules can be found in the prolific
case law of the Spanish Constitutional Court. An illustration thereof is
the exclusion of statements obtained in breach of the right to access a
lawyer. According to the Spanish Constitution, all detained persons
must be immediately and comprehensively informed of their rights
and the reasons for their detention, and they may not be forced to
testify. The assistance of a lawyer is guaranteed to the detainee in
police and judicial proceedings, according to the requirements
established by law. 93 Furthermore, the defendant has the right to use
evidence appropriate to his defence, to not make self-incriminating
statements and to not declare guilty. 94 Having regards to these
guarantees, the Constitutional Court held that the failure to appoint a
legal counsel or public defendant constitutes a violation of the right to
effective judicial protection. 95
Conversely, in the judgment of the Spanish Constitutional Court
number 229/1999, of December 13, the Court found that the right to
legal assistance was not infringed in the case where the accused, who
was not detained, during the first questioning before the judge without
the presence of a lawyer, waived to his right to be assisted by a
lawyer, after having been informed of such right by the judge.
As regards the right to interpretation and translation, the
constitutional case law consistently held that to prevent the use of
evidence collected in violation of such rights the defendant has to
prove that the lack of linguistic assistance hampered the exercise of
the right of defence. 96
More recently, in a judgement of 30 January 2017, the Court held
that breaches of defence rights may result under certain circumstances
from violations of the ABC Directives. The citizen was granted
constitutional protection (amparo) after his lawyer was denied access
to the police file opened after his arrest by the Civil Guard, a
situation that was not subsequently corrected by the Investigating
Judge who dismissed the habeas corpus petition. The application for
92 Art. 238 Judiciary Organic Act.
93 Art. 17.3 Spanish Constitution.
94 Art. 24.2 Spanish Constitution.
95 TC (Spanish Constitutional Court) no 217/1997, of 4 December.
96 TC (Constitutional Court) 338/2004, of 13 September. TS (Supreme Court) of
January 26, 2016 (STS 213/2016 - ES:TS:2016:213).
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‘amparo’ claimed that access to the police file is an enforceable right
granted by Directive 2012/13/EU, although the latter had not then
been implemented into Spanish law at the time of the events. Yet,
Spain did not comply with the time-limit of June 2014 for transposing
the EU Directive. The Constitutional Court gave direct effect to the
EU legal provisions, ruling that EU directives are binding before
formal implementation into national law when the State fails to meet
the deadline for transposing it. As a result, the Court found a
violation of the right to individual liberty and to legal assistance.
6. Appeals before second instance courts
In order to comply with Article 2 Protocol 7 ECHR, Spain has
recently adopted a reform aimed at generalizing courts of second
instance in criminal proceedings. 97 The Appeals Chambers have been
created within the National High Court and the Supreme Courts of
Justice of the Autonomous Communities are now entrusted with
jurisdiction to hear appeals against the decisions handed down at first
instance by the Provincial Courts. Appeals are the ordinary remedy
‘par excellence’. Judgments delivered by trial courts at first instance
may be subject to review on the merits before second instance courts. 98
Indeed, Spanish law grants to the defendant the right to appeal
against judgments and writs that put an end to the process. Decisions
amenable to review by second instance courts are the following: first
instance judgments delivered by the Provincial Court and by the
Criminal Chamber of the National Court; judgments issued in the
fast-track proceedings by the Judge of Criminal Cases and those
handed down by the Judge on Duty; judgments handed down for
minor offences by the Investigating Judges, as well as other decision
putting an end to specific type of criminal proceedings, such as the
proceedings before the Court with a Jury or the Juvenile Procedure;
judgments issued by the Provincial Courts of Appeal or the Criminal
Chamber of the National Court at first instance that may be appealed,
97 Law 41/2015, of October 5 modifying the CCP for the improvement of
criminal justice and strengthening of procedural guarantees: generalization of the
second instance; extension of the appeal and incorporation of the judgements
rendered by European Court of Human Rights against Spain.
98 In this regard, one should distiguish appeals against interlocutory ruling that
are delivered in the course of the proceedings and appeals against convictions and
sentences. The present section will focus on the latter.
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respectively, before the Civil and Criminal Chamber of the Superior
Courts of Justice in each Autonomous Community and before the
Appeals Chamber of the ‘Audiencia Nacional’; decisions that puts an
end to the criminal proceedings on grounds of lack of jurisdiction or
dismissal.
Specific procedural rules govern the access to second instance
courts depending on the decision that is subject to appeal. As regards
appeals against first instance judgments rendered by the Criminal
Chamber of the ‘Audiencia Nacional, the Provincial Court, the
Criminal Judge or the Central Criminal Court, the time limit for filing
the appeal is ten days following the notification of the impugned
judgment. 99 In principle, criminal appeals lead to a written procedure.
However, the competent court may order the holding of a hearing
where a request to produce evidence has been submitted and granted
or if the court deems the hearing necessary.
As mentioned above, appeals are also available against trial
judgments concerning minor offences and those rendered by the
Criminal Judge in the field of fast-track prosecution. The first case
includes judgments handed down in trials for minor offences by the
Investigating or Criminal Law Judge. As regards the decision issued
by the Criminal Judge in the context of fast-track criminal
proceedings, the time-limit for lodging an appeal are reduced from ten
to five days. 100
The scope of review of the above-mentioned appeals are limited.
Appellate Courts do not hold a new trial, but simply review the
judgement rendered at first instance. The grounds of appeal are the
following: 1) breach of procedural rules and guarantees that
undermined the effective exercise of defence; 2) error in assessing the
evidence, because for instance of insufficiency or lack of rationality in
the factual reasons, a clear departure from the rules of common
knowledge, or lack of reasoning on one or any of the admissible
evidence or on evidence that was unlawfully declared inadmissible; 3)
infringement of constitutional or legal principles. As mentioned above,
review by appellate courts over fresh evidence is limited; the Court
normally only examines old evidence. 101
99 Art. 790 CCP.
100 T Armenta Deu, Lecciones de Derecho Procesal Penal (España, Marcial
Pons, 2016) 328-333. See also A M Lara López, El recurso de apelación y la
segunda instancia penal (España, Aranzadi, 2014).
101 Art. 790 CCP.
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The appeal may lead to the annulment of the acquittal or conviction,
and, in such case, the case will be referred back to the body that issued
the appealed decision. The judgment on appeal will specify whether the
nullity should be extended to the oral proceedings and whether the
principle of impartiality requires a new composition of the body of
first instance in order to stage a re-trial.
When the judgment appealed against is annulled due to a breach of
some essential procedural forms, the court grants, without entering into
the substance, restauration of the status quo ante, notwithstanding
actions whose content would be identical irrespective of the said
violation. Where the appeal alleges an error in the assessment of the
evidence, the competent Appellate Court has jurisdiction to review
and correct the deliberation carried out by the first instance court.
As mentioned above, the Court of appeal has the power to review
new or fresh evidence only in a limited number of cases. This applies
to evidence that the appellant could not submit at first instance; to
evidence presented at first instance that was not admitted without
legal justification, provided that the appropriate objection was raised
at that moment; to evidence admitted at first instance which could not
be submitted for reasons not attributable to the appellant.
In addition, where only the convicted person lodges an appeal
against the first instance judgement, the powers of review of
Appellate Court are limited by the principle of reformatio in pejus. In
this case, the second instance court cannot convict the accused who
was acquitted at first instance, nor aggravate the sentence that had
been imposed at first instance. 102
7. Appeals limited on errors of law
Judgments rendered by appellate courts can be subject to a review
limited on points of law through appeals in cassation (recurso de
casación) before the Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo) or the High
Court of Justice (Tribunal Superior de Justicia). In particular, the
defendant has the possibility to lodge appeals for errors of law or
violation of procedural requirements against the following acts: 1)
judgments handed down in single instance or on appeal by the Civil
102 Art. 792 CCP. See E Guixé Nogués, ‘Consideraciones sobre el principio de
non reformatio in peius y el actual sistema de recursos en el ámbito penal’ (2016) 2
Justicia: revista de derecho procesal, 215-254.
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and Criminal Chamber of the Superior Courts of Justice; 2) judgments
issued by the Appeals Chamber of the National Court and those
handed down by the Provincial Courts in single instance. The
following decisions are subject to appeal for breach of law: 1)
judgments handed down on appeal by the Provincial Hearings and the
Criminal Chamber of the National Court (except those that are limited
to declaring the nullity of first instance judgments); 2) the documents
for which the law expressly authorizes such appeals and the final
orders issued at first instance and on appeal by the Provincial Courts
or by the Criminal Chamber of the National Court, when they put an
end to the proceedings due to a lack of jurisdiction or under certain
circumstances decisions not to prosecute. 103
As regards procedural requirements, it is worth noting that the party
must express his intention to appeal in cassation, indicating whether on
grounds of substantive or procedural errors, within 5 days after the
sentence was handed down.
The recent reform on criminal appeals mentioned above did not
only strengthen the right to access second instance courts, it also
expanded the number of criminal offences for which subsequent
appeals in cassation are available. The unifying role of such remedy is
aimed to enhance the consistency of criminal case law. Although it is
still premature to assess the impact of the recent reform on cassation
appeals in Spain, the extended scope of such remedy may lead to a
significant increase in the number of cases brought before the
Supreme Court, which might require the judicial practice to adapt.
Nonetheless, appeals in cassation must be seen as extraordinary
remedies based on limited grounds for appeal.
Appeals in cassation imply a review of the trial records in order to
ascertain the alleged errors of law. As previously mentioned, appeals in
cassation may be filed for breach of law and breach of form. On the one
hand, violation of law arise: 1) when, given the facts that are proven in
the resolutions subject to appeal, a substantive criminal law or other
legal rule of the same character that must be complied with has been
breached and 2) when there has been an error in the assessment of
evidence, based on documents in the file which prove the error of the
judge without being contradicted by other evidence.
On the other hand, violations of procedural requirements
encompass violations of forms related to both the hearing and the
103 Art. 847 and 848 CCP.
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judgement. The following shall be understood as violations of form in
the hearing: 1) when some evidence, which is presented in a timely
manner by the parties, has not been admitted and is afterwards
considered relevant; 2) when there is a lack of the summons of the
accused, of the party who has subsidiary civil liability, of the
claimants or of the civil plaintiff for their appearance at the hearing,
unless the parties have appeared within the given period, after being
summoned; 3) when the President of the Tribunal refuses to have a
witness answer the question or questions that are addressed to him,
when these are relevant and clearly influence the case; 4) when any
question is dismissed for being suggestive or impertinent, when it is
in fact not so, as long as it is of real importance for the outcome of
the trial, and 4) when the Court has decided not to suspend the trial
when the accused failed to attend, whenever there is a justified cause,
and refuses to hear him, regardless of this fact and when there has not
been any lack of declaration for failing to appear in court.
The reasons for the alleged breach of form in the judgment
encompass the following cases: 1) when the judgment fails to express
clearly and conclusively the facts considered proven, when there is a
clear contradiction between such facts or it considers as proven facts
concepts that, due to their legal nature should be predetermined; 2)
when the judgment only states that the charges have not been proven,
without expressly mentioning what facts are proven; 3) when it fails
to decide on all the points that have been object of the accusation and
defence; 4) when it punishes for a crime which is more serious than
the one that was the object of the accusation, if the Court has not
previously proceeded as determined by Article 733; 104 5) when the
judgment has been issued by less judges than required by law or
lacking the contribution of votes required by the same, and 6) when a
judge, that has been objected in due course, has taken part in
rendering the judgment. 105
The higher courts have the power to quash the impugned decision.
They can remand the case or, only when the court decides in favour the
accused, reverse the decision. In particular, if the appeal in cassation
claimed a violation of form, the result will be the annulment of the
decision subject to appeal. The case is then referred back to the
sentencing court. Likewise, if the appeal was filed due to an error of
104 Art. 851 CCP.
105 Art. 851 CCP.
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law, the impugned decision may be annulled, whilst in case of errors in
the assessment of evidence, the Court reviews the case on the merit.
8. Access to the Constitutional Court
Article 53 (2) of the Spanish Constitution provides the defendant
with the possibility to submit an application seeking constitutional
protection (recurso de amparo) against infringements of rights and
public freedoms. This remedy is available only after all remedies and
ordinary appeals have been exhausted. The deadline for filing an
action seeking constitutional protection against judicial decisions is 30
days from the notification of the decision that ends the previous
judicial proceedings. This appeal is initiated by a writ of claim before
the Constitutional Court. In order for the action to be admissible, the
application must justify the need for a review on the merits by the
Constitutional Court. The judgment grants or denies the constitutional
protection requested and, in the event that this protection is granted, it
contains mention of the public right or freedom violated.
In practice, however, the Constitutional Court reviews only a
limited number of recurso de amparo. The number of actions filed
with the Constitutional Court that are declared admissible is very low.
For instance, in 2011, only 80 ‘amparo’ remedies were admitted. 106
In 2015, the Chambers and Sections admitted 84 proceedings for
‘amparo’ and issued 7880 resolutions of inadmissibility 107. The main
cause of inadmissibility is insurmountable defects of the claim.
9. Judicial review and the EAW
9.1. Competent judicial authorities
The Framework Decision 2002/584/JHAwas implemented in Spain
under the Law no 23/2014 regulating the European Arrest Warrant
(EAW). 108 The law designates the authorities competent in Spain to
issue and execute a EAW. On the one hand, the judicial authorities
106 Statistical data are published in the Constitutional Court reports. See <http://
www.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/memorias/Documents/Memoria%202011.pdf> Last
accessed 19 July 2017.
107 http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/jurisprudencia/InformacionRelevante/
MEMORIA-2015.pdf> Last accessed 19 July 2017.
108 Law no 23/2014 of 20 November implementing the EAW.
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having competence to issue a EAWare the judge or the court hearing the
case in which such orders are issued. On the other hand, the competent
executing authority is the Central investigation Court within the
National Court. When the warrant concerns a minor, the decision falls
within the competence of the Juvenile Central Court within the same
National Court. 109
9.2. Defence rights in the execution of a EAW
Although Spanish law does not provide specific remedies against
breaches of defence rights in proceeding for the execution of a EAW,
pursuant to Article 3 of Law no 23/2014 the defence rights of the
surrender person must be respected. 110 In particular, Article 21 (1) of
the said law states that ‘the execution of the order or resolution that
has been transmitted by another Member State will be governed by
Spanish law and will be carried out in the same way as if it had been
issued by a Spanish judicial authority’. Therefore, procedural
requirements and guarantees granted by the Spanish CCP to suspects
and accused persons deprived of their liberty in the course of national
criminal proceedings also apply in proceedings for the execution of a
EAW. Thus, the general rules analysed in the previous sections are
relevant.
Within a maximum period of seventy-two hours after arrest, the
detained person shall be placed at the disposal of the Central
Investigating Judge within the National Court. The issuing authority is
informed about the arrest. The person brought before the judicial
authority is informed about the existence and content of the EAW, the
possibility to consent to surrender during the hearing before a judge,
as well as of further rights he enjoys. 111
The hearing takes place in the presence of the Public Prosecutor, the
109 Art. 35 of the 2014 Law implementing the EAW.
110 L Bachmaier ‘Quo vadis – el TJUE y su papel en materia de cooperación
penal al hilo de la reciente jurisprudencia sobre la orden de detención y entrega’
(2016) 38 Revista General de Derecho Europeo. J Burgos (et al) La cooperación
judicial entre España y Italia. La orden de detención y entrega enla ejecución de
sentencias penales (San Sebastián, Instituto Vasco de Derecho Procesal, 2017). M
Jimeno Bulnes, ‘Orden de detención europea’ in La cooperación judicial civil y
penal en el ámbito de la Unión Europea : instrumentos procesales’ (Barcelona,
Bosch, 2007 299-348. VM Moreno Catena, ‘La orden europea de detención en
España’ (2005) 78 Revista del Poder Judicial, 11-38.
111 Art. 50 of the 2014 Law implementing the EAW.
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defence lawyer and, if needed, the interpreter as provided in the CCP.
Likewise, the right to legal assistance is guaranteed and, when the
legal requirements are met, access to legal aid. 112 Indeed, the person
detained on the basis of a EAW is entitled to access a lawyer under
the same conditions as those provided under the CCP. It thus follows
that the person subject to a EAW has at his disposal the same rights
and remedies available to arrested and detained persons described in
the previous sections. 113 Hence, defence rights of the person subject
to a EAW do not raise specific problems, as these rights are duly
guaranteed in the Spanish system.
9.3. Judicial review and grounds for refusal
Spanish law does not provide for additional grounds for refusal
based on breaches of the rights of defence other than those set forth
in Articles 3 and 4 Framework Decision 2002/584. The national
executing authorities check whether any of the grounds for refusal
provided for in Law 23/2014 apply and, if not, whether other formal
requirements set forth by law are met. 114 In case of no procedural
obstacles to the execution of the EAW, the judicial authority carries
out a proportionality review.
Even if the executing judicial authority is aware of potential
violations of fundamental rights of the person to be surrendered in the
issuing State, this does not automatically lead to a refusal to
surrender. In such situation, the issuing authority may be required to
provide further guarantees. To this end, the executing judicial
authority must request urgent information from the issuing Member
State regarding detention conditions to which the person to be
surrendered will be subject. 115 The issuing judicial authority may thus
offer guarantees to the executing State indicating, for instance, that
the person will benefit from alternative measures to imprisonment or
112 Art. 51 of the 2014 Law implementing the EAW.
113 According to Art. 24 of Law implementing the EAW ‘Against the decisions
issued by the Spanish judicial authority deciding on the European instruments of
mutual recognition, appeals may be lodged in accordance with the general rules
provided for in the CCP. The appeal may suspend the execution of the order or
resolution when it might create irreversible situations or cause damages impossible
or difficult to remedy, adopting in any case precautionary measures to ensure the
effectiveness of the resolution’.
114 Art. 47 of the 2014 Law implementing the EAW.
115 Art. 30 of the 2014 Law implementing the EAW.
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that he will serve the sentence in a penitentiary centre where detention
conditions respect international standards. Once the information has
been received, the executing judge can rule out the existence of
alleged risks of inhuman and degrading treatment. 116 If such risks are
ascertained, the judicial authority shall grant the release. If, on the
other hand, the additional information submitted indicates that the risk
persists, the executing judicial authority must defer surrender for a
reasonable period of time in accordance with Article 17(4)
Framework Decision. 117
Within this period of time, the executing judicial authority
determines whether provisional detention is excessive and
consequently grants provisional release. Nonetheless, it must take all
necessary measures to prevent the person to be surrendered from
escaping and thereby ensure his possible future surrender. 118 This
requires the executing judicial authority to act in accordance with the
principle of proportionality and to take into account the presumption
of innocence of the person to be surrendered. But, even if the
existence of the risk persists after a reasonable period of time or, in
other words, the guarantees given by the issuing judicial authority are
insufficient, the Spanish executing authority will have to decide
whether to end the surrender procedure. There is no doubt that refusal
is a measure of last resort, precisely because it is an exceptional
check on the part of the executing judicial authority as to whether
fundamental rights are respected in the issuing Member State.
The Spanish Constitutional Court confirmed that such a refusal is
possible, although not expressly provided for by the Law 23/2014.
Nonetheless, it is for the defendant to provide reliable and specific
evidence supporting his claim, which corroborate alleged risks of
inhuman and degrading treatment in the issuing State. General
allusions or allegations denouncing detention conditions in the foreign
country are insufficient. 119
As regards EAW that seek to enforce judgements rendered in
116 The decision taken by the Spanish executing authority is without prejudice to
the possibility for the requested person to use legal remedies available in the issuing
Member State that enable him to question the detention conditions.
117 Art. 23 of the 2014 Law implementing the EAW. The said perios of a
maximum of 30 days. EUROJUST shall be informed of the reasons for the delay.
118 Art. 53.3 of the 2014 Law implementing the EAW.
119 See TC (Spanish Constitutional Court) : 30 March 2000, no 91/2000 ; 13
February 2003, no 32/2003 ; 13 September 2004, no 148/2004 ; 4 June 2007, no
140/2007 ; 28 September 2009, no 199/2009.
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absentia, Spanish law implements Article 4a (1) of the Framework
Decision 2002/584. In this case, the executing authority proceeds to
the surrender provided that the person benefits in the issuing State of
the right to a new trial or to appeal against the judgment rendered in
absentia. 120 In such circumstances, if the person did not receive
official notification of the decision rendered in absentia, he may
request a copy of the sentence at the time when he is informed of the
content of the EAW. The issuing authority, through the Spanish
judicial authority, shall provide the interested party with a copy of the
judgment immediately. In any event, the request of the copy does not
delay the surrender procedure nor the decision to execute the EAW. 121
EAW issued for the purpose of executing a sentence rendered in
absentia may raise problems, notably where the request for surrender
does not specify whether the conviction in the issuing State has been
rendered in the absence of the accused or without due notice to the
convicted person. The defence rights of the person subject to a EAW
because of convictions for particularly serious crimes rendered in
absentia are at the heart of several judgements rendered by the
Spanish Constitutional Court. 122 For instance, the ruling of 7 April
2014 dealt with a EAW issued without the requesting authorities
guaranteeing a possible review of the judgments rendered in absentia.
In the case in question, however, the Constitutional Court noted that
the applicant was in fact aware of the criminal proceedings and
voluntarily failed to appear at trial although duly summoned. In such
circumstances and according to the constitutional case law, the
defendant did not suffer from a breach of his right to a fair trial. 123
The situation would have been different if the person subject to the
EAW would not have been even aware of that criminal proceedings
against him in the issuing State. Despite this, the Constitutional
Tribunal held that the Spanish executing authority failed to provide
sufficient reasons for its decision to surrender, since it was not clear
whether the person subject to the EAW had the right appeal or apply
for retrial in the issuing State.
120 Art. 49.1 and .2, and 33.1 (c) of the 2014 Law implementing the EAW.
121 Art. 49.2 of the 2014 Law implementing the EAW.
122 In the same case, TC (Spanish Constitutional Court): 30 March 2000, no 91/
2000; 27 June 2006, no 177/2009; or, 28 September 2009, no 199/2009.
123 TC (Spanish Constitutional Court) 23 February 2014, no 26/2014.
464 PART III, CHAPTER VI
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
PART IV
FROM RIGHTS TO REMEDIES:
A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW

CHAPTER I
NATIONAL REMEDIES AGAINST BREACHES
OF THE RIGHT TO TRANSLATION
AND INTERPRETATION
Christian Schmitt
TABLE OF CONTENTS: 1. Introductory remarks. – 2. Right to interpretation. – 2.1.
The reference to ‘procedures in national law’. – 2.2. Judicial review in
the pre-trial or trial stage of criminal proceedings. – 2.3. Reasons for
divergences. – 3. Right to translation.
1. Introductory remarks
The effective exercise of defence rights guaranteed by the ABC
Directives also relies on the existence of effective remedies against
breaches of those rights under national law. Based on this hypothesis,
the present contribution intends to provide a comparative overview of
the national remedies that suspects and accused persons may use in
order to challenge violations of their right to interpretation and
translation.
To this end, special attention will be paid to the existing and newly
adopted national measures that implement the remedial obligations
under Directive 2010/64/EU into domestic law. 1 The following
observations are based on the analysis of six Member States’ criminal
justice systems presented in the present volume. 2
1 Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20
October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings
[2010] OJ L 280/1.
2 See supra Part III.
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2. Right to interpretation
2.1. The reference to ‘procedures in national law’
The right to interpretation is regulated in Directive 2010/64/EU.
The obligation to provide a remedy against breaches of the right to
interpretation is enshrined in Article 2(5) of this Directive. The
provision requires that Member States ensure, in accordance with
procedures in national law, that suspected or accused persons have the
right to challenge a decision finding that there is no need for
interpretation and, where interpretation has been provided, the
possibility to lodge a complaint that the quality of the interpretation
was not sufficient to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings. 3
It should first be noted that the implementation can be carried out in
accordance with procedures in national law. This gives the Member
States significant room for manoeuvre in implementation. As a result,
the examined Member States have implemented Article 2(5) Directive
2010/64/EU in very different ways. For instance, in Belgium,
Germany, Poland and Spain, the legal provision had no or little
impact on the national system of remedies available to suspects and
accused persons. Minor reforms adopted in France and Luxembourg
improved, although in an indirect way, the legal protection provided
under national law. France, for example, introduced the possibility for
a suspect to make observations recorded in the report of the
questioning for the purpose of challenging the lack or quality of the
interpretation provided. 4 The Luxembourg law implementing the
ABC Directives extended the number of acts that are the subject of
existing remedies available to the defendant. The latter can directly
challenge the decision finding that there is no need for interpretation. 5
2.2. Judicial review in the pre-trial or trial stage of criminal
proceedings
Moreover, the remedial obligation does not specify at which stage
of the criminal proceeding the review shall intervene. 6 The
opportunity to challenge breaches of the right to interpretation
3 Art. 2(5) Directive 2010/64/EU.
4 Art. D594-2 French CPP.
5 See supra Part III, Chap. IV, Section 4.3.
6 This also results from the very woring of Art. 2 (5) Directive 2010/64/EU,
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provides different level of judicial protection depending on the stage of
the criminal proceedings in which judicial scrutiny is undertaken. 7
Whilst remedies available in the pre-trial stage ensure a prompt
judicial review of decisions finding that there is no need for
interpretation, in some Member States the review focuses itself in the
main proceedings before trial courts. 8
In the examined Member States, there are indeed very different
remedies against the decision finding that there is no need for
interpretation. These differences can be roughly broken down into two
groups.
First: The group of Member States with direct judicial review
during or at the end of the investigation procedure includes Belgium,
France, Luxembourg and Spain. National law may, however, restrict
the possibility of challenging decisions finding that there is no need
for interpretation in the pre-trial stage of the criminal proceedings
depending on the authority taking that decision. 9
Second: The Member States that, in principle, do not have direct
judicial review during the investigation procedure. This group
includes Germany 10 and Poland. In these countries, judicial review of
decisions finding that there is no need for interpretation intervenes
only at the trial stage of proceedings, even when the lack of linguistic
assistance may have affected the questioning of the suspect or
accused person during the investigation. Although national law
provides for specific remedies during the pre-trial stage of
proceedings, these do not apply with respect to alleged breaches of
the right to interpretation. In Germany for instance, the accused has
the right to a lodge a complaint against judicial decisions. 11 This right
does not encompass, however, decisions that have been taken by the
public prosecutor. The appeal provided for by Section 98 (2) CCP 12
does not apply either, because the decision finding that there is no
need for interpretation is not covered by the relevant legal provision.
according to which the implementation should be carried out in accordance with
procedures in national law.
7 See supra Part II, Chap I, Section 3.
8 For example, this is the case in Germany and Poland.
9 For instance, only decisions taken by the Investigating Jugde can be subject to
judicial review in the course of judicial investigations under French law. See supra Part
III, Chap III.
10 This, however, only if the decision is enforced by the public prosecutor’s office
alone. An appeal against the court decision is admissible.
11 Section 304 CCP; Oberlandesgericht Hamburg (Higher regional court, OLG),
Beck online Rechtsprechung (BeckRS) 2014, p. 586.
12 German CCP.
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Another possibility would be a remedy pursuant to Section 23 of the
Introductory Law of the Courts Constitution Act (ILCCA). 13 This
remedy provides the possibility of reviewing a judicial administrative
act of the prosecutor. 14 However, the exact definition of a judicial
administrative act is not entirely clear. 15 Some have argued that the
decision denying the assistance of an interpreter is not an act covered
by this provision. Therefore, only an appeal on fact and law, and an
appeal limited to errors of law remain open to the accused at the trial
stage of criminal proceedings.
2.3. Reasons for divergences
These differences in approach have their roots in the very structure
of the different criminal justice systems. For example, German law
adopts the principles of immediacy 16 and orality. 17 The principle of
orality requires that live evidence be given at the trial stage and
prohibits the substitution of live testimony by the reading of any
documents from the pre-trial stage. It prioritizes the consideration of
evidence through interrogation of witnesses over the consideration of
evidence by inspections of documents. 18 The principle of immediacy
states that the court should form its own direct and immediate opinion
of the facts to be assessed. This requires that the judges called upon
to take the decision ground their judgment only on evidence which
they have heard during the trial. 19 This also concerns the testimony
of witnesses. 20
The consequence of the principle of immediacy is that statements
made by the accused during the investigation phase without the
13 T Wickern, in Löwe-Rosenberg StPO (2010, De Gruyter, Berlin), § 176, n. 47.
14 H Mayer, in Karlsruher Kommentar zur Strafprozessordnung (KK-StPO), (7th
edn, 2013, C.H. Beck), EGGVG § 23 n. 31.
15 Ibid.
16 Section 250 CCP; Kudlich, in Münchner Kommentar StPO (1st end, 2014,
Munich, C.H. Beck), introduction n. 177-179.
17 H Kudlich, in Müko StPO, n. 185-187.
18 Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court, BGH), in Neue Juristische Wochenschrift
(NJW) 1954, 1415; BGH NJW 1961, 327.
19 A Ganter, in Beck’scher Online-Kommentar Strafprozessordnung (28th edn,
2018, BeckOK StPO), § 250, Rn. 9.
20 There are exceptions to the principle of immediacy, which arise from Section
252 CCP and permit the replacement of a testimony of a witness, of an expert witness
or of a co-suspect.
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assistance of an interpreter cannot be directly used as evidence in
court. 21 On the contrary, the statements made during the pre-trial
stage must be repeated before the trial court. 22 Therefore, the
statements gathered during the investigation have little effect on the
main proceedings, since it is still possible to revoke or change those
statements made in the pre-trial stage. It is true that the trial court can
hear the interrogator as a so-called ‘indirect witness’. In this way, is it
possible to consider statements made during the investigation. 23
However, according to the case-law, these statements have limited
probative value. 24 Judgments should not be based solely on the
testimony of the indirect witness. 25 Therefore, judicial review during
the investigation procedure is not as important in these Member States
as in Member States which allow the direct use of questioning reports
and the statement recorded therein in the main procedure.
The argument that there is no need for a remedy during the pre-trial
stage also results from pragmatic considerations. Besides the principle of
immediacy explained above, the lack of judicial remedies would avoid
delaying tactics by the defence. The principle seems to be: rather too
much than too little. Sometimes this leads to an abusive use of
control mechnisms in order to waste time. Generally, the right to
interpretation leads to the prolongation of proceedings, very much to
the displeasure of all participants.
As a result, under German law, the breach of the right to
interpretation can be brought in the appeal on fact and law. In most
cases, only the failure to provide interpretation during the trial will
support such an appeal. The judgment must be based on the violation
of the right to interpretation regarding to statements made during the
investigation procedure. If this is the case, there is the possibility for
an appeal on fact and law against decisions finding that there is no
need for interpretation during the pre-trial proceedings.
In Poland, the legal situation is similar to that in Germany. Like
German law, Polish criminal procedure adopts the principle of
immediacy. 26 Accordingly, the accused person has to repeat his
21 U Eisenberg, in Beweisrecht der StPO (10th edn 2017, C.H. Beck, Munich) n. 66.
22 Ibid n. 65.
23 A Geipel, Handbuch der Beweiswürdigung (3th edn, 2017, LexisNexis
Deutschland GmbH - ZAP Verlag), n. 259-261.
24 K Detter, ‘Der Zeuge vom Hörensagen - eine Bestandsaufnahme’ (2003) Neue
Zeitschrift für Strafrecht (NStZ) 1.
25 A Ganter, in BeckOK StPO, § 250 Rn. 11-12.
26 S Waltos, in T Weigend, G Küpper, Festschrift für Hans Joachim Hirsch, Die
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statements before the trial court in order to gain probative value.
Exceptions to this principle, similar to that provided in the German
system, also exist.
By contrast, criminal justice systems rooted in the inquisitorial
tradition – such as in France, Belgium and Luxembourg - do not
adopt any principle of immediacy. 27 In those systems and most
particularly with regard to investigations conducted under the lead of
an Investigating Judge, judicial review over the admissibility of
evidence has a focus on the pre-trial stage of criminal proceedings.
The competent court controls only the legality of investigative acts
and may sanction procedural defects in the evidence gathering. In
doing so, the judge does not check, however, the probative value of
the evidence collected. 28
There exists, nonetheless, the principle of orality in the French
system. 29 This means that the Court must hear the defendant and
witnesses when their testimony is necessary to establish the truth.
Thus, pieces of evidences are at least partially repeated in the main
hearing, just as in Germany or Poland. There is, however, a
difference, in that the judge can take into consideration statements
made by the accused during police questioning and check, for
instance, whether he maintains the same version of the facts in order
to assess the evidentiary value of his statements. As a result,
statements made by the accused without the assistance of an
interpreter in the pre-trial stage of the criminal proceedings in these
Member States may have a greater impact on the trial than, for
example, in Germany or Poland.
The differences in the national measures implementing Article 2(5)
Directive 2010/64/EU have their origin in the very structure and
principles governing criminal justice systems. These differences
illustrate the difficulties of harmonizing the existing judicial remedies
in Member States. The implementation of the EU Directive did not
reduce such divergences, nor did it lead to the adoption of new
judicial remedies or specific complaint procedures.
neue polnische Strafprozessordnung im Vergleich mit dem deutschen Strafprozessrecht
(2011, Berlin, de Gruyter) 1000 ff.
27 J Leblois-Happe, ‘Das Unmittelbarkeitsprinzip im französischen
Strafverfahrensrecht’ (2014) 1 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft
185 ff.
28 Ibid.
29 H-H Kühne, in H-H Kühne, Strafprozessrecht Eine systematische Darstellung
des deutschen und europäischen Strafverfahrensrechts (9th edn, 2015, C.H. Beck,
Munich)709.
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3. Right to translation
Regarding the right to translation, Article 3 Directive 2010/54/EU
requires the Member States to ensure that suspected or accused
persons who do not understand the language of the criminal
proceedings are, within a reasonable period of time, provided with a
written translation of all documents which are essential to ensure that
they are able to exercise their right of defense and to safeguard the
fairness of the proceedings. 30 In the examined Member States, there
were very different forms of implementing the possibility to institute
an action against a decision finding that there is no need for
translation. One may distinguish three main groups of countries.
First: In Germany, as well as in Luxembourg and France, where the
impugned decision is taken by the Investigating Judge, the suspect or
accused person has immediate access to court or an independent
judicial authority during the pre-trial proceedings. 31 Those countries
thus provide for the possibility to challenge the decision finding that
there is need for translation before the trial court will rule on the
merits of the case.
Second: Other Member States provide the suspect or accused with
the possibility to lodge a complaint or an appeal in front of the same
authority that takes the challenged act during the pre-trial stage of
proceedings. This is, for instance, the case in Spain with regard to a
decision taken by an Investigating Judge finding that there is no need
for translation. 32
Third: In some countries, such as for instance Poland and France,
where the author of the impugned act is the Public Prosecutor, the
judicial review of decisions finding that there is no need for
translation is carried out at the trial stage of criminal proceedings. 33
As for the right to interpretation, the Member States implement the
remedial obligation set forth in Article 3(5) Directive 2010/64/EU in
very different ways. This complexity is not solely reflected in the
comparative analysis of national criminal procedures. Within the same
Member State, judicial remedies against decisions finding that there is
no need for translation may vary depending on the authority that takes
the impugned decision or whether that decision is taken ex-officio or
30 Art. 3 (5) Directive 2010/64/EU.
31 See supra Part III, Chap. II, III, IV.
32 See supra Part III, Chap. VI.
33 See supra Part III, Chap. II, V.
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upon request of the parties. 34 Again, divergences among the national
system of judicial review are rooted in the very structure of national
criminal justice.
34 This is for instance the case in Luxembourg, see supra Part III, Chap IV.
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CHAPTER II
RIGHT TO INFORMATION AND REMEDIAL
OBLIGATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF NATIONAL REMEDIES
Slawomir Steinborn
TABLE OF CONTENTS: 1. Introductory remarks. – 2. Remedies against breaches
of the right to access the case file. – 2.1. Variety of remedies under
national laws. – 2.2. The timing of review, a key issue. – 3. Remedies
against violations of the right to information about rights and
accusation. 4. Conclusions.
1. Introductory remarks
In order to provide the defendant with the possibility to effectively
use of a particular procedural right, it is not enough to foresee in a
specific legal act an adequate provision granting such right to this
person. The ability of effective exercise of procedural rights largely
depends on the creation of appropriate mechanisms to guarantee these
powers. 1 This means that a defendant should be given procedural
‘tools’, which he could use to effectively benefit from his procedural
right. This is of fundamental importance especially in a situation
when an authority conducting criminal proceedings violates this right
of the defendant, violations that are not completely unusual in
practice. Such mechanisms guaranteeing the possibility to exercise the
procedural right could consist in the right of the defendant to file a
motion for a particular procedural act; the possibility to appeal against
a negative decision of the authority; or, the possibility to ask for a
subsequent review of the decision during the trial stage of criminal
1 See supra Part II, Chap. I.
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proceedings – by the court of first or second instance or imposing the
obligation on an authority to make some activities ex officio.
Regarding the effectiveness of some particular procedural remedies,
it is also necessary to take into account the consequences of the breach
of a specific right of the defendant. If the law does not foresee such
negative consequences or they are too ‘lenient’, this may encourage
the authorities not to feel themselves obliged to respect the particular
right of the accused. This might be a problem especially during pre-
trial proceedings.
This paper will analyse the such remedies or ‘tools’ with regards to
the right to information provided for in Directive 2012/13 on the right to
information in criminal proceedings. 2 There are three separate rights
provided for in this directive: (1) right of the suspect or accused
person, and of an arrested or detained person to information about
rights, (2) right to information about the accusation, (3) right of
access to the materials of the case. 3
Article 8 (2) Directive 2012/13 states, that ‘Member States shall
ensure that suspects or accused persons or their lawyers have the right
to challenge, in accordance with procedures in national law, the
possible failure or refusal of the competent authorities to provide
information in accordance with this Directive’. Recital 36 of Directive
2012/13/EU also includes that the ‘right to challenge does not entail
the obligation for Member States to provide for a specific appeal
procedure, a separate mechanism, or a complaint procedure in which
such failure or refusal may be challenged’. This means that Member
States are free to provide the defendant with the possibility to appeal
against a refusal decision during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings,
or simply grant the accused the opportunity to challenge such a
decision in front of the trial court of first or second instance,
especially when the court examines the correctness of the procedural
steps performed during pre-trial proceedings.
Due to the differences between these three rights, the comparative
analysis of national legilsations in Belgium, France, Germany,
Luxembourg, Poland and Spain, will be conducted with regard to
these rights separately.
2 [2012] OJ L142/1.
3 See more S Cras, L de Matteis, The Directive on the Right to Information.
Genesis and Short Description, (2013) 1 Eucrim 22.
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2. Remedies against breaches of the right to access to case file
2.1. Variety of remedies under national laws
Besides the obligation resulting from Article 8 (2) Directive 2012/
13 to provide a right to challenge decisions refusing access to the case
file, 4 Article 7 (4) Directive 2012/13 also sets forth an important rule on
how national law remedies should be construed. Pursuant to this Article,
‘Member States shall ensure that, in accordance with procedures in
national law, a decision to refuse access to certain materials in
accordance with this paragraph is taken by a judicial authority or is at
least subject to judicial review’. 5 This means that, regardless of the
stage of proceedings in which it takes place, the review of the
decision refusing access should be carried out by the court if the
decision subject to review has been issued by a non-judicial
authority. 6 This is undoubtedly of particular importance in order to
ensure adequate judicial review of the refusal decision taken in the
course of pre-trial proceedings. The refusal decision should be
understood to mean not just a refusal to grant access to the case file
in general, but also only to a specific part of it.
Most of the analysed countries provide to the defendant a right to
appeal against a decision refusing access to the case file. In all cases,
it is an interlocutory appeal or a similar remedy, which means that it
affords the defendant the possibility to start a separate appellate
procedure against the decision.
In Luxembourg the defendant can lodge an appeal against the
decision whereby the investigating judge exceptionally restricts access
to the case file after indictment, rejects the defendant’s request to
revoke such a restriction, or denies the communication of materials of
the case file requested by the parties. The decision taken by the
investigating judge is notified within twenty-four hours to the
accused, who can lodge an appeal with the pre-trial chamber of the
Court of Appeal within five days from the date of the notification. 7
The scope of review is quite broad, because the competent court must
verify whether the contested decision is sufficiently reasoned and
4 Directive 2012/13 uses the term ‘materials of the case’ instead of ‘case files’.
About the reasons of this difference see Cras, de Matteis (n 3) 30. In this paper the
indicated terms are used indifferently.
5 Art. 7 (4) Directive 2012/13/EU.
6 On this aspect, see also Part II, Chap I.
7 Art. 133 Luxembourg CCP.
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whether one of the grounds set forth under Article 85 of Luxembourg
CCP justifies the denial to access the case file in the light of the
specific circumstances of the case.
In France, if the investigating judge refuses to provide the copies of
the documents requested, the defendant and his lawyer have, within two
days of its notification, the possibility to refer the decision of the
investigating judge to the President of the Investigating Chamber, who
shall rule within five working days and take a written and reasoned
decision, not subject to appeal. 8 The same procedure is used when
the investigating judge fails to rule upon a request to access the case
file within the given deadline.
Likewise, in Belgium an appeal may be lodged with the Chamber of
Accusation against a decision whereby the investigating judge refuses to
grant access to the case file or when it fails to rule upon a request of
access within the given deadline. 9
In Spain the remedy of ‘consideration’ may be submitted against
the decision of the investigating judge refusing access to case files.
This application is examined by the same judge. 10
Polish law provides the defendant and his defence lawyer the
possibility to challenge a decision refusing access to certain materials
of pre-trial proceedings. An interlocutory appeal may be submitted
within 7 days from the date of the notification of the refusal decision.
There is, however, a difference with regards to the reviewing
authority. If the refusal decision has been issued by a public
prosecutor, the appeal is examined by a single judge of the court
competent to hear the case. When the decision has been issued by
another non-judicial authority (eg police officer), the interlocutory
appeal shall be examined by the prosecutor supervising the
proceedings. 11
A similiar, but not identical solution has been adopted in Germany.
Namely, the decisions taken by the public prosecution office refusing
access to the files of investigation are subject to the review of the
judge, but only after the closing of the investigation. A suspect can
only apply against a decision taken by the judge. The impossibility to
challenge the prosecution office’s decision is considered to be
inconsequential as the accused has the possibility to repeat his
8 Art. 114 (9) French CCP.
9 See Part III, Chap. I.
10 See Part III, Chap. VI.
11 See supra Part III, Chap. V.
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demand of access to the materials of the file to the court after the
indictment has been submitted. It is assumed that this is sufficient to
be able to claim legal protection in a timely manner. 12
Some conclusions can be drawn from this brief overview. Certain
national legislations afford the defendant the right to challenge
decisions refusing or restricting access to case file also when this
decision is taken by the judicial authority stricto sensu (France,
Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain). Paradoxically, some countries do
not provide specific remedies enabling the suspect or accused person
to challenge such decisions when taken by the prosecutor in the pre-
trial stage of criminal proceedings (Spain, France) or even by a police
officer, as in Poland, where the law grants the possibility to challenge
his refusal only in front of the public prosecutor. This regulation
triggers a very important question as to whether the public prosecutor
is a judicial authority as provided in Article 7 (4) Directive 2012/13,
or even more generally in the perspective of procedural rights in
criminal proceedings in the EU. 13
Taking into consideration the rule set forth in Recital 36 of
Directive 2012/13, it is clear that the lack of immediate access to the
court is not, however, necessarily inconsistent with Article 7 (4)
Directive 2012/13. Judicial review can still be undertaken only at the
trial stage of proceedings (as in Germany) – both by the first instance
court and appelate court. The defandant and his lawyer can raise this
question, especially during the hearing in regard to particular
evidence, which was in their opinion obtained in flagrant breach of
the right to access to the case file. The defence can also raise their
alllegations in the appeal against the judgment.
2.2. The timing of review, a key issue
With regards to the time of the review of the refusal decision, a
certain contradiction may be observed in Article 7 (3) Directive 2012/
13. It states that access to the case file shall be granted in due time to
allow the effective exercise of the rights of the defence. However, in
order to forsee a precise guarantee, the Directive also adds a certain
time limit prior to which access must be granted in all cases: ‘at the
latest upon submission of the merits of the accusation to the judgment
12 See supra Part III, Chap. III.
13 On this issue see Part II, Chap I.
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of a court’. 14 It may be interpreted to the effect that the Member States
are free to choose not to grant any access to the case file during the
whole pre-trial stage of criminal proceedings. 15 There is no need for
such decision of national legislature to have an additional justification
in the circumstances indicated in Article 7 (4) Directive 2012/13,
because that provision regulates other separate restrictions on the right
to access to the case file. Surprisingly, it may thus be understood that
according to Directive 2012/13 the exercise of the right of access to
the case file in the pre-trial proceedings is not relevant for an
effective defence. It appears, however, that due to the fact that in the
course of pre-trial proceedings many acts (especially evidentiary) of
key importance to the outcome of the trial or irreversible acts are
likely to be carried out, it should be possible for the defence to obtain
prior access to the case file in order to prepare for this activity, rather
than only after the submission of the accusation to the court.
The question of the moment when the suspect and his defence
lawyer not only get access to the case file but also have the
possibillity to challenge the decision denying such access, is of great
importance for the perspectives and chances of effective defence.
Therefore, the question arises as to the advantages and disadvantages
of both alternative options, especially in view of their effectiveness.
There is no doubt that the possibility to challenge the refusal decision
enables the suspect to cause an immediate court review of this
decision and, as a result, obtain access to the case file. The
disadvantage, however, is that the lodging of an interlocutory appeal,
complaint or similiar application results in the initiation of a separate
proceedings, which in turn may result in the extension of the main
proceedings. The right to request access to a case file and then the
possibillity to challenge every refusal decision may also be used in
very obstructive manner, blocking the possiblillity to conduct the
main proceedings.
In turn, greater efficiency and effectiveness of the pre-trial
proceedings may be ensured when the timing of the judicial review of
the refusal decision is postponed to the stage of the proceedings
14 Art. 7 (3) Directive 2012/13/EU.
15 S Allegrezza, V Covolo, ‘The Directive 2012/13/EU on the Right to
Information in Criminal Proceedings: Status quo or step forward?’ in Z Durdevic, E
Ivicevic Karas (eds), European Criminal Procedure Law in Service of Protection of
European Union Financial Interests: State of Play and Challenges (Zagreb 2016)
47- 48.
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before the first or even second instance court. It seems, however, that
this solution is less desirable from the perspective of the defence.
Indeed, it should be noted that in such case the court is called upon to
examine whether the refusal to make the case file available to the
suspect in the pre-trial proceedings has affected negatively his
situation, and particularly the possibility to prepare and exercice an
effective defence.
For this purpose, the defendant and his laywer should prove – at
least its plausibility – that the specific procedural or evidentiary action
might have had a different effect, if they had been given access to the
case file at a specific point in time during pre-trial proceedings (eg if
the suspect had known about specific evidence, he would not have
given explanations of the specific content). It is extremely difficult,
however, to prove that, if at a specific point in time the defence had
had specific knowledge of the specific materials in the case file, it
would have taken other procedural steps than it actually did. It all
comes down to whether the court, which would assess ex post the
effects of the unjustified refusal to provide access to the case file,
would find that argument convincing. It is more a matter of faith than
of facts. For these reasons, it is also difficult to verify not only the
question of the causal link between the lack of access to the case file
and the content and effects of the specific procedural action during
the pre-trial stage of criminal proceedings, but also the judge’s
assesment of this relation itself. For this reason, there is a danger of
great discretion in these assessments.
The question of what consequences may an unjustified refusal to
give the suspect and his defence lawyer access to the case file have,
can also be asked. For example, if a defence lawyer has not been
given access to certain materials before the court’s hearing on the
detention on remand, what should be the consequence of finding that
this refusal unduly infringed the defence rights. Should this result in
the quashing of the detention order, in the granting of compensation
for the time of the detention, or merely in the examination of the
grounds for detention, of course after having made the case file
accessible for the defence lawyer and having given him enough time
to read it and prepare to the hearing?
There is no doubt that from the perspective of defence, the
mechanism of exclusionary rules (but also nullities) provides the
highest level of protection. It shall be indamissible to use, – as a
factual basis of judgment – the results of the evidentiary activity
undertaken during pre-trial stage of criminal procedings, when the
defence lawyer requested access to the case file or specific materials
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in connection with a specific action (eg the questioning of a suspect) and
it has been refused in the absence of any justification provided by the
law. There would therefore be a mechanism based on the presumption
that the breach of the defence right has an impact on the content of a
given activity. Such a rigid mechanism also has a negative side. It
could sometimes lead to the elimination of substantive evidence only
because of a formal failure to provide to the defendant and his lawyer
access to the case file. In addition, since pre-trial proceedings usually
take a certain period of time, the question arises on how to assess the
negative consequences of the refusal of access to the case file, and its
impact on further steps, especially with regard to evidence gathered
during this stage of criminal proceedings.
From this perspective it seems better to establish a different
safeguard mechanism, namely to give to the suspect and his defence
lawyer the right to logde a complaint or interlocutory appeal against
the negative decision whereby the authority conducting the pre-trial
proceedings (eg prosecutor, investigating judge) refuses access to the
case file. Such review can be carried out quite quickly and prevents
the permanently and sometimes difficult to reverse, negative
consequences for the defence. Such review also allows the avoidance
of the negative impact on the efficiency of the proceedings, if
additional strict deadlines and other safeguards against obstructive
uses of the right to access to the case file are introduced to prevent
extending the proceedings.
It may seem that these considerations were the main reasons taken
into account by the analysed countries, since the possibility of logding
appeal or a similar remedy against a negative decision was introduced
besides the mechanism of the exlusionary rule or nullity.
3. Remedies against violations of the right to information about
rights and accusation
The first problematic issue encountered when reading Article 8 (2)
Directive 2012/13 in regard to the information about the accusation and
the rights of the defendant, is how to challenge the failure of the
competent authority to provide this information at all. The complaint
against a lack of such information would require the defendant’s
knowledge that a specific situation takes place when the information
should be provided. Unless the authors of the Directive assumed that
it was still possible in the EU a situation like in the famous novel by
Franz Kafka, when the suspect has been denied any information about
the reasons justifying the criminal proceedings against him. For these
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reasons, national legislation should, first of all, include the positive
responsibility of the competent authorities to provide ex officio,
relevant information about the accusation 16 and rights of the
defendant. 17 The possibility to challenge the failure or refusal to
provide sufficient information about the accusation and the rights
should also be provided especially in the appeal procedure before the
court of second instance (so-called ‘subsequent review’). Thereby, a
comprehensive assessment of the consequences of the infringement of
the right to information for the defence rights, in particular the impact
of this infringement on the content of the judgment, would be
possible only in the course of the appeal review of the entire judgment.
The effective safeguard mechanism should consist of two linked
elements: (1) clear obligations imposed on the authorities conducting
criminal proceedings to inform in specified situations about the
charges (accusation) and defendant’s rights and (2) the elimination of
evidence obtained when a flagrant breach of this right to information
has occurred. This elimination of evidence could be based on the
mechanism of the exclusionary rule as well as on a system of
nullities. Generally speaking, in some of the analyzed national
legislation the breach of information already leads to the elimination
of the evidence. 18
Failure to provide relevant information could also include situations
where the notification took place, but was ineffective due to improper
form or language or due to other aspects, such as timing or content. 19
The best remedy against the situation when the information is not
transparent or complete is, on the one hand, the imposition of specific
obligations on the authorities conducting the criminal proceedings (eg
tape the moment of giving instructions to the suspect; written
confirmation of the suspect, that he has been given the information)
and granting to the suspect (accused) the possibility to ask for
information at any time during the further proceedings. It is also
possible to impose a presumption that the absence of disclosure
implies that the obligation to inform about the rights has been not
16 Art. 6 Directive 2012/13/EU.
17 Art. 3 and 4 Directive 2012/13/EU.
18 This is for instance the case in Germany, France and Poland.
19 A Tsagkalidis, ‘Directive 2012/13/EU on the Right to Information in Criminal
Proceedings’ (2017) 13 Online, <www.era-comm.eu/procedural_safeguards/kiosk/pdf/
2017/Article_Right_to_Information.pdf> accessed on 29 October 2017.
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fulfilled, unless it is proven otherwise. 20 When the information is
delayed there is only a matter of consequences of such failure.
Going further, one should address the possible consequences of an
infringement of the right to information during pre-trial proceedings.
Due to the preparatory function of pre-trial proceedings, it would be
difficult to justify the inadmissibility of the indictment in the event
that the suspect’s right to information about the accusation was
infringed during the investigation. In Poland, in practice, there have
been situations when after the indictment has been brought to the
court, it turned out that in the course of the previous investigation no
information was given to the suspect (in form of a written decision
presenting the charge to him/her) about one of the several charges
brought by the indictment. This situation is a clear violation of the
right to information about the accusation and, consequently, the right
of defence. However, since the charge was then contained in the
subsequent indictment, so that the accused actually received
information about it, it is difficult to determine what consequence this
should have, such as, for example, the withdrawal of the case from
the court and its being sent back to the prosecutor. While admittedly
late, the accused has received the information about the accusation
and charges. It seems therefore that the rational remedy in this
situation may only be granting adequate time to the defendant and his
defence lawyer before the hearing to prepare the defence in regard to
the ‘new found’ offence and the taking of the infringement into
account by the court in its assessment of evidence in the whole case.
Another problem occurs when, due to the lack of knowledge about
the charges or suspicions, a particular person (the suspect) gives
testimony of particular content as a witness. In some national
legislation or case-law special rules that concern this issue can be
found. In Luxembourg, it is prohibited by the law to question a
person as a witness where serious and consistent evidence against him
justify the pressing of charges. 21 In such circumstances, the contested
act is declared null and void where the delayed indictment deprived
the accused of the possibility to exercise defence rights. 22 A similar
rule has been developed in case-law of the Polish courts. 23 This is
20 S Allegrezza, V Covolo (n 15) 48-49.
21 Art. 73 Luxembourg CCP.
22 See supra Part III, Chap. IV.
23 See supra Part III, Chap. V.
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more a matter concerning the right to remain silent than right to be
informed about the accusation.
4. Conclusions
Considering the provision of effective remedies regarding the
defendant’s right to information, one should have in mind that this
right consist of three different guarantees. The nature of every right is
a bit different and this has its consequences on the appropriate
remedy chosen. The effective judicial remedy, on the one side, should
be an effective procedural safeguard of the defendant’s right, on the
other hand, it should also take into account the need to accomplish
the goals of the criminal proceedings. Generally speaking, subject to
the nature of the specific right, it is sometimes more important to
prevent infringements by imposing positive obligations on the
authorities conducting the criminal proceedings than granting the
defence a possibility to challenge the negative decisions. Discussing
the issue of the effective remedy it is also important to remember
how crucial is the timing (moment of criminal proceedings) when this
remedy may be sought by the defendant and his defence lawyer.
NATIONAL REMEDIES AND RIGHT TO INFORMATION 485
© Wolters Kluwer Italia

CHAPTER III
JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT
TO ACCESS A LAWYER IN THE MEMBER STATES
Valentina Covolo
TABLE OF CONTENTS: 1. Remedial obligations under Directive 2013/48/EU. – 2.
Decisions authorizing temporary derogations on the right to access a
lawyer. – 2.1. Judicial authorization or ex-post judicial review. – 2.2.
Grounds for derogation. – 3. Incriminating statements obtained in
breach of the right to legal assistance. – 3.1. Nullities and exclusionary
rules. – 3.2. A wide spectrum of sanctions.
1. Remedial obligations under Directive 2013/48/EU
How do Member States ensure respect of the right to access a lawyer
guaranteed under Directive 2013/48/EU? More particularly, what control
mechanisms prevent and sanction breaches of this right in criminal
proceedings? Based on the rich analysis of six Member States
displayed above, the present contribution seeks to identify
commonalities and divergences among national measures implementing
the remedial obligations set forth under Directive 2013/48/EU.
With this aim in mind, two provisions are of particular interest. On
the one hand, the EU Directive authorizes, under exceptional
circumstances and only at the pre-trial stage of criminal proceedings,
temporary derogations on the right to access a lawyer. 1 Two sets of
grounds may allow such restriction. The first is of a pragmatic nature,
since it justifies delayed access to legal assistance where the
1 Art. 3 Directive 2013/48/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of
22 October 2013 on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in
European arrest warrant proceedings, and on the right to have a third party
informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with third persons and
with consular authorities while deprived of liberty [2013] OJ L 294/1.
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‘geographical remoteness of a suspect or accused person makes it
impossible to ensure the right of access to a lawyer without undue
delay after deprivation of liberty’. 2 The second set of grounds for
temporary derogations consists in ‘compelling reasons’, namely an
urgent need to avert serious adverse consequences for the life, liberty
or physical integrity of a person, or where immediate action by the
investigating authorities is imperative to prevent substantial jeopardy
to criminal proceedings. 3 Thus defined, the compelling reasons leave
room for extensive interpretation. Hence, considering that delayed
access to a lawyer is likely to seriously undermine the right of the
suspect or accused to defend himself, the European Parliament
strongly advocated for the introduction of strict conditions that must
be fulfilled in the case of temporary derogations. 4 Delayed access to
a lawyer shall be proportionate and strictly limited in time. 5
Moreover, pursuant to Article 8 Directive 2013/48/EU, temporary
derogations must be authorized by a duly reasoned decision, taken on
a case-by-case basis by a judicial authority or by another competent
authority on condition that the decision can be submitted to judicial
review. 6
On the other hand, Article 12 is the first provision of the ABC
Directives addressing the question of the use of evidence gathered in
breach of defence rights. Whilst the first paragraph requires the
Member States to provide effective remedies against violations of the
rights guaranteed under Directive 2012/13/EU, 7 the second states that
the assessment of statements made by the suspect or accused person
in breach of the right to access a lawyer, or made where a derogation
to that right was authorized, shall ensure that the rights of the defence
and the fairness of the proceedings are respected. 8 It is worth
recalling that the EU legislature thereby declined to introduce in the
final text of the Directive a clear exclusionary rule, emphasizing, on
the contrary, that Article 12 is without prejudice to national rules and
systems on the admissibility of evidence. 9 The stipulation reflects the
2 Art. 3 (5) Directive 2013/48/EU.
3 Art. 3 (6) Directive 2013/48/EU.
4 S Cras, ‘The Directive on the Right of Access to a Lawyer in Criminal
Proceedings and in the European Arrest Warrant Proceedings’ (2014) 1 Eucrim 32, 41.
5 Art. 8 (1) 2013/48 EU.
6 Art. 8 (2) and (3) Directive 2013/48 EU.
7 Art. 12 (1) Directive 2013/48/EU.
8 Art. 12 (2) Directive 2013/48/EU.
9 Ibid.
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harsh opposition from a group of Member States against the
Commission proposal, 10 which intended to prohibit the use against
suspects of incriminating statements obtained in breach of the right to
access a lawyer ‘unless the use of such evidence would not prejudice
the rights of the defence’. 11 Similarly, during the negotiations of
Directive 2016/343/EU, the Council opposed the adoption of a fully-
fledged exclusionary rule applying to statements gathered in violation
of the right to remain silent or the right not to incriminate oneself. 12
This first insight into both provisions already demonstrates that
Directive 2013/48/EU gives the Member States significant latitude in
implementation. Hence, one may expect that requirements governing
temporary derogations and the use of evidence obtained in breach of
the right to access a lawyer has had little impact and harmonizing
effect on national criminal procedures. The following sections will
test this hypothesis with regards to the implementing measures
adopted in Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Poland and Spain.
2. Decisions authorizing temporary derogations on the right to
access a lawyer
2.1. Judicial authorization or ex-post judicial review
As mentioned above, Article 8 Directive 2012/48/EU sets forth
guarantees of judicial review governing decisions that delay, under
exceptional circumstances, the right to access a lawyer in the pre-trial
stage of criminal proceedings. Such decisions must be issued by a
judicial authority or, alternatively, be subject to subsequent judicial
control. 13 It thus follows that the Member States may either make
temporary derogations conditional upon judicial authorization or,
where the authority having competence to delay legal assistance is not
a judicial body, adopt a system of ex-post judicial review.
The lenient requirements laid down in the provision has not reduced
the significant divergences among national criminal procedures. Indeed,
10 S Cras (n 4) 40.
11 Art. 13 (3) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament of the Council
on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and on the right to
communicate upon arrest, COM(2011)326 final.
12 S Cras, A Erbežnik, ‘The Directive on the Presumption of Innocence and the
Right to Be Present at Trial’ (2016) 1 Eucrim 25, 34.
13 Art. 8 (2) and (3) Directive 2013/4/EU.
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the authority empowered to authorize temporary derogations varies from
one country to another. In the majority of the Member States examined
below, national laws designate that this power shall lie with the authority
leading the investigation or conducting the questioning. Thus, depending
on the type and structure of preliminary enquiries, the power to derogate
from the right to legal assistance falls within the competence of the
investigating judge, the public prosecutor or police officers, upon
approval of prosecutorial authorities. However, given the exceptional
nature of such derogations, some national legislation requires the
intervention of fully independent and impartial judicial bodies,
separate to those conducting the investigation. This, for instance, is
the case in Germany, where restrictions on the right to legal assistance
shall be ordered by a court. 14 In a similar way, French law requires
under certain circumstances that delayed access to a lawyer must be
authorized by the Judge of Freedom and Detention, upon the request
of police officers. 15
In this respect, it is worth recalling that Article 8 Directive 2013/48/
EU requires decisions derogating from the right to legal assistance to be
duly reasoned on a case-by-case basis and recorded in accordance with
national rules of procedure. 16 Yet, national laws of some of the Member
States under analysis expressly impose on the competent authority the
duty to state reasons for the decision authorizing temporary
derogations. For instance, written and reasoned decisions are required
under both French 17 and Luxembourg law. 18
Moreover, the remedial obligation enshrined in Article 8 Directive
2013/48/EU has no harmonizing effect on the remedies available to the
suspect against temporary derogations of the right to access a lawyer.
First, the provision does not specify at which stage of the proceeding
the subsequent judicial scrutiny of decisions taken by a non-judicial
authority shall occur. Accordingly, the analysis conducted in the
selected countries shows that the judicial control on the derogation
may take place either in the pre-trial or the trial stage of criminal
proceedings. The availability of remedies at an early stage does not
necessarily enhance the effectiveness of the right to legal assistance.
The significant time delays associated with judicial actions might
14 Section 148 German CCP.
15 Art. 63-4-2 French CCP.
16 Art. 8 (2) and (3) Directive 2013/48/EU.
17 Art. 63-4-2 French CCP.
18 Art. 3 – 6 (6) Luxembourg CCP.
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discourage the suspect or accused person from availing himself of the
remedies provided under national law. However, the delaying tactics
of defense counsel may also explain the low number of judicial
actions introduced.
Depending on the country and the type of investigation concerned,
judicial protection afforded by national law sometimes goes beyond the
standards set forth under the Directive. For example, this is the case in
Germany, Spain, France and Luxembourg, where the decision whereby a
judicial authority derogates from the right to access a lawyer can be
challenged in front of a court during the pre-trial stage of criminal
proceedings. Subsequent avenues of appeal are also provided. 19
In sum, Article 8 Directive 2013/48/EU had very little impact on
the system of judicial review in the selected Member States. The
remedial obligations against restrictions on the right to legal assistance
did not lead to the introduction of new judicial remedies under
national law. Nonetheless, the implementation of the EU Directive
had an indirect impact on existing control mechanisms. On the one
hand, where implementing measures strengthened the substance of the
procedural guarantee or clarify grounds for restriction, they
respectively extended the scope or specified the grounds for review. 20
On the other hand, national implementing measures introduced the
possibility to challenge directly the decision authorizing temporary
derogations. 21 This is without prejudice to the possibility of
incidentally challenging acts authorizing such derogations in the pre-
trial stage of criminal proceedings. For instance, under Luxembourg
law, requests for annulment may still be directed against the report of
the questioning conducted by the investigating judge without the
presence of a lawyer and, therefore, entail the review of the decision
delaying entitlement of the procedural safeguard. 22
2.2. Grounds for derogation
The judicial control undertaken by the national competent
authorities primarily aims at assessing, in the light of the specific
circumstances of the case, whether compelling reasons justify denials
19 This is notably the case in Spain where a judicial action can be instituted in
front of the Constitutional Court.
20 Luxembourg, Spain.
21 Luxembourg.
22 Art. 126 Luxembourg CCP.
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of access to a lawyer. Hence, the scope of review will also depend on the
way Member States have implemented Article 3(6) Directive 2013/48/
EU. In this regard, i t is worth noting that Belgium 23 and
Luxembourg 24 operated a literal implementation of the compelling
reasons defined by the said provision. Only German law allows
temporary derogations of the right to communicate in private with a
lawyer where the accused is strongly suspected of terrorism
organization. 25 This raises concerns about the compliance of German
law with the European instrument, since Article 8 Directive 2013/48/
EU prohibits temporary derogations exclusively based on the type or
the seriousness of the alleged offence. 26
Divergences among national legislation also lie in the
components of the right to legal assistance that are subject to such
derogations. For instance, German criminal procedure only allows
the competent authorities to ban communication or the possibility
for the accused held in custody to communicate in private with a
lawyer. 27 Other countries authorize derogations of all guarantees
defined under Article 3(3) Directive 2013/48/EU. An illustration
can be found in the Luxembourg Code of Criminal Procedures
(CCP), which empowers the competent authorities to derogate from
the right to meet and communicate in private with a lawyer, the
right to have a lawyer present at investigative or evidence-gathering
acts, as well as the right to effective legal assistance during any
questioning. 28
Finally, Article 8 Directive 2013/48/EU further requires temporary
derogations to be necessary, proportionate and strictly limited in time.
Depending on the country, such requirements find explicit expression
in legal provisions. A telling example are the maximum time-limits
governing the possibility to delay access to a lawyer during
questioning under French law 29 or those delimiting the possibility to
derogate from the right of the person under detention on remand to
communicate in private with a counsel laid down in the Polish
23 Art. 2bis and 24bis Belgian Law of 20 July 1990 on pre-trial detention.
24 Art. 3 – 6 (6) Luxembourg CCP.
25 Section 31 Interlocutory law of the Courts Constitution Act (ILCCA) and
Section 148 s2 German CCP.
26 Art. 8 (1) c Directive 2013/48/EU.
27 Section 31 Interlocutory law of the Courts Constitution Act (ILCCA) and
Section 148 s2 German CCP.
28 Art. 3 – 6 (6) Luxembourg CCP.
29 Art. 63-4-2 French CCP.
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CCP. 30 In most cases, however, national legislation makes general
reference to proportionality and the exceptional character of
derogations 31 or at least incorporates them in the scope of review
undertaken by the competent authorities. 32
3. Incriminating statements obtained in breach of the right to legal
assistance
3.1. Nullities and exclusionary rules
It has been underlined that judicial review of alleged violations of
the right to access a lawyer may take place during the pre-trial or trial
stage of the criminal proceedings. In the second case, the judicial
control carried out by first instance trial courts consists in the
assessment of evidence collected with a view to establishing whether
the accused is guilty or innocent. Evidentiary rules in criminal
proceedings call into play two competing interests. 33 On the one
hand, effective prosecution relies on the use of material evidence
collected in the previous stages of the proceedings that are necessary
to establish the facts. On the other, the right to due process entails
restrictions on the use of illegally or improperly obtained evidence.
Against this background, European countries have developed
different approaches towards the use of evidence gathered in breach
of defence rights that result in differing, although convergent, systems
of nullities and exclusionary rules. 34 Criminal justice systems
influenced by the accusatorial tradition, such as Germany and Poland,
provide exclusionary rules that prohibit the use of evidence on the
basis of constitutional principles or violations of specific statutory
provisions. In contrast, Member States attached to the inquisitorial
model, in particular France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain, adopt a
system of nullities. The latter do not necessarily and directly affect
the evidence itself. Nullities often relate to procedural acts that are, as
30 Art. 73 Polish CCP.
31 See for instance Art. 3 – 6 (6) Luxembourg CCP.
32 Poland.
33 For an historical perspective, S C Thaman, ‘Balancing Truth Against Human
Rights: A Theory of Modern Exclusionary Rules’ in: S C Thaman (ed), Exclusionary
Rules in Comparative Law (2013, Springer) 403 ff.
34 D Jackson, S J Summers, The Internationalisation of Criminal Evidence:
Beyond the Common Law and Civil Law Traditions (2012, Cambridge University
Press).
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a consequence, declared null and void. 35 Despite this common feature,
the national legislation and case law of the selected countries has
developed over the years slightly different classifications of rules
governing the use of evidence. The categorization that can be
observed in these systems notably distinguishes between, on the one
hand, grounds for nullity or exclusionary rules defined by law, and on
the other, those developed by the case law (nullité formelle – nullité
substantielle, 36 gesetzliche Beweisverwertungsverbote - nicht
normierte Beweisverwertungsverbote 37). Moreover, national
legislation enact automatic and non-obligatory prohibitions related to
the use of evidence. For instance, absolute – as opposed to relative -
exclusionary rules distinguish themselves according to grave breaches
of ru les re la ted to the ga the r ing of ev idence (abso lu te
Verwertungsverbote - relative Verwertungsverbote). 38 Other countries
adopt a classification based on procedural defects that entail
mandatory exclusion only where it is demonstrated that they cause a
prejudice to the defendant’s rights or regardless any proof of prejudice
(nullités d’ordre privé - nullités d’ordre public). 39
One should also note that national systems sanctioning illegally
obtained evidence and the national judicial structures are closely
interrelated. Within the Member States providing for exclusionary
rules, trial courts have exclusive competence to rule on the use of
evidence gathered illegally or improperly. 40 Conversely, the exclusion
of evidence may intervene at different stages of the criminal
proceedings in countries that adopt a system of nullities. In France,
Belgium and Luxembourg, the power to rule on the admissibility of
evidence falls, under specific circumstances, within the jurisdiction of
tribunals that are independent and distinct from trial courts in the
course of the investigation or before the referral of the case for
trial. 41 The review thus undertaken, either ex-officio or upon request,
35 S C Thaman (n33) 410.
36 Luxembourg.
37 Germany.
38 Germany.
39 France.
40 Germany, Poland.
41 Chambre de l’instruction in France, Chambre du Conseil in Luxembourg,
Chambre des mises en accusation in Belgium. By contrast, where national law
empowers trial courts to review the regularity of the investigation, it may requires
the accused to raise grounds for nullity before any review of the merits, such as for
instance in Spain and Luxembourg.
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aims at precluding the admissibility of evidence that, once declared null
and void, is removed from the case file in order to prevent judges sitting
in trial courts basing the assessment of the facts on that evidence. Such a
system entails an essential procedural consequence in as far as it
anticipates the possibility for the accused to raise a ground of nullity
that he can no longer invoke once the competent court reviews the
case on the merits. This does not preclude, however, the power of
trial courts to freely assess the evidential value of statements and
materials that were not declared inadmissible in the previous stages of
the criminal proceedings and eventually disregard such evidence. In
this regard, the analysis conducted in the selected countries shows that
even the Member States adopting a similar set of procedural rules
governing the use of evidence in breach of defense rights differ as
regards the substantive standards that national courts apply.
3.2. A wide spectrum of sanctions
With regard to procedural sanctions, Article 12 paragraph 2
Directive 2013/48/EU does not prohibit the use of evidence gathered
in breach of defence rights. It simply requires trial courts to ensure
the overall fairness of the proceedings in assessing statements made
by the suspect or the accused person in violation of the right to access
a lawyer. 42 These minimum standards of protection granted by the
EU Directive shall be construed in line with the ECHR. 43 In this
light, it is worth recalling that the recent case law of the Strasbourg
Court seems to abandon the stringent approach previously adopted in
Salduz. 44 In its landmark judgment, the ECtHR held that ‘the rights
of the defence would in principle be irretrievably prejudiced when
incriminating statements made during police interrogation without
access to a lawyer were used for a conviction’. 45 In Ibrahim, 46
however, the Court takes a step back. 47 Unlike previous rulings
42 Art. 12(2) Directive 2013/48/EU.
43 Art. 48 and 52 (3) EU Charter.
44 M Caianiello, ‘You Can’t Always Counterbalance What You Want’ (2017) 25
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 283, 293.
45 Salduz v Turkey App no 36391/02 (ECtHR, 27 November 2008) para 55.
46 Ibrahim and others v United Kingdom App nos 50541/08, 50571/08, 50573/08
and 40351/09 (ECtHR, 13 September 2016).
47 A Soo, ‘Divergence of European Union and Strasbourg Standards on Defence
Rights in Criminal Proceedings? Ibrahim and the others v. the UK (13th of September
2016)’ (2017) 25 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 327.
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assessing the violation of the right to access a lawyer in abstracto, the
ECtHR pays special attention to the specific circumstances of the case
whilst applying the ‘overall fariness’ test. 48 Although the national
court based the conviction on incriminating statements made in the
absence of the lawyer, the denial of access to counsel did not amount
to a violation of Article 6 of the Convention as far as the proceedings
as a whole were fair. 49
As a result, both Directive 2013/48/EU and the ECtHR case law
leave a wide margin for counterbalances, which prevent the automatic
exclusion of evidence gathered in breach of defence rights. Such
counterbalances can be found in all the Member States under
analysis. 50 But beyond this common feature, national rules
implementing Article 12 Directive 2013/48/EU provide a wide
spectrum of sanctions that vary depending on the specific aspect of
the procedural safeguard that has been violated. 51 The comparative
analysis of national law highlights three main thresholds. First, the
violation of the right as such prohibits the use of evidence, notably
where the statutes provide for absolute or automatic nullities and
exclusionary rules. 52 Second, the use of evidence obtained in breach
of a procedural safeguard is prohibited only if this would -
irretrievably – prejudice the proper and adequate exercise of the
defence. 53 This implies that an assessment in concreto that aims to
establish whether the violation that has occurred caused an actual
disadvantage for the defendant and has therefore hampered the
fairness of the proceedings. Third, trial courts are prevented from
using illegally obtained evidence where the latter constitutes the sole
48 M Caianiello (n 44) 293.
49 Ibrahim and others v United Kingdom App nos 50541/08, 50571/08, 50573/08
and 40351/09 (ECtHR, 13 September 2016) para 294.
50 For instance, the Belgian case law has established the so-called Antigone
doctrine, according to which procedural defects entail nullities in three situations:
pursuant statutory provisions, when the procedural irregularity compromises the
right to a fair trial or harms the trustworthiness of the evidence. In a similar way,
the French case law has acknowledged that procedural flows affecting the collection
of evidence might by counterbalanced by subsequent fair trial guarantees, in
particular the adversarial assessment of evidence by trial courts. M Marty, La
légalité de la preuve dans l’espace pénal européen (2016, Larcier) 283 ff.
51 This reflects the approach adopted by the ECtHR, since ‘the test for deciding
whether a remedy should be provided or not dpends on which aspect of the right is
breached’. A Soo (n 47) 45.
52 Eg Art. 81-10 Luxembourg CCP.
53 An example of balancing test can be found in Art. 32 Belgian CCP.
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and decisive evidence for conviction (and prosecution). 54 This
simplified picture only provides an overall categorization of the
multiple variety of standards adopted in the Member States. Thus, the
effectiveness of remedies against breaches of the right to access a
lawyer ultimately relies on the stringency of national rules governing
the admissibility and assessment of evidence. In this light, one may
wonder whether Union law may fully ensure the effective
implementation of defence rights granted by the ABC Directives
without providing minimum harmonized sanctions against breaches of
these rights. Despite the reluctance of the Member States and the
cautious approach adopted by European institutions, rules of evidence
are undoubtedly a key challenge for promoting fair trial rights within
the EU criminal justice area.
54 See for instance, Art. 47bis Belgian CCP.
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1. Reconciling EU and national approaches toward the effective
protection of defence rights
Does Union law effectively protect the rights of suspects and
accused persons? And more specifically, what judicial remedies
promote the effectiveness of defence rights in criminal proceedings?
In answering this question, the present study addresses a major
challenge that underlies the implementation of the ABC Directives
into the domestic legal orders: reconciling the EU and national
approaches toward the protection of defence rights in criminal
matters. Indeed, the European legislature has undertaken a step-by-
step harmonization 1 that led to the adoption of different legal
instruments defining the substance of specific rights throughout the
entire criminal proceedings. 2 By contrast, national criminal
1 Recital 11 Resolution of the Council of 30 November 2009 on a Roadmap for
strengthening procedural rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal
proceedings [2009] OJ C 295/ 1.
2 The ABC Directives apply from the time a person is made aware by the
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procedures traditionally focus on activities at different pre-trial and trial
phases and for each procedural act afford specific defence rights with the
aim to counterbalance the powers allocated to the law enforcement and
prosecuting authorities.
The same dichotomy reflects itself in the way EU and national legal
frameworks approach the judicial protection of defence rights. On the
one hand, the ABC Directives lay down a set of remedial obligations,
which afford the right to effective judicial protection of specific
guarantees without determining, however, the timing when judicial
scrutiny must be undertaken. Furthermore, the EU Directives refrain
from stating procedural sanctions against breaches of defence rights. 3
Conversely, they allow the Member States to counterbalance such
violations in so far as the legal system guarantees the overall fairness
of the proceedings. 4 On the other hand, national law generally makes
judicial remedies available to the defendant against specific activities.
It thereby enables suspects and accused persons to claim breaches of
procedural safeguards that affect the legality of the impugned act or
prohibit the use of illegally obtained evidence. Once the breach is
ascertained, the national legislation triggers the applicability of
specific sanctions that vary depending on the act and the stage of the
criminal proceeding in question.
competent authorities that he is suspected or accused of having committed a criminal
offence, until the conclusion of the proceedings including sentencing and resolution of
any appeal. See Art. 1(2) of Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 20 October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal
proceedings [2010] OJ L280/1; Art. 2(1) of Directive 2012/13/EU of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the right to information in
criminal proceedings [2012] OJ L142/1; Art. 2(1) of Directive 2013/48/EU of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 on the right of access
to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings, and
on the right to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to
communicate with third persons and with consular authorities while deprived of
liberty [2013] OJ L294/1.
3 See in particular Art. 12 Directive 2013/48/EU and Art. 10 Directives 2016/
343/EU. As regards the latter, it is worth recalling that the proposal made by the
European Parliament to include a fully-fledged exclusionary rule under the
Directives on the presumption of innocence was objected by the Council. S Cras, A
Erbežnik, ‘The Directive on the Presumption of Innocence and the Right to Be
Present at Trial’ (2016) 1 Eucrim 25, 34.
4 Art. 12 Directive 2013/48/EU and Art. 10 Directives 2016/343/EU. Further
references to the overall fairness of the proceedings can be found found in Art. 3
(7) Directive 2010/64/EU, Art. 6 and 7 Directive 2012/13/EU.
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2. Mapping the great complexity of judicial remedies
This explains both the great complexity and significant divergences
characterizing the domestic legal provisions, which implement the
remedial obligations set forth under the ABC Directives. As the
comparative analysis showed, the existing judicial remedies are first
fragmented along the different stages of the criminal proceedings.
Although national legislations tend to anticipate judicial control over
the most serious encroachments on fundamental rights during the pre-
trial stage, such scrutiny may intervene ex-ante or ex-post, ex-officio
or upon request. Moreover, different remedies apply within the same
Member State depending on the type of activity (personal liberty,
rights at trial, evidence), author of the breach or nature of the
impugned decision.
Significant divergences also arise with regard to the standards of
review that national courts apply to evidence gathered in breach of
defence rights. A telling example is the spectrum of sanctions against
violations of the right to access a lawyer during evidentiary activities
(in particular, the questioning of the defendant without the assistance
of a lawyer), which goes from excluding the sole and decisive
evidence for conviction, prohibiting the use of evidence that entails an
actual prejudice to the defendant’s rights to exclusionary rules or
fully-fledged nullities of the entire procedural phase. 5 Finally, the
strongest differences among the national criminal justice systems
touch upon the structure and functions of appeals and review on
constitutionality. Rules governing access to appellate and higher
courts, full review or limited on errors of law, power to review old or
fresh evidence are among the peculiar aspects that distinguish the
Member States’ criminal justice systems.
The implementation of the EU Directives on the right to translation
and interpretation, the right to access a lawyer and the right to
information has no or very little impact on the existing systems of
judicial remedies at the national level. The reason for this lies first in
the very wording of the remedial obligations provided by Union law.
The ABC Directives do not require the Member States to provide for
‘separate remedies or complaint procedure’ against breaches of the
rights that the suspect and accused person derives from Union law. 6
Likewise, the ABC Directives do not set forth specific requirements
5 See Part IV, Chap III.
6 Recital 25 Directive 2010/64/EU; Recital 36 Directive 2012/13/EU.
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related to the timing when the judicial scrutiny must be undertaken. And
even when the remedial obligations deal with the structure (eg the nature
of the reviewing authority) 7 and the standards of review (eg use of
evidence in breach of defence rights) 8, they leave a wide room of
discretion to the Member States. 9
This observation must nonetheless be nuanced. In some Member
States, the harmonization of defence rights indirectly led to a
clarification of the scope and grounds for judicial review. 10 Few
examples also show that national rules implementing the ABC
Directives into national law have punctually broaden the scope of
decisions that are subject to judicial review. 11 However, none of the
Member States under analysis has introduced new remedies nor have
they undertaken substantial reforms of the existing judicial actions
available to the defendant in criminal proceedings.
3. A European blueprint of the right to judicial review in criminal
proceedings
The comparative analysis thus underlines that the design of judicial
remedies adjust itself to the peculiar structure of each national criminal
justice system. As a result, it would be worthless to identify the best
system of judicial review or elaborate uniform model rules governing
judicial actions without considering the characteristic features that
distinguish criminal proceedings within the Member States. This also
holds true when considering that the right to effective judicial
protection has an ancillary nature 12 and does not constitute an
absolute right. 13 As the analysis of the European case law shows,
standards and requirements stemming from Article 47 of the Charter
and the guarantees of judicial review under the ECHR must be
7 For instance Art. 8 Directive 2013/48/EU.
8 Art. 12 Directive 2013/48/EU.
9 See Part II Chap I.
10 For instance, Article 8 (1) Directive 2013/48/EU lays down requirements
governing temporary derogations on the right to access a lawyer, among which
necessity, proportionality and procedural fairness.
11 For instance in Luxembourg.
12 H Hofmann, ‘Article 47. Specific provisions’ in S Peers, T Hervey, J Kenner,
A Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights : a commentary (Hart
Publishing, 2014) 1211, 1215.
13 See for instance Case C-300/11 ZZ v Secretary of State for the Home
Department, para 66.
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weighed against the specific circumstances of the case, including the
seriousness of the charges and the complexity of the facts. 14 They
also vary according to the stage of the criminal proceeding, the type
of activity in question and the alleged violation of the right at stake.
This results in a set of flexible parameters that allows to assess the
effectiveness of judicial protection provided under national law with
full regard to both the great complexity of criminal proceedings and the
constitutional traditions of the Member States. The said parameters
form a European blueprint of the ‘right to judicial review’ in criminal
proceedings, which emerges from the analysis of the abundant case law
of the CJEU and the ECtHR. The terminology used reflects the holistic
approach adopted throughout the study. By referring to a ‘right to
judicial review’, the proposed analysis aims indeed to overcome the
blurring of lines between the overlapping fundamental guarantees to
access a court, effective remedy, effective judicial protection and fair trial.
As regards the substance, the elaborated European blueprint
identifies common requirements inherent to the right of judicial
review and, consequently, key aspects that enhance or, on the
contrary, hamper the effective protection of defence rights. Such
parameters can be classified according to the following skeleton.
3.1. Requirements related to the structure of judicial review
3.1.1. Independence and impartiality of the reviewing authority
Among the common European standards inherent to the structure of
judicial review are first institutional requirements. Indeed, the strongest
convergences are about the very concept of court and judicial authority
entitled to carried out judicial scrutiny. Only an independent and
impartial tribunal previously established by law can guarantee
effective control against encroachments on individual rights. The right
to judicial review does not necessarily imply, however, the right to
appeal in front of a court of higher instance, 15 nor does the
14 In particular, the ECtHR undertakes a holistic assessment of the ‘overall
fairness’ of the proceedings. The recent case law seems to pay increasing attention
to the procedural peculiarities of domestic law and the specific circumstances of the
individual case. M Caianiello, ‘You Can’t Always Counterbalance What You Want’
(2017) 25 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 283.
15 By reference to Article 47 EU Charter, see Case C-69/10 Samba Diouf
EU:C:2011:524, para 69.
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possibility to challenge a decision before a hierarchical superior
authority necessarily provide the applicant with effective protection.
For instance, the review undertaken by a General Prosecutor over the
decision taken by another member of the Prosecution Office does not
amount to an independent and impartial judicial control within the
meaning of Article 47 of the Charter.
3.1.2. Time requirements
A second set of requirements is of a procedural nature. Within this
category, the conducted analysis identified time requirements, which
encompass three different guarantees. The first one lies in the right to
be tried or more generally have claims about breaches of individual
rights reviewed within reasonable time. Accordingly, the more judicial
review intervenes closer in time to the alleged violation of defence
rights, the more effective is the protection afforded. Underpinning this
conclusion is the assumption that serious breaches of defence rights
committed at an early stage of the criminal proceedings call for a
prompt judicial review where they are likely to irretrievably
jeopardize the holding of a fair trial. Examples are decisions allowing
temporary derogations on the right to access a lawyer 16 or refusing
access to essential documents, 17 which are subject to reinforced
remedial obligations under the ABC Directives. 18
Second, the time limits governing the admissibility of judicial
actions must guarantee adequate time for the preparation of defence.
Third, within the EU criminal justice area, the principle of effective
judicial protection prohibits that criteria governing the admissibility of a
judicial action available to the defendant within a Member State
discriminate between residents and non residents. In both situations,
the applicant must be provided with the same period of time to access
the competent court and prepare his defence. 19
16 Art. 3 (6) Directive 2013/48/EU.
17 Art. 7 (4) Directive 2012/13/EU.
18 Art. 8 Directive 2013/48/EU; Art. 7 (4) Directive 2012/13/EU.
19 Case C-216/14 Covaci EU:C:2015:686; Joined Cases C-124/16, C-188/16 and
C-213/16 Tranca EU:C:2017:228.
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3.1.3. Procedural fairness
In addition, defence rights serve the effectiveness of judicial
remedies given that they enable the suspect or accused person to put
forward his defence before the competent judicial authority. From this
perspective, effectiveness implies first that the person whose rights are
violated is informed about the possibility to institute a judicial action.
Such notification must include the date and place of the hearing, if
any. Likewise, the right to access a court would be ineffective if the
defendant is not informed about the charges or more generally the
decision subject to judicial review.
The latter guarantee overlaps with the right to access essential
materials enabling a person to put forward his defence. It should be
noted, however, that the very content of the right to access the case
file varies according the stage of criminal proceedings and may, under
exceptional circumstances, be subject to restrictions. 20 In such
situation, the right to judicial review entails a twofold assessment. The
competent court shall have at its disposal the necessary information to
verify whether restrictions to communicate confidential material are
justified. 21 If so, the judge must ensure that the consequent inability
of the defendant to submit his observation did not affect the probative
value of the confidential evidence. 22 Accordingly, the judicial review
thus undertaken aims to prevent that a conviction or more generally
decisions against the interest of the defendant is based on facts and
documents that were not subject to an adversarial debate.
Equally fundamental in granting the defendant an effective right of
judicial review are the right to translation and interpretation where he or
she does not understand the language of the proceedings. Both
guarantees aim to enable the suspect or accused person to become
aware of the reasons and content of acts subject to review and,
thereby, to raise relevant arguments supporting his action. 23
Not all judicial remedies available to the defendant in the course of
a criminal proceeding necessarily require the right to be heard in person
in order to be effective. 24 However, the adversarial character of judicial
20 Art. 7 (4) Directive 2012/13/EU.
21 Case C-300/11 ZZ v Secretary of State for the Home Department, para 56 – 57.
22 Joined cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P Commission v Kadi, para
127 – 128.
23 Case C-278/16 Sleutjes EU:C:2017:757, para 33.
24 Such procedural guarantee fully applies in front of a judge called upon to
review the lawfulness of detention and trial courts having competence to review
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proceedings implies at least the possibility for the applicant to state his
views and put forward arguments supporting his claims.
Finally, access to a lawyer must be guaranteed throughout the
criminal proceedings, in particular where, given the seriousness of the
charges and the complexity of the legal issues subject to review, the
lack of legal assistance is likely to undermine the proper defence of
the suspect or accused’s interests. 25
3.2. Requirements related to the functions of judicial review
3.2.1. Scope of review
The second set of minimum standards stemming from the right to
judicial review relates to the functions of the scrutiny. As regards the
scope of review, effective judicial protection first implies that the
competent judge is able to take a fully informed decision. This holds
true even where strictly compelling grounds of State security, threat
for the life, health and freedom of individuals justify the non-
disclosure of materials and information to the defendant. In such
situation, the judicial decision against the defendants’ interests cannot
be based on confidential information that the competent judge was not
able to access nor to appreciate. 26
Likewise, the scope of effective judicial review encompasses an
independent assessment of the arguments put forward by the parties
following an adversarial debate. Thus, a procedural system that prevents
the suspect or accused person or his lawyer from making his defence
known to the competent court ultimately hampers the effectiveness of
judicial review. 27 Lastly, requirements inherent to the scope of judicial
review reflect themselves in the duty incumbent on the judge to provide
the defendant with an adequately reasoned decision. 28 The
completeness of the reasoning implies that all the issues raised by the
points of both facts and law. By contrast, the right to be heard in person does not
systematically apply before appellate courts, which do not make a full assessment
of the issue of guilt or innocence as to the facts and the law. See for instance Hermi
v Italy App no 18114/02 (ECtHR, 18 October 2006) para 60.
25 Correia de Matos v Portugal App no 48188/99 (ECtHR Decision, 1 April
1999).
26 Case C-300/11 ZZ v Secretary of State for the Home Department, para 56 – 57.
27 An illustration thereof is the excessive formalism that may characterize the
admissibility of judicial action. Labergère v France App no 16846/02 (ECtHR, 26
September 2006) para 20 ff.
28 Case T-67/11 Martinair Holland v Commission EU:T:2015:984, para 31.
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appellant should be addressed by the reviewing authority. This leads the
reviewing authority to base its decision on objective and clear
arguments, while showing to the parties that they have been heard. 29
3.2.2. Powers of review
Lastly, the law must as a minimum entrust the judge with the power
to adopt a legally binding decision on the legal question in issue. Once
the violation of a right is ascertained, the consequent sanction against
that breach varies, however, depending on the specific right (from the
postponement of the hearing to the exclusion of evidence), the nature
of the impugned decision and the possibility to redress such breaches
at a subsequent stage of the proceedings (power to quash, remand or
substitute its own assessment). In any event, the effectiveness of the
remedy implies adequate redress for the alleged violation that has
occurred, which may consist in preventing that violation or its
continuation. 30
4. Enhancing the effectiveness of EU defence rights by means of
guarantees, remedies and sanctions
The European blueprint described above does not solely provide
transversal mimum standards of effective judicial protection in
criminal matters. It also highlights that judicial review is one among
the fundamental legal tools ensuring the effective exercise of defence
rights in criminal proceedings. Indeed, the mere existence of judicial
remedies is not per se sufficient to guarantee the full effectiveness of
the rights granted by the ABC Directives to suspect and accused
persons. The latter results from the interplay between three ‘shields of
protection’: the formal protection of defence rights under national law,
the effective judicial control over alleged breaches and an effective
sanction against the ascertained violation.
The very purpose of guarantees of judicial protection consists in
enabling a person to assert the rights conferred on him by Union
law. 31 Thus, the scope and strength of judicial scrutiny relies on
upstream legal provisions, which define the substance of the
29 Ruiz Torija v Spain App no 18390/91 (ECtHR, 09 December 1994) para 29.
30 Kudła v Poland App no 30210/96 (ECtHR, 26 October 2000) para 158.
31 H Hofmann (n 10).
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defendant’s rights. Hence, the formal effectiveness of those rights
depends first and foremost on the proper implementation of the ABC
Directives into national law. Indeed, the implementing measures
adopted by the Member States guarantee the minimum content of
procedural guarantees whose observance national courts ensure
throughout the criminal proceedings.
Moving to the law in action, the formal protection of defence rights
cannot be effective without adequate review mechanisms and, more
specifically, judicial scrutiny. This assumption is precisely reflected in
the remedial obligations set forth under the ABC Directives. The
justiciability of the rights of suspects and accused persons within the
Member States secures the effective enforcement of the EU defence
rights in individual cases. In this perspective, guarantees of judicial
protection are more than a fundamental right. They promote the
primacy and direct effect of procedural safeguards granted to suspects
and accused person in criminal proceedings by the EU Directives.
Thus, remedies available to the defendant under national criminal
procedure are to be seen as a second shield of protection that enables
the defendant to claim specific breaches of procedural rights he derives
from Union law and concomitantly entrusts an independent reviewing
authority with the power to ascertain the alleged violation. This holds
true where the system of judicial remedies meets the requirements
stemming from the ‘right to judicial review’ as identified above.
Lastly, legal and judicial protection would remain ineffective if the
competent reviewing authority were unable to provide adequate redress
once it has ascertain a breach of defence rights. Hence, the right to
judicial review further implies an effective remedy, here understood as
the power to order a measure or to apply a sanction against
procedural flows that undermine the right to a fair trial.
5. Further actions and challenges ahead
As a result, only a comprehensive strategy encompassing the legal,
judicial and sanctioning shields of protection can enhance the full
effectiveness of EU defence rights in criminal proceedings. Along this
path, the conducted analysis led us to identify further actions to be
undertaken both at the national and Europen levels.
5.1. National level
Firstly, there is a clear need to further monitor the implementation of
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the ABC Directives into national law. Indeed, the comparative analysis
conducted in the selected Member States shows that the domestic legal
frameworks and judicial practice are still adapting to the recently
adopted Directives and the resulting national reforms. In particular, the
implementation into national law of the second package of Directives
entered into force in 2016 is currently underway. 32 Based on the
findings of the present study, a comprehensive survey of national
implementing measures should identify deficiencies undermining the
effectiveness of EU defence rights with special focus on the following
aspects: national legislation providing defence rights that do not meet
the minimum standards of protection set forth under the ABC
Directives; national judicial remedies, which do not enable the
defendant to seek effective judicial control against breaches of defence
ritghs; ineffective procedural sanctions against ascertained violation of
defence rights that ultimately undermine the right to a fair trial.
Secondly, dissemination and training among practitioners of the
national criminal justice systems are of fundamental importance. This
shall not solely target law enforcement officials, prosecutors and
lawyers. Special attention should be paid to training program for
national judges, who play a forefront role in ensuring the proper and
actual implementation of the ABC Directives in individual cases.
Indeed, defence rights granted by EU law permeate every stage of
national criminal proceedings, irrespective of any extraterritorial
elements. Hence, the ABC Directives significantly intensify the role
of national judges as Union courts of ordinary jurisdiction in a way
no other EU legal instruments did before in criminal matters. It is
thus essential to improve the knowledge of national judges of the
fundamental principles governing the interplay between the EU and
national legal orders. In particular, the primacy of Union law requires
the national judge to interpret criminal procedures in compliance with
the Charter and the ABC Directives 33 or to set aside domestic legal
32 Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9
March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence
and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings [2016] OJ L 65/1;
Directive (EU) 2016/800 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May
2016 on procedural safeguards for children who are suspects or accused persons in
criminal proceedings [2016] OJ L 132/1; Directive (EU) 2016/1919 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2016 on legal aid for suspects and
accused persons in criminal proceedings and for requested persons in European
arrest warrant proceedings [2016] OJ L 297/1.
33 Case C-106/89, Marleasing [1991] ECR I-7321, para 8.
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provisions, where the latter violate the rights granted by the EU legal
framework to suspects and accused person. 34 From this perspective,
the preliminary reference procedure of Article 267 TFEU becomes a
key tool for ensuring the proper interpretation of the defendant’s
rights in criminal proceedings.
5.2. EU level
EU policy-makers should consider further actions to be undertaken
at the supranational level. At the outset, one should however exclude the
adoption of EU legal instruments that specifically aim at harmonizing
national judicial remedies. This would imply the competence of the
Union legislature to design the very structure of the national criminal
justice systems, which is rooted in the constitutional traditions of the
Member States. Yet, Article 82 TFEU provides that the approximation
of criminal procedures shall take into account the differences between
the legal traditions and systems of the Member States. 35 This limit on
EU harmonization is further confirmed in the third paragraph of the
provision, according to which the Member States may oppose to the
adoption of Directives that would affect fundamental aspects of their
criminal justice systems 36.
Nevertheless, the EU legislature may still advocate the need for
harmonized minimum requirements of judicial review to the extent
necessary to ensure the effet utile of those provisions of Union law
that grant defence rights to suspects and accused persons. Along this
path, the EU could envisage to strengthen the remedial obligations set
forth under the ABC Directives with regard to particularly serious
breaches of defence rights. Among these are the denial to access
certain materials of the case file 37 and temporary derogations on the
right to access a lawyer, 38 which the ABC Directives only allow
under exceptional circumstances and restrictive conditions. As
previously underlined, a prompt judicial review of such decisions
enhances the effectiveness of the rights of suspects and accused
34 Case C-106/77, Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, para 21.
35 Article 67 (1) TFEU also recalls the duty of the EU to respect for the different
legal systems and traditions of the Member States within the Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice.
36 Art. 82(3) TFEU.
37 Art. 7(4) Directive 2012/13/EU.
38 Art. 3(6) and 8 Directive 2012/48.
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person, since it enables them to benefit from the right to access the case
file and the right to legal assistance at an early stage of the criminal
proceeding. The requirement of prompt judicial scrutiny leaves the
Member States leeway for implementing the remedial obligation in
the light of the peculiar feature and structure of the national criminal
justice system, without however representing a disproportionate
interference into the national procedural autonomy. Accordingly, the
provisions in question could be amended as follow:
Denial to access to certain materials of the case file, Article 7§4
Directive 2012/13/EU
Member States shall ensure that, in accordance with procedures in
national law, a decision to refuse access to certain materials in
accordance with this paragraph is taken by a judicial authority or
is at least promptly subject to judicial review.
Temporary derogations on the right to access a lawyer, Article 8§2
Directive 2012/13/EU
Temporary derogations under Article 3(5) or (6) may be authorised
only by a duly reasoned decision taken on a case-by-case basis,
either by a judicial authority, or by another competent authority
on condition that the decision can be promptly submitted to
judicial review.
Having regards the competences provided by the Treaties, the EU
can further enhance the effectiveness of defence rights by adopting
minimum rules harmonizing sanctions against breaches of the rights
of suspects and accused persons. The resulting EU Directives would
perfectly meet the objective of Article 82 TFEU: they would
strengthen individual rights in criminal proceedings and, thereby,
enhance mutual trust and recognition of judicial decisions among the
Member States. 39 At first, this may result in a roadmap on procedural
sanctions, which should necessarily adopt a step-by-step approach. As
emphasized above, effective redress against violations of defence
rights varies depending on the procedural safeguard at stake, the stage
of the criminal proceedings and should ultimately guarantee the
fairness of the criminal trial. For instance, effective sanctions against
violations of the right to interpretation may simply consist in the
39 Art. 82(1) TFEU.
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postponement of the hearing, while breaches resulting from the lack to
access a lawyer trigger the application of rules preventing the use of
incriminating evidence during the trial. Therefore, the implementation
of a new European roadmap calls for further comparative studies
aimed to identify adequate minimum sanctions against different
breaches of differing defence rights.
Lastly, the ABC Directives substantially reinforce the role the
CJEU plays in criminal matters. Indeed, the effective judicial
protection of EU defence rights also relies on a smooth dialogue
between national and European judges. Yet, several recent cases
already illustrate that the CJEU faces a sensitive challenge: ensuring
the harmonious interplay of supranational and constitutional standards
for the protection of fundamental rights in criminal proceedings. 40
From a horizontal perspective, the EU Court increasingly underlines
the need for an autonomous interpretation of the rights enshrined in
the Charter in order to secure fundamental principles that underpin the
process of European integration. 41 Nevertheless, this approach shall
not lead the CJEU to restrict or adversely affect the minimum
substance of defence rights guaranteed by the abundant case law of
the ECtHR. 42
From a vertical perspective, questions for preliminary rulings enable
the CJEU to provide the national judge with guidance on the
interpretation of fair defence rights at an early stage of the criminal
proceedings. Can, and if so, how will the EU Court interpret the
‘overall fairness’ test echoed in the text of the ABC Directives? To
what extent may the national criminal court refrain from sanctioning a
breach of a defence right granted by the EU Directive or referring a
question for preliminary ruling on the ground that such violation does
not affect the fairness of the whole proceedings? On the other hand,
the duty of the national judge to set aside rules conflicting with Union
law shall not lead him to overcome his mandate nor to impinge on
fundamental constitutional rules inherent to democratic criminal justice
systems, such as for instance the separation of powers and the legality
principle. 43 The aforementioned challenges therefore require the CJEU
to develop a thoughtful approach for interpreting the rights of suspects
and accused persons within the European criminal justice area.
40 For instance Case C-310/18 PPU, Milev EU:C:2018:732
41 Opinion 2/13 EU:C:2014:2454, para 189.
42 Art. 53 EU Charter.
43 Case C-42/17, M.A.S. and M.B. EU:C:2017:936.
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